ilBliliiiii 


mm 


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m 


THE 


PRESENT    STATE 

OF 
IN    HF.GAUD    TO 

AGRICULTURE,    TRADE,    AND 
FINANCE; 

WITH 

A    COMPARISON    OF    THE    PROSPECTS    OF 
ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE. 


By  JOSEPH  LOWE,  Esq. 


S^cconU  ([Edition, 

WITH    VARIOUS    ADDITIONS    AND    EMENDATIONS. 


LONDON: 
PRINTED  FOR  LONGMAN,  HURST,  RKKS,  ORME,  AND  BROWN, 

PATERNOSTKR-nOW  } 

.1.  RICHARDSON,  91.  ROYAL  EXCHANGE; 
AND    MESSRS.   CONSTABLE    AND    CO.,  EDINBURGH. 

1823. 


London : 

Priiiteil  liy  A.  &  R.  Spottiswoode. 

New  -  Si  I  cci-S<jiiare. 


^5- 


TO 

WILLIAM  MANNING,  Esg.M.P. 

AND  A  DIRECTOR  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND, 
THIS    VOLUME, 

APPROPRIATED    TO 

OBJECTS    INTIMATELY    CONNECTED    WITH 

THOSE   OF    HIS   PUBLIC   LIFE, 

IS    INSCRIBED, 
WITH    SENTIMENTS    OF    THE   GREATEST    REGARD, 

BY 

THE  AUTHOR. 


A    '2 

33533? 


ADVERTISEMENT 


TO 


THE   SECOND   EDITION, 


In  preparing  this  Edition,  the  whole  volume  has 
been  revised  with  a  care  proportioned  to  the 
importance  of  the  subjects,  and  a  consider- 
able portion  of  additional  matter  has  been  in- 
serted. The  result  of  this  will  be  apparent  in 
several  of  the  tables,  as  well  as  in  the  reasoning  on 
the  following  topics  :  — 

The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies  during 
the  War. 

The  Causes  of  the  general  rise  of  Prices  in 
that  Period. 

The  Question  of  Depreciation  and  Over-issue. 

The  Effect  of  the  War  on  Property,  individual 
and  national. 

The  Connexion  between  Increase  of  Po])ulation, 
and  Increase  of  Wealth  ;  and 

The  Views  of  Finance  adapted  to  our  present 
Situation. 


A  .3 


INTRODUCTION. 


JN'  o  subject  can  present  a  higher  interest  than  an 
enquiry  into  the  state  and  prospects  of  the  pro- 
ductive industry  of  England.  Whatever  tends  to 
correct  error,  or  introduce  improvement  into  the 
operation  of  that  industry,  must  affect  the  comfort 
of  so  large  a  population,  that  no  research,  bestowed 
on  such  a  subject,  can  be  accounted  too  minute, 
no  labour  too  long. 

Fruitful  as  has  been  the  present  age  in  changes, 
military  and  political,  there  has  occurred  an  almost 
equal  degree  of  revolution  in  the  value  of  money 
and  the  productive  power  of  labour  and  capital,  de- 
partments in  general  so  tranquil  as  hardly  to  attract 
the  notice  of  the  historian.  Those  of  our  readers 
who  are  of  an  age  to  recollect  the  peace  of  1783, 
cannot  have  forgotten  tlie  general  discouragement 
caused  by  the  relinquishment  of  our  American 
Colonies,  followed  as  it  was  by  a  season  of  great 
financial  difficulty.  They  will  remember  with  more 
satisfaction  the  revival  of  our  commercial  activity 
in  the  years  preceding  the  French  Revolution, 
and  the  discussions  whetlicr  we  were  indebted  for 

A    1- 


VUl  INTRODUCTION. 

SO  beneficial  a  change  to  the  natural  course  of  cir- 
cumstances or  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Pitt.  This  was 
iollowcd  by  the  war  witli  France  —  a  period  sub- 
versive of  all  j)revious  calculation  in  finance,  since, 
after  experiencing  j)ecuniary  difficulty  during  a 
lew  years,  our  resources  aj)peared  to  expand  with 
our  wants,  and  continued  so  long  abundant,  that 
we  had  no  little  difficulty  in  anticipating  the  possi- 
bility of  a  recurrence  of  embarrassment. 

That  which  took  place  at  the  close  of  the  war 
(1815  and  1816)  was  altogether  unexpected,  and 
the  public,  accounting  pecuniary  straits  incom- 
patible with  our  brilliant  success  in  the  field,  clung 
to  the  expectation  that  their  distress  would  disap- 
pear as  soon  as  peace  should  be  firmly  established. 
This  hope  was  confirmed  by  the  revival  of  our 
commercial  activity  in  I8I7  and  1818,  but  the 
succeeding  years  dispelled  the  illusion,  and  taught 
us  that  the  evils  of  transition  were  not  yet  at  an 
end. 

During  the  last  and  present  year  circumstances 
have  become  more  favourable,  and  our  lower  orders, 
in  particular,  enjoy  a  larger  share  of  comfort  than 
they  have  known  for  a  long  period.  Still  it  might 
be  going  too  far,  were  we  to  flatter  ourselves  that 
our  embarrassments  had  reached  their  close.  The 
unfortunate  coincidence  between  the  relief  of 
the  consumer  and  the  distress  of  the  producer  of 
corn,  joined  to  the  portion  of  uncertainty  always 
attendant  on  a  conunerce  of  export,  convey  a  warn- 
ing that  a  season  of  difficulty  must  yet  elapse,  ere 
our  circumstances  become  thoroughly  adapted  to 
our  new  and  more  natural  state.     There  exists  in 


INTRODUCTION.  IX 


some  branches  a  want  of  employment ;  in  others,  a 
remarkable  dispro})ortion  in  the  rate  of  wages  and 
salaries  to  the  earnings  of  the  employer;  — the  whole 
affording  a  painful  lesson  how  little  either  the 
public  or  our  rulers  foresaw  the  consequence  of 
lavish  expenditure,  and  how  few  among  those  who 
undertook  to  enlighten  them,  either  in  parliament, 
or  through  the  medium  of  the  press,  were  ac- 
quainted with  tlie  circumstances  of  former  periods 
of  transition  from  war  to  peace. 

To  elucidate,  by  a  careful  survey  of  facts  and 
documents,  tlie  obscurities  of  the  past,  and  to  offer 
suggestions  \vlnch  may  perhaps  tend  to  facilitate 
our  transition  to  a  more  safe  and  steady  state  of 
things,  is  the  object  of  this  volume.  We  shall 
begin  by  endeavouring  to  account  for  our  financial 
prosperity  during  the  war,  and  to  explain  tlie 
causes  of  the  reverse  tliat  followed  the  peace.  No 
one  has  yet  attempted  to  show  how  far  our  increase 
of  wealth  during  the  war  was  real,  and  how  far 
nominal — a  distinction,  which,  if  subversive  of  a  part 
of  the  flattering  picture  with  which  we  gratified  our 
imagination  during  our  long  contest,  has  the  con- 
soling accom})animent,  that  the  decrease  of  our 
wealth  since  the  peace  will  be  found,  by  following 
up  a  similar  reasoning,  to  be  far  less  than  is  com- 
monly apprehended. 

This  enquiry  will  be  necessarily  connected  with 
researches  into  the  intricate  to])ics  of  iMoney  and 
Exchange.  How  far  did  the  substitution  of  ])a])er 
for  metallic  currency  prove  an  addition  to  our 
resources?    At   what  period    did    tiuit   hazardous 


I\  THOnnf.'TKJV. 


expeiiment  cease  to  afibrd  relief,  or  become  ))r()- 
diictivc  of  loss?  And  do  not  the  public  at  ])resent 
labour  under  a  general  misapprehension  in  regard 
to  the  effect  of  the  resumption  of  cash  payments, 
attributing  to  the  act  of  1819,  commonly  called 
Mr.  Peers  IJill,  tliat  fall  of  prices,  that  recovery 
of  the  value  of  money  vvhicli  ought  to  be  traced  to 
a  more  powerful  cause  ? 

Our  next  topic  shall  be  the  state  of  our  Agri- 
culture, and  the  causes  of  the  distress  that  has 
assailed  this,  the  most  flourishing  during  the  wai- 
of  all  the  branches  of  our  industry.  Here  also,  the 
attentive  observer  will  find  much  miscalculation  to 
correct  and  misapprehension  to  remove.  In  at- 
tempting this  we  shall  draw  a  comparison  of  the 
charges  attendant  on  British  and  Continental  agri- 
culture, and  venture  on  the  more  difficult  enquiry 
how  far  our  produce  is  likely  to  continue  at  its 
present  rate  ;  also  how  far  a  low  price  of  corn  is  or 
is  not  conducive  to  the  extension  of  our  productive 
industry. 

A  more  cheering  theme  will  be  opened  to  us  by 
the  increase  of  our  population,  the  adequacy  of  our 
produce  to  its  support,  and  the  refutation  of  the 
discouraging  theories  circulated  on  this  subject 
during  the  war.  An  intimate  connexion  evidently 
prevails  between  increase  of  numbers  and  increase 
of  wealth ;  particularly  in  a  town  population, 
among  whom  labour  is  subdivided,  and  the  pos- 
session of  capital  gives  assurance  of  profitable  em- 
ployment. 

These  and  similar  topics  will  occupy  the  greater 
part  of  our  volume  :  the  remainder  sliall  be  appro- 


INTRODUCTION.  \1 

priated  to  the  discussion  of  propositions  for  the 
reUef  of  our  suffering  chisses,  founded  on  tlie 
evident  tendency  of  our  resources  to  increase. 

To  objects  such  as  these  any  attachment  to  party 
poHtics  would  evidently  be   unsuited.     A  writer 
thoroughly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  his 
subject,  and  animated  by  the  hope  of  rendering 
service   to    his    countrymen,    will    consider    as    a 
secondary  object  the  notice  either  of  men  in  office 
or  their  opponents.     While  he  speaks  with  com- 
mendation of  measures,  which  bear  the  stamp  of 
good  intention  or  laborious  exertion,  he  will  ani- 
madvert without  reserve  on  such  as  are  indicative 
of  hasty  or  imperfect  views.     It  is  on  this  groinid, 
far  more  than  on  deficiency  of  zeal  for  the  general 
good,  that  our  public  men  are  vulnerable.     "  In 
retirement,"    said   an    eminent   public   character, 
*'  I  became  sensible,  that,  when  in  place,  I  had  been 
deficient  in  almost  every  thing  but  diligence."  * 
The  functions  of  our  heads  of  office  are  ofiten  ill 
distributed :  the  assistance  afforded  to  them  in  the 
higher  and  more  difficult  departments  is  apparently 
very  imperfect ;    and  their  minds,  engaged  from 
day  to  day  in  devising  expedients  to  meet  a  tem- 
porary urgency,  become  less  and  less  accustomed 
to  long-continued  reflection  on  one  subject,  and  to 
the  conclusions  for  which  such  reflection  is  indis- 
pensable.    Without  an  admission  of  this  nature, 
how  can  we  account  for  their  delaying  so  long  the 
adoption  of  a  decisive  course  in  regard  to  Ireland  ; 

•   Huskisson  on  the  Hiillioit  Question,  IS  10. 


XU  INTRODUCTION. 

or,  their  postponing  in  this  country,  till  the  eightli 
year  after  the  war,  the  financial  measures  which 
were  called  for  by  a  state  of  peace  ? 

An  equal  disposition  to  impartiality  will,  it  is 
lioped,  be  traced  when  we  carry  our  views  abroad, 
and  speak  either  of  that  nation  which  hereditary 
feeling  still  represents  as  our  rival  in  Europe,  or  of 
that  which  contests  of  recent  date  have  brought 
forward  as  our  opponent  on  the  farther  shore  of 
the  Atlantic.  A  personal  residence  of  several 
years  in  France  has  given  the  author  occasion  to 
mark  the  national  character,  to  study  the  politi- 
cal resources,  to  calculate  the  prospective  power 
of  our  once-dreaded  neighbour.  It  has  satisfied 
him  that  though  France  is  still  the  greatest  of  con- 
tinental states,  yet  that  England  may  soon  dismiss 
the  apprehensions  entertained  by  our  forefathers, 
and  rest  tranquil  in  the  assurance  of  the  more  rapid 
increase  of  her  population,  wealth,  and  power. 
May  we  not  add,  that  these  views  receive  confirm- 
ation from  the  conduct  of  our  rulers,  who,  when 
France  was  in  a  manner  at  the  disposal  of  this 
country  and  of  allies  ready  to  join  in  any  project 
of  partition,  accounted  it  impolitic  either  to  weaken 
her  frontiers  by  the  retention  of  fortresses,  or  to 
cripple  her  trade  by  the  imposition  of  restrictions  ? 
How  different  then  our  present  situation,  from  that 
of  former  years,  when  we  were  obliged  to  seek 
security  in  foreign  alliances,  and  to  postpone  the 
correction  of  domestic  abuses  from  a  dread  of  ex- 
citing discontent !  The  most  sincere  well-wisher 
to  his  country  may  now  speak  with  freedom  of 
past  transactions,  viewing  them  merely  as  historical 


INTRODUCTION.  XllI 

facts,  —  as  events  whicli,  though  not  remote  in 
date,  may  be  boldly  scrutinized  witliout  any  pre- 
judicial effect  on  our  present  situation. 

The  disposition  of  the  public  is  fortunately  in 
coincidence  with  this  state  of  things.  During  the 
war  events  followed  in  too  quick  succession  to 
admit  of  deliberate  reflection,  or  to  afford  a  basis 
for  instructive  conclusions :  —  all  was  absorbed  in 
the  bustle  of  action,  in  an  expectation  of  change. 
At  present  the  public  may  be  compared  to  those 
who,  retired  from  active  life,  pass  their  transac- 
tions in  review  with  the  advantage  of  leisure  and 
experience,  —  a  situation  far  more  favourable  than 
the  ardour  of  a  contest,  for  appreciating  both  the 
extent  of  our  sacrifices,  and  the  results  of  which 
they  have  been  productive. 

In  attempting  to  elucidate  these,  we  shall  pro- 
ceed with  a  scrupulous  reference  to  facts  and  do- 
cuments :  but  though  such  details  must  necessa- 
rily form  the  body  of  the  book,  we  shall  hope  to 
introduce,  occasionally,  considerations  of  a  higher 
kind.  Those  who,  from  their  time  of  life,  have 
been  enabled  to  follow  the  course  of  occurrences 
since  the  early  part  of  the  French  revolution,  have 
witnessed  an  age  of  vicissitude,  a  succession  of 
events  which,  whether  military  or  political,  were 
often  ill  calculated  to  favour  the  belief  that  justice 
and  moderation  form  the  true  basis  of  national 
prosperity.  But  time  alone  was  wanting  to  com- 
plete the  evidence  and  assert  the  truth  of  that  doc- 
trine. The  triumph  of  military  usurpation  was 
arrested  in  the  wilds  of  Russia,  and  received  its 
overthrow  in  the  plains  of  Flanders.     Since  then 


XIV  IN  rilODUCTION. 

our  soiitlicni  neighbours  have  been  awakened  i'roin 
tlicir  dream  of  continental  dominion.  We,  witliout 
having  trespassed  equally  in  point  of  aggression, 
had  also  our  exclusive  creed;  —  our  system  of 
vigour ;  our  jealousy  of  neutrals  ;  our  notion  that 
war  was  a  source  of  national  wealth.  How  far  these 
impressions  have  been  corrected  by  recent  events, 
by  our  experience  during  the  years  that  have 
elapsed  since  the  peace,  will  remain  to  be  explain- 
ed in  the  following  pages. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Events  of  the  War  viewed  in  Cofinexion  with  our  National 
Resmirces. 

Page 

Sketch  of  military  events  from  1793  to  1801  -               1 

Our  situation  at  the  peace  of  Amiens             -  -              10 

War  of  1 803                -             -             -             -  -              11 

Alternations  of  success          -             -             -  -             16 


CHAPTER   II. 

Maiftiitiah'  of  our  ILxpenditiirc  and  Sources  of  our  Financial 
Supplies. 

Expenditure  during  the  war ;  its  progressive  increase  22 

How  far  defrayed  by  loans,  how  far  by  taxes              -  24- 

Comparison  with  former  wars               -             -             -  25 

What  were  the  sources  of  these  great  supplies  ?         -  26 

Was  it  our  foreign  trade  ?      -             -             -             -  27 
Was  it  our  colonial  acquisitions,  or  the  suspension  of 

foreign  competition  ?           -             -             -              -  21) 
Ail  these  means  over-rated;  the  chief  source  of  our 

supplies  were  the 

Increase  of  employment  during  the  war          -             -  31 

Consequent  increase  of  our  revenue  -             -             -  \.V.\ 

Increase  of  our  population     .             -             -             -  ;5 1 

Increased  productiveness  of  our  excise  duties             -  ib. 
Estimate  of  our  taxable  income  a(   difl'crenl  periods, 

from  1792  to  1814               -              -             -              -  35 

Proportion  of  our  burdens  to  oui  resourccf?    -              -  3fi 


XVI  CONTENTS. 


Page 


Farther  causes  of  increase  of  revenue  during  the  war: 
Our  taxes,   in  a  great   measure,   a  circulation   of 
money,  a  repayment  of  government  expenditure        -         38 
Absence  of  foreign  competition  -  -  -         41 

Exemption  from  cash  payments  -  -  -         43 

The  public  not  aware  of  the  re-action  to  be  appre- 
hended at  a  peace     -  -  -  -  -        ib. 


CHAPTER  III. 

General  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

The  causes  specified      -  -  -  -  -  45 

The  demand  of  men  for  government  service       -  •  46 

Proportion  of  the  force  in  arms,  to  the  population  at 

large  .  .  »  .  .  -  ib. 

Annual  expence  of  our  army,  navy  and  ordnance,  from 

1791  to  1815  .....  49 

EflFect  of  this  expenditure  on  the  price  of  commodities  ib. 

Taxation,  its  effect  on  house-keeping     .  -  -  50 

Comparative  expence  of  house-keeping   in    1792   and 

1813  ..-..-  54, 

How  far  affected  by  the  rise  in  the  price  of  labour         -  57 

How  far  by  the  rise  of  corn       .  -  -  -  58 

Combined  result  of  all  these  causes      -         -         -         -  59 
Exemplified  by  the  rise  of  lands,  houses,  and  other 

real  property  -  -  -  -  -  ib. 
How  far  was  this  rise  nominal  ?  -  -  -  60 
The  case  of  money  property,  such  as  loans  on  mort- 
gage -  -  -  '  .  ■  .  '  -  61 
"  Change  in  the  value  of  Money;"  this  expression  defined  63 
Prices  on  the  Continent  since  1792  -  -  -  64 
Rise  of  prices  apparently  indicative  of  prosperity  -  67 
Evil  of  high  prices  when  peculiar  to  a  country ;  opinions 

of  Mr.  S.  Gray,  and  of  Mr.  Ricardo   -  -  -  69 

Effect  of  a  rise  of  prices  on  our  public  burdens       -       -  72 


CONSENTS.  XVU 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Ow  Currency  and  ExchaJiges  since  1792. 

Page 
Historical  sketch  of  our  Exchanges  since  1792;  and  of 

the  effects  of  our  corn  imports  and  subsidies               -  73 

Tabular  statement  of  these  imports  and  subsidies  -  8!J 
Our  inconvertible  bank  paper;  contradictory  opinions 

on  that  subject            -             -             -             -             -  87 

Our  money  system  previous  to  1797       -             -             -  89 

The  Bank  Restriction  Act          -             -             -             -  91 

Opinion  of  the  Bullion  Committee  on  that  Act  -  -  92 
Effects  of  that  Act  in  augmenting  the  disposable  funds 

of  bankers,  facilitating  discounts,  and  preventing  the 

rise  of  interest             -             -             -             -             -  9f? 


The  questions  of  Depreciation  and  Over-issue : 
Difference  betvi^een  an  addition  to  the  stock  of  bank 

paper,  and  an  increase  of  metallic  currency  -  -         96 

Discounts  ;  their  increase  during  the  war  -  -         9S 

•  —  tended  in  some  respects,  to  retard  the  rise  of 

prices  ---...  99 

greatly  facilitated   by   the   exemption   from 


cash  payments  -  -  -  -  -101 

Effect,  in  a  political  sense,  of  that  exemption    -             -  102 
Depreciation;  distinction  between  depreciation  of  Bank 

paper,  and  a  diminution  in  the  value  of  money  generally  \0'S 
Mode  in  which  depreciation  was  incurred  abroad  -  ibid. 
The  degree  of  such  depreciation  ...  104> 
Effect  of  a  rise  of  prices  abroad  on  prices  at  home  -  10.> 
Extent  of  such  effect  previous  to  1809  -  -  -  10(1 
The  same  after  1809  -  -  -  -  -  ibid. 
Summary  of  the  preceding  -  -  -  -  107 
Considerations  addressed  to  the  advocates  of  the  Bank  108 
■  to  the  supporters  of  the  Bul- 
lion Committee           -             -             -             -            -  110 


The  Exemption   Act   viewed    in    connection   with    the 

events  of  the  war       -  -  -  -  -       11:^ 

Would  the  exemption  from  each  payments,  if  not  re- 
sorted to  in  1797,  have  been  adopted  at  a  subse- 
quent period  ?-----      ibid. 

How  far  was  it  a  source  of  financial  aid  ?  -  -       11(> 

Mr.  Peel's  bill ;  its  effect  over-rated        -  -  -        117 

a 


Xviii  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  V. 
Our  Agiiadlrirc. 

Section  I. 

Historical  Skclch. 

Page 

Our  Corn  trade  previous  to  the  Revolution  of  1688        -  119 

Bounty  on  export  in  1689          ...             -  120 
Prices  stationary  during  the   reign  of  George  II.;  rise 

after  1764      -            -            -            -            -            -  122 

Act  of  1773 123 

The  late  Wars  -             -             -             -             -             -  124- 

The  peace  of  1814         ....            -  125 

Fluctuations    since    1792,   divided    into    periods:    from 

1793  to  1800 ;  from  1800  to  1809  ;  from  1809  to  1814  126 

From  1814  to  1819;  from  1819  to  the  present  year  -  129 
Tabular   statement   of  our   crops,  and  average   prices 

since  1790                -                -             -             -              -  131 
Causes   of  these    fluctuations:  the   effect    of  our  Corn 

laws  greatly  over-rated           -             -             -             -  132 

Causes  of  rise  after  1763            -             -             -             -  133 

during  the  war                 -             -             -  134 

Causes  of  fall  since  the  peace                 -             -             -  135 

Additional  hands  employed  in  tillage                               -  136 

Section  II. 
Situatiott  and  Prospects  of  our  Agriadturists. 

Annual  produce  and  rental  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  140 

Magnitude  of  the  depression  since  the  peace                   -  141 

Present  situation  of  our  landlords  and  farmers                 -  143 

Consequence  of  a  general  reduction  of  farming  charges  145 
Comparison  of  our  present  prices  with  those  prior  to 

1793 147 

Effect  on  the  price  of  corn  of  increasing  population       -  148 

Consumers  may  increase  without  raising  prices               -  150 

Effect  of  a  bad  season                 -             -             .             -  I'Jl 

Less  felt  in  peace  than  in  war  -  -  -  153 
Reaction  of  the  market  price  of  corn  on  the  cost  of  its 

production                  -             -             -             -             _  254 

Mode  of  such  reaction  in  war                 -             -             _  155 

■ in  peace               -            -            .  156 


CONTENTn.  XIX 

rage- 
How  far  understood  by  land-surveyors;  by  farmers;  by 

the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821               -             -  157 

Prospect  of  prices ;  —  Circumstances  conducive  to  a  rise  1 58 

Circumstances  which  render  a  low  price  probable            -  HU 

Prospect  of  relief  to  farmers;  tithe;  poor-rate                 -  163 

Section  III. 
A  protecting  Dtiti/. 

A  populous  country  not  necessarily  expensive                -  1(56 

Comparative  burdens  on  French  and  British  agriculture  168 

Comparative  rental  of  the  two  countries             -             -  173 

Are  our  manufactures  benefited  by  protecting  duties?  174? 

Danger  of  an  over-extension  of  tillage                 -             -  17G 

The  Corn  Committee  of  1813;  fallacyof  their  arguments  178 

Objections  to  a  high  import  duty           _             .             -  ibid. 

Tendency  of  our  legislation  to  ultimate  freedom  of  trade  180 

Physical  advantages  of  particular  countries                      -  181 

-~— — •  of  England              -             -             -  J  82 

A  free  import  of  corn;  arguments  for  and  against  it      -  183 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Poor-rate. 

Origin  of  our  Poor-law- system                 -             -             -  186 

Its  progressive  extension            -             -             -             -  188 

The  late  Wars                -             -             -             -             -  190 
Amount  of  poor-rate  in  the  different  years  from  1813  to 

1822               ..--.-  191 

Reduction  since  1818                  ....  192 

Workhouses                     -              -             -             -             -  193 

Management  of  the  poor  in  Scotland  and  France            -  191. 


Poor-rate  considered  as  a  tax                  -             -             -  197 

Its  amount  estimated  in  corn                   -             -             -  198 

Comparative  number  of  paupers  since  1688       -             -  199 

Wages  paid  by  poor-rate            ....  /^/^/, 

Particularly  in  Agricultural  districts                    -             -  201 
Computed  amount   of  the    rental    of  land   and  houses 

assessed  to  poor-rate               ....  202 


Comparative  comfort  of  the  labouring  classes  at  different 

periods  .....       oqS 

Is  our  poor-law  system  beneficial  to  the  lower  orders  ?  2(X> 

Repeal  of  taxes  on  the  necessaries  of  life  -  -      ibid. 

a  2 


XX  COMTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Popnlalion. 

Pag*- 

Penury  of  early  ages                   ....  212 

EIFcct  of  increasing  population                 ...  213 

(iradual  transition  from  penury  to  comfort         -             -  ibid. 

Is  the  amount  of  subsistence  limitetl  by  physical  causes?  216 

Average  increase  of  population               ...  217 

Comparison  of  the  present  with  former  periods  in  history  219 

Leading  ideas  of  Mr.  Malthus  and  Mr.  S.  Gray  -  220 
Progressive  increase  of  population  in  Europe; — effects 

of  climate  and  soil                   -             -             -             -  224 

Effect  of  easy  communication                  ...  225 

Effect  of  the  Protestant  Religion            -             -             -  226 

Population  per  square  mile;  Holland  and  England        -  227 

Austria,  Prussia,  and  Poland ;  France  -  -  229 
Chief  towns  of  France  and  England;  their  comparative 

population                    -             -             -             -             -  231 

Ireland;  Italy;  Spain                  ....  ibid. 


Connexion  between  the  increase  of  population  and  in- 
crease of  national  wealth        ....  233 

Effect  of  increasing  population  on  the  wealth  of  indivi- 
duals              ......  234 

Comparison  of  public  burdens  in  different  parts  of  Eu- 
rope               ......  237 

Rural  population ;  its  stationary  condition          -             -  238 

Wealth  of  town  population        ....  239 

Subsistence  more  easy  of  acquisition  as  society  advances  24'2 
Cultivation  becomes  extended  throughout  a  diversity  of 

soil  and  climate                        ....  2-t4 

Progress  of  Agricultural  improvements              -             -  245 
The  comforts  of  the  lower  orders  increase  as  society  ad- 
vances           ......  246 

Population  ought  to  be  left  to  its  natural  course             -  ib\d. 
Statistical  table  of  Europe  in  1823;  viz.  the  comparative 

taxation  and  population  of  different  countries              -  248 

Their  surprising  increase  since  the  16th  century             -  251 

Prospect  of  continued  increase  on  the  Continent            -  252 

In  England  a  still  greater  prospect         ...  253 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

CHAPTER  VIIT. 
On  the  National  llevemie  and  Capital. 

Page 

Property  annually  created  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  255 

Tabic  of  our  i)resent  taxable  income      ...  257 

Its  increase  since  1792  ...  -  -  259 
Connexion  between  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  and 

that  of  our  national  income  .  .  -  -  260 
How  far  is  the  former  a  basis  for  the  computation  of  the 

latter?            ....--  262 

Fluctuations  of  income  since  1792          ...  263 

An  estimate  of  them  attempted               ...  264? 

Tabular  statements  of  our  national  revenue  since  1792  -  267 
Our  public  burdens  ;  their  proportion  to  our  resources 

since  1792  .  -  -  .  -  -  269 
France;  her  national  income   compared   with    that    of 

England 270 

CHAPTER  IX. 

ItJJ'ccl  oj'  the  War  on  Ptopciiij^  Individual  and  National. 

Difference  of  opinion  among  political  economists            -  274? 

Mr.  J.  B.  Say,  ]\Ir.  S.  (iray,  Mr.  Ilicardo  -  -  ibid. 
Losses   to  our  productive  industry  in  the  beginning  of 

the  war           -....-  277 

Burdens  incurred  during  the  war           .             .             -  279 

Deduction  from  the  apparent  amount  of  these  burdens  280 

Taxation  of  other  countries        -             -             -             -  ibid. 

Our  War  taxes ;  Tithe ;  Poor-rate          .             -             .  281 

The  National  Debt        .             .             -             .             .  283 

Effect  of  a  state  of  war  on  the  habits  of  individuals        -  284- 

Losses  on  the  Transition  from  War  to  Peace     -             -  ibid. 

Magnitude  of  the  change           ...             -  285 

Similar  distress  in  foreign  countries       ...  287 

Temporary  revival  of  activity  in  1818    .             -             -  288 

Our  probable  situation  had  peace  been  preserved           -  289 

The  late  wars  examined  by  moral  considerations            -  290 


Comparative  estimate  of  our  taxable   income  in  1813 

and  1823        -             -             -             -             -  -  295 

Exphmatory  Remarks  on  this  estimate  -             .  -  296 

Reduction  of  income  since  the  peace     .             -  -  290 


XXII  4;oNTENTH. 


rage 

Comparative  pressure  of  our  burdens  in  war  and  peace        299 
Effect   oil  our   public  I)(>bt  of  tlie  rise  in  tlie  value  of 

money  ■..-..       'M)0 


Have  our  public  men,  since  179'},  understood  our  finan- 
cial situation  ?.----  302 

Mr.  Pitt  -  -  -  -  -  -  303 

The  successors  of  Mr.  Pitt         ....  305 

Tlic  Opposition  .....  308 

Strictures  on  the  education  of  our  public  men  -  -  309 

Their  conduct  of  the  late  Wars  -  -  -  311 

.    ■  ■  of  our  internal  affairs      ...  313 


CHAPTER  X. 

I'aliu:  of  Money. 

Section  I. 
Fluctuations  i7i  the  Value  of  Money. 

Tracts  published  on  this  subject             -             -             -  316 

Historical  sketch  of  such  fluctuations    ...  317 

Effects  of  a  state  of  War            -             -             -             -  318 

Can  fluctuations  be  prevented  in  future?            -             -  320 

Causes  which  affect  the  value  of  money              -             -  321 

Supply  of  specie  from  the  mines             -             _             .  Hid. 

Circulation  of  bank  paper          -             -             -             .  323 

Supply  of  agricultural  produce               ...  324? 

Probable  effects  of  a  state  of  war            ...  326 

Injurious  consequences  of  these  fluctuations      -             -  327 

Particularly  on  annuitants          -             -    .         -             -  328 

Section  11. 

Plan  for  lessening  the  Injurij  from  Fluctiuition^   and  giving 
a  uniform  J'alue  to  Money  Incomes. 

A  table  of  reference  for  time  contracts               -             -  333 

Effect  of  the  proposed  plan  on  the  labouring  classes      -  336 

Effcet  of  such  a  plan  on  agriculture       ...  338 

on  tithe     ...             -  339 

■ on  the  public  funds  and  govern- 
ment annuitants          .....  341 
Objections  ant^wercd      ....             -  343 
Concludimr  remarks       ....             -  344. 


CONTENTS.  XXIII 

CHAPTER  XL 

Our  Finances. 

Page 
The  National  Debt  -  -  -  -  -  347 
Fluctuations  in  the  price  of  stock  since  1720  -  -  34-9 
Mr.  Pitt's  administration  ....  250 
Reduction  of  the  Five  per  cents.  ...  352 
Our  other  financial  measures  since  1815  -  -  353 
The  Sinking  Fund ;  its  limited  operation  -  -  355 
Compound  interest  a  delusion  -  -  -  .  357 
Advantages  of  a  low  rate  of  interest  of  money  -  -  359 
Objections  to  a  large  Sinking  Fund  -  -  .  350 
Estimate  of  our  annual  expenditure  -  .  .  352 
Stockholders ;  distinction  between  permanent  and  tem- 
porary depositors  -----  364- 
Comparative  Taxation  of  England  and  France  -            -  368 

Section"  II. 

Our  Prospects  in  Commerce  and  Finance. 

Probability  of  continued  peace               -             -             -  371 

Causes  of  war  that  no  longer  exist          -             -              -  373 

Our  prospect  of  augmented  resources                  -             -  37'!- 

Computed  increase  of  our  national  income                        -  378 

Its  surprising  increase  in  the  course  of  last  century         -  379 

Parallel  of  the  resources  of  England  and  France            -  381 

Section  III. 
Vieias  of  Finance  suggested  by  our  Situation   and  Prusj)(rts. 

How  far  is  taxation  a  cause  of  embarrassment  ?              -  387 

Tabular  statement  of  our  taxes               -  .          -             -  389 
Examples   of    injury    from    taxation ;  in  the  distillery  ; 

insurance  ;  shipbuilding          .             -             -             -  390 

Relief  that  would  arise  from  u  reduction  of  taxes            -  392 

Objections  answered      -----  395 

M.  Nccker  ;  his  plan  of  fnumcc               -             -             -  ^^7 


t.ONTINTH. 


Pagr 


The  Qufslion  ol'a  hnuill  Annual  Loan  in  lieu  (»lTaxcfc 

State  of  the  nionied  interest   -             -             -             -  4CX) 

Transmission  of  capital  to  foreign  countries    -              -  401 

Would  the  proposed  loan  affect  the  rate  of  interest?  'K)4- 

Would  it  attcct  the  price  of  stocks  ?               -             -  4-^^ 

Limitation  to  borrowing          -             -             -             "  ^^^ 
The  bill  for  transferring  half-pay  and  pensions  into 

long  annuities         -----  ''"■^ 

Mr.  Pitt;  his  ability  in  finance            -             -             -  4-11 

The  period  from  178 !•  to  1793            -             -             -  4-1'^ 

Conclusion ;  summary  of  the  work      -             -             -  ^^^ 

Subjects  which  remain  to  be  treated  -             -             -  415 


CONTENTS  OF  THE  APPENDIX. 


CHAPTER  IL 

T^e  late  Wars. 

Our  war  expenditure  in  the  form  of  tabular  statements  [1 J 

The  war  of  1793,  distinguished  from  that  of  1803  [3] 
A  siniilar  statement  of  our  exports,  and  an  explanation 

of  the  custom-house  term,  "  official  value"                -  [4] 

Our  exports  greater  since  1814<  than  during  the  war  [5] 

Decline  in  the  price  of  manufactures  since  1818  -  [7] 
The  present  prices  of  manufactures  compared  to  those 

of  the  reign  of  King  William              -             -             -  iltid. 

Taxation ;  its  effect  on  trade                _            _            -  [8] 


CHAPTER  III. 

Hise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

Lower  orders  :  Table  of  their  family  expenditure  since 

1792;  —  the  country  labourer  -  -  -  [9] 

The  town  mechanic  -  .  -  -       ibid. 


rONTEVTS.  \xv 

■The  niidtlle  and  higher  classes:  similar  fluctuations  in 

their  fiimily  expenditure  ...       ["10] 

Proportion    borne    by  each   Jiead    of  expence,    (food, 
clothing,  and  lodging,)  to  the  total  of  family  expen- 
diture -  -  -  -  -  -       [11] 

Comparative  situation  of  the  lower  orders  in  war  and 

peace  -  -  -  -  -  -[12] 

Effect  on  housekeeping,  of  a  rise  in  the  price  of  corn  [12] 

..  —  in  the  rate  of  labour         [IS] 

. of  a  depreciation  in 

our  paper  currency  -  -  -  "       [l-"^] 

Annuitants  on  mortgage  -  -  -  -       [I'^l 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Currency  atid  Exchange. 

On  the  amount  of  Bank  of  England  notes  in  circulation  [15] 
Uncertainty  of  inferences  from  such  amount  -  [16] 
Fluctuations  in  the  circulation  of  Bank  of  England  Notes  [17] 
Circulation  of  country  banks  ...  f/;/V/. 
The  exemption  from  cash  payments:  its  effects  -.  [IS] 
The  time  of  its  operation  ....  [19] 
Discounts:  their  increase  explained  -  -  -  [19] 
The  rate  of  interest ;  its  rise  prevented  by  the  exemp- 
tion act  .....  ['20] 
This  act  considered  as  an  economizing  expedient  -  ibid. 
Remarks  on  the  Bullion  Committee  -  -  [21] 
Questions  at  issue  between  their  supporters  and  op- 
ponents .-.---  [23] 
Connection  between  the  circumstances  of  our  agricul- 
turists and  the  circulation  of  country  banks  -  [24] 
The  power  of  banks  over-rated  ...  [25] 
Inefficacy   of  an   exemption   from    cash    payments    in 

peace            ..--..  ibid. 

Mr.  Peel's  Bill  .....  [2(j] 
Publications  on  the  subject  of  exchange;  INIr.  J.  R. 

M'CuUoch    ......  ibid. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Our  Agriculture. 

Effect  of  increasing  population  on  the  price  of  corn  -  [29] 
Not  understood  by  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821  [30] 
National  disadvantage  of  a  high  price  of  corn  -       ibid. 


XXV  i  CONTENTS. 

I'age 

Subsistence  not  enhanced  by  increase  of  population      -  [32  J 

Uncertainty  of  speculative  opinions                     -             -  ibid. 
Arguments  in  favour  of  a  free   trade  in  corn,  by  Mr. 

Bannatyne,  Colonel  Torrens,  and  Mr.  M'Culloch     -  [33] 

Computation  of  Poor-rate  and  Tithe                   -             -  [3.5] 
Connection  between  increase  of  population  and  increase 

of  tithe         -             -             -             -             -             -  [36] 

The  same  in  regard  to  the  rent  of  land              -             -  [36] 

Comparative  burdens  on  British  and  foreign  agriculture  [39  J 

A  protecting  duty  ;  evidence  of  Mr.  Tooke                    -  ibid. 

Reasons  in  support  of  that  evidence                   -             -  [^O] 

Competition  of  Continental  agriculturists          -             -  [4-1] 

Probable  limitation  of  our  corn  imports  in  peace           -  ibid. 

Opinion  of  Mr.  llicardo             .             -             _             _  [43] 
A  protecting  duty;  ought  it  to  be  suspended  in  a  dear 

season?         ..----  [44] 

Observations  of  Mr.  S.  Gray  on  the  Corn  Trade           -  [45] 
The  case  of  Tenants  on  lease,  and  of  Debtors  on  mort- 
gage             -..-..  [45] 
The  question  of  interference  by  courts  of  justice          -  [46] 
Dr,  Smith  on  agricultural  improvers      .             -             -  [47] 
Value  of  land  during  last  century          ...  ibid. 
Price  of  wheat  on  the  continent  and  in  England  pre- 
vious to  1793            -             -             -             -             -  [48] 

Average  prices  of  our  corn  in  1822      -             -             -  [49] 
Exports  and  imports  of  Coi*n  since  1697            -             -  ihid. 
The  Agricultural  Report  of  1821;  abstract  of  its  con- 
tents             -..---  ibid. 
Remarks  on  that  Report           -             -             -             -  [51] 

Corn  law  of  1822;  abstract  of  its  provisions      -             -  [53] 

Additional  labour  bestowed  on  tillage  since  1814          -  \.5o\ 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Our  Poor-rate. 

Tabular  statements  of  poor-rate  for  England  and  Wales  [57] 

The  same  for  the  metropolis      -             .             -             .  [58] 

Highway,  church  and  county  rate          -             -             -  [59] 

Report  of  15th  July  1822,  on  the  poor-rate  returns       -  ibid- 

10 


CONTENTS.  XXVll 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Popidatioii. 

Page 

Employment ;  its  subdivision  as  society  advances           -  [60] 

Its  minute  division  in  a  great  city          -             -             -  [51] 

National  income  apportioned  among  different  classes  -  [62] 
Population ;  ratio  of  its  increase  in  different  stages,  as 

society  advances        ...             -             -  [63] 

The  mercantile  or  manufacturing  stage              -             -  [64'] 

Effect  of  the  enlargement  of  farms         .             -             .  [65] 

Effect  of  machinery       .              -             -             .             -  ibid. 

Great  increase  of  population  in  the  present  age             -  [66] 

Proportion  of  marriages  to  the  whole  population           -  [67] 

Deaths :  decrease  in  their  proportion                   -           -  [67] 
Counties  of  England  and   Wales ;  their  comparative 

extent           ..-.-.  [68] 

^— — — — productive  power  [69] 

■            —  their  rank  in  den- 
sity of  population                   .             .             .             _  [70] 
Census  of  1821 ;  the  increase  since  1811,  exhibited  by 

counties  .  -  -  .  .  [71] 
Increase  of  our  principal  towns  ...  [72] 
Distribution  of  our  population  into  classes,  and  com- 
parative numbers  of  each  .  -  .  -  ibid. 
Superior  increase  of  town  population  -  -  [733 
In  what  manner  do  population  returns  indicate  an  in- 
crease of  national  wealth  ?  -  -  -  -  [74-] 
Census  of  England  in  1377                   -             .             -  ibid. 

CHAPTER  Vin. 
Otir  National  Revenue. 

Is  our  consumption  equal  to  our  production,  or  how  far 

is  there  an  annual  addition  to  national  income  ?          -  [75] 

A  table  of  our  annual  consumption      -             -             -  [77] 

Proportion  of  national  income  exempt  from  taxation    -  [78] 

Case  of  Ireland             .             -             -             -             •  ibid. 

of  France             -----  [79] 

National  capital ;  estimate  of  it  in  1792,  1812,  1.S22     -  [82] 
Public  burdens  in  the  present  year  (1823)  discriminated 

into  taxes,  poor-rate,  and  tithe          -            -            -  [85] 


rovTrvTs. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Fbictuatiojis  in  Mo7icy. 

Page 

Abstract  of  Sir  G.  Shuckburgh's  table              -             -  [85] 
Comparison  by  Arthur  Young,  of  prices  in  the  17th  and 

18th  centuries          -             -             -                           -  [86] 
Progressive  prices  of  several  articles  of  manufacture  ;  of 

horses  and  cattle                   ...             -  [87] 

General  progression  of  prices  since  the  13th  century    -  [88] 

Annual  consumption  of  gold  and  silver  computed         -  [89] 

Comparative  rate  of  prices  in  France  and  England        -  [90] 
M'Culloch  (Mr.  J.  R.)  on  the  price  of  corn  throughout 

Europe [92] 

Expense  of  a  country  labourer's  family,  and  of  one  of 

the  middle  classes     -----  [93] 

Constituents  of  a  table  of  national  consumption             -  [94-] 

Farther  remarks  on  a  table  of  consumption      -             -  [95] 

The  table  adapted  to  farmers  on  lease               -             -  [97] 

'    ■ '        to  the  lessees  of  mines          -             -  ibid. 

• to  clergymen            .             .             -  [98] 

Objections  answered                   -            .             -             -  ibid. 

Letter  from  a  Hampshire  farmer           -             _             -  [99] 

Mr.  Tooke  on  "  high  and  low  prices  since  1792"          -  [100] 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Sinking  fund  ;   the  supplies  which  constitute  it              -  [101] 

The  nominal  Sinking  fund         -             .             .             -  [102] 

Comparison  of  our  present  burdens  with  those  of  1792  [103] 

The  Malt  Tax              -             -             -             -             -  [104] 

Price  of  commodities  a  century  ago                   -             -  ibid. 

Backward  state  of  France  as  described  by  Mr.  S.  Gray  [105] 


CHAPTER  I. 


Events  of  the  War  vietved  in  Connection  'doith  oiir  National 
Resources. 


In  appropriating  a  portion  of  our  volume  to  mili- 
tary events,  our  object  is  to   direct  the  reader's 
attention  to  the  effects  produced  by  them  on  our 
finances  and  national  industry: — to  enlarge  on  the 
occurrences  of  a  campaign  or  on  the  policy  of  cabi- 
nets, would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  foreign  to  our 
pur})ose.    In  some  respects,  however,  the  two  de- 
partments of  enquiry  are  connected,  the  effect  of 
our  military  operations  having  been  repeatedly  felt 
by  our  exchequer,  and  requiring  of  course  frequent 
notice  in  the  subsequent  pages.     It  seems  advise- 
able,  consequently,  that  our  reasoning  should  be 
preceded  by  a  brief  sketch  of  the  events  of  the 
war ;  an  outline  to  which  reference  may  be  made 
from  the  subsequent  chapters,  whenever  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  allude  to  the  connexion  between  the 
state  of  our  finances  and  the  aspect  of  a  campaign. 
Such  a  narrative,  however  cursory,  will  necessarily 
lead  us  over  beaten  ground ;  but  we  are  not  with- 
out ho])es  of  introducing,  particularly  in  regard  to 
France,  occasional  remarks  that  are  not  altogether 
familiar  to  the  public. 

War  o/"  1793.  —  Nothing  wonUl  have  induced 
Mr.  Pitt  to  take  part  in  tiie  coahtion  against  France, 

u 


2  Jf'nr  of179S. 

except  a  Iiopi'  llmt  the  contest  would  have  l)een 
hroui^ht  to  an  early  conclusion,  and  himself"  left 
at  liberty  to  pursue  those  measures  of  finance 
which  had  begun  to  wear  so  promising  an  aspect. 
His  apprehension  of  France  could  be  only  of  a 
j)olitical  nature  ;  a  dread  of  the  example  of  insub- 
ordination gaining  ground,  and  of  rank  and  j)r()- 
perty  becoming  endangered.  In  a  military  sense, 
France  was  far  from  formidable  ;  her  army,  in 
1792*,  did  not  exceed  the  usual  peace  establish- 
ment of  130,000  men,  and  its  strength  was  greatly 
impaired  by  the  emigration  of  its  principal  officers, 
as  well  as  by  the  general  relaxation  attendant  on  a 
continental  peace  of  thirty  years.  Her  navy  ha\- 
ing  occupied  the  attention  of  government  during 
and  after  the  American  war,  was  in  a  better  state 
than  usual ;  but  its  efficiency  was  impaired  by  the 
general  disorder  of  the  country,  and  its  aspect  was 
certainly  far  from  offensive. 

Under  these  circumstances  our  government, 
though  in  intimate  communication  with  the  powers 
that  had  taken  up  arms  against  France,  delayed  for 
some  time  joining  the  coalition.  The  recall  of  our 
ambassador  from  Paris  was  postponed  till  the  insur- 
rections of  autumn  1792,  and  the  subversion  of  the 
royal  authority ;  nor  did  our  preparations  for  war 
commence  till  towards  the  end  of  the  year.  This 
caution  on  our  part,  and  the  impetuosity  of  the 
ruling  faction  in  France,  caused  the  declaration  of 
war  to  proceed  in  the  first  instance  from  Paris,  and 
created  a  general  belief  in  this  country  that  the 
French  were  the  aggi'essors.  A  speedy  termination 
in  favour  of  the  allied  powers  was  promised  as  well 
by  general  appearances  as  by  the  early  events  of 

•  Joraini  sur  les  grandes  Operations  Militaires,  Vol.  Y. 


IVar  of  179.3.  3 

tlie  war,  the  Frencii  being  soon  repulsed  from  tlie 
Dutch  frontier,  and  some  time  alter  from  the 
Netherlands,  wliile  tlieir  intestine  divisions  rose  to 
a  height  that  tlu-catened  the  downfall  of  the  repub- 
lican system.  A  short  time,  however,  sufficed  to 
show  the  fallacy  of  judging  from  appearances,  and 
of  listening  to  representations  so  partial  as  those  of 
the  emigrants.  The  great  majority  of  the  nation, 
without  cherishing  either  personal  hostility  to  the 
Bourbons  or  schemes  of  foreign  conquest,  were 
strongly  attached  to  the  Revolution.  They  had 
long  felt  the  want  of  a  representative  assembly, 
and  regarded  themselves  as  checked  in  the  career 
of  honourable  ambition  by  the  preference  shown  to 
the  privileged  classes.  Without  any  distinct  concep- 
tion of  the  checks  requisite  to  good  government, 
they  entertained  a  sanguine  hope  that  the  revolu- 
tion was  about  to  prove  a  remedy  for  all  their 
grievances. 

In  such  a  state  of  national  feeling,  the  resistance 
to  invasion  would  probably  have  been  equal,  what- 
ever had  been  the  result  of  the  intestine  divisions 
of  France.  Had  the  Jacobui  party  been  kept  under 
by  the  Girondists,  the  strength  of  the  country 
would  still  have  been  called  forth  ;  the  property  of 
emigrants  confiscated ;  circulation  given  to  the 
assignats,  and  military  levies  enforced  on  a  large 
scale.  It  was  in  the  autumn  of  1/93,  and  in  tlie 
early  part  of  179f^,  that  these  potent  leveis  weie 
made  to  display  all  their  energy.  They  sent  forth 
armies,  which,  without  being  so  numerous  in  the 
field  as  was  generally  imagined,  were  assined  of 
an  ample  suj^ply  of  recruits ;  an  assurance  that 
justified  the  new  plan  of  rendering  a  campaign  a 
reiteration  of  attacks,  on  the  calculation,  that,  whe- 
ther successful  or  Jiot,  the  coinilry  which  shonhl  he 

B    'Z 
ft 


4.  //7//o/17f)3. 

able  to  call  the  greatest  mimbers  into  the  field, 
would  eventually  triumph.  Such,  with  a  few  qua- 
lifications, were  the  operations  of  lyo^  and  1791 : 
o})erations  in  which  the  national  im])etuosity  M'as 
called  into  full  display;  but  the  command  being 
fi'cquently  placed  in  unskilful  hands,  the  lives  of 
men  were  exposed  with  unexampled  rashness.  The 
result  of  continued  sacrifices  on  the  one  side,  and 
of  feeble  generalship,  of  deficient  concert,  on  the 
other,  was  that,  in  the  early  ])art  of  1795,  a  total 
change  took  place  in  the  as})ect  of  the  war.  By 
that  time,  France  had  acquired  both  the  Austrian 
Netherlands  and  the  Dutch  provinces,  was  on  the 
point  of  concluding  peace  with  Prussia  and  Spain, 
and  reckoned  only  Austria  and  England  as  her 
opponents. 

From  this  time  forward,  we  may  believe  with 
confidence,  that  Mr.  Pitt  deeply  regretted  that 
France  had  been  attacked,  and  the  nation  driven 
to  exertions  so  pernicious  to  its  assailants.  He 
saw  that  revolutionary  contagion  was  no  longer 
to  be  dreaded,  the  credulity  of  the  French,  their 
absurd  extremes,  their  repeated  changes,  their  sacri- 
fice of  one  party  to  the  other,  having  brought  com- 
plete discredit  on  their  politics.  His  objections  to 
peace,  very  different  from  those  in  179'2,  were  now 
of  a  military  character : — to  negotiate  with  France 
would  have  been  to  acknowledge  inabihty  to  resist 
her ;  to  leave  the  Netherlands  in  her  hands,  would 
have  been  to  concede  that  against  which  we  had 
contended  for  a  century.  He  determined,  there- 
fore, to  continue  the  war,  with  the  aid  of  Austria  ; 
and  the  exertions  of  France  might  have  been 
equalled,  perhaps  surpassed,  by  the  two  allied  go- 
vernments, had  they  possessed  the  knowledge  which 
they  afterwards  acquired  ;  —  had  England  directed 
•    '  9 


IVar  of  1703.  5 

her  chief  resources  to  continental  warfare,  and  had 
tlie  Austrians  opened  their  eyes  to  their  errors  in 
tactics.  The  numbers  of  the  French  were  now  less 
overwhehiiijig  than  in  the  time  of  the  assignats ; 
but  their  efficiency  was  greatly  increased,  tlieir  sol- 
diers had  become  well  disciplined,  and  a  number 
of  intelligent  officers  had  been  formed.  Their  sys- 
tem of  reiterated  attack  was  continued;  the  national 
ardour  was  kept  in  full  exercise ;  and  to  the  auda- 
city of  the  first  years  of  the  revolution  was  added, 
under  the  command  of  such  men  as  Bonaparte, 
Moreau,  Kleber,  Hoche,  Desaix,  the  advantage  of 
scientific  combination.  It  is  to  superiority  of  ge- 
neralship more  than  to  superiority  of  numbers,  that 
we  should  attribute  the  reverses  of  the  Austrians 
in  1796  and  1797,  followed  by  a  peace  (Campo 
Formio)  of  which  the  preliminaries  were  signed 
when  three  armies  were  in  march  to  their  capital. 

What  in  these  early  years  of  the  war  was  our 
situation  in  regard  to  financial  supplies  ?  A  state 
of  war  creates  a  sudden  demand  for  money,  by 
su})eradding  what  may  be  termed  the  mercantile 
operations  of  government  to  those  of  individuals. 
The  call  for  arms,  clothing,  and  military  stores, 
forms  a  new  demand  on  the  manufacturing  in- 
dustry of  the  country,  while  tiie  drain  of  men 
for  the  public  service,  enhances  both  wages  and 
salaries.  On  the  part  of  individuals,  there  takes 
place  a  decrease  in  certain  branches  of  industry, 
a  relinquishment  of  undertakings  which  can  be 
carried  on  only  by  cheaj)  labour,  or  a  low  interest 
of  money ;  but  the  diminution,  in  one  sense,  is  by 
no  means  {)roj)ortioned  to  the  increase  in  tiie  other. 
Hence,  a  rise  in  the  rate  of  interest,  and  a  difficulty 
in  borrowing,  even  at  an  advanced  premium.     Of 

B   3 


6  War  (>/'  171'3- 

siic'li  (liHiciiltics,  anil  ol"  tlic  expedients  ad()])tctl  to 
meet  thein,  we  liave  had  repeated  examples,  in  our 
history,  (hiring  the  hist  century  and  a  half.  It  was 
in  the  reign  of  king  VVilliani  that  England  first 
took  a  })art  in  continental  war,  on  a  scale  of  great 
and  contiinied  expcnce ;  and  that  reign  was  ac- 
cordingly the  icraof  tile  ini])osition  of  the  land-tax, 
of  the  establishment  of  the  bank  of  England,  and 
of  the  first  currency  of  its  jyaper. 

It  unfortunately  happened  that  the  demand  for 
money  in  the  early  years  of  tlie  wars  of  the  present 
age,  was  coincident  with  unfavourable  seasons, 
our  crops,  both  in  1794  and  179«5,  being  insuffi- 
cient for  our  consumption.  Hence,  a  necessity  to 
export  coin  lor  the  purchase  of  subsistence,  as  well 
as  for  military  pui'poses ;  and  hence  those  embar- 
rassments so  severely  felt  in  the  mercantile  world 
during  1793,  4,  5,  6,  and  from  which  we  were  not 
effectually  relieved  until  1797*  when  there  occurred 
both  a  diminution  of  oiu'  continental  expenditure, 
and  a  general  acceptance,  at  home,  of  bank  paper 
for  coin. 

At  this  time,  England  stood  alone  in  the  conflict, 
and  the  state  of  our  finances  was  far  from  satisfactory ; 
but  our  navy  had  in  the  course  of  the  year  (1797) 
achieved  a  double  triumph,  and  the  war  becoming 
strictly  maritime,  our  attitude,  like  that  of  France 
in  1794,  showed  all  the  advantage  possessed  by  a 
nation,  when  combining  its  resources  on  its  proper 
element.  The  confidence  thus  inspired,  and  the 
spirit  roused  by  tlie  extravagant  ambition  of  the 
French  government,  enabled  i\Ir.  Pitt  to  meet  our 
pecuniary  difficulties,  by  a  recourse  to  the  plan 
which  we  shall  developc  presently, — that  of  raising 
supplies  within  the  year  ;  a  })lan  to  which,  still 
more   than  to  the  substitution  of  paper  for  coin, 

11 


IVar  o/'iyOo.  7 

was  owing  tlie  surprizing  increase  that  took  place 
in  our  financial  receipts. 

Tiie  year  171)^  will  long  be  remembered  bv 
those  who  distinguish  particular  e})oclis  in  a  great 
contest,  as  one  of  favourable  commerce,  of  improved 
exchanges,  of  an  abundant  harvest,  anil  of  relief 
liom  tlie  dread  of  invasion.  The  Frencli,  discou- 
raged by  our  naval  array,  and  by  the  failure  of 
I  heir  expedition  against  Ireland,  made  a  tacit  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  ho])elessness  of  an  attack 
on  England,  by  directing  their  disposable  force  to 
Egypt.  The  absence  of  this  army,  and  our  vic- 
tory at  Aboukir,  revived  the  hopes  of  the  Aus- 
trians,  who  regarded  the  existing  peace  as  a  truce, 
and  who  have,  throughout  the  present  age,  shown 
themselves  so  prompt  to  second  our  efforts,  and  to 
take  up  arms  against  France. 

The  year  1799. — We  come  now  to  what  is  termed 
the  third  coalition,  or  the  third  time  that  the  allied 
])owers  commenced  operations  by  land  in  the  hope 
of  either  changing  the  French  government,  or  re- 
covering a  portion  of  lost  territory.  In  adverting 
to  these  remarkable  aeras  in  the  contest,  it  is  fit  to 
recollect  that  the  aggressions  were  not  on  the  part 
of  France,  and  that,  with  the  exception  of  179'<?, 
England  was  the  author  and  main-spring  of  every 
successive  coalition.  Had  this  been  openly  avowed, 
it  is  probable,  that  in  those  days  of  alarm  the 
majority  of  the  public  would  have  approved  of  an 
offensive  system  of  war;  but  it  is  the  well-known 
rule  of  cabinets,  and,  of"  course,  of  their  sup- 
porters, whether  in  parliament  or  connected  with 
the  press,  to  avoid  such  admissions,  and  to  throw, 
as  ijiuch  as  possible,  the  odium  of  attack  on  the 
enemy.     At  present,  such  reserve  is  needless  j  the 


8  mir(fl793. 

question  is  to  be  viewed  historically,  uiul  tlie  point 
is  merely,  whether  there  existed,  on  the  ground  of 
justice  iuid  policy,  sufKciciit  reasons  for  calling 
the  continent  to  arms,  and  for  encountering  the 
hazards  of  a  conflict  by  land  ?  As  usual  in  such 
discussions,  we  shall  find  much  to  advance  on 
either  side.  The  dread  of  revolutionary  infection 
had  by  this  time  disaj)peared ;  the  French  them- 
selves had  suffered  cruelly  from  their  experiments  in 
government,  having  felt  all  the  instability,  all  the 
division  and  i)arty  violence  attached  to  the  repub- 
lican form.  But  while  the  majority  of  our  coun- 
trymen had  dismissed  the  apprehension  of  political 
contagion,  they  had,  in  a  military  view,  urgent 
motives  for  hazarding  an  appeal  to  arms  ;  they 
entertained  the  hope,  that,  with  the  co-operation 
of  Austria  and  Russia,  we  should  succeed  in  ex- 
pelling the  French  from  Italy,  and  in  recovering 
the  Netherlands. 

These  hopes,  whether  on  the  whole  justified  or 
not,  received  confirmation  from  the  events  of  the 
first  part  of  the  campaign  of  1799  *•  the  Austrians 
took  the  field  with  augmented  numbers  and  an  im- 
proved system  ;  the  repulse  of  the  French  in  every 
direction,  in  Germany,  as  in  Italy,  proved  the 
danger  of  neglecting  their  military  establishment, 
and  of  the  practice  which  had  begun  to  show  itself 
for  the  first  time  since  the  revolution,  of  appointing 
generals  by  favour.  But  in  the  autumn  of  the 
year  new  levies  took  the  field,  and  abler  chiefs 
commanded  ;  the  war  changed  its  aspect ;  a  few 
months  produced  the  defection  of  the  fickle  ca- 
binet of  Russia  from  the  coalition,  and  consolidated 
the  executive  power  of  France  in  the  hands  of 
Bonaparte.  The  campaign  of  1800,  though  open- 
ed by  the  Austrians  with  confidence,  soon  showed 


War  of  179s.  9 

their  inability  to  contend  with  their  antiigonists ; 
and  on  the  conchision  of  tlie  second  continental 
peace,  (Linieville,)  England  was  once  more  left 
alone  in  the  conflict. 

Few  periods  of  the  war  presented  a  more  gloomy 
combination  of  circumstances  than  the  early  part 
of  1801.  —  Austria  humbled,  Russia  hostile,  Den- 
mark and  Sweden  following  her  example,  and  re- 
viving the  menace  of  the  armed  neutrality  :  while 
at  home  a  double  failure  of  harvest  had  produced 
a  scarcity  and  rise  of  prices,  which,  in  some  parts 
of  the  country,  resembled  the  privations  of  our 
ancestors  in  the  latter  years  of  Elizabeth,  or  the 
sufferings  of  France  after  the  dreadful  winter  of 
1709.  On  the  other  hand,  the  value  of  our  paper 
currency  was  but  slightly  affected,  our  navy  pos- 
sessed the  undisputed  command  of  the  sea,  while 
our  army  had  improved  equally  in  strength  and 
numbers  :  hence,  the  success  of  our  attack  on  Co- 
penhagen, and  our  brilliant  exploits  in  Egypt.  Still 
the  ex})ediency  of  peace  was  apparent ;  our  finan- 
cial resources  had  been  stretched  to  the  utmost; 
there  remaineil  no  deflnite  object  of  warfare,  and 
no  co-o])eration  could  be  expected  from  the  con- 
tinent. Tliese  considerations  were  felt  by  our 
leading  ministers  ;  and,  in  concurrence  with  an 
apprehended  division  in  the  cabinet,  or  a  sense 
tliat  the  same  ministry  could  not  suitably  negociate 
with  a  government  so  long  the  object  of  its  invec- 
tive, led  to  that  retirement  of  Mr.  Pitt  from  office, 
which  many  persons  still  good-naturedly  ascribe  to 
his  difference  with  the  king  on  the  C'atiiolic 
question. 

Thus  ended  the  first  great  contest  of  our  age,  a 
contest,  of  which  the  most  remarkable  feature  was, 
its  placing  the   two  leading   powers    successively 


10  (hir  S'ltualion  at  lite  Peace  (>f  Amiais. 

ill  oj)j)osition  to  a  confederacy,  and  bafiling,  in  the 
case  of  each,  tlie  confident  calculation  of  politicians. 
France,  in  171i3,  could  not,  in  the  0})inion  (jf  these 
persons,  avoid  sinking  imder  the  coalition  ;  Eng- 
land, wlien  left  alone,  in  1797>  had,  in  their  view, 
no  alternative  but  a  speedy  ])eace.  They  were 
more  correct  in  asserting  that  no  war  had  aflbrded 
an  example  of  such  sacrifices  ;  of  men  on  the  part 
of  France,  of  money  on  the  part  of  England.  The 
losses  of  each  seemed  of  a  nature  to  produce  ex- 
liaustion,  yet  each  continued  capable  of  prolonging 
or  renewing  the  conflict.  Each  had  obtained  bril- 
liant success,  and  added  largely  to  its  territorial 
possessions ;  but  the  acquisitions  of  France,  at 
least  in  the  Netherlands,  were  more  compact, 
and  more  calculated  to  add  strength  to  the  state, 
than  our  dazzling  but  insecure  conquests  in  the 
East  and  West  Indies. 

Our  Situation  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  —  What, 
it  may  be  asked,  were  the  chief  difl'erences,  in  our 
condition  at  the  peace  of  1802  and  that  of  1814? 
The  financial  and  commercial  evils  that  have  since 
pressed  so  heavily  on  us,  existed  in  1802,  but  in  a 
very  mitigated  form.  The  interest  of  our  public 
debt,  (18,000,000/.)  was  great,  but  not  enormous; 
our  total  expenditure,  had  peace  been  confirmed, 
woidd  not  have  much  exceeded  30,000,000/.  a  year. 
The  value  of  our  currency,  though  shaken  at  a 
particular  period,  (1800  and  1801,)  had  been  rein- 
stated without  much  injury  to  the  public ;  and 
our  customers  on  the  opposite  shore  of  the  Atlan- 
tic, though  affected  by  the  transition  of  Europe 
from  war  to  peace,  were  by  no  means  so  disabled 
from  paying  for  our  exports  as  at  the  peace  of  1814. 
Still  our  agriculturists  felt  the  budden  change  from 


War  of  1803,  11 

high  to  low  prices ;  our  merchants  were  embar- 
rassed by  the  surrender  of  the  conquered  colonies, 
and  had  the  reduction  of  our  military  establishment 
been  permanent,  we  should  have  exj)erienced,  in 
1802,  no  small  share  of  the  embarrassment  of  late 
years :  it  would  have  been  similar  at  least  to  that 
so  laith fully  described  by  Sir  W.  Temple,  as  affect- 
ing the  productive  industry  of  Holland,  after  the 
peace  of  1648. 

These  complaints,  however,  had  hardly  assumed 
consistency,  when  the  })ublic  were  roused  to  new 
alarms  :  in  France,  a  ruler  whom  no  power  could 
satisfy;  in  England,  a  ministry  who  followed,  in- 
stead of  leading  the  public  voice,  were  respectively 
the  authors  of  an  abruj)t  renewal  of  war.  Seldom 
has  an  appeal  to  arms  been  made  with  less  of  a 
direct  motive  or  definite  object :  Malta  was  too 
insignificant  to  form  a  ground  of  war;  the  real 
cause  was  of  a  general  nature,  and  to  be  sought 
in  the  encroachments  of  Bonaparte  during  the 
interval  of  peace,  in  the  resentment  roused  by  his 
aggression  on  Switzerland,  and  the  obstacles  op- 
posed to  our  trade  with  France.  Our  ministers 
could  not  consider  the  moment  favourable  for  at- 
tempting to  recover  the  independence  of  the  con- 
tinent ;  they  acted  in  concert  with  none  of  the 
great  powers,  and  the  experience  of  the  past  was 
altogether  adverse  to  hopes  founded  on  a  coalition. 
They  knew,  however,  that  our  financial  resources 
were  large,  that  the  chances  of  a  naval  contest 
were  in  our  favour,  and  that  we  should  in  any 
event  prevent  the  increase  of  the  enemy's  marine. 

War  ()/' ISO'S.  —  During  two  years  the  contest 
was  strictly  maritime,  and  the  demand  on  our  cir- 
culating mediinn,  for  subsidies  or  the  purchase  of 


12  Jn/r  of  180.1. 

com  l)('in«j^  slight,  our  ])a|)er  currency  maintaiiictl 
its  credit.  The  ])ubnc  attention  was  closely  fixed 
on  the  project  or  ])retended  j)roject  of  invasion. 
But  in  IHO.*},  the  growing  discontent  of  the  Russian 
cabinet  with  I3ona])arte,  and  the  well-known  hos- 
tility of  Austria,  induced  our  government  to  form  a 
new  coalition.  Our  allies  began  the  war  with  san- 
guine hopes,  but  found  it  vain  to  attack  a  great 
military  state,  conducted  by  a  single  liead.  The 
result  would  have  been  alarming  even  to  this  coun- 
try, had  it  not,  by  a  remarkable  counterpoise  of 
fortune,  been  coincident  with  a  naval  victory,  which 
fairly  put  at  rest  the  question  of  invasion. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  of  alternate 
disappointment  and  success,  that  Mr.  Fox  began 
at  Paris  the  negociation  of  1806,  a  measure  by  no 
means  sanctioned  by  tlie  majority  of  our  country- 
men. The  offers  of  Bonaparte,  towards  the  close 
of  the  conferences,  would  perhaps  have  been  satis- 
factory on  tlie  score  of  territorial  cession,  had  they 
not,  when  viewed  in  concurrence  with  his  other 
})rojects,  appeared  to  our  ministers  little  else  than 
a  link  in  the  chain  of  aggression ;  an  expedient  to 
procure  not  a  peace,  but  a  truce. 

War  was  accordingly  renewed,  and  by  land,  vic- 
tory continued  faithfid  to  France :  the  events  of 
the  campaigns  of  1806  and  1807,  were  subversive 
of  the  remaining  independence  of  Germany,  and 
by  giving  France  the  co-operation  of  Russia, 
seemed  to  leave  her  without  a  riv  al  on  the  conti- 
nent. Under  these  circumstances,  our  only  safety 
lay  in  our  naval  superiority,  and  the  war  Mas  pro- 
ceeding without  any  definite  prospect  or  favour- 
able opening,  when  Bonaparte  committed  his  first 
great  ])o]itical  error.  Hitherto,  in  liis  successes, 
he  had  shown  more  moderation,  at  least  apparent 


War  of  1803.  13 

moderation,  than  miglit  have  been  expected  from 
one  so  little  advanced  in  years,  and  so  confident  in 
his  general  calculations.  He  now,  however,  forgot 
the  dictates  of  caution,  turned  his  aggression  to  an 
unoffending  quarter,  and  by  his  manner  of  inveigling 
the  royal  family  of  S})ain,  excited  not  only  the  in- 
dignation of  foreigners,  but  general  suiprise  and 
dissatisfaction  among  the  French,  who  were  heartily 
sick  of  war,  and  coveted  no  })ossessions  beyond 
the  Pyrenees  or  the  Al])s.  It  is  a  truth,  by  no 
means  sufficiently  understood  in  this  country,  that 
the  French  people  at  no  time  participated  in  the 
restless  ambition  of  their  ruler  :  their  views  in 
regard  to  territory  were  limited  to  the  Belgic 
provinces,  and  those  they  desired  not  on  politi- 
cal grounds,  not  from  a  wish  to  overawe  Hol- 
land or  threaten  Germany,  but  from  considerations 
chiefly  commercial,  from  similarity  of  language 
and  habits,  vicinity  of  position,  and  the  non-exist- 
ence of  physical  barriers.  So  far  from  being 
animated  by  that  eagerness  for  war  which  so  many 
on  our  side  of  the  Channel  ascribe  to  them,  the 
French  regarded  themselves  as  the  greatest  suf- 
ferers by  the  sanguinary  contest,  and  were  taught 
to  ascribe  its  prolongation  to  the  ambitious  views  of 
our  cabinet. 

The  war  in  Spain,  varied  as  was  its  success 
during  several  years,  proved  the  first  great  scene 
on  which  the  hitherto  victorious  armies  of  France 
were  effectually  resisted.  That  power  of  combin- 
ation, that  skill  in  generalship,  which,  in  the  pre- 
sent age,  has  been  so  little  cons})icuous  in  the  mili- 
tary opponents  of  France,  wiiich,  in  the  long 
struggle  of  the  Austrians,  was  remarked  in  only 
two  campaigns,  (179'^  and  17i^{^)  ^^'^^^  'i^'''c>  called 
into  action,   and  directed  against  the  enemy  both 


14  intr  (flHOS. 

the  discipline  of  tlic  British,  and  the  national  anti- 
pathy of  the  Spaniards.  This  war  was  remarkahk' 
as  the  first  in  which  Bonaparte  did  not,  on  the 
appearance  of  serious  resistance,  forsake  his  capital, 
and  bring  tlie  contest  to  a  decisive  issue.  In  1810, 
the  humiliation  of  Austria  and  Prussia  lefl  him  at 
liberty  to  recross  the  Pyrenees,  but  to  the  surprise 
of  France,  as  of  the  continent  in  general,  he  allowed 
his  army  to  remain  long  in  an  indecisive  })Osition 
before  our  lines  at  Torres  Vedras,  and  eventually 
to  retreat. 

This  signal  repulse  was  followed  by  symptoms  of 
resistance  in  a  new  quarter.  Russia,  alarmed  for 
her  independence,  and  taught,  by  the  success  of 
our  Portuguese  campaign,  the  means  of  bafHing  by 
defensive  operations,  an  enemy  hitherto  accounted 
irresistible,  no  longer  concealed  her  hostility  to 
France.  Bonaparte  passed  a  year  in  forming  his 
gigantic  plan  of  invasion :  it  failed,  as  is  well 
kno\vn,  less  from  direct  opposition  than  from  phy- 
sical causes ;  and  that  over-confidence  on  his  part, 
w^hich  w^e  trace  on  so  many  occasions,  and  at  such 
different  periods  of  his  career — at  Arcole,  at  Acre, 
at  Aspern,  and  finally,  at  Waterloo. 

The  loss  of  the  Russian  campaign  and  of  tlie 
flower  of  the  army,  however  disastrous  in  a  mili- 
tary sense,  did  not  give  so  great  a  shock  as  the 
public  in  England  anticipated  to  the  power  of 
Bonaparte  in  the  interior  of  France.  The  nation 
was  in  affliction  at  the  extent  of  the  bloodshed  ;  but 
this  feeling  was  overborne,  at  least  in  the  middle 
classes,  by  the  dread  of  a  counter-revolution,  and 
the  return  of  the  old  abuses  —  the  prixileges  of  the 
nohlesscy  the  ascendancy  of  the  clergy.  During 
1813,  the  general  wash  was,  not  for  a  change  of 
dynasty,   but  for  a  change  of  system    under  the 


jrar  of  \80S.  15 

existing  ruler.  No  insurrection  took  place,  no 
resistance  was  made,  or  even  attenij)ted,  to  the 
enormous  levies  of  men  and  money,  during  that 
year  ;  nor  was  it  till  renewed  disasters,  and  the  loss 
of  all  Germany,  that  the  public  began  to  contem- 
plate the  possibility  of  tlie  return  of  the  Bourbons. 
Even  in  1814,  the  operations  continued  without 
any  rising  in  favour  of  that  family,  or  any  defection 
of  the  military  from  their  leader,  till  after  the  sur- 
render of  Paris,  the  possession  of  which  has,  through- 
out the  whole  of  the  French  revolution,  enabled 
one  party  to  give  law  to  another. 

This  unconsciousness  of  tlie  real  character  of 
Bonaparte,  this  credulity  in  hoping  a  pacific  sys- 
tem from  one  so  long  accustomed  to  war  and 
usurpation,  must  appear  not  a  little  singular  to  the 
untravelled  part  of  our  countrymen.  But  those 
among  them  who  visited  France  in  1814,  had  ample 
opportunity  of  observing  that  the  name  of  the  late 
ruler  was  seldom  mentioned  with  reprobation,  and 
that  when,  from  the  decided  royalists,  tliey  haj)- 
pened  to  hear  language  to  that  effect,  it  was  unac- 
companied by  any  knowledge  of  the  secret  springs 
of  his  pohcy,  or,  indeed,  by  any  attempt  to  deve- 
lope  his  character. 

This  was,  in  fact,  a  task  too  complicated  for  the 
reasoning  habits  of  our  southern  neighbours :  they 
knew  and  lamented  his  propensity  to  war  ;  but  his 
diplomatic  art,  his  Machiavelian  pohcy,  surpasseil 
their  analysing  powers,  unaided  as  they  were  by 
the  light  of  a  free  press.  Nor  was  it  until  his 
sudden  return  from  Elba,  when  the  peace  so  long 
desired  and  so  recently  obtained,  was  wrested  from 
them,  that  the  French  (we  speak  here  not  of  the 
military  nor  of  the  party  leaders,  but  of  the  bulk  of 
the  nation,)  gave  a  loose  to  resentment,   and  con- 


16  If'ir  uf  ISO'}. 

ncclcd  with  Ins  iiamr  lli:i1  clKir^c  of  liiitlilcssncss, 
that  suspicion  of"  criminality  vvliicli  wc,  during  so 
iiianv  years,  had  accounted  inseparable  fioni  it. 

Tlie  reverses  of  the  French  arms  occurred  most 
oj)portunely  for  our  finances,  as  shall  he  shown 
when  we  treat  of  the  de])icciation  of  our  currency; 
but  before  proceeding  to  that,  the  proper  object  of 
our  researcli,  we  shall  bestow  a  few  sentences  on 
the  eventful  character  of  the  military  history  of  the 
])eriod. 

Alternations  of  success. — No  contest  was  ever 
marked  by  greater  variety  of  fortune,  or  more 
chequered  by  vicissitudes,  the  effect  of  which  was, 
at  one  time,  to  check  sanguine  expectation,  at  an- 
other, to  prevent  despair.  The  Netherlands  reco- 
vered in  1793,  were  again  lost  in  lyUl-;  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  Austrians  in  1795  were  more  than 
balanced  by  their  disasters  in  the  two  following 
years.  In  1799  the  revived  strength  of  that  power 
and  the  co-operation  of  Russia,  led  to  a  brilliant 
campaign,  producing  the  recovery  of  Italy,  and  in- 
flicting severe  losses  on  the  French ;  but  fortune 
once  more  forsook  the  allies,  and  obHged  them  to 
conclude  at  Luneville  a  treaty  on  conditions  which 
left  France  the  leading  power  on  the  continent. 

In  our  second  appeal  to  arms,  our  hopes  were 
raised  in  180.5  by  the  co-operation  of  the  great  con- 
tinental })owers ;  these  hopes  were  blasted  at  Ulm 
and  Austerlitz,  but  despondency  was  prevented  by 
our  victory  at  Trafalgar.  Next  year,  the  fatal  day 
of  Jena,  and  the  conquest,  rapid  beyond  example, 
of  the  Prussian  dominions,  would  have  excited 
great  alarm,  had  not  our  courage  been  sustained  by 
a  successful  resistance  at  Eylau,  and  by  a  confident 
estimate  of  the  power  of  Russia.  These  favourable 
expectations  were  shaken  by  tlie  events  of  the  cam- 


JFar  of  1803,  17 

}3aign,  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  and  more  than  all,  by 
the  increasing  connection  and  community  of  pur- 
pose between  the  French  and  Russian  cabinets. 
The  close  of  I8O7  was  consequently  a  period  of 
gloom,  for  the  capture  of  the  Danish  navy,  and  the 
issuing  of  our  Orders  in  council,  could  afford  satis- 
faction to  those  only  who  were  incapable  of  appre- 
ciating the  odium  inspired  by  the  one,  and  the  dis- 
astrous effects  likely  to  residt  from  the  other. 

A  more  substantial  ground  of  liope  was  afforded 
in  the  ensuing  year  by  the  attack  on  Spain,  the 
general  resistance  which  it  provoked,  the  still  more 
general  hatred  which  it  roused.  The  repulse  of 
the  French  from  the  southern  and  central  parts 
of  Spain,  and  the  success  of  our  troops  at  Vimeira, 
the  lirst  general  action  on  land  that  we  had  fought 
during  the  war,  confirmed  these  flattering  impres- 
sions ;  but  they  were  unfortunately  clouded  by  the 
repeated  defeats  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  winter, 
and  the  retreat  of  our  army  to  Corunna.  Next 
year  opened  with  the  arming  of  Austria,  and  with 
some  successful  operations  in  the  Peninsula,  but 
the  battles  of  Eckmuhl  and  Wao-ram,  the  failure  of 
our  Antwerp  expedition,  the  second  retreat  of  our 
army  from  Spain,  cast  a  gloom  over  the  aspect  of 
affairs,  which  continued  during  the  whole  of  1810. 

At  that  time  the  contest  presented  no  expecta- 
tion of  a  favourable  issue ;  the  Spaniards  were 
inefficient  and  divided;  the  northern  courts,  if 
not  unfriendly,  were  unable  to  hazard  co-operation 
with  us  ;  and  our  bank  ])aper,  after  having  diu'ing 
tiie  preceding  seven  years  maintained  its  \alue 
with  almost  all  the  stability  of  a  regular  currency, 
now  gave  way  before  the  triple  pressure  of  corn 
imports,  foreign  subsidies,  and  a  suspension  of  our 
accustomed  receipts  from  the  Continent  of  Europe 

c 


18  ff^^if  of  180S. 

on  account  of  Ami'iicaii  merchants.  Our  exports  to 
the  United  States  had  been,  for  the  most  part,  paid 
by  remittances  in  money  from  the  Continent  of 
Kin'ope,  and  woukl,  had  we  allowed  their  na\  iga- 
tion  to  continue,  have  formed  a  finid  capable,  in  a 
great  measure,  of  balancing  our  demands,  whether 
for  military  expenditure  in  the  south  of  Europe,  or 
for  the  purchases  of  corn  in  the  north.  But  this 
truth  was  unfortunately  unknown  to  the  public, 
and  imperfectly  felt  by  ministers.  We  persevered 
in  stopping  the  American  trade,  and  thus  deprived 
ourselves  of  a  powerful  counterpoise  to  the  irre- 
gularity of  our  circulating  medium.  Our  situation 
thus  became  replete  with  anxiety  :  from  invasion  we 
were  secured  by  our  fleet,  but  we  dreaded  to 
make  peace,  lest  an  interval,  turned  assiduously 
to  account  by  our  artful  enemy,  might  shake  even 
this  last  stay  of  our  independence.  On  other 
grounds  also,  peace  seemed  unadvisable,  for  by 
this  time  Bonaparte  had  incorporated  a  farther 
part  of  Germany  with  France,  and  shown  himself 
equally  blind  to  the  lesson  given  by  the  resistance 
of  Spahi,  and  to  the  hazard  of  alarming  Russia. 

It  was  under  these  disquieting  circumstances 
that  we  passed  the  latter  months  of  1810  and  the 
beginning  of  1811.  The  necessity  of  abandoning 
the  Peninsula  Avas  declared  by  many,  and  silently 
anticipated  by  more,  when  the  scene  was  unex- 
pectedly changed  by  the  retreat  of  the  French 
army  from  Portugal,  and  by  conflicts,  which,  ii* 
not  altogether  decisive  in  our  favour,  w^ere  indi- 
cative of  great  improvement  in  our  army.  An 
intimation  of  a  growing  hostility  on  the  part  of 
Uussia  to  France,  now  raised  hopes  of  a  higher 
kind  —  hopes  which,  after  an  interval,  were  con- 
flrmed  by  the  memorable  campaign  of  1812.     StUl 


JFar  0/1803.      .  19 

the  period  of  vicissitude  was  not  passed ;  the  ex- 
pectation excited  by  the  advance  of  the  Russians, 
and  the  zeal  of  their  Prussian  allies,  were  dis- 
appointed at  Lutzen,  Bautzen,  and  Hambui-gh ; 
while  our  bank  paper  had  fallen  above  20  per 
cent.,  a  fall  involving  the  certainty  of  a  loss  to  that 
amount  on  all  the  contributions  we  might  make 
to  the  cause  of  the  continent,  whether  in  Spain  or 
Germany.  It  was,  however,  no  time  to  pause ; 
circumstances  had  produced  an  opportunity,  such 
as  had  not  occurred  during  the  whole  war,  of  re- 
storing the  equilibrium  of  the  Continent :  Austria 
had  joined  the  alliance,  and  the  inefficiency  of  the 
French  levies  was  shown  in  their  actions  with  the 
Prussians  in  Silesia.  Germany  was  now  delivered, 
and  the  French  territory  invaded,  yet  even  then 
there  occurred  an  interval  of  suspended  hope :  the 
imprudence  of  Blucher,  and  the  prompt  decision 
of  Bonaparte,  led  to  a  check  and  partial  retreat, 
which,  to  the  public,  assumed  a  serious  aspect, 
when  viewed  in  connection  with  a  negotiation 
at  Chatillon  ;  but  the  apprehension  inspii'ed  by 
that  real  or  ostensible  negotiation,  was  soon  dis- 
jielled  by  the  evident  superiority  of  the  allies, 
and  by  the  result  of  a  movement,  remarkable  as 
indicative  of  the  over-confident  calculation  of  Bo- 
naparte even  under  disaster ;  we  mean  his  march 
to  gain  the  rear,  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  his  ene- 
mies— a  manoeuvre  that  might  have  been  followed 
by  success  if  at  the  head  of  such  armies,  as  he  com- 
manded at  Ulm  and  Jena,  but  which,  with  the 
feeble  means  at  his  disposal  in  1814,  served  only 
to  embolden  his  opponents  and  accelerate  the  loss 
of  his  capital. 


c  2 


'20 


CHAP.   II. 

Magnitude  of  mir  Expenditure.  —  The   Sources   of  our 
Financial  Supplies. 

After  this  brief  sketch  of  military  events,  we  pro- 
ceed to  the  proper  object  of  our  enquiry,  the  ex- 
pence  incurred  by  the  war,  the  resources  by  which 
it  was  supported,  and  the  cause  of  our  financial 
embarrassments  since  the  peace.  In  this  we  are 
aware  that  we  venture  on  difficult  ground,  and  at- 
tempt a  question  of  more  than  usual  complexity. 
War,  accounted  in  former  days  a  season  of  embar- 
rassment and  povert}',  assumed  in  tlie  present  age 
the  appearance  of  a  period  of  prosperity.  It  closed, 
indeed,  with  a  great  addition  to  our  permanent 
burdens,  but  with  an  increase  of  national  income, 
whicli  seemed  fully  to  counterbalance  it,  and  to 
confine  our  loss  to  that  of  our  brave  countrymen 
who  had  fallen  in  the  struggle.  Peace,  we  thought, 
was  about  to  bring  a  consolidation  of  the  advan- 
tages earned  in  battle  and  sanctioned  by  treaty, 
but  the  residt  has  been  widely  different :  every 
succeeding  year  has  discovered  some  financial  dif- 
ficulty, some  fresh  defalcation  in  our  national  re- 
sources. The  causes  have  as  yet  been  by  no  means 
satisfactorily  explained,  either  in  or  out  of  Parlia- 
ment, and  the  contradiction  between  what  was  ex- 
pected, and  what  has  actually  taken  place,  implies 
the  prevalence  of  inurh  popidar  error,  as  well  as 
the  necessity  of  an  attentive  and  anxiously-balanced 
enquiry. 


Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure.  21 

This  enquiry  we  may  liope  to  divest,  in  some 
measure,  of  its  complexity,  by  proceeding  step  by 
step,  and  dividing  our  subject  into  separate  heads. 
The  first  point  is  to  form  a  distinct  idea  of  our 
war  expences,  as  well  the  annual  charge  as  the 
aggregate  for  the  whole  contest ;  a  calculation  as 
yet  famihar  to  few  persons  on  account  of  tlie  mag- 
nitude of  the  sums,  the  detached  manner  in  which 
they  are  generally  brought  before  the  public,  and 
tlie  complexity  of  our  finance  accounts,  which  have 
hitherto  presented,  in  the  sinking  fund,  an  ap- 
parent surplus,  and,  under  the  head  of  supply,  an 
apparent  deficiency. 

In  the  early  years  of  this  memorable  contest, 
ministers  were  almost  as  little  avv^are  as  the  public 
of  the  extent  to  which  the  national  contributions 
could  be  carried,  and  the  increase  of  our  expendi- 
ture was,  consequently,  gradual.  Taking  the  total 
money  raised  by  loans  and  taxes,  but  deducting 
from  it  18,000,000/.  annually,  as  the  probable  ex- 
penditure of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  had  peace 
been  preserved,  we  find  tlie  following  result :  — 

Su7ns  annually  raised  for  the  War  of  1793. 


179S. 

-  £   1-,000,(X)() 

1798. 

-   ^29,000,000 

i  794-. 

10,000,000 

1799. 

36,000,0(K) 

1795. 

18,000,000 

1800. 

36,000,000 

1796. 

26,000,000 

1801. 

45,000,000 

1797. 

35,000,000 

1802. 

44-,000,000 

These  sums  are  properly  the  amount  raised,  not 
the  amount  expended  in  each  year  :  still  they  con- 
vey a  fair  idea  of  the  annual  cost  of  the  war.  Their 
great  increase,  in  the  latter  years,  was  owing  to 
several  causes  ;  the  augmentation  of  our  establish- 
ments, the  depreciation  of  money,  and  consequent 
rise  of  pay,  stores,   &c. ;    and,  finally,    to  the  nc- 


fS  Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure. 

cumulation   of  interest  on  the  expenditure  of  all 
the  preceding-  years. 

Such  was  the  war  of  1793,  a  war  exhibiting  an 
average  expenditure  of  ?7>000,000/.,  which,  though 
nearly  double  that  of  any  preceding  contest,  was 
destined  to  be  surpassed  both  soon  and  in  a  very 
great  degree. 

^ums  raised  by  loans  and  taxes  for  the  ivar  of  1803,  after  de- 
ducting the  portion  appropriated  to  Ireland,  and  allowing 
^2,000,fXX)/.  as  the  total  (f  our  prnhahle  expenditure,  had  peace 
been  preserved  in  1793. 

1803.  .....     ^29,000,000 

1804.  .--...         1-0,000,000 

1805.  .....        52,000,000 

1806.  ......        50,000,000 

1807.  ....  -        56,000,000 

1808.  -  -  -  ...        57,000,000 

1809.  (War  in  Spain)         -  ...  61,000,000 

1810.  (Ditto)  ....  62,000,000 

1811.  (DiUo)       .....  66,000,000 

1812.  (War  in  Spain  and  Russia)  -               -  80,000,000 

1813.  (War  in  Spain  and  Germany)  -  -  98,000,000 
1814-.  (War  on  the  French  territory)  -  -  89,000,000 
1815.  -               -               -        '      -               -  86,000,000 

Here  also  the  increase  was  progressive  ;  so  ne- 
cessary was  it,  even  in  our  day  of  enthusiasm,  to 
wait  until  the  machine  of  circulation  became 
adapted  to  this  new  impulse.  At  last,  our  expen- 
diture reached  a  sum  unexampled  in  the  history  of 
any  country,  ancient  or  modern.  It  is  fit,  however, 
to  keep  in  mind  two  very  material  qualifications ; 
first,  that  the  sums  in  the  latter  years  are  greatly 
swelled  by  the  accumulation  of  interest  on  the  pre- 
vious expenditure  ;  next,  that  after  1810,  a  large 
sum,  fully  20  per  cent,  on  our  foreign  disburse,  is 
to  be  put  to  the  account  of  the  depreciation  of  our 
bank  paper.  With  these  deductions,  the  expence 
of  the  unparalleled  year  of  1813  may  be  stated  at 


Magnitude  of  otir  Expenditure.  23 

70,000,000/.,  and  the  other  years  reduced  in  a  cor- 
responding proportion.  But  after  every  subtract 
tion,  the  amount  of  our  expentliture  was  sui'prising: 
for  the  whole  contest  it  may  be  thus  stated. 

Total  money  raised  in  Great  Britain  by 
loans  and  taxes,  during  the  23  years  that 
elapsed,  between  the  beginning  of  1793 
and  that  of  1816 ;  (see  Appendix)  about       -^1,564,000,000 

Deduct  for  the  amount  of  our  peace  es- 
tablishment and  charges  unconnected  with 
the  war,  a  sum,  which,  from  the  increase  of 
our  population  and  the  necessity  of  enforc- 
ing the  collection  of  the  revenue  in  Ireland, 
we  reckon  at  somewhat  more  than  the  aver- 
age expenditure  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
previous  to  1793;  making  (see  Appendix) 
an  amount  of  about  -  -  -     ^^4.64,000,000 


Remainder,  constituting  the  charge  of  7     ,,,  .  „    „  „  „  ^^^ 
the  war  -  -  -  -    J         '       '       ' 

The  next  question  is,  in  what  manner  did  go- 
vernment find  it  practicable  to  raise  these  unex- 
ampled sums  ?  Loans,  the  great  resource  in  former 
wars,  were  resorted  to  during  the  early  years  of 
the  contest ;  thus  — 

Money  raised  by  loans. 

1794-.     -     c^' 11,000,000  1796.     -     ^^2.5,500,000 

1795.     -         18,000,000  1797.     -         32,500,000 

Tlie  last  of  these  sums  being  great  beyond  ex- 
ample in  the  history  of  our  loans,  had  the  effect  of 
lowering  stocks  in  an  alanning  degree,  reducing  the 
3  per  cents,  in  1797,  below  kS. '^  Mr.  Pitt  now- 
felt  the  necessity  of  altering  his  j)lan  of  finance,  and 
was  led,  as  well  by  his  cliaracteristic  confidenci?, 
as  by  the  general  increase  of  individual  income 
attendant  on  the  war,  to  adoj)!  ihe  very  bold  expe- 

♦  Dr.  Hamilton  on  the  National  Dcbi,  p,  252. 
C    i 


iil'  M(i}j:nihi(lc  of  our  Espcnditnrc. 

(liriil  ol"  war  taxes,  or,  as  it  was  officially  termed, 
*'  raisiiiL;-  a  Jari;v  ))roj)ortion  of  the  sii])])lies  witlun 
the  year."  i'iie  success  of"  this  plan  forms  tiie 
^raml  feature  of  tlie  financial  history  of  our  age : 
attem})ted  at  first  on  a  liinited  scale,  it  was  carried 
by  the  imposition  of  the  income  tax,  to  a  large 
amount,  and  before  the  close  of  the  war  attained  a 
magnitude  almost  incredible. 

Supplies  raised  tvitkin  the  year,  being  the  vet  produce  of  our 
taxes,  after  deducting  1 8,000,000/.,  as  the  computed  average  of 
a  peace  establislnnent,  and  excluding  all  loans. 

War  0/179S.  —  During  the  first  four  years 
the  war  taxes  were  in  considerable,  and  in  1797, 

tliey  were  carried  to  only       -              -              -  d^  3,000,000 

But  in  1798.  they  were  carried  to               -  12,000,000 

1799.  -             .             -             -  17,000,000 

1800.  ....  16,000,000 

1801.  -             -             -■           -  17,000,000 

1802.  ...             -  19,000,000 

War  o/"  1803.  —  The  produce  of  our  annual 
supplies  computed  as  above,  with  the  exclu- 
sion ,of  loans,  but  after  deduction  of  a  larger 
sum  (22,000,000/.,  see  Appendix,)  as  the  pro- 
bable peace  establishment : 


1803. 

16,000,000 

1810.   . 

45,000,000 

1804. 

23,000,000 

1811. 

43,000,000 

180.5. 

28,000,000 

1812. 

41,000,000 

1806. 

31,000,000 

1813. 

45,000.000 

1807. 

36,000,000 

1814. 

48,000.000 

1808. 

40,000,000 

1815. 

48,000,000 

1809. 

4-1,000,000 

Respective  Propoi^tion  of  Loans  and  Taj:es, 
Of  the  total  sum  of  1,100,000,000/.  expended 
during  the  war,  the  amount  added  to  our  perma- 
nent debt  w^as  160,000,000/.,  so  that  the  aggregate 
of  the  supplies  raised  within  the  year,  amounted 
for  the  whole  war  to  640,000,000/.  a  surprising 
sum  to  be  obtained  by  a  mode  of  taxation  almost 


Magnitude  ofoitr  Expendihn^e.  2.5 

unknown  in  foreign  countries,  and  carried  in  former 
wars  to  a  very  limited  extent  among  ourselves. 

The  financial  history  of  the  war  may  l)e  divided 
into  three  periods  : 

First,  the  tbiu'  years  previous  to  1797,  in  which 
our  treasury  was  conducted  as  in  former  wars,  with- 
out any  innovation  in  regard  to  war  taxes  or  pa])er 
money. 

Secondly,  the  interval  from  1797  to  1805,  in  which 
we  had  hoth  war  taxes  and  non-convertible  paper, 
but  M  ithout  greatly  depreciating  the  one,  or  carry- 
ing the  other  to  an  extreme. 

Thirdly,  the  period  from  1805  to  1815,  in  which 
the  amount  of  the  sujoplies  raised  within  the  year 
became  enormous,  and  the  depreciation  of  our 
paper,  particularly  after  1810,  formed  a  very  serious 
addition  to  our  difficulties. 

We  have  thus  exhibited  a  statement  of  our 
expenditure,  which,  though  brief)  is,  we  trust, 
perspicuous,  all  complexities  of  redeemed  and 
uiu'edeemed  stock,  all  distinctions  of  funded  and 
unfunded  debt,  being  excluded  from  our  calcuhi- 
tion,  and  the  charge  of  the  war  considered  only 
under  the  two  great  divisions  of  debt  contracted 
and  expenditure  defrayed  in  the  current  year. 
Compared  with  these  sums,  how  insignificant  were 
the  additions  made  to  our  public  burdens  by  former 
wars.  That  of  1689,  under  King  Wilham,  cost 
annually  between  3  and  4,000,000/.  and  addetl  in 
all  20,000,000/.  to  the  national  debt.  Under  Queen 
Anne,  the  flattering  hopes  inspired  by  repeated 
victories,  led  to  a  longer  contest  and  hu-gor  outlav, 
carrying  our  annual  ex])enditure  to  5  or  (),000,000/. ; 
the  addition  to  the  public  debt  during  the  war  to 
somewhat  more  than  30,000,000/.  In  the  less  suc- 
cessful  contest  of  1710,    our  ex})enditure  differed 


^6       The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

from  year  to  year;  the  addition  to  our  j)ublic  debt 
aiiiomitcMl  lo  nearly  .'3(),()()0,()00/.  In  that  of  17^6, 
the  angnientcd  resources  of  the  country,  and  the 
bold  system  of  Lord  Chatham,  raised  our  annual 
expenditure  to  an  average  of  10,(KK),()()(J/.,  the  ad- 
dition to  our  debt  to  fully  r)(),(K)(),000/.  The  un- 
ibrtunate  contest  with  our  colonies,  and  the  war 
that  ensued  after  1778  with  European  powers,  was 
attended  with  an  average  charge  of  17,000,000/., 
and  an  addition  to  our  debt  of  somewhat  more 
than  100,000,000/.  The  total  of  public  debt  in- 
curred in  the  course  of  a  century  was  thus 
2^0,000,000/.,  a  sum  which,  however  large,  formed 
only  the  half  of  that  which  we  have  contracted  in 
the  present  age. 

The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.  —  The 
next  and  by  far  the  most  im})ortant  step  in  the 
progress  of  our  enquiry  is,  by  what  means  and  from 
what  sources  the  nation  was  enabled  to  meet  such 
unprecedented  demands  ?  In  the  opinion  of  many, 
the  means  were  derived  from  the  extension,  or  as 
it  is  commonly  termed,  our  monopoly  of  foreign 
commerce.  "  The  French  revolution,"  said  the 
late  Arthur  Young*,  "  burst  forth  like  a  volcano, 
*'  and  laid  the  mdustry,  manufactures,  and  com- 
*'  merce  of  France,  and  eventually  those  of  the 
*'  whole  Continent,  hi  the  dust;  Britain  became  the 
"  emporium  of  the  world,  and  such  a  scene  of  wealth 
"  and  prosperity  tilled  every  eye  in  this  happy 
"  country,  as  the  sun  before  had  never  shone 
"  upon."  The  belief  of  such  a  monopoly  has,  on 
the  part  of  a  merely  practical  man,  or  in  the  pages 
of  a  pamphleteer,  nothing  surprising,  but  we  were 
little  prepared  to  find  it  in  a  publication  of  large  cir- 

*  Enquirv  into  the  Value  of  Money  in  England,  1812 ;  p.  77- 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.       27 

culation  and  acknowledged  ability.  *  The  fact  is, 
that  the  amount  of  our  foreign  commerce  was  not 
greater,  nor  so  great  at  any  time  during  the  war  as 
since  the  peace  ;  a  point  wliich  may  at  once  be  as- 
certained by  a  reference  to  our  custom-house  re- 
turn of  exports  and  imports.  These  documents, 
however  unfit  to  represent  the  balance  of  mer- 
cantile payments  from  one  country  to  another, 
form  good  authorities  for  ascertaining  the  com- 
parative extent  of  our  business  from  year  to  year. 

Our  Exports  according  to  the  official  value. — We 
shall  give  the  result  of  our  custom-house  return  of 
exports  in  two  modes  ;  first,  by  the  official  value, 
which  means  (see  Appendix,)  the  value  computed 
by  the  weight  or  dimensions  of  inerchandize,  and 
at  a  uniform  rate  of  price,  without  reference  to  the 
fluctuations  of  the  market. 

Total  Exports  from  Great  Britain,  computed  according  to  thejixed 
official  standard  of  the  Custom-house. 

Average  of  the  nine  years  of  the  first 
war,  viz.  from  the  beginning  of  1793  to 
that  of  1802  -  -  -  a^3O,760,0OO 

Average  of  ten  years  of  the  second 
war,  from  1803  to  1812,  both  inclusive, 
leaving  out  1813,  the  records  of  which 
were  destroyed  by  fire,  and  considering 
1802  as  a  year  of  peace  -  -  42,145,000 

But  if  we  compare  this  with  the  eight  years  of 
peace,  of  which  the  returns  have  been  made  to  Par- 
liament, we  shall  find  a  considerable  increase  since 
1814. 

Average  of  the  total  exports  from 
Great  Britain  computed  officially  for  the 
eight  years,  from  1814  to  1821,  both  in- 
clusive.    (See  Appendix.)  -  -  54,200,000 

'■  Edinburgh  Review,  No.  Ixv.  p.  170-,  and  again  in  No.  Ixxii. 
p.  458. 


i28        The  Sources  <>['  otn-  Fhinneidl  Supplies. 

TUvsc  ciistoni-lioiisc  rcliiriis,  l)ciiiL,^  made  on  a 
uniform  plan,  and  calculated  by  the  weight  or 
dimensions  of  the  package,  are  conchisive  as  to  the 
(juantitii  of  our  exports.  It  may  be  said,  however, 
ihaf,  ill  otlicr  respects,  tliey  are  less  satisfactory; 
and  that  although  the  bulk  ex])ortcd  at  present  be 
greater,  the  value  is  less  in  consequence  of  the 
general  reduction  of  prices.  That  prices  were 
much  higher  during  the  war,  particularly  in  the 
latter  years,  admits  of  no  doubt,  but  in  whatever 
way  the  calculation  be  made,  the  advantage  is  on 
the  side  of  peace,  thus:  — 

Exports  from  Great  Britain  (luring  the  tvar,  computed  chiefly 
from  the  declaration  of  the  exporting  merchants ;  or,  tvhen 
there  rvas  no  declaration,  by  a  suitable  addition  to  the  official 
value. 

Average  of  the  ten  years  from  1791 
to  1801,  both  inclusive  -  -  ^48,890,000 

Average  of  the  ten  years  from  1801 
to  1810  -  -  -  -  52,84-7,000 

In  peace,  our  exports  afford  an  average  consi- 
derably larger,  after  making  (see  Appendix,) 
an  allowance  for  the  reduced  value  of  merchan- 
dize. 

Average  of  our  annual  exports  during 
eight  years  from  ISH  to  18'21,  both  inclu- 
sive, computed  chiefly  from  the  declara- 
tion of  the  exporting  merchants.  (See 
Appendix.)  -  -  -  ^63,787,000 

In  both  points  of  view,  therefore,  our  foreign 
connnerce  is  found  to  have  been  less  considerable 
in  war  than  in  peace  :  it  is  equally  easy  to  sho\v, 
that  its  profits  were  wholly  inadequate  to  the  sup- 
port of  any  great  share  of  our  expenditure.  Mr. 
Pitt,  on  proposing  the  income-tax  in  1798,  com- 
puted our  foreign  commerce  to  yield  to  the  various 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.       -29 

persons,  merchants  and  others,  engaged  in  it,  an 
annual  income  of  12,000,000/.,  a  sum,  ])robably 
not  under-rated  at  the  time,  but  which,  for  the  sake 
of  giving  those  who  diifer  from  us,  tlie  full  benefit 
Q^ argument,  ought,  we  shall  suppose,  to  ha\e  been 
doubled  and  taken  during  the  war,  at  an  anmial 
amount  of  !ii4,000,000/.  This,  be  it  observed,  is 
not  saving,  but  income,  out  of  which  are  to  be  sup- 
ported all  the  persons  engaged  in  the  business  j  and 
if  we  compute  the  clear  saving  in  a  proportion, 
which,  in  regard  to  most  other  branches  of  indus- 
try, would  be  more  than  sufficiently  liberal,  the  re- 
sult will  be  a  clear  yearly  gain  of  three  millions 
sterling.  But  what  would  be  thought  of  that  sum, 
or  of  double  or  triple  its  amount,  as  a  countei- 
poise  to  such  expenditure  as  ours  during  the  late 
wars  ? 

Of  all  the  branches  of  our  foreign  commerce, 
the  greatest  extension  took  place  in  that  with  tlie 
United  States  :  but  that  outlet  was  closed  several 
years  before  the  end  of  the  war  ;  and,  however  pro- 
ductive of  work  to  oiu'  mamifactui'ers,  lias  never 
been  considered  a  source  of  pecuniary  aid,  accom- 
panied as  it  necessarily  is,  by  long  credits  and  debts 
(hfficult  of  recovery. 

Our  Colonial  Acquisitions.  —  Our  other  sources 
of  imagined  supply  were  the  occupation  of  new  colo- 
nies, the  suspension  of  the  navigation  of  hostile 
states,  and  a  supposed  reduction  of  their  rival 
manufactures. — Of  the  conquered  colonies,  the 
princi])al  were  Trinidad,  Demerara,  Esseciuebo, 
Tobago,  each  little  advanced  in  culti\ati()n,  each 
recpiiring  a  large  transfer  of  capital  from  this 
country,  and  each  yielduig  little  present  reveiiiu-. 
Similar  disadvantages  characterised,  though,  ni  a 


30        The  Sources  (if'ttiir  Financial  Supplies. 

less  degree,  St.  Lucia,  Guadaloupe,  Martinique. 
As  to  the  East  Indies,  our  acquisitions,  vast  in  point 
of*  territory,  and  considerable  in  regard  to  internal 
reveiHie,  have  been  as  yet  of  very  secondary  im- 
portance in  respect  to  commerce,  though,  on  the 
continent  of  Europe,  there  prevails  an  opinion 
that  India  is  the  grand  source  of  our  uational 
wealth. 

Suspension  of  Foreign  Competition .  —  We  come 
next  to  a  very  plausible  argument,  the  benefit  sup- 
posed  to  arise  to  us  from  the  suspension  that  took 
place  during  the  war,  of  the  navigation  of  France, 
Holland,  and  the  other  states  dependent  on 
France.  The  fact  doubtless  was,  that  the  flag  of 
these  countries  could  not  appear  on  the  ocean, 
because  they  had  not  men  of  war  to  protect  their 
convoys  ;  but  the  transfer  of  navigation  was  made 
less  to  British  vessels  than  to  neutrals,  —  Americans, 
Danes,  Swedes,  Prussians,  and  to  Dutch  shipping, 
bearing  the  flag  of  the  petty  ports  in  the  north-west 
of  Germany.  —  Lastly,  in  regard  to  manufactures, 
those  of  France  have  undergone  no  reduction  since 
the  Revolution,  and  much  less  fluctuation  than  is 
commonly  supposed  :  during  the  last  thirty  vears 
they  have  been  on  the  same  scale  of  gradual  in- 
crease as  before ;  that  is,  they  have  all  along  kept 
pace  with  the  wants  of  a  country,  increasing  pro- 
gressively, though  not  quickly,  in  population. 

Compelled  to  quit  their  favourite  ground  of 
foreign  commerce,  to  what  do  these  calculators 
resort  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  our  prosperity 
during  the  war  ?  Government  loans  and  contracts, 
however  profitable  in  vulgar  estimate,  are  obviously 
out  of  the  question  as  a  source  of  national  supply. 
The  conunand  of  money,  given  by  the  adoption  of 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.       31 

a  paper  currency,  is  ii  theme  confidently  urged,  to 
use  a  parliamentary  phrase,  both  "  in  and  out  of 
doors:"  it  was  certainly  of  great  importance,  but 
enough,  we  trust,  will  be  advanced  in  a  succeed- 
ing chapter  to  show  that  the  extent  of  supply,  de- 
rived from  that  source,  has  not  yet  been  distinctly 
comprehended.  We  dwell,  therefore,  no  longer 
on  delusive  suppositions,  but  proceed  to  what  ap- 
pears to  us  the  true  solution  of  this  financial 
enigma,  seeking  it  in  the  increase  less  of  our  trans- 
actions M'ith  foreign  countries,  than  of  our  pro- 
ductive industry  at  home. 

Increase  of  Employment  during  the  War.  —  We 
begin  by  requesting  those  of  our  readers  who  are 
of  an  age  to  recollect  the  period  of  peace  prior  to 
179s,  to  recall  to  mind  the  circumstances  of  that 
time  in  as  far  as  regarded  the  employment  of  indi- 
viduals, the  chance  of  favourable  openings  in  tlie 
different  walks  of  industry.  They  will  not  fail  to  re- 
member, that,  though  by  no  means  an  unprosperous 
season,  it  was  marked  by  the  symptoms  common  in 
an  aara  of  political  tranquillity,  —  complaints  of 
overstock  in  the  genteel  professions,  and  of  inade- 
quate payment  in  almost  all  of  a  humbler  descrip- 
tion. In  a  season  of  peace,  salaries  or  wages  are 
adapted  with  scrupulous  nicety  to  tlie  sum  neces- 
sary for  personal  support,  and,  except  in  tlie  case 
of  the  inheritors  of  patrimony,  the  ])ortion  of  in- 
come disposable  for  purposes  of  indulgence,  is  far 
from  large.  Sucli  has  long  been  the  case  in  France, 
and  most  countries  of  the  Continent;  such,  at 
various  intervals  of  the  last  century,  was  the  case 
in  our  own  —  a  state  by  no  means  unsound  or 
likely  to  engender  future  embarrassment,  but  lead- 
ing by  very  slow  degrees  to  the  attaiinnent  of  pro- 
fes«?ional  rank,  or  the  acquisition  of  property.   This 


;j'2         7'//r  Soinrcs  of  our  Fnidncial  Supplits. 

tiun(|iiil  condition,  this  nicdium  between  activity 
and  stagnation,  was  entirely  altered  by  the  war ; 
the  army,  the  navy,  the  pubHc  offices  of  govern- 
ment opened  a  career  to  mmnbers  of  every  class, 
and  by  absorbing  a  very  large  ])roportion  of  the 
candidates  for  em])]oynient,  created  a  corres})ond- 
ing  briskness  in  agriculture,  trade,  and  professions  ; 
increasing  the  wages  of  the  lower,  and  the  salaries 
of  the  higher  ranks. 

Capitalists  also,  a  class  retired  for  the  most  part 
from  active  pursuits,  partook  of  the  general  im- 
pulse ;  the  pecuniary  demands  of  government  were 
large,  and  the  rate  of  interest  experienced  a  gene- 
ral and  permanent  rise.  Occupation  was  thus 
afforded  to  individuals  of  every  age  and  of  almost 
every  degree  of  capacity ;  many,  who  from  defi- 
cient activity  or  mediocrity  of  parts,  would,  in  a 
state  of  peace,  have  necessarily  remained  unem- 
])loyed,  were  brought  by  the  war  into  situations 
attended  with  income ;  some  in  the  pubUc  serxice, 
others  in  private  employment,  but  ail  in  conse- 
(pience  of  the  extra  demand  created  by  govern- 
ment. Several  departments  of  business,  such  as 
our  fisheries,  our  trade  with  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  and  that  with  our  AVest  India  colonies, 
were  exposed  to  heavy  losses,  and  the  whole  body 
of  fixed  annuitants  felt  severely  the  increased  ex- 
pence  of  living.  But  these  classes  formed  the 
minority  of  the  public :  and  even  they  felt,  more 
or  less  directly,  through  the  medium  of  their  con- 
nections, the  benefit  of  that  impulse  which  for  a 
time  improved  the  income  of  almost  all  persons  in 
active  life,  raising  to  the  monied  men  the  rate  of 
interest ;  to  the  labouring  class,  the  rate  of  wages  ; 
to  the  manufacturer,  the  merchant,  and,  in  parti- 
cular, to  the  farmer,  the  profits  of  stock. 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.        3"5 

Such  was  the  activity  attendant  on  a  state  of  war, 
and  on  tlie  facihty  with  which  extended  trans- 
actions were  managed  by  means  of  bank  pajjer. 
If  to  some  our  sketch  appear  too  highly  coloured, 
we  have  merely  to  refer  them  to  a  comparison  of 
the  average  rate  of  wages  and  salaries  in  particular 
periods,  such  as  179^  and  181^;  to  the  increased 
sales  of  our  manufacturers  and  merchants ;  the 
rise  of  rent  to  the  landlord  ;  the  increase  of  profit 
to  his  tenant. 

Consequent  Increase  of  Revenue. —  All  these  cir- 
cumstances, in  particular  the  increased  call  for  per- 
sonal labour,  had  a  powerful  tendency  to  augment 
the  relative  population  of  towns,  as  well  by  pro- 
moting mai'riage  as  by  drawing  to  them  an  extra 
share  of  the  country  population.  Now  what  is  the 
effect  of  an  increase  of  town  population  on  the 
productive  powers,  or,  in  other  words,  on  the  tax- 
able income  of  a  country  ?  To  form  a  due  esti- 
mate of  this,  we  must  point  the  reader's  attention 
to  the  passages  hi  our  cliapter  on  Population,  where, 
in  treating  of  the  comparative  revenue  of  chflerent 
classes,  we  contrast  the  dexterity  and  dispatch 
of  towns,  witli  the  slow,  inefficient  labour  of  the 
country.  A  transfer  of  residence  from  country  to 
town  leads  to  augmented  ability  in  the  individual, 
to  the  increase  of  the  quantity,  the  amelioration  of 
the  quality,  of  liis  work  ;  it  raises  his  wages,  and,  by 
enabling  him  to  live  better,  extends  the  consumj)- 
tion  of  articles  productive  to  the  exchequer.  Of 
tlie  magnitude  of  the  amount  paid  by  the  lowej- 
orders,  and  the  increase  of  public  re\enue  at- 
tendant on  increase  of  wages,  whether  in  war  or 
peace,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the  follow- 


ing table. 


» 


.11.        The  Sm/rrrs  o/'ni/r  Financial  St/pplies. 


AhstrnrI  nf  Kxrisr  n»/l  Ct/sfotn  Hvlica  in 

1820,  nffectitig  ihe  cnn 

.sumption  nf  l/ic  labouring 

classes. 

Malt            ...           - 

-       -i£'5,000,000 

Ik-er 

-       2,500,000 

British  spirits         ... 

fl,0()0,(XK) 

Salt          .... 

1  ,.500,{XK) 

Tobacco  and  Snuff 

3,000,000 

Soap         -            .            .            - 

9(H),()00 

Leather 

600,000 

Candles        ... 

300,000 

Tea 

3,000,000 

Hemp          .          -          - 

200,000 

20,000,000 

To  which  may  be  added,  Timber 

1,000,000 

Coals  carried  coastwise  nearly     - 

1,000,000 

Total       ^'22,000,000 

Tlie  progressive  increase  in  the  productiveness 
of  our  taxes  was  owing  partly  to  higher  wages, 
partly  to  augmented  population. 

Increase  of  our  Population.  —  We  shall  have 
occasion,  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  to  show  the 
close  connection  that  exists  between  the  increase 
of  our  numbers  and  the  productiveness  of  our 
taxes :  at  present,  our  statement  shall  be  brief 
Our  population  returns  for  the  last  twenty  years 
indicate  an  increase  of  no  less  than  one  and  a  half 
per  cent,  annually;  but  to  avoid  the  hazard  of  over- 
rating, we  shall  suppose  that  previous  to  these 
returns,  and  to  the  general  introduction  of  \accin- 
ation,  the  augmentation  was  less  rapid,  and  shall 
assume  eighteen  per  cent,  on  the  po})ulation  of 
1792  as  the  total  increase  during  the  fourteen  years 
that  followed  that  date. 

After  these  preliminary  remarks,  we  proceed  to 
state  arithmetically,  the  increase  of  our  resources, 
beginning  by  a  table  of  the  amount  of  our  excisB 


T)ie  Sources  of  our  Financial  Sujyp/ics.        35 

Juties,  the  operation  of  winch  affects,  as  is  well 
known,  a  great  variety  of  articles,  inchiding  as 
w^ell  the  wine  of  the  higher  orders,  as  the  malt 
liquor,  the  s})irits,  the  tobacco,  consumed  by  their 
humbler  countrymen. 

Revenue  arising  J)'om  the  Excise  during  the  Jbllffwing  years  oj' 
xmr,  being  the  gross  Income,  before  deducting  0ie  charges  of 
collection. 

1805.  ....  ^23,194-,0OO 

1806.  ....  -  24.,08 1,000 

1807.  .....         24,681,000 

1808.  .....         25,593,000 

1809.  (Orders  in  Council)         -         -        -         23,471,000 
1810. 25,796,000 

1811.  -  -  -  -  -  26,078,000 

1812.  (War  with  America)  -  -         23,532,000 

1813.  ....  -  25,272,000 

1814.  .....         26,471,000 

1815.  -  -  -  -  -         27,207,000 


i^onjectural  estimate  of  the  total  taxable  Income  of  Great  Britain, 
at  different  periods,  from  1792  to  1814. 

Money  of  the 
same  value  as 
in   1792, 
(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.) 
In    1792  our   taxable   income  may  be  com- 
puted to  have  been         ....         ^125,000,000 

In  1806;  increase  calculated  in  the  ratio  of 
the  increase  of  tlie  population,  viz.  18  per  cent.,        22,500,000 


147,500,CX)0 


Probable  addition  to  national  income  from 
the  higher  wages  and  higher  profits  of  capital 
in  a  state  of  war,  .  -  .  .  22,500,000 


Total  of  taxable  income  in  1806,  -  1 70,0(X),0()0 


We  shall  now  apply  this  mode  of  calculation 
to  the  last  year  of  the  war. 

In  1813  or  1814:  Increase  of  national  income 
since  1806,  calculated  in  the  ratio  of  the  in- 
crease of  population,  1 1  per  cent. 

D    "i? 


SC)  J*/'()j)(>rii()?i  (>!'  our 

National  iiKomc  ill  I H(Mj  us  above,  -  i"147,500,(X)0 

Add  1  I  pirioiit.  ....  Jf;,5(X),(KX) 


1  f)1-,()00,(KX) 


Probable  addition  to  national  income,  from 
the  higher  wages  and  higher  profits  of  capital 
in  a  state  of  war,  ....  24,000,000 


Total  of  taxable  income  in  1813  or  IHl^,  in 
money  of  1792,  ....  188,000,000 

By  taxable  income,  we  understand  the  aggregate 
income  of  the  individuals  accustomed  to  consume 
taxed  articles;  and  our  estimate  is  founded  chiefly 
on  the  returns  made  under  the  property,  tax,  with 
the  addition  of  the  computed  amount  of  wages 
and  other  incomes,  which,  though  exempt  from 
that  charge,  are  subject  to  taxes  on  consumption. 

(See  the  chapter  on  National  Capital  and  Re- 
venue.) 

We  shall  explain  in  the  next  chapter  the  fluctu- 
ation in  the  value  of  money  since  1792;  meantime 
by  exhibiting  our  income  at  different  dates  in 
money  of  uniform  value,  we  simplify  the  estimate, 
and  enable  the  reader  to  mark  its  increase,  without 
the  perplexity  attendant  on  a  difference  in  the  value 
of  our  currency. 

A  comparative  Statement  of  our  Public  Burdens,  and  Taxabh 
Income. 
The  public  burdens  include  taxes,  {tvith  the  expence  of  collec- 
tion) poor-rate,  and  tithe.  , 

Tlie  same   re-  Our  taxable  in- 
duced   to    a  come  comput- 
Annual  burdens      uniform  stan-  ed    b}'    a  uni- 
Years.                 in  the  money      dard ;     viz.  form  standard; 
of  the  parti-      money  of  the  viz.    money  of 
cular  year.          same  value  as  the    value     of 
ia  1792.  1792. 
1792.       -         a£'22,000,000        22,000,000  125,000,000 
1806.       -             60,000.0(X)        46,000,000  170,000,000 
1814.       -             80,000,000        50,000,000  188,000,000 


Burdens  /o  our  Resoicrces.  SJ 

The  advantage  of  making  our  computation  in 
money  of  uniform  value  is  here  very  a})parent.  To 
judge  from  the  numerical  amount,  our  public  bur- 
dens would  seem  to  have  more  than  tripled  in  the 
course  of  the  twenty -three  years  of  war,  but  when 
reduced  to  the  money  of  179^,  the  increase  is 
ibund  to  be  little  more  than  double. 

It  remains  that  we  bring  our  reasoning  to  a 
point,  by  ascertaining  "the  proportion  borne  at 
different  periods  by  our  burdens  to  our  means."^ 
This  we  accomplish  by  a  calculation  founded  on 
the  preceding  tables,  but  modified  by  some  consi- 
derations which  shall  be  explained  in  our  chaj)ter 
on  National  Revenue  and  Capital.  The  result  is 
that  our  burdens  bore  to  our  resources, 

(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.) 

In  1792.  a  proportion  of  nearly  -         18     to     100 

1806.         -  of  -  -         27     to     100 

1813.  or  1814.         of  -         27     to     100 

(See  Chap.  VIII.  p.  269.). 

Such  was  the  proportion  of  our  burdens  to  our 
resources,  afler  including  in  the  latter  the  increase 
arising  from  the  augmentation  dining  the  war,  both 
of  our  numbers  and  our  pecuniary  means.  The 
additional  pressure  stated  arithmetically,  was  about 
nine  per  cent,  on  our  national  income,  a  charge  less 
great  than  is  commonl}^  attributed  to  our  taxes, 
but  sufficiently  large  to  call  for  some  farther  ex- 
planation of  the  remarkable  circumstances  that 
enabled  us  to  defray  it. 

Our  War  Taxes.— Thii  amoinit  of  our  loans, 
though  very  dififercnt  in  different  years,  averaged, 
on  the  whole  of  the  war,  the  annual  sum  of 
20,()(X),000/.    This  bold  use  of  our  credit,  this  free 

D  3 

335337 


38  rrvporlioji  of  our 

iliHuglit   oil  (Hir  tiitmc  resources,    was  ulniost  all 
expended  in  tlie  extension  of  our  domestic  indus- 
try.    It   may  be  termed  a  premium  given  to  the 
existing  generation  at  the  charge  of  posterity :  it 
may  be    comi)ared   to    a  stream,    which,    though 
proceeding    from    an    unnatural    and    temporary 
source,   diffused  a  fertility  a})proaching  to    luxu- 
riance,   so    long    as  it  continued  to   flow.      Our 
reailers  have  probably  little  difficulty  in  conceiving 
the  operation  of  borrowed  money;  —  in  compre- 
hending how  individual,   and  consequently  public 
income  may  be  increased  by  giving  activity  to  the 
present  age  at  the  expence  of  the  next.    The  intri- 
cacy lies  in  a  different  question ;  in  the  mode  of 
accountino-  for  our  taa:es.  and  for  the  ease  with 
which    sums   of  unprecedented   magnitude   w^ere 
raised  in  that  manner  during  the  war.     To  solve 
til  is  difficidty,  some  writers  adopt  the  convenient 
theory,  that  taxation  may  be  made  an  engine  for  in- 
creasing national  wealth,  as  if  the  money  expended 
on  an  indecisive  campaign  were  ultimately  as  pro- 
fitable as  a  rate  imposed  for  the  improvement  of 
our  streets,  roads,  and  canals.    Without  becomino* 
converts  to  this  singular  opinion,  we  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  regarding  taxation,  when  expended  at  home,. 
less  as  a  privation  of  wealth  than  as  an  instrument 
of  circulation.     It  is  evidently  applied  to  the  ex- 
tension of  employment,  and,  by  increasing  the  in- 
comes of  inchviduals,  enables  them  to  find  a  liuid 
lor  answering  its  own  demand, —  the  subsequent 
visits  of  the  collector. 

Ta.vation  considered  as  Circidation.  —  Imat^ine 
the  case  of  a  contractor  receiving  annually  100,000/. 
from  the  Treasury,  and  distributing  it  in  an  addition 
to  the  wages,  salaries,  and  profits  of  two  or  three 
thousand  persons.     AVithout  the  war,  these  indivi- 


Burdens  to  our  Resources.  39 

duals  iiiight,  and  probably  Avould,  have  had  employ- 
ment, but  not  to  an  equal  extent,  receiving  perhaps 
60/.  annually  instead  of*  the  70/.  or  80/.  given  them 
by  the  war,  an  addition  which  fully  enabled  them 
to  pay  the  extra  charge  imposed  in  the  shape  of 
taxes.  Or  suppose  the  whole  expenditure  of  the 
nation,  in  other  words,  the  amount  disbursed  on 
articles,  which  directly  or  indirectly  })ay  taxes,  to 
be  200,000,000/.  a  year,  and  that  in  addition  to 
former  burdens  new  taxes  are  imposed  to  the  extent 
of  '20,000,000/.  The  effect  of  this  heavy  impost 
is  a  correspondent  rise  in  the  price  of  the  articles 
consumed ;  but  as  the  amount  received  by  the 
Treasury  is  forthwith  circulated  among  the  payers 
of  the  taxes,  and  applied  to  remunerate  their  exer- 
tions, the  latter  are  enabled  to  indemnify  themselves 
by  an  addition  to  the  charges  constituting  their 
respective  incomes,  whether  in  the  shape  of  wages, 
salary,  or  profit  of  stock.  Possessed  of  this  power, 
the  higher  price  paid  for  iirticles  of  consumption 
becomes  a  matter  of  indifference,  particularly  when, 
in  consequence  of  the  government  demand  for  men 
and  money,  the  increase  of  their  incomes  exceeds 
the  increase  of  their  expence.  The  result  accord- 
ingly is,  that  they  pay  10  per  cent,  additional  on 
their  consumption,  and  add  as  much,  or  more,  to 
the  charges  constituting  their  incomes. 

To  what  amount,  it  may  be  asked,  did  the  circu- 
lation in  question  take  place,  in  consequence  of 
taxes?  To  a  sum  very  different  in  different  years, 
and  increasing  largely  after  ISOG,  but  forming,  on 
an  average  of  the  whole  period  of  war,  more  than 
40,000,000/.  a  year.  In  what  particular  mode  did 
file  annual  expenditure  of  that  sum,  and  of  the  far- 
ther 20,000,000/.  supplied  by  loans,  chiefly  take 
place  ?   In  recruiting,  clothing,  and  victualling  our 

D    !< 


40  J'ritpo/ //<)/>  o/  our 

militia,  iirmy,  and  navy;  in  the  purchase  of  stores, 
the  hiiiiditiiT  of"  ships  of"  war,  the  repair  of"  fortifica- 
tions ;  in  contracts,  pay,  salaries,  pensions.  Even 
ill  tliat  whicli  scented  strictly  foreign  expenditure, 
our  subsidies  to  tiie  continent,  luid  tiie  mainte- 
nance of  our  garrisons  abroad,  the  remittances 
took  place  less  in  money  than  in  articles  of  British 
manufacture. 

It  remains  to  add  a  few  remarks  on  tiie  manner 
in  which  these  large  sums  were  repaid  to  the  Trea- 
sury. Of  our  taxation,  the  far  greater  proportion 
(40,000,000/.)  is  on  articles  of  consumption,  a 
mode  in  which  the  tax,  blending  itself  with  the 
price  of  the  article,  escapes,  in  a  great  measure, 
the  observation  of  the  consiuner.  No  wonder, 
therefore,  that  such  imposts  were,  in  a  manner, 
overlooked  in  the  general  rise  of  wages,  salaries, 
and  profits.  In  like  manner,  the  increase  of  stamps, 
heavy  as  it  became,  was  accounted  a  secondary 
object  after  the  great  augmentation  of  price  ob- 
tained, as  the  war  proceeded,  by  the  venders 
of  property.  The  assessed  taxes  and  poor-rate 
being  undisguised  burdens,  excited  more  animad- 
version, but  they  w*ere  submitted  to  as  well  from  a 
conviction  of  their  necessity,  as  from  the  genera] 
ardour  in  the  contest  with  France,  and  her  dreaded 
ruler. 

Computed  Amount  thus  repaid  to  the  Treasury.  — 
If  we  go  a  step  farther,  and  endeavour  to  define 
the  amount  repaid,  during  the  war,  to  the  public 
Treasury,  the  plan  is  to  revert  to  the  estimate  we 
have  already  made  of  the  proportion  of  our  burdens 
to  our  national  income.  Tliat  proportion,  (27  per 
cent.  f"or  the  country  at  large,)  was  greater  in 
towns,  on  account  of  the  more  general  consump- 

14. 


Burdens  to  our  Resowxes.  41 

tion  of  exciseable  articles.  Now  as  the  expend- 
iture of  government  for  the  war,  or,  to  speak  more 
correctly,  the  increased  expenditure  of  individuals 
consequent  on  government  disburse,  took  place 
almost  entirely  in  towns,  we  shall  probably  not 
exceed  in  calculating  that  it  returned  into  the 
Exchequer  a  proportion  approaching  to  33  per 
cent.,  or  a  third  of  the  amount  that  had  issued 
from  it.  This  estimate  justifies  the  following  in- 
ference : 

Total  of  expenditure  for  the  war  -         ^1100,000,000 

Of  which  a  third,  or  33  per  cent.,  paid  back 

in  taxes,  formed  a  sum  of  about  -  3GO,000,000 

a  sum  which  goes  far  towards  accounting  for  the 
payment  of  our  w  ar  taxes,  enormous  as  they  were ; 
or,  in  other  words,  towards  proving  that  those 
pecuniary  sacrifices  on  which  tlie  public  received 
such  eloquent  compliments  from  ministerial  orators 
and  newspaper  writers,  were  often  little  more  than 
a  repayment  of  money  issued  from  the  Treasury. 

The  power  of  paying  taxes  during  the  late  war 
is  thus  to  be  sought,  not  in  retrenchment  on  the 
part  of  the  public,  but  in  an  increase  of  the  general 
activity,  and  still  more  in  that  which  a  writer  of 
the  present  age,  (as  yet  little  known  to  the  public, 
but  to  whose  works  we  shall  frequently  have  occa- 
sion to  refer,  Mr.  8.  Gray)  terms  the  power  of 
"  charging  and  counter-charging ;"  the  j)ower  of 
individuals  to  augment  tliose  demands  whicli  con- 
stitute their  respective  incomes;  and  thus  to  transfer 
from  one  hand  to  another  the  burden  of  a  new  tax. 

Absence  of  Foreign  Co7npetition.  —  This  aug- 
mentation of  charjre,  tliis  transfer  of  burden,  was 


^^  Proportion  of  our 

liiciliLatod  during  the  war  by  various  causes,  among 
which  is  to  be  included  the  existence  of  similar, 
though  not  equal  demands  iiom  continental  go- 
vernments on  their  subjects.  These  demands,  in 
conjunction  with  the  obstructions  to  intercourse 
attendant  on  a  state  of  war,  had  the  effect  of  pre- 
venting the  high  prices  in  England  from  being 
lowered  by  foreign  competition.  Had  the  war 
affected  only  France  and  England,  had  the  rest  of 
Euro})e  been  exempted  from  the  burdens  of  great 
military  establishments,  such  a  system  of  increased 
taxation,  or,  in  other  words,  such  a  rapid  augment- 
ation of  prices  would  have  been  impracticable : 
our  countrymen  woidd  have  emigrated ;  capital 
would  have  been  sent  abroad ;  foreign  manu- 
factiu'es  would  have  been  smuggled  among  us ;  the 
supplies  for  the  United  States  and  other  dis- 
tant markets  would  have  been  prepared  on  the 
continent.  But  Holland,  the  only  continental 
country  possessed  of  disposable  capital,  was  sub- 
jected to  great  oppression  ;  while  Germany,  and  in 
the  latter  years  of  the  war,  Denmark  and  Sweden, 
were  burdened  with  heavy  military  charges.  Bri- 
tish capital  was  prevented  from  finding  its  way 
abroad,  as  well  by  dread  of  Bonaparte's  despotism, 
as  by  the  profitable  employment  afforded  it  at 
home.  Smuggling  was  continued,  but  only  in 
articles  (such  as  spirits,  tea,  laces,)  in  which  it  had 
been  carried  on  in  peace  :  the  number  and  activity 
of  our  cruisers  prevented  its  extension,  notwith- 
standing the  additional  temptation  arising  from 
our  augmented  duties. 

Our  country  was  thus  insulated  commercially  as 
well  as  physically,  and  an  amount  of  taxation,  a 
rise  of  prices,  which  at  other  times  woidd  ha\e 
been  ruinous,  were  comparatively  innoxious  when 


Burdens  to  our  Resources.  43 

our  neighbours  were  subjected  to  heavy  burdens. 
As  soon  as  this  point  is  clearly  comprehended  by 
the  enquirer  ;  as  soon  as  he  becomes  satisfied  of 
the  '  7ion-ea:istence  of  foreign  competition  ;  he  will 
find  much  less  difficulty  in  the  solution  of  our 
financial  problem. 

Substitution  of  Bank  Notes  for  Coin.  —  To 
all  those  causes  there  remains  to  add  the  ex- 
emption of  our  banks  from  cash  payments ;  the 
effect  of  which,  though  less  great  than  is  vulgarly 
supposed,  was  to  make  money  almost  as  plenty  in 
war  as  in  peace;  and  to  increase  the  amount  of  our 
circulating  medium  in  proportion  as  other  circum- 
stances led  to  a  rise  in  prices. 


Thus  was  carried  on,  from  year  to  year,  a  most 
expensive  contest,  without  much  pressure  on  any 
part  of  the  public,  unless  the  fixed  annuitant,  and 
without  a  depreciation  of  our  national  capital,  ex- 
cept of  that  portion  (such  as  the  funds,  or  loans  on 
mortgage,)  of  which  the  value  is  permanently  re- 
presented by  money.  To  many  persons,  and  in 
particular  to  those  interested  in  the  expenditure, 
this  state  of  things  bore  a  favourable  appearance ; 
conveying  to  some  the  idea  of  an  accumulation  of 
national  Avealth,  to  others  the  belief  that  we  de- 
frayed all  our  burdens  from  funds  arising  fiom 
the  war.  The  general  enhancement  of  commotlities 
was  ascribed  to  an  abundance  of  money,  and 
deemed  a  symptom,  or  rather  a  proof^  of  the 
increase  of  our  national  wealth. 

These  explanations  enable  us  to  account  in  some 
measure  for  a  notion  very  })revalent  on  the  conti- 
nent, and  which,  in  the  latitude  in  which  it  is  oi- 
tertained,  strikes  every  Englishman  with  surprise, — 


44i  /*r(>/)(>r/i(>f/  of  oiir   Bilrdens,  S^r. 

That  we  prolonged  the  war  with  a  view  to  our  pecu- 
niary ailvaiitage —  as  if  a  charge,  which  may  1)C 
true  in  regartl  to  ])articuhir  classes,  could,  with  any 
degree  of  justice,  be  ajjplied  to  our  countrymen  at 
huge. 

The  temporary  stimulus  afforded  to  productive 
industry  by  the  funding  system,  though  never  so 
strikingly  exemplified  before,  might  have  been 
traced  in  various  periods  of  the  history  of  Europe 
during  the  last  two  centuries.  Was  it  not  conspi- 
cuous in  the  long  contests  of  the  Dutch,  first  with 
Spain  and  subsequently  with  France,  as  well  as  in 
every  war  that  has  been  carried  on  by  England 
since  the  revolution  ?  In  none  of  these,  it  is  true, 
did  the  amount  of  loans,  and  still  less  the  amount 
of  war  taxes,  bear  any  proportion  to  those  of  the 
present  age ;  but  they  supplied  facts  of  a  nature  to 
suffscest  serious  conclusions,  had  studies  of  that 
description  entered  into  the  habits  of  our  legisla- 
tors. To  the  more  cautious  among  them,  it  seem- 
ed to  occur  that  our  situation  w^as,  in  some  degree, 
unnatural ;  that  the  great  expenditure  of  govern- 
ment was  not  compensated,  on  the  part  of  the  pub- 
lic, by  economy,  or  by  any  great  share  of  extra 
exertion.  Hence  an  apprehension,  on  the  part  of 
some,  that  the  war  must  entail  a  burdensome  in- 
heritance, but  at  what  time,  or  to  what  degree,  they 
did  not  attempt  to  calculate.  Of  the  reaction  to 
be  expected  at  a  peace,  no  one  appears  to  have  had  a 
distinct  conception.  To  foresee  its  extent  was,  we 
admit,  impossible ;  but  few  of  our  public  men  be- 
stowed a  serious  thought  on  its  nature,  while  some 
of  them  seemed  hardly  aware  of  the  possibility  of 
its  occurring ;  so  limited  had  been  their  study  of 
political  economy  as  a  science,  so  cursory  their  ex- 
amination of  corresponding  periods  of  our  history. 


45 


CHAP.  III. 

Effect  of  the  War  on  the  Price  of  Commodities. 

We  sliall  now  fix  our  attention  on  that  general 
rise  of  prices  whicli  took  place  during  the  war,  and 
continued  ahnost  without  interruption  from  1793 
to  1814.  As  this  formed  one  of  the  principal 
changes  in  our  situation,  both  individually  and 
nationally,  it  is  fit  we  should  investigate  it  with 
minute  attention. 

Of  the  causes  of  rise  during  the  war,  tlie  prin- 
cipal were :  — 

1.  Tlie  great  demand  of  men  for  government 
service,  and  the  consequent  increase  of  wages  and 
salaries. 

2.  The  insufficiency  of  our  agricultiu-al  produce, 
caused  partly  by  bad  seasons,  partly  by  the  drain  of 
labour  and  capital  for  the  public  service. 

3.  The  increase  of  taxation. 

4.  The  addition  to  the  cost  of  imported  articles, 
arising  from  the  greater  expence  of  freight,  in- 
surance, and  other  charges  of  transport ;  and  still 
more  from, 

5.  The  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper  after  the 
year  1809. 

Of  these  different  causes,  the  insufficiency  of  our 
agricultural  produce,  and  the  non-convertibility  of 
our  bank  paper,  are  reserved  for  separate  discus- 
sion :  at  present,  we  proceed  to  the  eflect  of  the 
demand  of  men  for  government  service. 


46  Crnisci  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

Proporlion  nfotir  Population  engaged  in  thePvMic 
Serxice.  —  In  1792,  and  tlie  preceding  years  of  peace, 
llie  demanil  made  on  onr  j)0})uIation  for  military  })ur- 
poses  \vas  ^•ery  limited.  \\\  179'3,  our  le\ies  took 
place  on  a  large  scale,  and  in  179'5,  tlie  numbers 
raised  in  three  successive  years  were  such  as  to 
form  a  \'ery  large  establishment.  Recruiting,  how- 
ever, continued  with  activity  during  the  whole 
war,  until  the  signature  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace, 
in  tlie  autumn  of  1801.  —  In  1803,  the  renewal  of 
hostilities  was  attended  by  a  call  on  our  population, 
which  led,  in  little  more  than  a  year,  to  a  more 
numerous  establishment  than  we  had  e\er  had  on 
foot.  The  decisi^•e  victory  of  Trafalgar  remo\ed 
the  dread  of  invasion  ;  but  the  continental  suc- 
cesses of  the  French,  the  aggrandizing  projects  of 
Bonaoarte,  were  such  as  to  admit  of  no  reduction 
on  our  part;  and  after  1808,  all  hearts  were  united 
in  the  cause  of  Spanish  independence.  Hence  a 
continued  demand  for  recruits,  an  increase  of  levy 
money,  and  a  progressive  addition  to  the  numbers 
on  foot,  during  the  rest  of  the  war. 

The  proportion  of  our  population  under  arms 
was  larger  in  this  country  than  in  any  other  state 
in  Euroi)e.  In  March  1804,  Lord  Liverpool,  then 
Lord  Hawkesbury,  declared  in  Parliament,  that 
our  army  and  na\y,  including  militia,  but  exclusive 
of  volunteers,  approached  to  the  number  of  400,000, 
being  more  than  one  in  ten  of  the  able-bodied  po- 
pulation (then  computed  at  3,800,000)  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland.  France,  he  added,  had  at 
that  time  in  arms  about  560,000  men,  or  one  in 
fourteen  of  her  able-bodied  population.  Austria 
had  on  foot  also  one  man  in  fourteen  ;  and  Russia, 
if  any  dependence  was  to  be  placed  in  the  loose 
returns  of  her  population,  nearly  the  same  propor- 


during  the  War.  ly 

tion.  Prussia  was  tlic  only  j)o\ver  whose  military 
force  (about  240,000)  bore,  like  ours,  tlie  propor- 
tion of  one  in  ten  to  her  able-bodied  males :  but  it 
was  with  her  a  season  of  peace,  and  a  number  of 
her  soldiers  were  permitted,  by  furlough,  or  other- 
wise, to  give  a  part  of  the  year  to  productive 
labour. 

It  is  usual  to  compute  the  proportion  of  able- 
bodied  men  in  a  country  at  a  fourth  of  the  total 
population.  The  war  of  1793  lasted  nine  years, 
and  in  the  middle  of  that  period  (the  year  I797  or 
1798),  the  po})ulation  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land was  probably  about  14,000,000,  giving  for  the 
able-bodied  3,500,000. 

The  war  of  1803  lasted  twelve  years,  and  in 
1809,  the  medium  year,  our  numbers  appear  to 
have  been  somewhat  less  than  17,000,000,  trivino' 
for  the  able-bodied  a  proportion  of  4,200,000.  The 
year  1804  was  in  the  middle  of  our  great  contest, 
and  his  Lordship's  computation  may  accordingly 
be  taken  as  a  fair  average  of  the  numbers  under 
arms  during  the  war. 

It  would  be  a  task  of  no  great  difficulty  to  com- 
pute and  place  in  one  column  the  number  of  our 
able-bodied  population  for  each  year,  and  in  an- 
other the  number  of  soldiers,  seamen,  and  militia- 
men in  the  ])ublic  service.  But  the  demand  of 
war  on  population  goes  considerably  farther,  and 
extends  into  a  field  admitting  of  less  accurate  cal- 
culation, comprising  not  only  persons  in  j)ublic 
offices,  dock-yards,  &c.,  but  a  number  of  indivi- 
duals unconnected  with  government,  such  as  manu- 
facturers of  arms,  clothing,  naval  stores,  builders 
of  barracks,  contractors,  and  others,  the  list  of 
whom  is  too  diversified  and  too  mixed  with  the 
occupations  of  private  life  to  admit  of  any  otliei- 


than  a  t^eneral  estimate.  Tliis  estimate  we  are 
inclined  to  make,  in  the  proportion  of  one  lialf  of 
the  mihtary  servants  of  tlie  jiiibhc,  taking  the  aver- 
age of  the  army,  navy,  and  mihtia,  at  400,000 
during  our  twenty-three  years  of  war,  and  at 
^J00,000  the  })ersons  deriving  an  indirect  emi)lo}  - 
ment  from  tlie  war. 

The  number  of  men  thus  withdrawn  from  the  pur- 
suits of  private  industry  appears  toliave  been  on  an 
average  (i00,000,  or  15  per  cent  of  our  able-bodied 
population.  It  is  of  importance  to  remark,  that 
they  consisted  of  individuals  born  chiefly  between 
the  years  177^  ^"^1  1790,  a  time  when  our  popula- 
tion was  very  considerably  inferior*  to  our  numbers 
in  1800.  We  mention  the  year  1800,  because  in 
the  event  of  any  contest  occurring  at  present,  our 
recruits  would,  in  general,  consist  of  individuals 
born  about  that  period,  and  the  abstraction  of  an 
equal  niunber  of  men  from  productive  industry 
would,  of  course,  be  less  felt  than  during  the  late 
war.  The  magnitude  of  the  change  which  it  at 
that  time  produced  will  be  put  in  a  striking  light 
by  a  reference  to  our  annual  expenditure,  keeping 
out  of  view^  our  payments  for  interest  of  debt,  or 
the  civil  service  of  go\ernment,  and  fixing  our  at- 
tention on  a 

Statement 


*  Ricknian's  Preliniiuary  Observations    on  the    Population 
Return  of  1821. 


diiriiig  the  War.  49 

Statement  of  the  conjunct  expense  of  our  army,  navy,  and  ord- 
nance, from  the  beginning  to  the  close  of  the  xvar,  taken  from 
the  accounts  laid  before  Parliament. 


1791. 

-  £   4,226,000 

Brouglit  up 

^£'287,333,000 

1792. 

8,750,000 

1804. 

30,854,000 

1793. 

13,5I1,(X)0 

1805. 

36,219,000 

1794. 

20,247,(X)0 

1806. 

37,706,000 

1795. 

28,751,000 

1807. 

36,176,000 

1796. 

fiO,  165,000 

1808. 

39,778,000 

1797. 

27,606,000 

1809. 

42,073,000 

1798. 

25,982,000 

1810. 

43,246,000 

1799. 

27,257,000 

1811. 

47,968,000 

1800. 

29,613,000 

1812. 

49,739,000 

1801. 

26,998,000 

1813. 

54,872,000 

1802. 

23,121,000 

1814. 

60,239,000 

1803. 

21,106,000 

1815. 

43,282,000 

£287,333,000 

£809,485,000 

Total  exceeding  800,000,000. 

To  these  sums  there  remains  to  add  a  proportion 
of  our  subsidies  ;  we  mean  the  part  suppHed  to  our 
alhes,  not  in  money,  but  in  stores,  the  manufac- 
ture of  which  formed,  of  course,  a  farther  demand 
on  our  national  labour.  Combining  these  into  one 
sum,  and  dividing  it  by  tlie  number  of  years  of 
military  expenditure,  (in  all  twenty- three,)  we  find 
the  average  annual  charge  for  the  army,  navy,  and 
ordnance,  to  have  been  thirty -six  millions,  instead 
of  the  four  or  five  millions  a  year  prior  to  1792. 

Observe  next,  the  difference  of  effect  on  prices 
in  a  sum  raised  for  a  military  purpose,  and  that 
which  is  levied  for  the  interest  of  the  national  debt. 
The  latter  bore,  like  all  taxation,  on  the  prices  of 
commodities ;  but  our  military  expenditure  had  a 
double,  or  rather  triple  effect  of  that  nature  ;  first, 
by  a  drain  of  money  ;  next,  by  a  drain  of  liands  ; 
and,  thirdly,  by  obliging  other  hands  to  work  for 
those  so  withdrawn.  It  is  only  thus  that  we  find  it 
})()ssible  to  explain  cither  the  extraordinary  rise  of 

i: 


50  Cavsex  of  I  lie  liisc  of  Prices 

i)rices  ill  llic  w;ir,  oi"  llu'ir  no  less  extraordinary  fall 
since  the  peace. 

EJfcct  of  Taxal'um  on  House-keeping.  —  I'he 
result,  or,  to  sj)eak  more  })roperly,  the  avowed  ten- 
dency of  most  taxes,  is  an  augmentation  of  })rice. 
Taxes  on  commodities  are  always  imposed  on  the 
calculation  of  being  paid  by  the  consumer;  the 
supply  of  any  article,  whether  a  luxury,  such  as 
wine  and  sugar,  or  a  necessary  of  life,  like  corn, 
salt,  leather,  being  presumed  to  be  in  proportion  to 
the  effectual  demand,  and  the  tax  intended  not  as 
a  burden  on  the  })roducer  or  v^ender,  but  as  an  ad- 
dition to  the  price  paid  by  the  consumer.  This  was 
strikingly  exemplified  in  the  enhancement  during 
the  war  of  several  articles  of  daily  use.  The  su- 
gar which  the  planter,  on  paying  a  moderate  duty, 
could  have  afforded  to  sell  in  England  at  (JOs.  the 
cwt.,  was  raised  by  the  effect  of  new  taxes  and  war 
charges  to  ^Os.  or  7^*'.  Tea  which,  after  paying 
half  its  original  cost  to  the  custom-house,  might 
have  been  sold  at  5s.  or  iSs.  the  lb.,  was  raised,  in 
consequence  of  being  taxed  100  per  cent.,  to  'Js.  or 
8*.,  and  the  salt  which  (see  Sir  T.  Bernard's  pam- 
phlet on  the  employment  of  the  labouring  classes 
in  1817)  might,  if  unburdened,  have  been  afforded 
at  1/.  a  ton,  was  made,  in  consequence  of  the  duty, 
to  cost  more  than  twenty  times  that  price. 

Holland  was  the  first  country  in  Europe  that 
afforded  a  striking  example  of  the  enhancement 
arising  from  taxation,  her  long  and  expensive  strug- 
gle against  Spain  having  necessitated  very  hea\T  im- 
posts so  far  back  as  two  centuries  ago.  Sir  William 
Temple,  among  other  interesting  particulars  with 
which  he  has  diversified  the  graver  matter  of  his 
Memoirs,  takes  occasion  (Vol.  I.  Chapter  VH.) 
to  insert  the  following  remark :    "  The  excise  in 


iluring  I  he  J  far. 


.5i 


Holland  is  great,  and  so  general,  that  I  have  heard 
it  observed  at  Amsterdam,  that  when,  in  a  tavern, 
a  certain  dish  offish  is  eaten  with  the  usual  sauce, 
thirty  several  excises  are  paid,  for  what  is  necessary 
to  that  small  service.'*  —  In  England  taxation  was 
comparatively  light,  until  we  became  ardent  par- 
ticipators in  continental  war,  at  first  under  King 
William,  afterwards  under  Queen  Anne.  A  long 
peace,  and  the  prudent  administration  of  Walpole, 
lessened  for  a  time  the  pressure  of  the  burden  ;  but 
it  was  very  sensibly  increased  by  the  wars  of  17'1'^» 
17«56,  lyy-S*,  and,  above  all,  by  those  of  the  present 
age.  This  is  sufficiently  apparent  from  the  follow- 
ing table  of  taxes  which  affect  house-keeping. 


Taxes  on  Luxuries.    - 

Foreign  spirits,  chiefly 

brandy     -  a£'2,300,000 

British  spirits       -        3,()00,(X)() 
Wine  -  1,600,0(X) 

Rum  -  200,000 

Coffee  and  Cocoa  300,000 

Raisins  and  other  fruits  iGO.GOO 
Silk,  raw  and  thrown      5W.000 


Taxes  on  tlie  necessaries  or 
comforts  of  life. 

Assessed  taxes  (pre- 
vious to  the  late 
reduction)  £6,500,000 

Malt  and  Beer, 
(since  the  reduc- 
tion in  1822)         6,500,000 

Sugar  -  3,000,000 

Tea  -  3,000,000 

Coals  carried  coast- 
ways         -  900,000 

Soap  -  900,000 

Candles  and  Tallow  400,000 

Cotton,  Wool  500,000 

Leather  (since  the 

reduction  in  1822)  300,000 

Foreign  timber         1,000,000 

Bricks,  tiles,  stone, 

slate  -  400,000 

Glass  -  400,000 

Hemp  -  200,000 

In    all,   above   3^2,000,000/.,    exclusive   of   stani]) 
duties  and  postage  j  also  of  taxes  on  foreign  articles, 

E  2 


52  Cauxes  uf'flif  Rise  af  Prices 

such  as  wool,  butter,  cheese,  linens,  drugs,  all  of 
which  have  an  effect  more  or  less  direct  on  house- 
kee})ing,  and  were,  like  those  enumerated  above, 
considerably  increased  during  the  war. 

It  occasionally  happens,  tliat,  in  consequence  of 
over  supply,  the  market  price  of  an  article  does 
not  rise  in  })roportion  to  the  duty,  but  continues  as 
low,  or  nearly  as  low,  as  previous  to  its  imposition  ; 
the  consequence  of  which  is  to  throw  the  new  bur- 
den on  the  producer.  Such  was  long  the  case 
of  our  West  India  sugar  planters  during  the 
war  ;  such  is,  in  a  great  measure,  their  case  at 
present :  it  is  the  case,  also,  of  a  far  more  nu- 
merous cla.ss,  our  farmers,  who,  in  1823  as  in  181.5, 
arc  to  be  considered  as  paying  a  large  share  of 
their  taxes  out  of  their  capital.  In  general,  how- 
ever, there  is  made  an  addition  to  the  price  of  an 
article,  not  merely  to  the  amount  of  the  tax,  but  in  a 
somewhat  increased  proportion.  Suppose  a  custom 
duty  paid  on  an  article  w^hich,  on  importation,  is 
sold  to  a  wholesale  dealer  of  the  first  class,  next  to 
one  of  the  second  class,  and,  lastly,  to  a  retailer : 
the  demand  of  a  profit  on,  or  rather  of  an  indem- 
nity for  the  tax,  is  repeated  three  times ;  and  al- 
thouirh  these  demands  are  far  smaller  in  degree 
than  has  been  asserted  by  the  advocates  for  the  re- 
peal of  taxes,  they  form,  eventually  and  collec- 
tively, a  serious  addition  to  the  national  burdens  j 
an  addition  which,  joined  to  the  charge  of  collect- 
ing our  taxes,  constitutes,  we  believe,  a  dead  loss 
of  from  six  to  seven  millions  sterling,  on  the  total 
amount  paid  by  the  public.  This  loss  will  be 
effectually  lessened  only  by  the  introduction  of  a 
double  improvement ;  a  farther  simplification,  on 
the  part  of  government,  of  the  process  of  collec- 
tion, and,  on  the  part  of  the  public,  the  adoption  of 


duriiijx  the  War.  53 


'© 


the  practice  of  ready  money  payments,  so  general 
in  Holland,  in  its  day  of  prosperity. 

Next,  as  to  taxation  in  a  more  direct  and  undis- 
guised form,  such  as  the  assessed  or  the  property 
taxes.  In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  do  indi- 
viduals in  general  meet  burdens  of  that  description  ? 
Is  it  by  self-denial  and  economy,  by  increased  in- 
dustry, or  by  adding  the  amount  of  the  tax  to  the 
charge  which,  in  their  respective  lines  of  business, 
they  make  on  the  public  ?  Economy  is  practised, 
we  may  be  assured,  by  those  only  wliose  income 
admits  of  no  increase :  augmented  exertion  is  more 
natural  to  our  countrymen,  and  was,  doubtless, 
made  to  bear  a  considerable  part  in  defraying  our 
war  burdens  ;  but  the  latter,  whenever  it  was  at 
all  practicable,  were  charged  by  the  payer  on  his 
customers  or  connections  ;  and  the  result,  as  ex- 
plained in  the  last  chapter,  was  a  progressive 
enhancement  not  only  of  commodities,  but  of 
salaries,  professional  fees,  and  labour  of  every 
kind. 

Collective  Ejfect  of' the  various  Causes  of  Knhance- 
ment.  —  The  total  rise  in  prices  during  the  war, 
appears  to  have  been  between  60  and  70  per  cent., 
IGO  or  170/.  being  required  in  1813  to  make  the 
purchases,  whether  for  the  necessaries,  comforts, 
or  luxuries  of  life,  which  were  made  in  179^2  for 
100/.  Tlie  degree  of  rise  was,  doubtless,  different 
in  different  situations,  but  in  regard  to  the  public 
at  large,  tliat  pro})ortion  will,  we  believe,  be  found 
to  hold.  To  facilitate  the  compreliension  of  this 
somewhat  intricate  enquiry,  it  may  be  useful  to 
descend  into  the  details  of  domestic  life,  and  to 
refer  the  reader  to  the  subjoined  table  of  family 
expenditure. 

E  3 


54  Cduscs  of  I  he  Rise  (J'  Prices 


Comparative  expenditure  oj'  a  Family  of  the  middle  class  in 
Enf;land  in  the  years  1792  and  1813; — discriminating  the 
heads  of  cxpcnce  {by  Nos.  1,  2,  3, 1.)  so  as  to  shpw  the  rise 
produced  respectively  by  each  cause  of  enhancement. 


1792. 

1813, 

£18 

47 

16 

35 

22 

38 

1.  Taxation  was  evidently  the  ciiief  caose  of  rise  in  the  follow- 

ing heads  of  expence  : 

Assessed  taxes  and  poor  rate 

Wine  and  spirits 

Tea,  sugar,  and  other  groceries 

Beer  (partly  from  taxation,  partly  from 

enhancement  of  corn)  -  -  -         7         11 

2.  The  advance  of  labour,  the  occurrence  of 

indifferent  seasons,  and  the  difficulty  of 
import  (from  the  rise  of  freight,  and 
depreciation  of  our  bank  paper  after 
1809,)  were  the  principal  causes  of 
enhancing 


Bread                   -                    .               . 

25 

50 

Butcher  meat 

25 

45 

Milk,  butter,  cheese,  vegetables 

50 

85 

3.  The  advance  of  labour  was  chiefly  in- 
strumental in  raising 

Servants'  wages  -  -  -  18         22 

House  rent,  the  rent  of  houses  in  occu- 
pancy being  determined  by  the  ex- 
pence  of  building  new  houses,  and  the 
latter  by  the  price  of  labour  -  60       100 

Clothes  ...  .  60        85 

Fuel  ....  24         35 

Furniture;  whether  wc  consider  the  in- 
terest on  the  money  vested  in  its 
purchase;  which  we  calculate  at  -  42         63 

Or  annual  repairs  and  purcha!>es,  esti- 
mated at  .  .  -  14         24 


durifiii  the  TFar,  55 


4.  The  rise  of  the  following  can  hardly  be 
referred  to  any  particular  head,  but  ap- 
pear the  mixed  result  of  taxation,  en- 
hanced labour,  and  depreciated  currency. 


Articles  of  leather  manufacture,  chiefly 

boots  and  shoes              ... 

9 

18 

Candles  and  oil 

6 

10 

Washing                      ... 

16 

25 

Education               -               - 

14. 

22 

Medical  attendance 

U 

20 

Incidents,  such    as    postage,   stationery, 

charity,  pocket  disburse 

35 

55 

Expences  of  a  less  necessary  character, 

viz.  travelling,  and  temporary  residence 

in  the  country 

30 

50 

Expence  of  company 

35 

60 

Total 

JL'54-0 

900 

A  table  of  this  kind,  useful  as  it  in  some  degree 
is,  will  hardly  enable  us  to  ascertain  with  precision 
the  rise  proceeding  from  each  of  the  great  causes  of 
enhancement.  But  as  on  so  interesting  a  topic  no 
enquiry  can  be  too  minute,  we  shall  endeavour,  by 
\  arying  our  plan  and  resorting  to  other  grounds  of 
calculation,  to  attain  the  desired  result. 

EJfecl  of  Taxatio7i.  —  For  an  estimate  of  the 
effect  of  taxes  on  house-keeping,  we  are  in  some 
measure  prepared,  by  the  tables  in  our  second 
chapter.  These,  as  well  as  our  subsequent  calcu- 
lations, (see  the  chapter  on  National  Revenue  anil 
Expenditure,)  exhibit  tlie  proportion  borne  at  dif- 
ferent periods  (179^,  1806,  and  1813),  by  our  bur- 
dens to  our  resources.  And  the  result  is,  that  the 
increase  of  our  taxes,  during  the  war,  amounted 
to  a  charge  oi'?imej)C)^  cent,  on  our  national  capital. 
This,  the  arithmetical  result,  is  greatly  below  the  ge- 

E  4 


56  Causes  ()f  the  Rise  of  Pt'iccs 

neral  estimate  of  the  taxes  imposed  during  the  war. 
It  is  also  l)clow  the  addition  whicli  they  will  be 
found  to  liave  causctl  to  our  j)rices,  when  we  take 
into  account  the  obstacles  they  create  to  improve- 
ment in  our  agriculture  and  manufactures.  These 
various  impediments,  unknown  to  the  public,  but 
severely  felt  by  the  persons  on  whose  diffl'rent 
lines  of  occupation  they  bear,  all  tend  to  keep  up 
or  augment  prices,  and  their  collective  effect  was, 
we  believe,  such  as  amply  to  justify  our  computing 
the  addition  to  our  prices,  from  our  war  taxation, 
at  twelve  instead  of  nine  per  cent.  Of  this  we 
shall  treat  more  fully  in  our  concluding  cha})ter, 
when  we  come  to  urge  the  expediency  of  a  farther 
reduction  in  our  public  burdens. 

Substitution  of  Bank  Paper  for  Coin.  —  Here 
we  introduce  a  cause  to  which,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  great  majority  of  the  public,  we  ought  to 
ascribe  the  chief  part  of  the  rise  of  prices  during 
the  war.  This,  however,  is  a  very  complicated 
question,  and  one  which  wdll  require  all  the  eluci- 
dation that  a  separate  discussion  can  confer  on  it. 
At  present  we  shall  merely  observe,  that  the  addi- 
tion to  our  prices,  arising  from  the  fall  of  our  cur- 
rency, from  the  inferiority  in  value  of  our  paper 
to  coin,  appears  to  have  been  about  15  per  cent, 
during  the  latter  years  of  the  war. 

Rise  in  the  Price  of  Labour,  —  To  what  are  we 
to  attribute  the  remarkable  rise  in  the  rate  of  la- 
bour during  the  late  wars  ?  —  To  two  main  causes  : 
the  demand  of  men  for  the  public  service,  and  the 
increased  expence  of  provisions.  In  the  first  years 
of  the  war,  the  rise  w-as  caused  only  bv  the  demand 


durim  the  War.  57 


"& 


of  men  for  the  public  service,  and  provisions  had 
very  httle  share  in  the  enhancement  during  1793 
and  1794.  But  after  1795,  and  still  more  after 
1799,  the  additional  cost  of  provisions  became 
such  as  to  oblige  the  labourer  and  mechanic,  in 
self-defence,  to  stipulate  a  higher  money  payment 
for  his  services. 

A  rise  of  wages  may  be  either  real  or  nomina). 
That  which  was  consequent  on  the  demand  for 
the  militia,  army,  and  navy,  proved  a  real  and 
hondjide  addition,  the  mechanic  or  manufacturer 
who  remained  at  home  being  in  greater  request, 
and  receiving  larger  pay  from  his  employer,  with- 
out reference  to  an  increase  in  his  expenditure. 
But  a  rise  of  wages  proceeding  from  a  rise  of  pro- 
visions is  very  different :  the  addition,  in  one  sense, 
is  merely  a  balance  to  the  addition  in  another,  and 
the  augmentation  is  consequently  nominal.  To 
such  an  extent  did  this  hold  in  the  case  of  our 
labouring  classes  during  the  war,  that  the  286\  or 
.305.  paid  them  weekly  in  our  provincial  towns  in 
1812,  were  hardly  more  available  in  the  purciiasc 
of  the  necessaries  or  comforts  of  life,  than  \os.  \\\ 
1792. 

Effect  of  a  Rise  in  the  Price  of  Labour  on  House- 
keeping Exycnces.  —  The  direct  effect  of  s>uch  a 
rise  is  readily  seen  in  the  increase  of  servants' 
wages  ;  but  its  indirect  operation,  its  enhancement* 
of  work  performed  out  of  doors,  is  of  much  more 
consequence.  This  will  be  at  once  a})parcnt  on 
our  analyzing  the  component  })arts  of  the  cost  of 
manufactures.  In  cotton  goods,  after  all  the  aid 
derived  from  machinery,  labour  still  constitutes 
nearly  a  third  of  the  price  ;   while  in  woollens,  lea- 


.'JS  Cai/sci  (>fflic  Rise  (if  Prices 

ihcr,  liartlvvare,  linen,  anil  })frhaps  in  silk,  its  pro- 
portion is  more  nearly  a  lialfl  Next,  as  to  a  very 
clillercnt  lieacl  in  family  expenditure,  that  of  house- 
rent,  the  chief  constituent  of  charge  is  laboin*, 
since  in  a  country  of  increasing  population,  the 
rent  of  houses  in  occupancy  is  regulated  by  the 
cost  of  new  buildings  ;  and  in  regard  to  these,  the 
command  of  materials  being  unlimited,  the  ques- 
tion resolves  itself  into  a  calculation  of  theexpence 
of  the  requisite  labour.  In  the  case  of  furniture, 
ii  similar  remark  is  applicable ;  and  even  in  ser- 
vices of  a  higher  class,  such  as  teaching  or  medical 
attendance,  the  influence  of  this  cause  (rise  of 
labour)  is  not  excluded. 

To  the  lower  orders  the  rate  of  labour,  in  a 
direct  sense,  is  of  little  consequence,  as  they  are 
accustomed  to  serve  themselves  j  but,  in  an  in- 
direct sense,  by  enhancing  corn,  it  proves  of  the 
greatest  importance. 

EJfect  of  an  Enhancement  oJCorn  on  House-keep- 
ing.— A  return  of  the  ten  years  of  peace  preceding 
1793,  gave  as  the  average  of  the  quarter  of  wheat  in 
the  Windsor  market,  2/.  10^.  ^d.  But  thirteen  years 
of  war,  from  1793  to  1805  (both  inclusive),  gave 
lor  the  quarter  of  wheat  an  average  of  3/.  I'^s.  2d.', 
in  other  words,  152/.  were  required  to  purchase 
the  same  quantity  as  100/.  previous  to  the  war. 
And  the  succeeding  eight  years,  from  ISO6  to 
1813,  gave  the  still  higher  average  of  5/.  1*.  Sd. 
for  the  quarter  of  wheat,  denoting  that  no  less  than 
'200/.  were,  during  that  period,  required  to  purchase 
what,  previous  to  the  war,  had  been  obtained  for 
100/.  Such  was  the  rise  in  wheat :  in  butcher 
meat,  and  agricultural  produce  generally,  the  en- 
U 


during  the  War.  59 

hancement  appears  to  liave  been  nearly  equal ; 
but  for  these  and  other  details,  we  refer  to  the 
Appendix,  and  proceed  to  lay  before  our  readers 
a  statement  of  the  general  result. 

Summary  of  the  Rise  in  House-keeping  at  the  dose  of  the  late 
f'Vars,  making  the  Cnlctdation  in  the  most  comprehensive  Form, 
so  as  to  be  applicable,  not  to  particular  classes,  but  to  the 
public  at  large. 

Proportion  of  rise  proceeding  from  increase  of 

Taxation     12  per  cent. 

from  rise  of  wages  and 

labour  generally  ...     20     ditto 
from   the  enhancement 


of  provisions,  (see  Appendix)  -  -     30     ditto 

Of  this  rise  in  provisions,  we  may  ascribe  per- 
haps the  half  (or  15  per  cent.)  to  the  rise  of 
labour,  and  other  farming  charges  consequent 
on  the  demand  of  men  for  the  public  service : 
the  other  15  per  cent,  to  the  depreciation  of 
our  bank  paper,  enhancement  of  freight,  and 
other  charges  attendant  on  import. 
Proportion  of  rise  from  extra  charges  on  the 
purchase  and  import  of  other  articles  than 
corn ;  such  as  wool,  cotton,  tobacco  -       5     ditto 


Total  -  67  per  cent. 

Such  appears  to  have  been  the  operation  of  the 
different  causes  of  enhancement  diu'ing  the  war. 
We  proceed  to  exemplify  that  rise  by  a  reference 
to  real  property. 

Land. — The  farm  which,  in  179^,  let  for  I70/. ; 
and  which,  in  1803,  (see  the  tabular  return  of 
cliarges  of  cultivation  in  the  cha})ter  ou  Agri- 
culture,) afforded  a  rental  of  ^24.0/.,  lot  in  1813, 
for  S201. 

Houses. — The  house  which,  in  179-»  let  for  .50/., 
and  in  180(),  for  ().5/.,  might  be  consiilered  in  ihc 


60  Cicncnd  Kisc  <>/' Prices 

latter  years  of  the  war,  as  worth  70/.,  tlie  rise  being 
less  <rr(>at  in  lionses  than  in  land.  Its  value,  as  a 
j)urchase,  originally  1000/.,  was  raised  towards 
the  middle  of  our  long  contest  to  1300/.,  and 
eventually  to  1400/.  or  1500/. 

To  deline  the  amount  of  the  rise  of  prices  in 
particular  connnodities,  would  be  a  task  of  great 
labour  and  nicety  :  the  only  person  who  attempted 
it  was  the  late  Mr.  Arthur  Young,  of  whose  calcu- 
lations we  shall  treat  afterwards.  If,  for  the  sake 
of  conferring  some  degree  of  precision  on  an  ob- 
scure subject,  an  attempt  be  made  to  divide  the 
progress  of  enhancement  into  periods,  we  may 
consider  the  war  as  having  produced  half  its  effect 
towards  the  year  1806,  viz.  that  the  rise  of  prices 
taken  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense,  whether  of 
provisions,  clothing,  labour,  or  professional  charges, 
was  in  that  year  somewhat  more  than  30  per  cent, 
above  the  prices  of  1792.  From  I8O6  to  1813  the 
rise  was  more  rapid,  in  consequence  of  the  double 
effect  of  a  non-convertible  currency,  and  extended 
military  operations,  so  that  in  1813  and  1814  the 
enhancement  was  30  or  35  per  cent,  on  the  prices 
of  1806,  or  about  67  per  cent,  on  those  of  179^. 

Hoxcfar  xvas  this  rise  of  prices  7iominal?  —  It  is 
incumbent  on  the  attentive  enquirer,  to  guard 
against  the  error  so  frequent  in  former  years,  and 
at  present  by  no  means  exploded,  of  considering  a 
rise  of  prices  in  the  light  of  a  bondjide  addition  to 
our  public  wealth.  The  reader,  on  referring  to  the 
preceding  table  of  house-keeping  expence,  and 
considering  how  different  trades  and  professions 
are  linked  together,  v.ill  readily  perceive  the  man- 
ner in  which  an  individual,  on  the  occurrence  of  a 
rise  of  prices  in  his  particular  de})artment,  indeni- 


during  the  War.  61 

nifies  himself  by  a  charge  on  the  community.  If, 
for  the  sake  of  ilUistration,  we  advert  to  articles  of 
daily  consumption,  and  to  the  tradesmen  who  are 
most  familiar  to  us,  we  find  the  baker  and  butcher 
raise,  of  course,  their  demands  on  their  customers, 
in  proportion  as  the  prices  of  their  articles  are 
raised  to  them  by  the  farmer  or  grazier.  In  a 
similar,  though  not  equally  direct  manner,  the 
teacher  augments  his  charge  for  board  and  instruc- 
tion ;  the  upholsterer,  the  price  of  his  furniture  ; 
the  landlord,  the  rent  of  his  houses.  —  The  whole 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  circulation  ;  or,  to  borrow 
an  expression  from  Mr.  S.  Gray,  of  "  charge  and 
counter-charge.'* 

But  a  rise  which  is  common  to  all  can  be  little 
else  than  nominal.  The  owner  of  a  house  or  land 
was  hardly  able  to  purchase  more  commodities  with 
the  increased  rent,  during  the  war,  than  with  the 
limited  sum  paid  to  him  in  1792.  He  found  130/. 
in  180G,  or  160/.  in  1813,  of  no  greater  value  than 
100/.  at  the  beginning  of  the  French  Revolution  ; 
and  the  correct  mode  of  speaking  is, — that  land  and 
houses  rose  in  money  rent  in  proportion  as  money  de- 
clined in  value,  that  is,  they  maintained  a  nearly  uni- 
form \'alue,  though  the  sum  paid  was  very  different. 
The  same  is  applicable,  as  we  shall  see  presently, 
to  the  far  greater  part  of  income,  whether  arising 
from  ])roperty  or  labour ;  from  capital  vested  in 
trade,  manufacture,  or  agriculture  ;  from  wages, 
salaries,  or  professional  charges,  the  sum  paid  hav- 
ing regularly  increased  as  its  value  diminished. 

Money  Property^  such  as  a  Ijoan  on  Mortgage. — 
We  here  advert  to  a  descrij)tion  of  property  ma- 
terially different  from  lantl  or  houses,  a  property 
which  cx])ericnces  neitiier  rise  or  fall,  whatever  be 
the  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money.     Sup])0se 


(32  (icniral  Rise  ufVriccs 

\\  sum  (.3,200/.)  to  have  been  advanced  on 
morti^age  in  179*^,  ^ind  to  liave  remained  on  tliat 
security  dnrini^  the  war,  it  will  hardly  be  denied 
that  in  sncii  years  as  1811  or  1812,  it  was  con- 
sidered a  proi)erty  of"  less  value  than  ])revious  to 
the  war.  The  ICIO/.  which  tlie  owner  continued 
to  draw  as  interest,  was  in  these  years  worth  to 
liini  little  more  than  100/.  in  1792. 

Proportion  of  national  Income  affected  i?i  this 
Marnier. — The  reader  on  referring  to  our  estimate 
of  taxable  income,  in  the  chapter  on  National 
Revenue,  will  find  the  sums  paid  to  annuitants, 
whether  creditors  of  the  public  or  of  individuals, 
computed  at  50,000,000/.  a  year,  or  one-fitth  of 
the  total  national  income.  The  receivers  of  the 
other  fbur-fifUis,  whether  landholders,  farmers, 
merchants,  or  manufacturers ;  whether  clerks,  me- 
chanics, or  country  labourers,  obtained  in  their 
annual  income,  (in  the  form  of  rent,  salary,  wages, 
he.)  an  addition  corresponding,  or  nearly  corre- 
sponding to  the  decline  in  the  value  of  money. 
From  this  benefit  were  excluded  the  annuitants, 
to  the  extent  we  have  mentioned ;  and  many  of 
them  would  have  felt  more  severely  the  dimi- 
nished value  of  their  receipts,  had  it  not  been  in- 
directly counterpoised  by  tlie  activity  arising  from 
the  war,  and  the  consequent  facility  in  providing 
for  their  connections  in  the  public  service. 

Since  the  peace,  the  relative  situation  of  these 
great  portions  of  the  community  has,  as  is  well 
known,  been  reversed.  Annuitants  have  found 
their  incomes  recover  their  \alue ;  while  the  other 
classes,  above  all,  the  agriculturists,  have  expe- 
rienced the  most  distressing  effects  from  the  fall 
of  prices. 


during  the  War,  63 

Change  in  the  Value  of  Money.  —  Our  readers 
will  now  be  able  to  form  a  definite  idea  of  what  is 
meant  when  we  speak  of  a  fall  or  rise  in  the  value 
of  money.  The  fall  of  prices  since  the  peace  has 
been  very  different  in  different  articles  ;  for  while 
in  the  produce  in  the  soil  it  is  above  GO,  and  in 
several  branches  of  manufacture  above  50  per  cent., 
in  the  case  of  house-rent,  or  the  wages  of  me- 
chanics, it  probably  does  not  exceed  15  per  cent. 
But  the  business  of  the  statistical  enquirer  is  with 
the  average^  which  is,  doubtless,  not  less  than  30 
per  cent,  on  all  payments  determined  by  free  com- 
petition ;  in  other  words,  in  all  articles  brought  to 
open  market.  In  payments  of  a  different  natiu-e, 
such  as  professional  fees,  salaries,  servants'  wages, 
the  decrease  is  as  yet  inconsiderable ;  because  in 
these  there  exists  no  ready  appeal  to  competition, 
no  prompt  means  of  overcoming  the  opposition  to 
reduction.  In  London,  journeymen  in  various 
trades  are,  in  consequence  of  their  system  of  com- 
bining, still  in  the  receipt  of  5,y.  or  iSs.  a  day,  as  in 
the  season  of  war  and  expensive  living;  but  such 
a  state  of  things  can  hardly  be  of  long  duration. 
The  fall  of  provisions,  the  example  of  other  coun- 
tries, the  diminished  profit  of  capital,  all  point  to 
the  necessity  of  a  change,  and  will  eventually  over- 
come resistance,  whether  on  the  part  of  tl\e  lower 
orders,  or  of  the  receivers  of  pensions  and  salaries, 
in  whom,  possessing  as  they  do  better  means  of 
information  and  comparison,  pertinacity  in  reten- 
tion would  be  more  reprehensible.  As  such  re- 
duction, therefore,  will,  in  all  probability,  become 
general,  and  the  words,  "  fall  of  })rice,"  are  too 
limited  to  express  a  decrease  of  such  incomes  as 
arise  from  personal  exertion,  we  adopt  the  more 
comprehensive  phrase  of  a  "rise  or  lull  in  the  ^•alue 
of  money." 


(j4  (iencral  Rise  of  Prica* 

Prices  nn  the  Covlineiif  since  1792.  —  In  liow  far, 
in  tlie  present  age,  have  the  other  countries  of 
Knroj)e  participated  in  those  fluctuations  of  money 
wliich  among  us  have  reached  so  extraordinary  a 
lengtli  ?  Tliis  question  is  of  no  easy  solution,  as 
well  from  want  of  documents  in  countries  which 
liad  then  no  representative  assembly,  as  from  a 
depreciated  paper  having  been  current  in  almost 
every  part  of  Europe.  France,  the  only  state  that 
has  equalled  us  in  the  duration  of  her  wars,  ex- 
hibits a  remarkable  contrast  to  us  in  the  extent  of 
her  financial  burdens.  Her  taxation,  amounting 
in  the  beginning  of  the  revolution,  to  about  twenty- 
two  millions  sterling,  (see  the  Report  of  Camus  to 
the  National  Assembly,  in  July  1790),  was  never 
increased  by  more  than  the  half  of  that  sum ;  while 
our  sixteen  millions  of  1792,  became  forty-five 
millions  in  1804;  sixty  millions  in  1808,  and  nearly 
seventy  millions  in  1814.  In  fact,  in  the  early 
part  of  the  revolutionary  war,  the  collection  of 
revenue  in  France  was  (see  the  Due  cle  Gaete  on 
French  Finance),  considerably  under  twenty  mil- 
lions ;  the  wants  of  government  having  been  sup- 
plied by  the  emission  of  assignats  during  four  yeai's 
of  emergency,  (1792-3-4-5)  and  afterwards,  in  a 
considerable  degree,  by  contributions  from  con- 
quered territories.  After  the  fervour  of  the  first 
years  of  the  revolution,  there  was  in  France  no 
legislative  body  capable  of  conferring  credit  on 
government  stock :  no  exemption  from  cash  pay- 
ments to  facilitate  to  the  payers  of  taxes,  the  means 
of  reimbursing  themsehes  by  a  ready  addition  to 
wages,  salaries,  or  professional  fees.  The  amount 
emitted  in  the  form  of  assignats  admits  of  no  defi- 
nite calculation,  the  value  of  that  government 
paper  having  fallen  rapidly,   and  having  been  at 

21  ' 


during  the  TVar,  iS5 

last,  ill  1796,  reduced  to  a  nullity.  But  if  we 
compute  at  two  liundred  millions  sterling  the 
amount  of  public  sacritice  from  the  assignats,  and 
if  we  add  for  the  bankruptcy  committed  in  regard 
to  two-thirds  of  the  public  debt,  the  forced  loan  of 
1797>  i^"d  the  augmented  taxation  of  the  latter 
years  of  Bonaparte,  two  hundred  millions  more ; 
and,  finally,  if  we  add  a  national  loss  of  one  hun- 
dred millions,  consequent  on  his  inauspicious  return 
from  Elba,  and  the  invasion  of  1815,  we  make  in 
all,  a  pecuniary  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  France,  of 
five  hundred  millions  sterling,  over  and  above  the 
twenty-two  millions  of  annual  expenditure  neces- 
sary under  a  peace  establishment. 

But  the  political  strength  of  our  southern  neigh- 
bour lies  less  in  money  than  in  men,  and  that 
forced  annual  levy  which  would  be  so  indignantly 
received    among    us,    and    so   subversive    of   the 
resources   of  a    commercial    and    manufacturine: 
country,  proved  the  most  effectual  means  of  draw- 
ing forth  the  power  of  France.     In  this  respect 
accordingly,   her  sacrifices  have  been  very  great, 
the  number  of  men  who  fell  in  the  long  struggle 
from  1792  to  1815,  estimated,  on  a  moderate  com- 
putation, at  a  million  and  a  halfj  being  probably 
more  than  three  times   the  number  lost  by  our 
country,  after  every  allowance  for  the  destructive 
effect   of  tropical   climates.      In  another  respect, 
also,  the  neglect  of  education  and  postponement 
of  the    choice    of  a  profession    attendant  on  the 
Conscription,  as  well  as  the  loss  of  time  to  those 
who   escaped   the   sword  and    resumed  a   })acific 
occupation,  form  an  amount  of  national  detriment 
which  may  very  fairly  be  put  in  the  balance  against 
the  vast  loss  sustained  in  this  country  by  the  transi- 
tion from  war  to  peace. 


C)6  General  Rise  af  Pricea 

The  Netherlands,  siihjecteil  iluriiifr  twenty  years 
to  the  sway  of  France,  and  (liirin*;-  a  part  of  the 
time  to  the  Conscri})ti()n,  were  also  ex})osed  to 
heavy  losses  from  the  war.  If  less  great  than  those 
of  France  in  men,  they  were  larger  in  a  financial  and 
commercial  sense,  as  well  from  angmented  taxation 
as  from  intern ij)ted  intercourse,  and  the  many, 
abortive  attempts  made,  during  the  enforcement 
of  the  prohibitory  decrees,  to  produce  substitutes 
for  coflf'ee  and  other  articles,  the  growth  of  a  tro})i- 
cal  climate. 

Of  the  other  European  powers,  the  chief  belli- 
gerent was  Austria,  whose  pecuniary  sacrifice  was 
lessened  by  our  subsidies,  but  whose  loss  in  men 
amounted  perhaps  to  the  half  of  that  of  France. 
Next  came  Prussia,  Spain,  Russia,  Sweden,  in 
whose  case  the  duration  of  suffering  was  less,  but 
who  were  all  doomed  to  feel  the  destructive  ravag-e 
of  war  and  invasion.  A  pressure  of  a  more  lasting 
kind,  we  mean  that  which  is  attendant  on  the 
maintenance  of  a  large  standing  force,  extended  to 
every  state,  great  and  small,  on  the  Continent,  from 
179'^  to  1814.  Their  taxation  consequently  in- 
creased, and  the  general  demand  for  men  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  general  rise  in  the  price  of  labour.  The 
impracticability  of  effecting  loans  prevented  that 
stimulus  to  productive  industry,  that  diain  on  the 
future  in  favour  of  the  present  which  took  place 
among  us  to  so  great  an  extent :  nor  was  there  in 
any  part  of  the  Continent  a  continued  inadequacy  of 
agricultural  produce.  Accordingly,  though  prices 
on  the  Continent  became  higher  in  war  than  they 
had  been  in  peace,  though  during  the  one  period 
the  demand  for  labour  was  brisk,  in  the  other  lan- 
guid, the  degree  of  difference  was  much  smaller 
than  with  us.  This  topic  shall  be  more  fully  treated 
1? 


during  the  War.  Cfjf 

in  a  subsequent  part  of  our  volume,  (Appendix  to 
Chap,  ix.)  but  were  we,  for  the  sake  of  arriving  at  a 
definite  estimate,  to  hazard  a  conjecture  of  the  differ- 
ence between  the  present  ])rices  on  tlie  Continent 
and  those  of  17f)^-^,  we  shoukl  pronounce  the  former 
about  15  per  cent,  higlier,  being  half  the  enhance- 
ment that  we  find  in  Enghmd,  comparing  our  pre- 
sent prices  to  tiiose  of  179^. 

This  excess  on  our  part  in  tiie  ratio  of  enhance- 
ment, added  to  a  nearly  similar  excess  in  prices 
previous  to  1792,  makes  a  total  difference  between 
this  country  and  the  Continent  of  from  20  to  30 
per  cent.  The  leading  causes  of  this  are  our  lieavy 
excise  duties,  the  larger  size  of  our  towns,  and  the 
occasional  operation  of  our  corn  laws.  The  balance 
against  us  would  be  still  greater,  were  it  not  in  a 
considerable  degree  counteracted  by  the  cheapness 
of  fuel  and  of  several  articles  of  manufacture,  in 
particular  hardware,  in  which  our  connnand  of 
capital,  our  inland  navigation,  and  our  machinery, 
afford  us  a  considerable  advantage  over  the  Con- 
tinent. 

Rise  of  Prices  apparently  indicative  of  Prosperity. 
—  An  increase  in  the  money  value  of  commodities, 
of  land,  houses,  and  stock  in  trade,  accom})anied 
by  a  general  augmentation  of  salaries  and  wages, 
suggested  during  the  war  the  idea  of  a  general 
increase  of  wealth  in  correspondence,  as  was  com- 
monly believed,  to  the  increase  in  our  circulating 
medium. 

We  have  already  shown  that  this  was,  in  a  great 
measure,  nominal:  the  augmented  })rice  of  com- 
modities, of"  land,  houses,  merchandise,  re(juii"ed, 
to  represent  it,  a  larger  sum  of  money,  but  that 
such  money  was  of  less  value.     Or,  if  we   admit 

F  '2 


f,H  General  Bhc  of  Prices 

thai  there  was  in  several  respects  an  inciease  of 
i)roperty,  tliat  the  general  briskness  caused  by  the 
(liMnands  of  government  led  to  an  actual  rise  of 
])rices,  a  rise  over  and  above  that  Avliich  was  recjni- 
site  to  meet  the  alteration  in  the  value  of  the  cur- 
rency, it  is  fit,  on  the  other  hand,  to  recollect  that 
the  fixed  money  property  of  the  country,  such  as 
the  stocks  and  loans  on  mortgage,  all  underwent 
depreciation,  because  in  these  the  same  sums  repre- 
sented a  reduced  value.  What  then  was  the  real 
result?  That,  on  the  one  hand,  the  national  pro- 
})erty  was  lessened  by  the  great  additional  charge 
arising  from  the  war :  on  the  other,  it  was  aug- 
mented in  proportion,  not  to  the  rise  of  prices,  but 
to  the  progress  of  national  improvement  and  in- 
crease of  population.  No  such  limitations,  how- 
ever, were  admitted  in  the  estimate  of  the  public, 
or,  as  far  as  we  can  perceive,  in  that  of  ministers  : 
both  confidently  inferred  prosperity  from  rise  of 
prices,  and  appear  never  to  have  suspected  that 
such  a  rise  was  deceptive,  and  might  take  its  origin, 
in  great  part,  from  an  increase  of  burden. 

What  a  train  of  misconception,  w^hat  a  series  of 
sanguine  and  fallacious  notions  would  have  been 
prevented,  had  the  public  been  earlier  aware  of 
these  simple  truths  !  During  the  Avar,  the  rise  of 
price  was  so  regular,  and  of  such  long  continuance, 
(from  1793  to  181  i),  that  the  majority  of  the  pre- 
sent generation  took  for  granted  that  it  would  be 
permanent,  ascribing  it  less  to  the  war  and  the  de- 
mands of  government,  than  to  causes  likely  to  be  per- 
manent,— such  as  the  unknown  gains  of  our  foreign 
commerce,  or  the  influx  of  the  precious  metals  of 
America.  But  in  this,  as  in  other  points, the  return  of 
peace  has  undeceived  us ;  it  has  shown  that  the 
amount  of  our  commercial  gains,  and  the  influx  of 

14  " 


during  the  War.  Cf) 


't> 


specie,  were  botli  over-rated  ;  ami  tliat  the  origin  of 
Iiii;Ii  prices  is  to  be  sought  in  less  welcome  causes. 
Of  these,  the  demand  for  men  for  the  public  service, 
the  insufficiency  of  our  growth  of  corn,  and  the  de- 
preciation of  our  bank  paper,  have  all,  for  some  time,^ 
ceased  to  operate,  but  their  effects  have  by  no  means 
ceased ;  while  the  fburtli  cause,  we  mean  taxation, 
continues  to  press  on  us  with  almost  undiminished 
rii>'our. 

ILvll  of  high  Prices  wheii  peculiar  to  a  Country. — 
The  pernicious  tendency  of  fluctuation  in  the  value 
of  money  is  generally  admitted,  but  that  of  a  ge- 
neral rise  of  prices  is  less  understood :  it  is  even 
the  notion  of  a  number  of  writers,  and  of  a   still 
greater  number  of  practical  men,   that   taxation, 
though  a  great  cause  of  enhancement,  is  productive 
of  no  injury  in  a  public  sense,  because  the  money 
thus   collected   is   almost  all  expended  at  home. 
This  idea  has  induced  the    writer   already  men- 
tioned (Mr.  S.  Gray),  whose   views,   sound   and 
liberal  in  several  respects,  are  in  others  greatly  im- 
paired by  over-confidence,    to   give    our  national 
debt  the  convenient  name  of  "  public  service  ca- 
])ital."     "  The  payment  of  the  interest  is,**  says 
Mr.  Gray,  in  the  work  entitled,   *  All  Classes  pro- 
ductive of  National  Wealth,*    (p.  13G.)  "  no  dis- 
advantage :  the  public  is  just  where  it  was  before  : 
they  have  had  thirty  millions  charged  on  them,  for 
the  interest  of  the  national   debt,   and  they  have 
charged  thirty  millions  in  return.'*  —  All  this  might 
be  true  were  the  British  Islands  a  distinct  })lanet, 
or  were  they  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  world 
by  a  "  wall  of  brass  ten  thousand  cubits  high :  '* 
l)ut,  doomed  as  we  are  to  intercourse  with  our  con- 
tinental brethren,   does  not  an  excess  of  taxation 
place  us  under  a  great  relati\e  tlisad\antage  in  a 

1-^  3 


JO  General  Rise  uf  Prices 

competition  witli  foreign  nuinufacturers  ?  And, 
before  the  liill  in  our  corn  market,  was  it  not  to 
be  apprehended,  tliat  our  capitalists  might  transfer 
to  less  burdened  countries,  tliat  money,  that  ma- 
chinery, and,  in  part,  those  hands,  which  have  so 
eflTectually  conduced  to  make  us  support  our  finan- 
cial pressure? 

A  writer  of  great  notoriety,   without  carrying 
his  doctrine  so  far  as  Mr.  Gray,  expresses,  in  more 
places  than  one,  an  opinion  that  high  taxation  im- 
poses on  us  no  disadvantage  relatively  to  our  neigh- 
bours, or,  to  use  his  own  words,  that  *'  a  generally 
high  })rice  of  commodities  in  consequence  of  tax- 
ation would  be  of  no  disadvantage  to  a  state."  * 
This  opinion  Mr.  Ilicardo  repeats  in  another  pas- 
sage (p.  305.)  where  he  says,  that  the  "  amount  of 
taxes  and  the  increased  price  of  labour  in  a  coun- 
try does  not,  according  to  his  ideas,  place  it  under 
any  other  disadvantage  with  respect   to   foreign 
countries,  except  the  unavoidable  one  of  paying 
these  taxes.'*     But  he  soon  after  makes  a  highly 
important  qualification,    by  admitting  that  these 
charges  render  it  the  interest  of  every  contributor 
to  "  withdraw  his  shoulder  from  the  burden,  and, 
in  many  cases,  to  remove  himself  and  liis  capital  to 
another  country ;"  a  course  replete  with  the  most 
injurious  results. 

Were  we  to  suppose,  for  the  sake  of  illustration, 
that  the  whole  of  the  civihzed  world,  the  whole  of 
the  states  who  carry  on  a  commercial  intercourse 
with  each  other,  were  simultaneously  involved  in 
war,  and  obliged  to  impose  on  themselves  burdens 
which  bear  the  same  proportion  to  the  taxable 
income  of  each  :  —  the  consequence  would   be  a 

*  Ilicardo  on  Political  Econoiuy,  2d  edition,  p.  283. 


during  the  War.  71 

concurrent  and  uniform  rise  of  prices ;  and  a  con- 
test, after  lasting  twenty  years,  miglit  terminate 
without  any  relative  disadvantage  to  any  of  the 
belligerents,  as  far  as  regarded  thek  finances,  or 
the  state  of  their  productive  labour.  But  in  every 
war  there  are  certain  states,  whose  rulers  have  the 
prudence  to  avoid  participating  in  the  unprofitable 
struggle,  and  who  secure  to  their  subjects  the  ad- 
vantages of  neutrality,  along  with  an  exemption 
from  the  burdens  entailed  on  their  neighbours. 
Such,  in  the  present  age,  was  the  case  of  Denmark 
until  I8O7 :  such  also  was,  for  a  time,  the  case  of 
Sweden,  Prussia,  and,  above  all,  of  the  United  States 
of  America. 

Holland,  a  country  particularly  inclined  to  a 
pacific  policy,  has,  firom  her  geographical  position, 
been  unavoidably  involved  in  most  of  the  great 
contests  which  have  taken  place  since  she  became 
a  power,  so  that,  during  the  last  two  centuries,  her 
history  exhibits  hardly  any  period  of  exemption 
from  them,  except  in  the  war  of  1756.  We,  whe- 
ther from  the  necessity  or  belligerent  ardour,  have 
so  seldom  enjoyed  the  blessing  of  neutrality,  that 
to  trace  it  in  our  history,  we  are  obliged  to  reciu" 
to  the  reign  of  James  I.,  who,  whatever  might  be 
his  weakness  in  other  respects,  stedfastly  maintained 
peace  amidst  the  convulsions  of  Germany,  the  dis- 
sensions of  France,  the  prolonged  hostilities  of 
Spain  and  Holland.  A  striking  illustration,  not 
indeed  of  neutrality,  but  of  that  prudent  mode  of 
warfare  which  secures  national  independence,  with- 
out aiming  at  foreign  acquisitions,  is  to  be  found 
in  the  troubled  reign  of  Elizabeth,  and  the  wise 
administration  of  Cecil.  How  different  would  have 
been  our  situation  in  regard  to  pubUc  burdens,  had 

1-  4 


7'i       (itiural  Rise  ()f'  Prices  (luring  I  lie  War. 

tlie  reins  of  «;ovcrnmcnt  \\\  the  ])rcsent  age  been 
held  by  such  experienced  hands ! 

Elfi'cl  of  the  Rise  of  Prices  on  our  Finances. 
—  This  rise,  hke  all  artificial  clianges,  was  pro- 
iluctive  of  little  j)ermanent  eHect :  it  increased 
the  numerical  amount  of  the  revenue,  but  it  was 
ultimately  followed  by  an  equivalent  loss  in  aug- 
mented expenditure ;  enhancing  stores,  salaries, 
the  pay  of  the  army  and  navy,  in  short,  almost  every 
object  of  government  disburse.  Unluckily,  the 
amount  of  our  loans  was  greatest  at  the  time  that 
money  was  of  the  least  value.  If  we  calculate 
the  debt  contracted  since  1792  at  460,000,000/., 
and  divide  the  period  with  reference  to  the  value 
of  money,  we  shall  find  that  the  smaller  part  of  this 
debt  was  incurred  when  money  was  more  valuable 
than  at  present,  the  larger  when  money  was  more 
depreciated.  Since  the  cessation  of  war,  money  has 
risen  progressively  in  value,  and  the  interest  of  our 
debt,  without  augmenting  in  amount,  has  increased 
in  pressure  to  a  degree  which,  coupled  with  the 
evils  of  sudden  transition,  has  unfortunately  borne 
hard  on  the  majority  of  the  public. 


73 


CHAP.  IV. 

Our  Currcnc})  and  Exchanges  since  1 792. 

Having  now  traced  the  fluctuation  in  the  price 
of  commodities  during  the  last  thirty  years,  we 
proceed  to  a  topic  closely  connected  with  it,  the 
variations  in  our  continental  exchanges.  In  this, 
one  of  our  chief  objects  will  be  to  describe  the 
operation  of  our  subsidies,  and  of  our  purchases, 
occasionally  to  a  great  amount,  of  foreign  corn; 
these  being  the  causes  which  mainly  affect  our 
exchanges,  and  are  productive  of  great  and  rapid 
fluctuation.  They  are,  in  general,  demands  both 
of  large  amount,  and  of  sudden  occurrence,  super- 
added to  our  customary  disburse,  and  requiring  to 
be  paid  before  time  can  be  given  to  our  merchants 
and  manufacturers  to  prepare  and  send  abroad 
an  equivalent  amount  in  commodities.  This  chap- 
ter will  accordingly  comprise, 

A  historical  sketch  of  our  continental  ex- 
changes ; 

The  eflects  of  the  exemption  of  the  Bank  from 
cash  payments  ;  and 

The  questions  of  depreciation  and  over-issue. 

Historical  Sketch  of  our  Excf/angoi. 

From  17D'2 /o  1707.— In  the  lir^t  year  of  the 
war,  our  participation  iu  the  contest  produced 
little   eliect  ou   the  exchange,   in    consequence  ot 


74  Our  Currcncjj  and  Exchanges. 

our  aitl    hein*^    liirnished   less  in    money  tlian    in 
troops  iuul  military  stores.     Next  siimmei-  (I7fjl') 
a  sudden  depression  was  produced  Ijy  the  remit- 
tances commenced  for  the  Prussian  sul)sidy;  but 
it  ceased  as  soon  as  it  became  known  that  that 
])ower,  a  far  less  zealous  ally  in  those  days  than 
subsequently,   was  not  likely  to  fulfil  its  engage- 
ments.     In    1795,    circumstances    became    very 
different :    oiu-  troops  had  been   withdrawn   from 
the  Continent,  our  contribution  to  the  allied  cause 
was  made,  in  a  great  measure,   in  money,  and  an 
unfortunate   deficiency  in  our  harvest,   forced  us 
to  make  large  importations  of  corn.     A  balance 
from  commercial  payments  began  thus  to  be  added 
to  the  remittances  of  government,  and  the  result 
was  a  considerable  fall  in  the  exchange  ;   money 
in  England  becoming  inferior  in  value  by  five  per 
cent,  to  the  money  of  the  Continent.     This  dif- 
ference was  of  serious  moment  to  the  Bank,  and 
obliged    them   to   limit   greatly   the    discount   of 
mercantile  bills,   under  an  apprehension  that  the 
notes  issued  for  such  discount  would  be  presented 
at  the  Bank  for  specie,  and  the  latter  exported  to 
the  Continent.     Of  the    distress   caused   to  mer- 
chants by  this  limitation,   those  only   can  judge 
who  witnessed  the  pecuniary  difficulties  of  1795 
an4  179^^  or  who  have  had  access  to  read  in  the 
parliamentary  papers  the  anxious  correspondence 
of  that  date  between  Mr.  Pitt  and  the  Bank  di- 
rectors.    At  one  time  (November,  1795)  the  price 
of  gold,    when  purchased  with  Bank   notes,   had 
risen  to  eight  per  cent,   above  its  value  in  coin, 
and   necessitated  a  farther    and    most    distressing 
reduction  of  Bank  paper.    In  the  autumn  of  1796, 
a  better  harvest   delivered  us  from  one  cause  of 
drain ;  but  towards  the  end  of  that  year,  and  the 


Our  Currencij  and  Exchanges.  75 

beginning  of  1797»  distrust  and  alarm  were  re- 
newed by  a  threatened  invasion  from  France.  The 
failure  of  several  country  banks  having  unluckily 
occurred  at  that  critical  moment,  tlie  consequence 
was  a  run  on  other  country  banks,  and  a  great  de- 
mand for  gold  from  the  Bank  of  England.  In  vain 
did  the  Directors  resort  to  their  hitherto  unfailing 
expedient,  a  reduction  of  the  quantity  of  their  notes: 
the  evil  was  new  and  peculiar ;  the  drain  conti- 
nued without  a  prospect  of  abatement,  when,  after 
bringing  down  their  circulation  to  nearly  8, (iOO, 000/. 
and  communicating  their  situation  to  ministers,  the 
Directors  received,  on  the  25th  February,  1797, 
the  well-known  injunction  from  the  Privy  Council, 
to  suspend  all  farther  payments  in  cash. 

This  order,  limited  at  first  to  a  few  weeks,  was 
soon  after  prolonged  to  the  end  ofthe  current  session 
of  parliament,  and  eventually  to  the  opening  of  the 
succeeding  session.  In  the  interval,  circumstances 
became  more  favourable,  corn  was  abundant,  our 
continental  subsidies  drew  to  a  close,  our  exports 
of  merchandize  were  large,  the  exchange  rose,  and 
specie  flowed  into  the  country  from  causes  very 
similar  to  those  which  had  lately  made  it  flow  out. 
The  bank  was  now  in  a  state  to  resume  cash  })ay- 
ments;  but  parliament,  finding  that  no  >incon- 
venience  had  resulted  from  the  suspension,  deter- 
mined to  adhere  to  it,  and  passed  resolutions 
which  made  exemption  from  cash  payments  be  con- 
sidered our  settled  policy  during  the  remainder  of 
the  war. 

From  \l^.)'-i  to  1802.  — The  year  1708  was  more 
than  usually  pros})erous,  l)eing  marked  by  a  favour- 
able season  at  home,  an  exemption  from  the  bur- 
den of  subsidies  abroad,  and  distinguished  success 


70  Our  Cunrnci/  and  E^rclum^cs. 

in  our  n:i\  al  operations.  Confidence  bein*^  now  re- 
stored, money  became  more  rapid  of  circulation 
and  comparatively  plentiful,  while  our  exclian^es 
with  the  Continent  experienced  no  full,  althou<;h 
our  bank  pai)er  was  no  longer  convertible  into  cash, 
■^riie  succeeding  year,  however,  ])resented  a  very 
iliflerent  spectacle  :  Austria,  encouraged  by  a  Bri- 
tish subsidy  and  the  co-operation  of  Russia,  took 
the  field  against  France,  and  hardly  did  intelligence 
arrive  of  the  formation  of  this  second  coalition,  and 
of  an  engagement  for  a  double  subsidy,  when  our 
exchanges  began  to  bear  the  mark  of  rapid  declen- 
sion. The  summer  of  1799  was  wet,  and  it  unfor- 
tunately happened,  as  in  1796,  that  large  purchases 
of  corn  were  necessary  at  the  time  of  the  greatest 
pressure  of  foreign  expenditure.  Such  continued 
our  situation   during  the  summer  and  autumn   of 

1800,  when  the  successes  of  Bonaparte  in  Italy, 
and  of  Moreau  in  Germany,  brought  our  subsidies 
to  a  close.  Relief  would  now  have  been  felt,  had 
not  the  calamity  of  a  deficient  harvest  taken  place 
in  1800,  and  raised  the  price  of  corn  during  that 
and  the  following  year  to  an  unexampled  height. 
The  total  value  of  our  corn  imports  during  1800, 

1801,  and  part  of  1802,  was  declared  in  evidence 
before  a  parliamentary  committee  to  be  no  less  than 
15,000,000/.  sterling. 

Of  all  the  trials  our  money  system  had  yet  expe- 
rienced, this  was  the  most  severe ;  and  it  was  ac- 
cordingly in  1800,  that  the  effects  of  the  non-con- 
vertibility of  our  bank  paper  became  distinctly 
visible  in  the  state  of  our  exchanges.  The  wants 
of  the  merchants  drove  them  to  the  bank  for  dis- 
counts, and  their  demands  were  supplied  with  a 
confidence  which  the  Directors  would  not  have  ven- 
tured to  exercise,  had  they  been  liable  to  pay  in 


Our  Currency  and  Edrlianges.  77 

specie.  This  accommodation,  thougli  far  from  be- 
neficial in  its  remote  consequences,  served  at  the 
time  to  lessen  to  the  public  the  evils  arising  from 
the  fall  of  the  exchange,  and  the  subsequent  depre- 
ciation of  our  paper  (between  three  and  five  j)ei 
cent.)  was  hardly  perceived,  either  by  us  or  by 
foreigners.  The  charge  most  open  to  observation 
was  in  the  materials  of  our  currency :  our  guineas 
had  now,  for  the  most  part,  gone  abroad,  and  our 
small-note  circulation,  insignificant  during  1797, 
179s,  and  part  of  1799,  became  augmented  in 
1800,  1801,  and  1802,  to  four  millions,  exclusive  of 
the  small  notes  of  our  provincial  banks. 

From  1803  to  1808.  —  The  peace  of  Amiens  was 
too  short  to  admit  of  the  repeal  of  the  Restriction 
Act,  and  on  the  renewal  of  war,  all  idea  of  re))eal 
was  relinquished,  a  continuance  of  the  sus})ension 
being  considered  an  essential  part  of  our  })()hcy. 
Unattended  by  continental  subsidies,  or  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  corn  imports,  the  years  1803,  1801<,  and 
part  of  1805,  passed  over  without  pecuniary  pres- 
sure ;  and  when,  in  the  hitter  part  of  1805,  the 
formation  of  a  new  coalition  produced  a  sudden 
revolution  in  the  exchange,  its  duration  was  mo- 
mentary, for  the  day  of  Austerlitz,  so  disastrous  in 
other  respects,  dispelled  the  cloud  that  was  gatlier- 
ing  over  our  financial  horizon,  and  showed  in  the 
distance  the  suspension  of  our  continental  remit- 
tances. Next  year,  war  ensued  between  Prussia 
and  France,  but  that  contest  took  place  at  a  time 
when  we  had  a  ministry  (the  Whigs  and  Grcnvilles) 
sparing  in  their  advances  to  our  continental  allies : 
the  exchange  was  not  seriously  affected,  and  after 
the  peace  of  Tilsit  (July  I8O7)  began  \isibly  to  re- 
cover. 


78  0//r  CinTcncij  (nid  Karliangcs. 

Four  years   of  the  war  luul  tliiis  ])assc(l  without 
any  material  inconvenience  from  the  non-converti- 
bihty  of  our  bank  })aj)er,  ami  its  depreciation,  still 
unknown  to  the  j)ublic,  had  been  but  partially  in- 
jurious.   We  are  now,  liowever,  arrived  at  a  difl'er- 
ent  iura ;  a  period  when  our  hatred  of  Bonaparte, 
the  confidence  inspired  by  our  decisive  superiority 
at  sea,  and  the  influence  of  enthusiastic  counsellors 
at  home,  made  us  forget  calmer  considerations,  and 
join  in  a  general  call  for  a  "  system  of  vigour." 
The  sufferings  of  several  great  branches  of  our 
commerce;  the  stagnation  of  our  East  India  trade; 
the  progressive  sinking  of  West  India  property ; 
the  diminished  profit  of  ship  owning;  —  misfortunes 
arising   chiefly  from    heavy   taxes   and   increased 
charges,  were  ascribed  by  many  of  the  distressed 
parties  to  the  competition  of  the  Americans.  Com- 
mercial jealousies  have  never  been  inactive :  the 
American  navigators  had  become  in  our  eyes,  what 
the  Dutch  had  been  in  those  of  our  ancestors  un- 
der Cromwell  and  Charles  II.  ;  and  our  merchants 
liad  no  great  difficulty  in  persuading  a  ministry, 
elated  with  our  success  at  Copenhagen,  and  little 
versed  in  the  sources  of  national  w  ealth,  that  when 
neutral  navigation  should  be  controlled,  the  Conti- 
nent must  di'aw  its  supplies  through  the  mediimi  of 
Eniiland.  Hence  our  Orders  in  council  of  Novem- 
ber,  1807,  orders  issued  with  so  much  ardour,  with 
such  confidence  of  a  fa\ourable  residt,  that  our 
government  paid  no  attention  to  the  singular  fact, 
that  the  intercourse  they  were  so  anxious  to  control, 
was,  in  the  opinion  of  our  enemies,  highly  advan- 
tageous to  us ;  for  Bonaparte  had,  almost  at  the 
same  moment,  intimated  to  the  American  ambassa- 
dor at  Paris,  his  intention  to  prohibit  it,  declaring 
that  "  all  maritime  commerce  tolerated  on  the  Con- 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  79 

tinent,  whether  through  Americans  or  others,  must 
turn  to  the  advantaoe  of"  England."  These  re- 
markable measures,  joined  to  an  embargo  adopted 
by  the  American  government,  produced  an  almost 
complete  suspension  of  intercourse  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe,  during  1808;  the  first 
time  that  such  had  been  the  case  during  twenty- 
five  years. 

Our  stoppage  of  the  American  navigation  is, 
we  believe,  the  greatest  error  on  record  in  mercan- 
tile history.  Our  trade  with  that  country  which, 
on  the  acknowledgment  of  its  independence  in 
1783,  we  considered  as  wrested  from  our  grasp, 
had  proceeded  in  a  i^atio  of  continued  increase, 
affording  both  advantage  to  the  parties  engaged, 
and  the  most  gratifying  lessons  to  those  who, 
studying  in  the  closet  the  sources  of  national  pros- 
perity, are  enabled  to  discover  how  often  the  real  are 
at  variance  with  the  apparent  causes.  This  increase 
showed  first  that  political  and  even  national  antipa- 
thies do  not  impede  commerce  between  indi\  iduals, 
and  that  it  is  perfectly  practicable  to  reap  benefit 
from  countries  that  were  once  our  colonies,  without 
the  charge  of  defending  them.  It  showed  further 
the  still  more  important  truth,  that  *'  the  greater 
the  freedom  of  the  trade  of  the  Americans,  the 
more  active  their  intercourse  with  France,  Holland, 
and  other  countries,  the  greater  was  the  advantage 
arising  to  us." 

In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  did  it  produce 
that  result;  a  result  so  contrary  to  the  tenets  of 
the  mercantile  theory  and  of  the  colonial  system, 
not  of  this  country  only,  but  of  all  Europe  ?  From 
a  cause  of  which  the  explanation,  at  first  somewhat 
complicated,  becomes,  when  examineil,  sufficicntiv 
easy  and  convincing  —  the  iucreasc  of  American 


so  Oi/r  Ciirroicij  and  Ka:ch(mges. 

capital  consequent  on  unfettered  trade,  and  the 
ilireclion  of  a  larger  sliare  of  it  to  the  purchase  of 
our  manufactures.  Our  exports  to  tlic  United 
States  amounted  in  1805,  180fi,  and  I8O7,  to  the 
very  large  sum  of  11  or  12,000,000/.  sterling, 
while  our  im])orts  from  that  country  (Seybert's 
Statistical  Annals,  pp.  137.  1-55.)  did  not  exceed 
7  or  8,000,000/. :  the  remainder  (Baring  on  the 
Orders  in  Council,  p.  155.)  was  remitted  to  us  in 
money,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in  bills  of  ex- 
change from  the  Continent  of  Europe,  being  the 
proceeds  of  tobacco,  cotton,  rice,  and  otlicr 
American  products  sold  there.  The  Continent, 
feeble  at  that  time  in  its  stock  of  manufacture  and 
means  of  giving  credit,  could  not  supply  the 
Americans  with  merchandize  equal  to  more  than 
half  the  articles  which  it  imported  from  them  ; 
and  the  result  was  the  transmission  of  the  proceeds 
to  this  country,  a  course  which  supplied  us  with 
funds  for  our  continental  expenditure  as  regularly 
as  the  packets  crossed  the  narrow  seas.  Such  was 
the  trade  stopped  by  our  Orders  in  Council;  a 
measure  which,  persisted  in  with  blind  pertinacity 
from  year  to  year,  drove  the  Americans  first  to  the 
temporary  expedient  of  an  embargo,  afterwards  to 
the  establishment  of  manufactures  in  their  own 
country,  and,  eventually,  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

JP/ WW  1808  to  1814. —  This  stoppage,  sufficient 
of  itself  to  produce  a  rapid  fall  in  the  exchange, 
was  unluckily  coincident  in  point  of  time  with  a 
heavy  drain  of  money  to  Portugal  and  Spain,  in 
support  of  the  contest  with  France.  From  the 
Appendix  to  the  Report  of  the  Bullion  Committee, 
(p.  23^2.)  it  appears  that  nearl}-  three  millions  ster- 
ling were  sent  in  specie  to  the  Peninsula  in  1808. 


Our  Currencij  and  Ejrlicuige.s.  81 

Next  year  neutral  intercourse  was,  in  a  great 
measure,  resinned,  and  the  hazard  of  pecuniary 
embarrassment  would  have  been  less  serious,  had 
we  not  unfortunately  been  visited  by  the  other 
great  cause  of  pressure  on  our  foreign  exchanges, 
a  deficient  harvest.  It  became  intUspensable, 
therefore,  to  import  corn  at  an  unfortunate  mo- 
ment; at  a  time  when,  from  other  causes,  our 
bank  notes  were  at  a  depreciation  of  twelve  or 
fifteen  ])er  cent.  And  the  sum  paid  to  foreigners 
for  corn  in  1810  being  very  large,  cxceedhig  (see 
the  return  to  Parhament  in  the  following  year) 
seven  millions  sterling,  our  exchanges  fell  so  as  to 
bring  our  bank  paper  more  than  twenty  per  cent, 
below  bullion.  This  fall  took  })lace  some  time 
after  the  public  attention  had  been  drawn  to  the 
subject  by  the  Report  of  the  Bullion  Connniftee ; 
and,  great  as  it  was,  it  would  have  been  still 
greater,  had  not  the  abundant  harvest  of  1810 
come  most  oj)portunely  to  our  relief. 

The  autumn  of  1810  was  the  first  season  in  which 
the  decrees  of  Bonaparte  against  our  intercourse 
with  the  Continent  were  actually  carried  into 
effect.  He  had  then  brought  his  w^ar  with  Austria 
to  a  close,  secured  himself  by  an  alliance  with 
that  power,  and  concei\ed,  from  the  fall  of  our 
bank  paper  and  the  multitude  of  our  mercantile 
failures,  the  hope  that  a  vigorous  enforcement  of 
his  decrees  would  complete  the  measure  of  our 
embarrassment.  Hence,  in  the  winter  of  1810, 
the  general  seizure  of  British  shipping  Id  the 
Prussian  harbours  ;  hence  also  the  ridiculous  mea- 
sure of  burning  quantities  of  our  merchandize  in 
his  sea-ports. 

In    1811    our    corn    im])orts    were   inconsider- 
able;   but   the  operations   of    neutral    conmioice 

(i 


82  Our  Cunenctf  and  EocchanffOi. 

were  much  cramped,  our  remittances  to  the  Penin- 
sula were  large,  and  our  exchanges  extremely 
low.  The  same  causes  operated  with  increased 
effect  in  181^,  the  year  that  our  discussions 
with  the  United  States  unfortunately  terminated  in 
war.  Happily,  towards  the  end  of"  tliat  year,  the 
result  of  the  Russian  campaign  opened  a  cheering 
prospect  in  the  political  horizon ;  but  the  result 
was  remote  ;  a  great  struggle  was  still  necessary, 
and  the  campaign  of  1813  required  exertions  in 
Spain,  and  aid  to  our  allies  in  Germany,  on  a  scale 
of  unparalleled  magnitude.  By  this  time  our  me- 
tallic currency  was  exhausted,  and  the  specie 
bought  up  for  the  cause  of  the  Continent,  was 
paid  for  by  government  in  bank  notes,  at  the 
enormous  premium  of  twenty-five  or  thirty  per 
cent.  Such  continued  to  be  the  difference  between 
paper  and  coin,  until  the  overthrow  of  Bonaparte 
in  April,  1814,*after  which  the  difference  diminished 
to  ten,  and  even  to  eight  per  cent.  His  return 
from  Elba  in  1815,  and  the  vast  preparations  forth- 
with made  on  the  Continent  by  us  and  our  allies, 
again  lowered  the  exchange  to  twenty,  and  even 
twenty-five  per  cent.  —  a  fall  which,  after  his  second 
overthrow,  disappeared  with  a  rapidity  that  seemed 
destined  to  exemplify  the  arguments  of  the  anti- 
bullionists ;  of  tliose  who  maintained  that  the  de- 
preciation of  our  notes  arose  not  from  over-issue, 
but  from  continental  demands. 


Oicr  Currenaf  and  Exchanges. 


83 


Tabular  Sketch  of  the  principal  Demands  on  our  Currency  for 
Continental  Subsidies  ana  Purchases  of  Corn  since  1792. 


Years. 

1792. 
1793. 


1794. 


Events  Political  and 
Commercial. 

Peace. 

Great  mercantile  fail- 
ures: limitation  of  our 
paper  currency. 

Confidence  reinstated. 


1795.  Subsidy  to  Austria. 

1796.  Subsidy  continued,  &  an 

importation  of  corn. 

1797.  Reduction  of  our  paper 

currency;  great  scar- 
city of  money. 

(The  Bank  was  exempted  from  cash 

1798.  Neither  subsidy  nor  corn 

import. 

1799.  Renewed   subsidies  fol- 

lowed by  a  deficient 
harvest. 

1800.  Continuation  of  subsidy 

to  Austria;  great  im- 
portation of  corn. 

1801.  Subsidy  suspended,  but 

cornimport  continued. 

1802.  Peace. 

From  1802  No  large  importation  of 
to  1808.  corn,    except    in   the 

summer  of  1805;  nor 
any  subsidy  of  mag- 
nitude, except  in  the 
autumn  of  that  year. 
From  1808  War  in  Portugal  and 
to  1814.  Spain  throughout  the 

whole  period  ;  war  in 
Germany     in      1809  ; 
G    ^ 


State  of  our  Exdumge 
with  the  Continent. 

A  little  above  par. 
A  considerable  rise  in  the 
Exchange. 

Exchange  nearly  as  in 
1792. 

A  fall  at  first  small,  after- 
wards considerable. 

Exchange  continues  very 
low. 

A  considerable  rise  in  the 
exchange ;  large  im- 
ports of  specie. 

payments  in  Feb.  1797.) 

Exchange   continues   in 

our  favour. 
Fall    of    the    exchange 

after  Midsummer. 

Continued  depression. 


Continued  depression. 

Exchange  reinstated. 

The  exchange  little  af- 
fected during  these  six 
years,  except  in  the 
autumn  and  winter  of 
1805. 

The  fall  in  the  exchange 
great  and  permanent, 
beginning  at  eight  or 
ten  percent-increasing 


84. 


Our  ('uvrcnc}!  and  Eachamxcs. 


Years. 


1814. 


1815. 


Evt'iifs  Poliliccal  arnl 
Commercial. 

in  Russia  in  1812,  and 
in  Germany  &  France 
in  1813  and  1814. 
Corn  purchases  to  a 
great  amount  in  1810. 
The  Americans  ex- 
cluded from  inter- 
course with  the  Con- 
tinent after  1808,  but 
more  particularly  af- 
ter 1810. 

Peace  after  1st  April, 
and  a  great  increase  in 
the  export  of  our  mer- 
chandize, but  a  con- 
tinuance of  remit- 
tances for  subsidies 
and  corn  imports. 

In  April,  May,  June, 
renewal  of  war. 


In  August  and  Septem- 
ber, peace;  cessation 
of  corn  imports;  re- 
newal of  American 
intercourse. 
1816.  No  subsidy  or  import  of 
corn. 
1817.  1818.  Large  imports  of  corn. 


From  1819  No  import   of  corn    or 
to  1823.  heavy        continental 

charge. 


Stntc  of  our  Excltange 
with  thf  Continent. 

to  twelve,  fifteen,  twen- 
ty-five, and  eventually 
to  nearly  thirty  per 
cent. 


A  considerable  reinstate- 
ment of  the  exchange, 
leaving  it  from  only 
eight  to  ten  per  cent, 
against  England. 


Fall  of  the  exchange 
twenty  and  twenty -five 
per  cent. 

The  exchange  recovered 
and  brought  first  within 
twelve  per  cent.,  after- 
wards within  five  per 
cent,  of  par. 

Exchange  nearly  at  par. 

Exchange  again  lowered 
three,  four,  five,  and 
eventually  six  percent. 

Exchange  recovers;  rises 
to  par  in  1820,  and 
has  since  continued 
somewhat  above  par. 


Distribution  into  Periods  during  the  War.  —  The 
years  in  the  preceding  table  may  be  classed  into 
periods,  each  marked  by  distmct  features.  The 
first,  from  1793  to  1797,  preceded  the  exemption 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  85 

act :  after  that  act  came  an  interval  of  two  years, 
during  which,  from  a  concurrence  of  favourable 
circumstances,  the  non-convertibility  of  our  bank 
paper  was  not  productive  of  depreciation.  A  very 
different  scene  was  opened  by  the  transactions  of 
the  three  years  between  the  summer  of  1799  and 
that  of  180^2;  years  of  heavy  continental  demand 
and  of  great  pressure  on  the  exchange.  It  was, 
however,  reinstated  by  the  peace  ;  nor  did  it  ex- 
perience any  pressure  of  magnitude  or  long  con- 
tinuance during  the  long  interval  tliat  elapsed 
from  the  autumn  of  1802  to  that  of  1808.  This 
period  of  six  years  is  perhaps  the  most  remarkable 
of  the  whole,  exliibiting  tlie  possibility  of  carr}ing 
on  a  war  of  great  expence,  without  a  material  de- 
rangement of  our  currency,  so  long  as  we  left  to 
trade  its  free  course,  and  abstained  from  great  con- 
tinental advances.  It  was,  doubtless,  this  long 
enjoyment  of  financial  ease,  this  apparent  stability 
of  our  money  system,  that  inspired  our  ministers 
and  bank  directors  witli  over  confidence,  leading 
tlie  former  to  their  unfortunate  measures  against 
the  American  trade,  and  impressing  the  latter 
(Evidence,  Bulhon  Report,  pp.  89.  9().  1 14.)  with 
tlie  notion  that  their  issues  of  paper  had  no  effect 
on  the  exchange.  To  the  measures  founded  on 
these  views,  and  to  the  events  noticed  in  the  pre- 
ceding table,  is  to  be  ascribed  the  depreciation 
that  prevailed  during  the  last  period  of  the  war 
—  the  five  years  from  1809  to  1814. 

Total  of  our  Corn  Imports  and  Si//)sidics.  —  In 
computing  the  former,  it  is  lit  to  bear  in  mind  that 
we  had  become  previously  to  179i^,  a  corn  import- 
ing country,  and  that  a  certain  quantity  might  be 
termed  our  habitual  supply;  an  import  not  affecting 


86  Our  Currenci/  and  Exchanges. 

the  exchaiii^e,  but  })iii(i  hy  a  correspond ini^  export 
of  our  produce  or  manufactures;  our  coals,  our  tin, 
our  hardware,  our  cottons.  We  dwell,  therefore, 
only  on  the  years  of  scarcity  and  extra  import, 
which,  during  the  war,  were  179^,  1800,  1801, 
180'-2,  1805,  1810.  After  deducting  from  our  total 
supply  in  these  years  our  average  annual  im})ort, 
there  remains,  as  extra  import,  a  quantity  of  which 
the  cost,  in  the  six  years  collectively,  was  not  short 
of  25,000,000/. 

Next  as  to  the  amount  of  our  subsidies : 
the  total  during  twenty-one  years,  from  1793 
to  1814,  was  between  50  and  60,000,000/.,  form- 
ing with  the  corn  purchases,  an  aggregate  of 
80,000,000/.  Of  this  great  sum,  what  proportion 
was  sent  abroad  in  the  shape  of  specie  ?  Of  the 
subsidies,  the  chief  part  was  supplied  in  clothing, 
arms,  stores  ;  of  our  corn  purchases,  the  larger 
share  was  necessarily  paid  in  money.  If,  without 
attempting  nicety  of  calculation,  we  assume  the 
export  of  specie  for  these  purposes  during  the 
whole  war  at  30,000,000/.,  we  shall  be  at  no  loss 
to  account  for  the  disappearance  of  our  metallic 
currency,  and  of  such  supplies  of  bullion  as  found 
their  way  to  this  country. 

Our  E.Tchajiges  since  the  Peace.  —  Since  the 
peace,  the  different  periods,  though  less  mark- 
ed by  extremes,  have  been  equally  deserving 
of  attention,  as  illustrative  of  our  view^  of  the 
causes  of  fluctuation.  In  the  autumn  of  1814 
our  war  charges  ceased,  our  exports  had  free  ac- 
cess to  the  Continent,  and  the  exchange  altered 
from  twenty-five  to  ten,  and  even  eight  per  cent, 
only,  against  us  :  it  would  have  risen  farther,  had 
not  our  corn  imports  been  large.     But  no  sooner 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  87 

did  the  return  of  Bonaparte  from  Elba  revive 
tlie  alarm  of  war  and  subsidies,  than  the  exchange 
fell  to  eighteen,  twenty,  and  twenty-tive  per  cent. ; 
a  depression  from  which  it  recovered  as  suddenly 
after  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and  the  prospect  of  a 
speedy  })eace.  During  181(i  there  was  neither 
corn  import  nor  subsidy;  the  American  trade  with 
the  Continent  was  open,  and  the  exchange  returned 
to  par,  at  which  it  for  some  time  remained  ;  but 
the  deficient  harvest  of  that  year  necessitated  in 
181 7  corn  imports  on  a  very  large  scale,  reduced 
the  exchange,  and  would  have  completely  overset 
it,  had  not  all  the  coimteracting  causes  of  free 
trade  been  in  operation.  By  their  aid  we  were 
enabled,  during  1817,  1818,  and  tlie  early  part 
of  1819,  to  pay  for  an  unexampled  amount  of 
foreign  corn,  (above  20,000,000/.  as  appears  by 
the  Appendix  to  the  Agricultural  Report  of  1821, 
p.  396.)  without  a  greater  depreciation  than  four, 
five,  or  six  per  cent.  Since  1819,  these  drains 
have  ceased,  and  the  exchange  has  been  steadily 
in  our  favour. 

Our  Bank  Paper:  —  Contradictor}!  Opinions  on  the 
Subject. 

We  have  now  brought  to  a  close  our  historical 
sketch,  and  shall  proceed  to  make  some  remarks 
on  the  very  opposite  doctrines  held  in  regard  to 
our*  paper  currency,  by  the  adherents  of  ministry 
and  o])position  ;  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  by 
the  adversaries  and  supporters  of  the  Bullion 
Committee  of  1810.  The  former  are  still  un- 
willing to  admit  the  existence  of  depreciation  in 
our  bank  paper,  even  in  the  latter  years  of  the 
war :  the  latter  equally  unreasonable,  refuse  to 
trace  such  depreciation  to  tiie  extra  demands  made 

G   4 


88  Our  (  tirrcurij  and  Kdcliaji^u;cs. 

on  lis  [\)\  siibsidii's  and  corn  purcliast's,  and  insist 
that  it  originatcil  in  over  issue  on  the  part  otour 
banks.  A  singular  discre])ancy  this,  in  a  country 
of  free  discussion,  after  the  direction  of  so  much 
reasoning  to  the  subject,  and  the  hi})se  of  so  many 
years  re})lete  with  commercial  and  political  inform- 
ation. 'J'his  discrepancy  implies,  we  apprehend, 
more  than  the  absence  of  impartiality  :  it  gives 
cause  to  suspect  in  one  party,  an  inadequate  know- 
ledge of  the  })rinciples  of  productive  industry  ;  in 
the  other,  an  insufficient  attention  to  the  evidence 
of  facts. 

In  attempting  to  point  out  the  manner  in  which 
both  have  deviated  from  impartial  inquiry,  and 
exceeded  the  limits  of  fair  inference,  we  shall 
proceed  as  much  as  possible  by  a  reference  to 
documents.  We  shall  have  little  difficulty  in  de- 
scribing the  nature  of  our  currency  previous  to 
1797»  initl  the  effect  produced  on  it  by  sudden 
drains  for  continental  disburse:  our  more  intricate 
task  will  be  to  define  the  results  of  the  exemption 
act,  the  operation  of  which,  has,  from  very  dif- 
ferent views,  been  considerably  over-rated  by  each 
party.  The  buUionists  attribute  to  it  the  whole, 
or  nearly  the  whole,  of  the  enhancement  of  com- 
modities during  the  war  ;  while  their  opponents, 
regarding  it  as  no  less  potent  in  good,  than  theii' 
antagonists  in  evil,  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  it 
as  almost  the  sole  engine  of  our  financial  support. 
Both  sides  forget  that  these  effects  are  too  great 
for  the  cause,  and  that  the  exemption  act  was 
coincident  in  point  of  time  with  a  change  in  our 
financial  system,  of  still  more  powerful  operation  ; 
we  mean  the  increase  of  our  war  taxes  and  the 
reduction  of  our  loans. 


Our  Cuvrencij  and  Ej:clianges.  81) 

Our  Money  Sijutem  jyrevious  to  1797- — Tlie  nature 
of  our  money  system  will  be  best  understood  bv  a 
comparison  with  that  of  the  neiglibouring  coun- 
tries. The  amount  of  money  circulating  in  France 
was  com])uted,  or  rather  guessed  by  Necker  at 
80,000,000/.  sterling  ;  the  amount  in  England  anil 
Scotland,  not  ascertained  with  more  certainty  than 
that  of  France,  is  supposed  (Bank  Committee  Re- 
port, May,  1819,)  to  be  between  50  and  60,000,000/. 
The  currency  of  France  is  almost  entirely  metallic  : 
there  are  in  that  country  no  banks  of  ckcuhition, 
except  the  bank  of  Paris,  and  none  of  its  notes 
being  below  20/.,  paper  forms  a  very  small  part  of 
the  circulating  medium.  A  foreigner  may  reside 
many  years  in  a  provincial  town  in  France  without 
seeing  a  bank  note,  and  may  occasionally  hear  the 
natives  speak  of  having  seen  them  as  of  a  cir<;um- 
stance  somewhat  unusual  and  remarkable.  France 
is  consequently  prevented  from  saving  interest  on 
40  or  50,000,000/.  of  metallic  currency,  the  ])lace 
of  which,  were  the  banking  system  general,  might 
be  suj)plied  by  paper.  The  case  of  France  is,  in 
a  jrreat  measure,  that  of  the  Continent  at  larire  ; 
while  in  this  country,  on  the  other  hand,  the  saving 
arising  from  bank  paper  has  been  enjoyed,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  for  more  than  a  century. 

In  what  maimer  was  this  saving  accomplished 
before  the  exemption  from  cash  })ayments  in  1797? 
A  bank  of  good  character  issued  notes  to  an  ex- 
tent of  four  or  five  times  the  amount  of  the  gold 
kept  in  its  coffers,  a  circulation  of  100,000/.  being 
maintained  in  ordinary  times  without  a  greater  re- 
serve or  dead  fund  than  between  20,  and  30,000/. 
leaving  above  7^,000/.  to  be  vested  in  })roductive 
securities,  such  as  short-dated  acceptances,  ex- 
chequer bills,  or  the  public  lunds,  all  possessing  a 


90  Our  Currenci)  and  Exchanges. 

characfcristic  indispensable  to  a  banker,  that  of 
speedy  convertibibty  into  cash.  Hence  an  income 
to  tlie  banking-house  of  2  or  3,000/.  a-year  arising 
from  perfectly  fair  sources ;  its  credit  and  the  su- 
perior convenience  of  paper  to  metallic  currency. 
This  saving,  considered  in  a  general  sense,  was  such 
as  to  form  a  national  object,  England  having,  even 
previous  to  the  exemption  act,  economised  the 
interest  on  a  sum  probably  exceeding  20,000,000/. 
of  its  currency. 

Such  was  the  state  of  our  money  system  in  the 
early  years  of  the  revohitionary  war,  when  the  con- 
fident character  of  our  ministers  and  the  surpris- 
ing exeiiions  of  France  led  to  an  unexampled 
extension  of  our  continental  expenditure.  It  be- 
came particularly  heavy  in  1795,  and  unfortunately 
a  deficient  harvest  in  that  year  necessitated  in  1796 
large  purchases  of  foreign  corn,  augmenting  greatly 
the  demand  on  the  bank  for  metallic  currency  : 
hence  a  reduction  of  its  chscounts  to  merchants,  a 
reluctance  or  rather  inability  to  make  the  advances 
required  by  government,  and  a  general  embarrass- 
ment in  the  money-market.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, nothing  could  be  more  natural  to  all  parties 
than  to  look  for  relief  in  exempting  the  bank  from 
the  necessity  of  paying  cash  for  its  notes ;  a  measure 
that  would  enable  it  to  continue  its  customary  ac- 
commodation to  trade,  while  government  should 
meet  the  wants  of  our  allies  with  our  spare  coin  and 
bullion.  The  experiment,  however,  was  too  bold 
and  noA-el  to  be  adopted  as  a  matter  of  choice  ;  it 
was  delayed  imtil  the  continued  call  for  guineas 
in  February  1797  left  no  other  alternative.  Its 
adoption  excited  both  surprise  and  distrust,  but 
was  divested  of  a  part  of  its  alarming  character  by 
the  known  solvency  of  the  bank ;  and  the  acknow- 


Our  Currencij  and  Exchanges.  |jl 

ledged  discretion  of  those  to  whom  the  new  pri- 
vilege was  to  be  entrusted.  A  farther  source 
of"  confidence  was  afforded  to  the  few  who  knew 
the  regukitions  of  the  bank,  by  tlie  fact  that  the 
personal  interest  of  a  director  is  very  slightly 
promoted  by  an  increase  of  the  income  of  the 
establishment. 

Effects  of  tlie  Restriction  Act.  —  This  decisive 
measure,  which  ought  rather  to  be  called  an  ex- 
emption than  a  restriction  act,  was  limited  at  first 
to  a  few  months,  and  the  exchange  being  favourable 
during  1797>  the  bank  made  ample  provision  by  the 
autumn  of  that  year  for  the  resumption  of  cash 
payments.  But  that  step  being  deemed  unneces- 
sary by  government,  the  exemption  assumed  the 
character  of  a  permanent  war  measure,  and  enabled 
the  bank  to  give  a  greater  latitude  to  its  accom- 
modation both  to  merchants  and  the  treasury. 
What  were  the  chief  characteristics  of  our  money 
system  in  the  succeeding  years  ?  A  relief  from  such 
pecuniary  difficulties  as  those  of  1796  ;  an  increase 
of  our  paper  circulation,  at  first  small,  afterwards 
considerable,  and  eventually  very  large.  Next,  in 
regard  to  the  value  of  our  notes  compared  to  coin 
or  bullion,  there  was,  after  1799,  a  fall  (about  four 
per  cent.)  in  the  value  of  our  notes,  whicli  long- 
remained  uniform,  but  was  followed,  after  1809,  by 
a  new  and  much  greater  fall.  Lastly,  the  general 
rise  in  prices,  though  it  in  part  preceded  the  exemp- 
tion act,  and  originated  consequently  in  other  causes, 
continued  during  the  whole  period  of  the  non-con- 
vertibility of  our  bank  notes,  and  became  greatest 
during  their  greatest  depreciation. 

These    facts  are   admitted  by    all   parties ;    the 
difficulty  is  in  tracing  them  to  theij-  origin,  and  in 


92  Our  Currency  and  Eixkanij^c'.s. 

disrrimiiiatiMi,^  liow  far  the  exemption   act  was  or 
was  not  instrumental  in  ))roducin^  tliem. 

Opinion  of  the  Bullion  Committee.  —  TJie  writers 
of  the  BulHon  Report,   aware  that  the  amount  of 
hank  notes    in    circulation     had    been    materially 
increased,  as  well  as  that  the   scale    of  discounts 
(Report,   p.  26.)  had   been  greatly  enlarged,   na- 
turally became  impressed   with  the   idea  of  over- 
issue,   and  ascribed  to  it   almost  exclusively   the 
great  rise  in  our  prices  during  the  war.     But  this 
opinion,    when   given    in    the    unqualified   terms 
adopted  by  them  and  their  supporters,   is  liable  to 
serious  objections.     First,  the  amount  of  Bank  of 
England  notes  in  circulation  affords,   as  we  have 
more  fully  shown  in  the  Appendix,  no  satisfactory 
criterion  for  estimating  the  increase  of  our  whole 
circulating  mediimi,  as  part  of  the  bank  paper  may 
be  a  substitute  for  coin  sent  abroad.     In  the  next 
place,  the  means  possessed  by  the  Bullion  Com- 
mittee  of  appreciating  the   effect  of  the  various 
other  causes  of  enhancement  were  very  limited  : 
no  evidence  W'as  given  as  to  the  rise  of  prices  prior 
to  the  exemption  act ;  no  reasoning  attempted  in 
retrard  to  the  effect  of  war  in  this  auo-mentatiori. 
Neither  the  framers  of  the  Report,  nor  those  who 
wrote  and  s])oke  most  confidently  on  the  subject, 
possessed  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  increase  of 
our  productive  industry  consequent  on  the  w^ar,  or 
even  of  the  increase  of  our  population.     Had  Mr. 
Horner  or  Mr.  Huskisson  been  aware  of  these  vital 
truths,  —  had  they  know  n  how^  materially  prices 
were  affected  by   causes  altogether  distinct  from 
our  paper  currency,  such  as  the  demand  for  men 
for  the  public  service,  and  the  insufficiency  of  our 
growth  of  corn  to  our  consumption,   the  conclu- 


Our  Currenci/  and  luvchangcs.  \}S 

sions  of  the  Report  would  have  l)een  materially 
different.  The  various  facts  and  arguments  ad- 
duced in  our  ])reeeding  ciiapters,  show  liow  large 
an  addition  to  our  currency  was  indispensable  to 
transact  our  extended  business,  to  correspond 
with  our  augmented  prices.  And  when  to  this  is 
added  a  reason,  different  in  its  nature,  but  equal  in 
its  operation  —  the  inducement  after  1799  to  export 
our  metallic  currency  to  the  Continent,  we  shall 
find  ample  means  of  accounting  for  a  fact  which 
we  admit  to  be  at  first  calculated  to  excite  surprise, 
the  increase  of  our  bank  paper. 

What  then  were  the  results  distinctly  attribut- 
able to  the  exemption  act ;  and,  in  the  first  place, 
what  was  its  effect  on  the  rules  followed  by  the 
Bank  of  England  in  regard  to  discounts  ?  Its  effect 
was  highly  beneficial  to  that  Corporation :  the 
Directors  were  relieved  by  it  from  the  necessity  of 
watching  continental  exchanges,  from  the  appre- 
hension of  a  drain  of  metallic  currency  on  the 
a])proach  of  a  subsidy,  or  a  large  import  of  corn  ; 
the  rules  of  discount  became  greatly  simplified, 
and,  after  some  years,  the  Directors  considered 
themselves  at  liberty  to  issue  notes  to  whoever 
tendered  bills  possessing  the  requisite  of  solidity, 
and  the  less  easily  ascertained  characteristic  of 
being  for  a  bondjide  transaction. 

Countrij  Banks.  —  In  regard  to  these,  the  })rovi- 
sion  made  by  the  act,  if  not  properly  an  exemption, 
was  an  accommodation  of  great  importance.  They 
were  relieved  fi-om  the  necessity  of  paying  cash  if 
they  tendered  Bank  of  Kngland  notes,  a  supply  of 
which  was  attainable  (Evick^nce  of  Mr.  Baring  before 
the  Committees  on  Cash  Payments)  without  the 
uncertainty  and  loss  so  frequently  attendant  on  the 


94  Our  Currency/  (tnd  Kacluai^cs. 

acquisition  of  coin.  A  stock  of  notes  could  be 
procured  at  very  short  notice  in  exchange  for  the 
mercantile  acceptances  or  other  securities  in  which 
the  funds  of  country  banks  are  generally  vested  ; 
and  the  latter,  thus  relieved  from  much  expense 
and  anxiety,  were  enabled  to  lessen  greatly  tlieir 
reserve  fund,  and  consequently  to  extend  their 
discounts. 

Such  were  the  effects  of  the  act  in  regard  to 
banks  :  to  the  public  the  principal  result  was  a  re- 
lief from  scarcity  of  money. 

\i\  for  the  sake  of  calculation,  we  assume  that 
in  179^^  the  total  bank  paper  in  circulation  in  the 
kingdom  was  2.5,000,000/.,  and  that  7,000,000/.  of 
coin  were  kept  in  depot,  we  may  safely  infer  that 
_of  those  7>CKX),000/.  two-thirds  became  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years,  disposable  for  the  purpose 
of  discount.  Now,  if  from  the  rapidity  of  our 
transfers,  a  million  of  money  suffice  to  circidate 
merchandize  to  the  value  of  twenty  or  thirty  mil- 
lions, the  change,  arising  from  the  addition  of  four 
or  five  millions  to  our  currency,  could  not  be 
other\vise  than  great  in  its  degree,  and  extensive  in 
its  operation.  Continental  demands  arose  in  1799, 
and  were  carried  during  three  years  to  an  unex- 
ampled height :  these  the  exemption  act  enabled 
us  to  meet  by  sending  abroad  our  coin,  exempting 
us,  not  indeed  from  a  depreciation  of  our  currency, 
but  from  pecuniary  sti^aits. 

The  act  had  another,  though  as  yet  unnoticed 
result  —  that  of  counteracthig  the  tendency  of  our 
public  loans  to  raise  the  rate  of  interest.  What, 
it  may  be  asked,  was  the  current  or  average  rate  of 
interest  previous  to  1793  ?  If  we  form  our  comput- 
ation, not  on  the  price  of  stocks,  which  from  arti- 

9 


Our  Currency  and  Eo'changes.  \)5 

ficial  causes  fluctuated  greatly,  but  on  the  general 
transactions  of  merchants,  bankers,  and  capitalists, 
we  shall  find  it  to  have  been  between  four  and  five 
per  cent.  ;  and  if  we  apply  a  similar  mode  of  cal- 
culation to  the  war,  we  shall  have  reason  to  fix  the 
average  rate  of  interest  between  five  and  six  per 
cent.,  the  charge  of  commission,  and  other  small 
additions  familiar  to  persons  in  business  (Evidence 
to  the  Bullion  Repoit,  p.  124.)  accounting  for  the 
excess  above  the  statutory  limit.  The  effect  of  a 
war,  the  most  expensive  ever  waged,  was  therefore 
to  raise  interest  only  one  per  cent.  ;  an  effect  evi- 
dently disproportioned  to  the  unexampled  calls 
made  on  oiu'  national  capital,  and  the  cause  of 
which  is,  doubtless,  in  a  great  measure  to  be  sought 
in  the  reduction  of  the  charge  of  banking  conse- 
quent on  the  exemption  act. 

The  Question  of  Depreciation  and  Over -issue.  — 
We  are  now  arrived  at  the  most  important  ques- 
tion in  the  history  of  our  currency ;  a  question 
in  which  the  advocates  of  the  Bank  and  those  of 
the  Bullion  Committee  are  directly  at  variance. 
The  former  maintain  that  the  public  possessed, 
after  1797?  the  same  power  of  limitation  as  before, 
Both  in  withholding  bills  for  discount,  and  in  pay- 
ing over  their  notes  to  the  Treasury,  an  absorbent 
to  the  extent  of  1  or  2,000,000/.  a  week.  Their 
antagonists,  without  denying  this,  which  in  fact 
cannot  be  controverted,  appeal  to  the  state  of  the 
bullion  market  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war ;  to 
the  acknowledged  inferiority  of  bank  notes  ;  and 
to  the  formidable  argument,  that  a  contraction  of 
the  amount  in  circulation  would,  at  any  time,  have 
raised  their  value,  and,  if"  carried  sufficiently  far, 
have  brought  them  on  a  par  with  coin. 


96  '-i'lfc  Question  uj 

Such  was  the    substance    of  tlie  reasoiiiiii^  ad- 
duced in  the  various  speeches  and  publications  on 
tliis  subject  in  1810  and  1811  :  such  are  still,   in  a 
great  measure,  the  tenets  of  the  adverse  parties  ; 
each    interpreting,    in    conformity  with  their  own 
theory,  the   fluctuations  that  have  occurred  since 
the  peace.     No   si)eaker  in  parliament,  no  writer 
on  trade  or  finance  has,   as  far  as  we  are  aware, 
endeavoured  to  reconcile  arguments  at  present  so 
strongly  in  contradiction,  or  sougiit  a  solution   of 
the  problem,   while  he  admitted  the  substance  of 
the  allegations  on  either  side.     Tliis  we  shall  now 
attempt,  and  as  we  enter  on  the  discussion  with  an 
advantage  unknown  to  our  predecessors,  —  the  evi- 
dence supplied  by  several  years  of  peace,  —  we  are 
not  without  hopes   of  conducting  our  readers  to  a 
satisfactory  conclusion,  if  they  will  summon  patience 
to  accompany  us  thiough   an   enquiry  which  can 
hardly  fail  to  be  both  long  and  intricate.     If  the 
narrators  of  military  events,  wlien  entering  on  the 
relation  of  complicated  movements,  deem  it  neces- 
sary to  make  a  demand  of  patient  attention  on  the 
part  of  their  readers,  much  more  is  such  a  warning 
required  when  we  venture  on  a  question  which  has 
been  a  source  of  perplexity  to  the  public  for  a 
number  of  years. 

Difference  bctxveen  an  Increase  of  Bank  Paper  and 
an  Increase  of  Metallic  Currency.  —  The  ease  with 
which  bank  notes  are  struck  ofl|  and  tlie  apparent 
ease  with  which  they  are  circulated,  impressed  the 
public,  long  before  the  late  wars,  with  a  notion, 
that  banking  operated  like  mining;  and  the  ge- 
neral rise  of  prices  that  took  place  atler  17<34,  was, 
by  many,  ascribed  to  that  cause.  Fortunately, 
Dr.  Smith  was  then  alive  to  combat  prejudice  in 


Depreciation  and  Ovcr-issne.  97 

the  people,  or  error  in  their  rulers :  he  undeceived 
the  puhhc  in  this  important  j)oint,  and  showed 
(Wealth  of  Nations,  Book  II.  Chap.  II.)  tluit  bank 
notes  formed  not  an  addition  to  the  circnlatino' 
medium  of  a  country,  but  a  substitution  for  coin 
sent  abroad.  An  increase  of  coin  and  an  increase 
of  bank  paper  have  this  radical  difference  ;  the 
former  tends  to  lower  the  value  of  money  through- 
out the  world  at  large,  by  bringing  forward  gold 
and  silver,  conniiodities  of  undoubted  acceptance 
and  universal  circulation,  while  a  bank  produces 
an  article  current  only  in  a  particular  country. 
These  countries  are,  as  yet,  of  very  limited  extent, 
paper  money  being  hardly  known  in  France  or 
Holland ;  while  in  the  rest  of  Europe  the  expe- 
rience of  its  effects  during  the  present  age  is  not 
at  all  of  a  nature  to  extend  its  circulation. 

Wliat,  it  may  be  asked,  are  the  causes  which 
limit  the  supply  of  gold  and  silver  from  the  mines? 
Is  it  a  monopolizing  spirit  on  the  part  of  any 
government  or  association,  a  deficiency  of  metallic 
ore,  or  a  limitation  in  the  demand  of  the  public 
for  either  plate  or  currency  ?  To  this  we  answer, 
that  the  mines  are  open  to  undertakers  of  any 
nation  ;  that  the  demand,  whether  for  plate  or  cur- 
rency, is  unlimited  ;  and  that  as  to  the  quantity  of 
ore,  it  is  not  probable  that  one  hundredth  part  of 
that  which  is  in  existence  has  yet  been  ex])lored. 
The  difficulty  lies  in  the  expence  of  mining;  for 
were  the  machinery  and  labour  thus  employed,  to 
be  rendered  more  effectual  or  less  expensive,  we 
should  soon  see  an  increase  in  the  quantity  of  the 
precious  metals  extracted  and  brought  to  market. 
How  far  does  a  similar  reasoning  apply  to  banks  ? 
They,  like  mines,  are  subjected  to  a  limitation 
arising  from  expence  (in  salaries,  rent,  stamps,  and 

II 


5)8  The  (Question  of 

the  other  cliargcs  of  an  establishment);  but  they 
have  a  more  formidable  Hmitation  in  the  hazard  at- 
tendant on  over-issue,  a  hazard  which  may  consist 
either  in  the  discount  of  doubtful  bills,  or  in  the 
losses,  less  sudden,  but  eventually  as  serious,  which 
are  inseparable  from  an  attempt  to  force  paper  on 
the  public.  How  imperiously  tliese  obstacles  impede 
circulation,  —  liow  effectually  they  confine  a  new 
establishment  within  narrow  limits,  is  well  known 
to  all  who  have  endeavoured  to  overcome  them. 

So  far  we  are  likely  to  have  the  assent  of  our 
readers,  whether  bullionists  or  advocates  of  the 
bank;  uor  need  we  enter  on  any  argument  to  show 
that  the  issue  of  bank  paper  adds  but  slightly  to  the 
general  stock  of  currency,  so  long  as  such  paper  is 
demandable  in  cash.  But  when  exemption  prevails, 
the  case  appears  very  diflerent,  and  requires  a  close 
and  attentive  investigation. 

Discounts — Increase  of  their  Amount  during  the 
War.  —  Of  the  great  increase  during  the  war  in  the 
issues  of  bank  paper  for  discounts,  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  recorded  as  it  is  in  the  books  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  and,  we  might  add,  in  those  of 
almost  every  provincial  bank  in  tlie  kingdom.  On 
this  the  supporters  of  the  Bullion  Committee  found 
their  grand  argument  for  the  charge  of  over-issue, 
but  in  their  eagerness  to  attain  a  favourite  result, 
they  overlook  several  material  considerations. 

1.  The  increase  of  our  population  between  the 
years  1797  and  1810  (15  per  cent.),  was  necessa- 
rily productive  of  a  certain  addition  to  the  quantity 
of  our  bank  paper ;  an  addition  sufficient  to  balance 
the  saving  arising  from  economy  in  the  use  of  notes. 

2.  A  farther  and  more  powerfid  cause  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  activity  arising  out  of  a  state  of  war, 
a  state  which,  by  holding  forth  the  prospect  of  large 
eventual  profits,   naturally  induced  individuals  to 


Deprecialinn  and  (hrr-issue.  99 

trade  beyond  their  capital.  Hence  that  multipli- 
cation of  bills,  promissory  notes,  and  other  expe- 
dients for  raising  money,  so  well  known  to  those 
who  have  marked  the  course  of  mercantile  affairs 
during  the  present  age,  and  so  clearly  described  in 
the  evidence  (p.  1^24.)  appended  to  the  Bullion 
Report.  At  that  time  tiie  great  object  of  a  man 
engaged  in  business,  whether  as  merchant,  manu- 
iactiu'er,  or  farmer,  was  to  gain  time  by  putting  off 
a  payment  until  he  had  accomplished  a  sale,  or 
otherwise  realised  an  advantage  in  prospect.  But 
in  a  season  of  peace,  business  is  comparatively 
stationary.  Our  currency  is  adequate  to  our  trans- 
actions ;  bills  are  less  numerous,  and  })ayments  in 
ready  money  or  at  short  dates  far  more  frequent.  * 

3.  Add,  farther,  that  in  a  state  of  war,  the  rise 
of  price  proceeding  from  the  various  circumstances 
enumerated  in  tlie  j)receding  chapter,  (augmented 
taxation,  enhancement  of  labour,  insufficiency  of 
our  growth  of  corn),  made  a  larger  sum  requi- 
site to  circulate  the  same  commodities. 

Yet  here  we  must  add  a  remark  which  we 
do  not  recollect  to  have  seen  advanced  by  any 
writer  or  speaker  on  the  subject,  \\z.  that  an 
increase  of  discounts  is  likely  to  tend  as  much  to 
lower  as  to  raise  prices.  The  advances  of  that 
nature  during  the  war  were  made  to  classes  strictly 
])roductive,  and  were  evidently  instrumental  in 
increasing  the  (piantity  of  our  farming  produce  and 
manufactures.  If  the  dearness  of  our  fanning  pro- 
duce was  owing  to  the  insufficiency  of  our  growth, 
what  could  conduce  more  to  retard  the  progress  of 
enhancement,  tlum  to  give  our  agriculturists  the 
means  of  increasing  their  supply  ? 

*  Tooke  on  High  and  Low  Prices.    Part  I.   pp.  87.  d  sey. 
H    J2 


HH)  "Flic  Question  uf 

All  tliis  may  be  readily  aclmittcd,  but  it  will  be 
urged  that  bankers  were  led  by  the  exemption  ac^t, 
and  by  the  flattering  prospects  of  their  customers 
during  the  war,  to  make  advances  which,  under 
other  circumstances,  they  would  have  withheld. 
They  were,  we  believe,  very  often  persuaded  to 
discount  bills  which  were  never  paid,  and  occasion- 
ally to  depart  from  their  proper  province  by  making 
advances  on  such  securities  as  land  or  houses.  The 
Bank  of  England,  in  like  manner,  dispensed  on 
various  occasions  with  a  rule  to  which  they  would 
otherwise  have  strictly  adhered ;  we  mean  the  con- 
viction that  the  bills  tendered  for  discount  had  been 
drawn  for  real  or  Inmd  Jide  transactions.  Such 
relaxation  probably  proceeded  from  commendable 
motives  :  from  a  wish  to  prevent  the  extension  of 
bankruptcies  in  manufacturing  towns,  in  particular 
Glasgow  or  Manchester,  at  seasons  when  a  fall  of 
prices,  or  the  failure  of  some  eminent  house 
threatened  to  involve  in  insolvency  hundreds  of 
persons  engaged  in  trade  with  inadequate  capital. 
We  admit,  however,  that  on  such  occasions  the 
bank  directors  went  beyond  their  province,  and 
that  the  results  were,  in  general,  either  unavailing 
or  unfortunate,  consisting  in  a  loss  to  the  Bank,  or 
in  a  fruitless  postponement  of  bankruptcy  to  the 
trader.  But  these  advances  could  have  very  little 
tendency  either  to  overcharge  currency,  or  raise 
prices.  The  notes  issued,  whether  in  town  or 
country,  whether  on  good  or  bad  security,  soon 
found  their  way  into  hands  whose  interest  it  was 
to  keep  them  as  little  time  as  possible ;  and  any 
temporary  over-issue  was  of  short  continuance. 

Effect  of  the  Eaemption  Act  on  ow^  Currency.  — 
We  must  thus  dissent  from  the  assertion  so  often 
urged  since  1810,  that  the  exemption  from  cash 


Depreciation  and  Ocer -issue.  101 

payments  gave  bankers  the  power  of  overcharging 
the  currency,  or,  in  other  words,  of  causing  a 
direct  rise  of  prices.  But  in  regard  to  their  power 
in  an  indirect  sense,  we  mean  tlie  power  of  issuing 
money  to  meet  a  rise  of  prices  proceeding  from 
other  causes,  such  as  increase  of  taxes  or  insuffi- 
ciency in  tlie  supply  of  corn,  we  consitler  the 
question  as  very  different,  and  are  ready  to  make 
a  very  ample  admission. 

So  long  as  the  currency  of  a  country  consists  of 
coin  or  of  bank  notes  for  which  cash  may  be  de- 
manded of  the  issuer,  the  export  of  a  large  sum, 
whether  for  military  piu'poses,  for  a  subsidy,  or  the 
purchase  of  corn,  is  necessarily  productive  of  a 
scarcity  of  money  at  home.  This  was  strikingly 
exemplified  in  1795  and  \1[)i),  and  in  such  a  case 
the  money  price  of  commodities,  far  from  rising, 
is  likely  to  be  reduced  in  correspondence  with  the 
reduction  of  the  circulating  medium.  Had  such 
continued  the  case,  the  war,  we  may  be  assured, 
would  never  have  been  popular.  ]3ut  under  the 
o])eration  of  the  exemption  act,  circumstances  were 
altogether  different ;  the  check  of  scarcity  was  re- 
moved, money  was  to  be  obtained,  as  in  peace,  by 
whoever  was  able  to  offer  good  bills  payable  at 
short  dates,  and  the  amount  of  these  was  in  a  state 
of  progressive  increase  from  the  various  causes  re- 
ca])itulated  in  the  j)receding  paragraph. 

Having  thus  admitted  the  principle,  the  next 
point  is  to  estimate  the  extent  of  its  operation. 
And  here,  if  we  cannot  agree  with  the  Bulhonists 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  power  conferred  on  bankers 
by  the  act  of  1797»  we  shall,  we  doubt  not,  give 
tiiem  full  satisfaction  by  our  view  of  its  results. 

All  ])arties  admit  the  fact  of  an  increase  of  cur- 
rency during  the  war,  but  the  bidlionists  ascribe  it 

H  3 


lO'J  The  Qucalion  of 

to  ;i  direct  ])ower  on  tlic  ]);irt  of  bankers  to  over- 
issue*, while  we  account  that  power  strictly  passive 
and  restricted  in  its  duration  to  a  state  of  war. 
We  consider  it,  liowe\'er,  to  liave  been  of  very 
coni])rehensive  operation  so  long  as  it  lasted,  and 
if  wc  arc  asked  in  what  manner  its  operation,  if 
temporary,  proved  so  extensive;  we  answer,  be- 
cause it  seems  to  have  enabled  bankers  to  meet  a 
rise  of  price  by  an  increase  of  issue,  ^from  whatever 
cause  thai  rise  proceeded.  What  then  was  the  re- 
sult during  the  war?  An  increase  of  currency 
in  proportion  to  rise  of  price,  whatever  was  the 
cause  that  produced  the  rise  ;  whether  taxes,  scar- 
city of  corn,  demand  of  men  for  government,  or 
the  additional  cost  of  articles  purchased  abroad. 

Effect  i  in  a  political  sense,  of  the  Exemption  from 
Cash  Payments.  —  The  exemption  act  was  in  part 
productive  of,  in  part  coincident  wdth,  a  great 
change  in  our  financial  situation  —  a  change  from 
embarrassment  to  abundance,  from  a  state  of  dis- 
quietude to  a  state  of  confidence.  The  continuance 
of  the  war,  the  subsidizing  of  foreign  poAvers,  was 
no  longer  checked  by  pecuniary  difficulties,  and 
our  rulers  w^ere  induced  to  take  several  measures 
less  necessary  for  self-defence,  and  partaking  more 
of  an  aggressive  character,  than  our  countrymen  in 
general  are  aware  of.  Is  it  likely  that,  without 
the  confidence  thus  inspired,  we  should  have  formed 
against  France  the  coalitions  of  1799  or  1805,  or 
that  we  should  have  commenced  our  second  war 
so  early  as  1803  ?  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  pos- 
session of  the  Netherlands  by  France,  and  the  rest- 
less spirit  of  Bonaparte  would,  under  any  circimi- 
stances,  have  prevented  the  enjoyment  of  tranquil- 
lity, it  is  tit  to  add,  on  the  other,  that  the  scale  of 


Depreciatioti  and  Over-issue.  103 

expence  on  wliich  the  war  was  conducted,  was 
our  own  act,  and  attributable  in  a  great  degree, 
to  the  exemption  of  our  banks  from  cash  pay- 
ments. 

Distinction  between  Depreciation  of  Batik  Papery 

and  Diminution  in  the  Value  of  Moneij  generallij. 

It   is   of  importance  to  make  a  distinction  in  re- 
gard to  the  operation  of  the  exemption  act  before 
and  after  I8O9.     During  the  twelve  years  that  fol- 
lowed the  suspension  of  cash  payments  in   1797, 
our  bank  paper  had  given  the  greatest  facilities  to 
government   expenditure,    without  incurring   any 
depreciation  of  consequence,    relatively   to   coin. 
The  average  price  of  commodities  had  in  this  inter- 
val experienced  a  great  rise,  (not  less  than  -1-0  per 
cent.),  compared  to  their  average  price  in  1792. 
But  as  the  causes  of  rise,  (taxation,  insufficiency  of 
provisions  of  home  growth,  demand  of  men  for  go- 
vernment, &c.)  were  distinct  or  nearly  distinct  from 
an  inferiority  of  paper  to  coin,  the  proper  term  for 
such  rise  of  prices  is  not  "  depreciation  of  bank 
paper,"  but  "  a  diminution  in  the  value  of  money.** 
In  1809  began  a  rise  of  prices  from  an  altogether 
different  cause ;  a  rise  proceeding  from  our  bank 
paper  not  being  j)ayable  in  coin,  and  from  its  being 
ex})osed  to  a  trial  it  was  unable  to  bear.     This 
trial  consisted  in  the  concurrence  of  three  remark- 
able circumstances;  the  expence  of  the  war  in 
Spain  ;  the  necessity  of  purchases  of  corn  ;  and  the 
privation  of  remittances  consequent  on  our  unfor- 
tunate stoppage  of  the  American  trade  with  the 
continent  of  Europe. 

Mode  in  rcliich  Depreciation  n-as  incurred  abroad. 
—  If  we  take,  as  an  example,  a  campaign  inthepeiiin- 
sular  war,  and  suppose  that  in  a  year,  such  as  ISli 

H    1- 


1(H  'I'hc  (^iK'sdoti  uj' 

or  LSI '2,  ill  which  our  c'X))t'mlitme  tliere  cxcet'detl 
1  (),()()(),()()()/.  there  was  suppUed  to  the  extent  of 
nine-tenths  in  clothing,  arms,  stores,  and  specie, 
exported  from  I'^ngland,  leaving  1,000,000/.  to  be 
defrayed  by  bills  in  our  public  offices  ;  in  what 
manner,  we  ask,  could  the  receivers  of  these  bills 
in  the  Peninsula  turn  them  to  account?  There 
was  not  there,  as  in  this  country,  an  excise-office, 
a  custom-house,  a  receiver  for  the  county,  nor, 
after  the  stoppage  of  the  American  trade,  were 
there  merchants,  to  whom  they  could  be  trans- 
ferred at  par  or  at  a  slight  discount.  If  remitted 
to  England,  those  bills  could  not  purchase  bullion  ; 
and  if  they  procured  English  merchandize  without 
a  perceptible  loss,  the  quantity  of  such  was  beyond 
the  demand  of  the  peninsular  or  any  continental 
market,  limited  as  it  was  in  these  years  by  Bona- 
parte*s  anti-commercial  decrees.  The  unavoidable 
consequence  w  as  a  fall  in  the  value  of  our  bills,  in 
other  words,  of  the  bank  notes  in  which  these  bills 
were  paid,  exemplifying  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Smitli, 
or  rather  the  self-evident  truth,  that  "  whatever 
causes  delay  the  payment,  or  restrict  the  circulation 
of  a  currency,  necessarily  produce  depreciation, 
the  ratio  of  which  must  increase  with  the  pressure 
of  these  causes." 

A  similar  reasoning  was  evidently  applicable  to 
our  continental  subsidies  as  far  as  paid  in  monev. 
It  held  also  as  to  the  purchase  of  foreign  corn 
whenever  such  purchases  were  of  an  amount  to 
surpass  our  export  of  merchandize. 

The  degree  of  such  Depreciation. — Of  the  degree 
of  inferiority  in  our  paper  to  the  metallic  currency 
of  the  Continent,  the  only  fit  index  was  the  rate  of 
cxcharigc  ;  and  on  referring  to  that  impartial  mo- 
nitor,  we  shall  find  an  ample  confirmation  of  the 


Dejyreciation  and  Over-hsue.  105 

preceding  reasoning.  The  extent  of  fall  during 
the  war  differed  regularly  in  different  years  accord- 
ing to  the  amount  of  the  demands  of  the  Continent 
on  this  country.  Slight  in  years  such  as  1S03  and 
1801<,  when  the  war  was  merely  maritime,  it  was 
more  considerable  in  the  case  of  continental  oper- 
ations, as  in  1805  and  1806 ; — serious,  when  to  these 
operations  was  joined,  as  in  ISOO,  the  necessity  of 
corn  purchases  ;  and  greatest  of  all  when,  as  in  the 
years  following  1809,  there  existed  the  double  drain 
of  subsidy  and  corn  import,  without  either  a  me- 
tallic currency,  or  a  free  neutral  traffic  to  interpose 
their  countervailing  effects. 

Effect  of  high  Prices  abroad  on  Prices  at  home. — 
Whatever  enhances  corn  enhances  labour,  and 
makes  itself  felt  in  almost  every  department  of  our 
])roductive  industry.  Now,  after  1809  the  quarter 
of  wheat  rose  from  80i\  to  100^.  in  consequence 
chiefly  of  the  fall  of  the  exchange,  of  the  necessity 
of  pa}ing  in  paper  a  fourth  or  a  fifth  more  than 
woidd  have  been  required  had  not  that  paper  been 
depreciated.  This  rise,  unfortunately  so  great  in 
corn,  pre\^ailcd  in  other  foreign  connnodities  ;  in 
timber,  hem]),  tallow,  to  which  may  be  added  a  few 
articles  insignificant  in  amount,  but  illustrative  of 
our  proposition,  because  they  were  wholly  sup})lied 
by  the  Continent,  such  as  cork,  antimony,  and  others, 
the  price  of  which  rose  rapidly  after  1809. 

How  far  were  the  effects  of  this  enhancement 
apparent  in  our  hardware,  cotton,  antl  woollens, 
the  cost  of  which  was  less  directly  affected  by  the 
price  of  our  imports  ?  The  cost  in  English  money 
of  Spanish  wool  and  American  cotton,  doubtless, 
rose  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  our  pa|)er  ;  the 
wages  of  our  workmen  had,  likewisL',  a  tendency 
to   rise    with    liie    price  of   corn.       The    finishetl 


10()  The  Question  of 

article  was  consequently  enhanced,  but  as  the 
chan''es  we  have  mentioned  formed  only  a  j)art  of 
tlic  cost,  the  proportion  of  rise  attributable  to  our 
bank  paper  was  not  great  in  the  case  of  our  manu- 
factures. 

Extent  of  such  Effect  previous  to  1809-  —  Having 
now  explained  the  mode  in  which  our  bank  paper 
affected  the  price  of  commodities,  it  remains  to 
ascertain  the  quantum  of  the  enhancement  thus 
caused.  And  here  when  computing  such  by  the  rate 
of  exchange,  it  would  evidently  be  unfair  to  draw 
our  inferences  from  a  short  interval,  such  as  the 
latter  months  of  180.5,  when  our  exchanges  were 
depressed  by  a  sudden  continental  demand  :  the 
correct  and  impartial  mode  is  to  class  the  years  of 
the  exemption  by  periods.  If  w^e  begin  with  the 
twelve  years  that  elapsed  from  the  earJy  part  of 
1797  to  that  of  1809,  we  shall  find  that  the  infe- 
riority of  our  bank  notes  to  coin  (see  Mr.  Mushet's 
Tables  and  Mr.  M'CuUoch's  article  on  Moneij,  in 
Napier's  Supplement  to  the  Encyclop.  Brit.)  may 
be  reckoned,  at  an  average  of  the  whole  period, 
between  three  and  five  per  cent.  But  as  this  infe- 
riority refers  to  continental  purposes,  and  as  a 
considerable  interval  elapsed  before  the  depreci- 
ation became  so  great  in  regard  to  payments  at 
home,  it  will  suffice  that  we  assume  three  per  cent. 
as  the  average  rise  in  our  prices,  consequent  on  the 
exemption  act,  until  1809. 

The  same  after  1809.  —  After  1809  we  enter 
on  a  new  a?ra ;  our  fin.ancial  horizon  became  ob- 
scured, and  the  tone  of  the  calculator  must  be 
altered.  If  after  that  year  twenty-five  per  cent, 
was  the  average  depreciation  of  our  bank  notes 
abroad,  and  if  at  home   we    make  the  same   al- 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  107 

lowance  as  before,  an  allowance  founded  on  the 
time  which  it  takes  to  adjust  prices  generally  to 
an  alteration  in  the  value  of  a  currency,  particu- 
larly where  that  alteration  is  not  apparent,  we  shall 
probably  find  Jifteen  per  cent,  a  fair  representation 
of  the  rise  of  prices,  as  far  as  caused  by  the  non- 
convertibility  of  our  paper,  during  the  five  last  years 
of  the  war  ;  in  other  words,  that  llo/.  of  our  bank 
paper  was  required  to  make  those  purchases,  or 
transact  that  business  for  which  100^.  of  it  would 
have  been  sufficient,  had  there  been  no  exemption 
from  cash  payments. 

Summary  of  the  preceding.  —  If  we  proceed  to 
make  a  summary  of  the  various  facts  connected 
with  our  paper  currency,  and  of  the  conclusions 
they  suggest,  we  shall  find  them  nearly  as  follows  : 

In  regard  to  Diminution  in  the  Value  of  Money 
generally  ^distinct from  the  Fall  of  our  Bank  Paper. — 

1.  The  exemption  from  cash  payments  was  pro- 
ductive of  a  sa\  ing  to  our  banks  peculiar  to  this 
coinitry,  and  enabled  them  to  make  ad\ances  at  a 
rate  of  interest  lower  than  that  of  any  other  country 
during  the  war.  This  had,  in  some  measure,  a 
tendency  to  retard  a  rise  of  prices  ;  but 

2.  The  exemption  caused  a  very  different  result,  in 
as  far  as  it  relieved  bankers  from  the  necessity  of 
regulating  their  issues  by  the  state  of  the  exchange. 
It  may  even  be  said  to  have  given  free  sco])e  to  the 
various  causes  of  enhancement  attendant  on  a  state 
of  war. 

Depreciation  or  inferiority  of  our  Paper  to  Coi/i. 

1.  Our  dependence  on  the  Continent,  and  the 
non-convertibility  of  our  bank  ])aper,  were  produc- 
tive of  its  depreciation,  particularly  after  180'J; 
but, 


108  '/'^"'  (^ic'^liox  '.'/' 

<2.  The  c'flect  of  that  depreciation  on  the  |>rice  of 
coinnioditics,  in  other  words,  tlic  rise  of  prices  cou- 
seciiient  on  tiie  fall  of  our  bank  pa})er,  does  not 
a])pear  to  have  exceeded  15  per  cent. 

These  conchisions  will,  we  trust,  be  found  to 
give  the  question  a  definite  form  ;  yet  moderate  as 
our  statement  may  a])pear  to  the  reader,  we  liardly 
expect  it  to  receive  a  ready  assent  from  either 
])arty,  so  perplexing  is  this  enquiry,  and  so  nuich 
lias  it  been  involved  with  other  topics  of  discus- 
sion. We  shall  accordingly  proceed  to  make  a  few 
animadversions  on  the  favourite  tenets  of  each. 

Arguments  of  the  Advocates  of  the  Bank.  —  These 
gentlemen,  with  all  their  ardour  in  the  cause  of 
nn'nisters,  will  hardly  refuse  to  allow  that  the  com- 
mand of"  money,  to  which  the  exemption  from  cash 
payments  was  so  instrumental,  increased  our  scale 
of  expenditure  during  the  war.  In  admitting 
this,  they  can  make  no  great  objection  to  the  infer- 
ence that  the  exemption  act  was  a  powerful,  though 
indirect,  cause  of  the  rise  of  prices  previous  to 
1809.  They  will  be  more  reluctant  to  admit  our 
second  position,  that  which  assumes  deprecia- 
tion of  our  bank  paper ;  for  though  they  allow  a 
great  fall  to  have  taken  place  in  the  exchange 
after  1809,  they  are  ill  prepared  to  admit  tliat 
from  the  moment  we  declared  our  paper  not  con- 
vertible into  the  currency  of  the  rest  of  the  civi- 
lised world,  we  rendered  depreciation  possible,  and 
that  a  postponement  of  the  evil,  or  a  mitigation  of 
its  extent,  would  necessaVily  dojiend  on  the  natiu'e 
of  our  coiniection  with  the  Continent,  on  the 
degree  to  which  our  paper  should  be  put  to  tlie 
test. 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  109 

But  those  wlio  still  feel  a  difficulty  in  believing 
depreciation  to  have  existed  at  home,  should  ben-in 
by  asking  themselves  whether,  \vithout  the  non- 
convertibility  of  our  paper,  depreciation  would 
have  existed  abroad  ;  or,  if  it  had  begun,  whether 
it  would  have  continued.  If  they  refer  to  the 
evidence  of  Mr.  Goldsmid,  and  others,  before  the 
Bullion  Committee,  they  will  find,  that  had  our 
currency  been  of  coin,  or  convertible  into  coin, 
7  or  8  per  cent,  would  have  been  the  greatest  dif- 
ference that  could  possibly  have  taken  place  in  the 
exchange  even  at  the  time  of  the  anti-commercial 

o 

decrees.  Let  them  ask,  in  the  next  place,  whether 
a  reduction  of  the  quantity  of  oin*  bank  pa})er 
would  not  at  any  time  have  raised  its  value,  and,  if 
carried  a  sufficient  length,  have  brought  it  to  a  par 
with  coin  ? 

Supposing  the  advocates  of  the  Bank  to  assent 
to  this  reasoning,  and  to  admit  the  existence  of 
depreciation,  our  next  object  is  to  satisfy  them  that 
our  estimate  of  it  is  not  exaggerated.  This  will 
best  be  done  by  a  comparison  of  the  rise  of  prices 
in  England,  and  on  the  Continent.  If  in  this  coun- 
try 160/.  were  necessary  towards  the  close  of  the 
war  to  make  the  purchases  which  100/.  made  in 
1792,  or  if,  in  other  words,  our  prices  experienced 
a  rise  of  HO  per  cent.,  the  rise  on  the  Continent 
will  probably  have  been  found  to  have  been  about 
30  per  cent.  This  difference  was  too  great  to  be 
explained  by  any  difference  in  the  com})arative 
charges  of  war  ;  for  taxation,  the  demand  of  men 
for  the  public  service,  and  the  enlianccment  of 
corn,  were  all  operative  in  a  considerable  ilegree 
on  the  Continent.  Farthei-,  since  the  reinstate- 
ment of  our  currency,  the  decline  in  prices  has 
been  about  15  per  cent,  greater  in  England  than  on 


110  The  Quest  toll  ()f 

the  Continent,  a  coincidence  which  seems  iiilly  to 
justify  our  computation,  that  that  proportion  of  the 
rise  in  war  was  produced  by  the  fall  of  our  bank  paper. 

The  Supporters  of  the  Bullion  Committee.  —  We 
are  next  to  address  ourselves  to  the  adherents  of 
a  dirterent  doctrine,    to  men  who    take  a  bolder 
tone,  and  do  not  scruple  to  tax  their  antagonists 
with  ic'iiorance  of  the  principles  of  productive  indus- 
try.   Nor  need  we,  in  truth,  be  surprised  at  the  con- 
fidence of  their  language  in  regard  to  the  question 
under  discussion.     The  rise  of  our  prices  during 
the  war  was  so  progressive,  and  so  coincident  in 
point  of  time  with  the  increase  of  bank  paper,  that 
the  connexion   of  cause  and  effect  was  generally 
asserted,  long  before  it  received  a  kind  of  official 
sanction  from  the  Bullion  Report.     To  ascribe  en- 
hancement to  over-issue,  was  easy ;  to  trace  it  to 
other  causes  and  to  define   the  limited  operation 
of  the  exemption  act,  would  have  been  a  tedious 
and  intricate   task.     Yet   the    difference  between 
us  and  the  Bullionists  consists  less  in  the  extent 
of  enhancement,    attributed   to   our   bank  paper, 
than    in    the   mode    by  which   that  enhancement 
was  produced.    While  tlieij  hardly  notice  the  effect 
of  taxation,  demand  of  men  for  government,  or  the 
insufficient  growth  of  corn,  as  causes  of  rise  of  price, 
and  ascribe  almost  all  to  bank  paper,  5x'^  consider 
these  as  the  direct  causes,  and  our  paper  as  opera- 
tive only  in  a  passive  sense,  by  giving  scope  to  these 
causes,  and  consequently  facilitating  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war.     We  can  trace  no  direct  power  in 
banks  to  over-issue ;  and  those  who  insist  on  it,  will 
find  themselves  involved  in  all  the  difficulty  attend- 
ant  on  an  attack  ol'  the  strong  hold  of  their  oppo- 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  Ill 

nents,  viz.  the  power  possessed  by  the  piibHc  of 
reheving  themselves  of  a  surcharge,  by  paying  bank 
notes  into  tlie  Treasury. 

The  Bulhonists,  being  4n  general  political  eco- 
nomists, will  readily  assent  to  the  arguments  of  Dr. 
Smith,  that  banks,  while  subject  to  cash  payments, 
possess  no  power  of  increasing  the  amount  of  cur- 
rency ;  a  power  which  many  projectors,  about  the 
middle  of  last  century,  fondly  imagined  to  reside 
in  banks,  and  the  non-existence  of  which  is  so  clearly 
explained  by  Dr.  Smith,  in  his  account  of  the  un- 
successful career  of  the  Ayr  Bank.   When  satisfied 
of  this,  let  them  next  endeavour  to  show  in  what 
manner  it  was  possible  that  such  power  could  have 
been  conferred  by  the  exemption  act.     That  act 
was  evidently  incapable  of  giving  solidity  to  bills  or 
other  securities,  which,  without  it,  would  liave  been 
bad  or  doubtful ;  nor  did  any  of  its  provisions  either 
oblige  or  induce  the  public  to  pay  interest  on  more 
currency  than  they  required.    During  its  operation 
as  before,  our  notes  were  nothing  more  than  an 
instrument  of  circulation,  and  one  which  continued 
to  cost  the  holders  fully  as  much  as  prior  to  the 
war.     Obtained  by  a  sacrifice  of  interest,   it  was 
important  to  every  indi\idual,  whether  a  speculative 
or  a  regular  dealer,  to  circulate  them  as  quickly  as 
possible,  to  retain  them  no  longer  than  was  neces- 
sary to  accomplish  a  specific  purpose.      From  this 
reasoning  we  infer  that  bank  paper,  whether  pay- 
able or  not  in  cash,  must  await  the  call  of  the  cus- 
tomer, and  that  its  circulation  can  be  augmented 
only  to  meet  a  rise  proceeding  from  other  causes. 
Farther,   this  extended    circulation    can    continue 
only  so  long  as  the  causes  of  high  prices  remain 
in   force;  for  bank  paper  lias  neither  the  power 
of  raising  prices  in  the  first  instance,  or  of  main- 


112  The  (liics/ioti  o/ 

tainini^    llioin   wlieii    tlic    causes   of"  enlianccincnt 
cuasc  to  opcMate. 

If  tliis  doctrine  appear  somewhat  ])oId,  \ve  ap- 
peal to  the  evidence  of  facts,  and  invite  our  readers 
to  consider  how  remarkably  our  conclusions  are 
su])ported  by  the  course  of  circumstances  since  the 
peace.  During  the  years  181.5  and  1810  no  com- 
pulsion was  exercised  in  regard  to  a  return  to  cash 
payments,  nor  were  the  advantages  arising  to  bank- 
ers fiom  the  exem})tion  act,  restricted  in  a  single 
instance  ;  yet  country  bankers  were  forced  greatly 
to  curtail  their  circulation,  a  measure  which,  had 
they  possessed  the  power  commonly  attributed  to 
them,  would,  doubtless,  have  been  postponed  till 
the  act  had  been  repealed.  Further,  had  our  banks 
possessed  this  })ower,  the  latitude  given  to  circula- 
tion during  the  war,  would,  we  may  be  assLU'ed, 
have  been  much  greater.  Mr.  Huskisson,  when 
writing  on  this  subject  in  1810,  and  viewing  the 
question  in  the  light  of  the  Bullion  Committee,  ac- 
knowledged his  surprise  that  the  issues  of  the  Bank 
had  not  been  far  greater.  Is  it  going  too  far  to  ask 
whether  this  does  not  justify  the  suspicion  of  a 
latent  error  in  the  reasoning  of  bulHonists ;  of  the 
existence  of  circumstances  of  which  their  arguments 
take  no  account  ?  Without  pressing  this  point  in 
the  abstract,  we  shall  adduce  a  fact  entitled  to  the 
most  attentive  consideration  of  those  who  invest 
the  exemption  act  with  so  formidable  an  attribute 
as  that  of  enabling  bankers  to  make  a  direct  increase 
of  their  issues.  Our  growth  of  corn,  inadequate 
during  the  whole  war,  became  so,  in  a  high  degree, 
soon  after  the  exemption  act :  our  farmers  had 
then  a  powerful  motive  to  extend  their  tillage,  and, 
in  fact,  did  extend  it  as  far  as  their  means  admitted. 
It  was  a  general  notion  on  the  part  of  the  public, 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  113 

and  we  believe  of  ministers,  that  this  extension  was 
limited,  not  by  want  of  funds,  but  by  the  nature  of 
the  soil ;  an  opinion,  however,  wlioUjj  disproved  by 
the  experience  of  the  last  seven  years,  in  which  the 
amount  produced  from  our  soil  has  been  so  greatly 
augmented.  To  what  has  this  augmentation  been 
owing,  except  to  the  application  of  additional  capi- 
tal and  labour  ?  Observe  the  importance  of  the 
conclusion  to  which  this  leads  :  our  soil  having 
been,  as  far  as  regarded  natural  fertility,  equally 
capable  of  increased  production,  ten  or  twelve  years 
ago,  would  not  our  farmers,  had  our  banks  possessed 
the  power  ascribed  to  them,  have  obtained  such  an 
issue  of  notes  as  would  have  enabled  them  to  ex- 
tend their  tillage,  and  bring  our  growth  of  corn  on 
a  level  with  our  consumption  ?  If  want  of  hands 
be  alleged  as  the  obstacle,  we  answer,  that  in  Ire- 
land and  in  Germany  there  were  many  thousand 
labourers  unemployed,  and  that  a  command  of  ca- 
pital, such  as  is  vulgarly  ascribed  to  our  banks, 
would  soon  have  transported  them  to  our  shores. 

Historical  Enquiries. 

I.  The  Exemption  Act,  viexved  in  connection  with 
the  events  of  the  War. — We  shall  now  bestow  a 
few  paragraphs  on  an  interesting,  but  hitherto  un- 
noticed topic,  in  the  history  of  our  paper  currency ; 
we  mean  the  question,  "  whether  the  exemption 
act,  had  it  not  taken  place  when  it  did,  would 
have  been  resorted  to  at  any  subsequent  ajra  in 
the  war?"  This  enquiry,  brief  as  we  shall  make 
it,  requires  an  attentive  notice  of  our  situation 
relatively  to  the  Continent  at  particular  periods. 

The  preliminaiies  of  peace  between  France 
and  Austria  were  signed  at  Leoben  in  April  1 797, 


1 1  i.  The  K.reinpHnn  Act  vie7vefi 

a  frw  wooks  af'fer  the  exemption  act,  and  thoii<rh 
the  (leHnitive  treaty  (that  of  Campo  Formio)  was 
not  concluded  till  the  antunm,  there  existed  little 
doubt  of  its  taking  place,  and  it  is  a  well-known 
fhct,  that,  in  the  course  of  the  summer,  our  pecu- 
niary  resir)urces  became  more  abundant.  This 
was  also  a  time  of  naval  success,  and  though  the 
dfead  of  invasion  continued,  we  have  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Bullion  Committee  (Report,  page  ^7.) 
that  the  Bank  ought  to  liave  met  an  alarm  of  that 
nature  by  a  liberal  issue  of  their  notes.  Be  this  as 
it  may,  it  seemrs  extremely  imHkely  that  at  anytime 
in  1797»  after  the  preliminaries  of  Leoben,  minis- 
ters would  have  adopted  a  measure  so  new  and 
questionable  as  the  suspension  of  cash  payments. 

The  Succeeding  year  was  one  of  peace  on  the 
Continent,  and  of  prosperity  in  tliis  country.  But 
in  what  manner  did  the  renewal  of  operations  by 
land  in  1799,  affect  the  state  of  our  circulating 
medium  ?  The  effect,  for  some  time  inconsider- 
able, became  very  different  after  the  failure  of  the 
harvest ;  the  long  interval  of  two  years  that  elapsed 
from  that  failure,  until  the  certainty  of  a  favour- 
able crop  in  1801,  would,  had  cash  payments  been 
enforced,  have  recalled  all  the  difficulties  of  1796  ; 
so  that  we  by  no  means  \enture  to  assert  that 
ministers  would  have  forborne  a  recourse  to  the 
measure  in  question. 

The  prelimin:u-ies  of  peace  with  France  were 
signed  in  the  autumn  of  1801,  and  there  ensued  a 
long  interval  of  ease  in  regard  to  financial  and 
commercial  affairs.  E^'en  in  180.5,  wlien  we  again 
roused  the  Continent  to  arms,  and  subsidized  not 
only  Austria,  but  Russia,  the  pressure  on  our  ex- 
change was  temporary ;  for  this  was  no  season  of 
indecisive  warfare,  of  protracted  operations :  our 
allies  had  now  an  antagonist  who  brought  a  cam- 


i?i  co7inection  with  the  Events  of  the  War.     115 

paign  speedily  to  issue ;  and  who,  at  Ulm  and 
Austerlitz,  effectually  relieved  us  from  the  pressure 
of  subsidies.  In  180f)  and  I8O7,  part  of  our  aUies 
continued  in  arms,  but  they  were  not  supported 
by  ministers  on  a  scale  productive  of  pecuniaiy 
embarrassment,  and  our  corn  imports  were  fortu- 
nately not  of  a  magnitude  to  press  on  the  ex- 
change. 

There  thus  elapsed  a  period  of  not  less  than  seven 
years  without  any  great  or  continued  derangement 
in  oiu'  continental  exchanges.  However,  a  very 
different  prospect  was  opened  by  the  events  of 
1809,  by  our  augmented  expenditure  in  the  Pe- 
ninsula, and  the  necessity  of  large  purchases  of 
corn.  Had  oiu'  bank-paper  been  at  that  time  de- 
man  dable  in  cash,  we  should,  doubtless,  have  ex- 
perienced great  difficulties,  nor  would  the  public, 
ardent  in  the  cause  of  vSpain,  have  hesitated  to 
support  ministers  in  any  measure  that  promised  an 
addition  to  oui'  pecuniary  means.  There  is,  on 
the  other  hand,  equally  little  doubt,  that  withoirt 
the  ])revious  existence  of  the  exemption  act,  and 
the  confidence  inspired  by  its  till  then  successflil 
operation,  we  should  not  have  interfere!  with  the 
freedom  of  American  navigation:  we  would  have 
studied  more  carefully  the  effect  of  that  navigation 
on  oui'  resources,  and  have  cherished  it  as  a  fund 
for  our  continental  expences.  Our  ship-owners 
might  have  clamoured,  and  individual  members  of 
the  cabinet  might  have  been  rendered  couM-rts  to 
their  views,  bnt  the  opinion  of  the  bank  directors 
would  have  been  hostile  to  such  a  measure ;  and 
the  danger  pointed  out  by  the  solitary  voice  of 
Mr.  Baring  (Inquiry  into  onr  Orders  in  Council) 
^ould  have  been  brought  before  governnient  with 
all  the  weight  of  that  powertiil  body. 

I  ^2 


116  The  Ejccmptum  Act  viewed 

II.  The  next  and  concluding  object  of  our  inquiry 
is,  **  to  what  depjree  did  tiie  exemption  from  cash 
payments  increase  to  government  the  means  of 
exertion  on  the  Continent?'*  By  substituting  at 
home  paper  for  metalhc  currency,  it  enabled  us  to 
send  abroad  our  gold  coin,  the  amount  of  which, 
very  dift'erently  as  it  has  been  computed,  (Bank 
Committee  Report,  May  1819,)  was,  probably,  not 
far  short  of  20,000,000/.  sterling ;  —  a  most  sub- 
stantial aid,  doubtless,  but  one  w^hich  was,  in  a 
great  measure,  exhauarted  in  the  first  three  years 
of  trial,  1799,  1800,  1801.  From  that  time  for- 
ward, the  portion  of  gold  coin  in  the  country 
appears  to  have  been  comparatively  small :  at  all 
events,  it  was  found  quite  inadequate  to  the  de- 
mand in  the  second  period  of  trial,  1809  and  1810, 
the  exchange  having  fallen  rapidly  as  soon  as  the 
pressure  on  it  became  considerable. 

The  extent  of  direct  aid  arising  from  the  ex- 
emption act,  seems  thus  to  have  been  limited  to 
the  amount  of  our  gold  coin ;  but  w^e  should  enter 
into  a  much  wider  field,  were  we  to  calcidate  the 
augmentation  of  our  financial  means  by  the  other 
results  of  the  act ;  the  increased  facility  of  dis- 
count, the  comparatively  moderate  rate  of  interest, 
above  all,  the  practicability  of  increasing  our  stock 
of  currency  in  proportion  to  the  rise  of  our  prices. 
After  every  deduction  for  exaggeration,  and  after 
ascribing  the  larger  share  of  our  financial  abun- 
dance to  the  bold  plan  of  raising  the  supplies 
within  the  year,  there  still  remains  a  great  amount 
referable  to  the  effects  of  the  exemption  from  cash- 
payments.  Of  the  extent  of  aid  arising  from  a 
moderate  rate  of  interest,  some  idea  may  be  formed 
by  those  who  have  visited  the  Continent,  and 
observed  how  slowly  productive  industry  advances 


in  connection  xvith  the  Events  of  the  War,     II7 

in  a  country  like  France,  where,   even  in  peace, 
6  or  7  per  cent,  is  the  current  interest  of  money. 

This  benefit  we  experienced  without  much  alloy, 
until  the  five  last  years  of  the  war,  when  the  de- 
preciation of  our  paper  on  the  Continent  caused 
a  sudden  increase  of  our  foreign  disburse,  and 
some  time  after,  an  increase  less  sudden,  but  of 
greater  amount  and  permanency,  in  our  expen- 
diture at  home.  The  losses  hence  arising  may,  we 
believe,  without  pressing  the  point  to  an  extreme, 
be  carried  to  100,000,000/.,  in  addition  to  which 
we  have  to  charge  on  the  exemption  act  a  large 
proportion  of  the  distress  of  our  agriculturists, 
conducive  as  that  act  certainly  was,  to  the  enor- 
mous rise  of  prices  during  war,  the  fall  of  which 
has  been,  and  will  be  productive  of  great  embar- 
rassment, until  wages,  salaries,  and  other  charges, 
shall  be  accommodated  to  the  new  scale.  It  thus 
becomes  a  question,  whether  the  amount  of  benefit 
derived  from  the  exemption  in  the  period  preced- 
ing I8O9  has  not  been  balanced,  perhaps  more 
than  balanced,  by  the  loss  and  pressure  of  the  sub- 
sequent years.  This  point,  however,  we  have  no 
wish  to  urge,  and  still  less  the  speculative  question 
already  alluded  to,  whether,  without  the  aid  derived 
from  this  act,  our  government  would  have  renewed 
the  war  in  1803,  or  have  conducted  it  on  so  expensive 
a  scale.  Our  object  is  statistical,  not  political ; 
and  in  calculating  the  advantage  or  disadvantage 
of  a  great  financial  measure,  we  confine  ourselves 
to  reasoning  on  events  as  they  actually  occurred. 

Mr.  Peel's  Bill.  —  The  majority  of  the  public, 
yielding  to  first  impressions  and  unable  to  follow 
up  an  intricate  course  of  reasoning,  have  ascribed 
to  Mr.  Peel's  bill  that  re-action  which  arose  from  a 

I  S 


Xm  Th/i  FjJ-cmplion  Act  vieuedy  <SfC. 

i'ar  more  coinprehunsive  cause.  As  to  the  p'escnl 
effects  of*  that  bill,  we  can  trace  none  of  conse- 
quence, except  a  partial  rise  in  the  value  of  gold 
throughout  Europe,  consequent  on  the  large  pur- 
cliases  of  the  Bank  of  England ;  while,  as  to  its 
permanent  effects,  we  can  perceive,  so  long  as  peace 
lasts,  hardly  any  worth  notice,  except  an  obligation 
on  that  establishment  to  keep  a  large  reserve  in 
cash,  and  consequently  to  reduce  its  annual  profits 
by  400,000/.  or  whatever  may  be  the  charge  of 
providing  and  keeping  that  deposit.  Country 
bankers,  on  the  other  hand,  are  subjected  to  little 
additioniU  expence,  since  by  a  clause  in  the  act  of 
1819,  recently  prolonged,  they  continue  exempt 
from  the  necessity  of  paying  in  cash,  if  they  tender 
Bank  of  England  notes. 

But  innoxious  as  this  law  in  a  great  measure 
was,  we  consider  its  enactment  matter  of  great 
regret,  partly  as  subjecting  to  undue  censure  the 
individuals  instrumental  in  passing  it,  more  as 
tending  to  make  the  public  mistake  the  real  cause 
of  the  distress  that  has  since  taken  place.  Had  no 
such  act  been  passed,  and  had  the  Bank  been  left 
to  pay  in  cash  or  not  at  its  option,  the  public 
would,  as  in  1815  and  1816,  have  fixed  their  at- 
tention on  the  transition  from  peace  to  war  as 
the  real  cause  of  the  fall  of  prices,  and  have  been 
better  prepared  to  comprehend  and  second  the 
financial  measures  which  such  a  transition  required. 


119 


CHAP.  V. 

Agriculture. 

Wi:  propose  dividing  this  very  important  branch 
of  our  subject  into  three  parts : 

I.  A  historical  sketch  of  our  corn-trade,  parti- 
cularly since  1792  ;  and  the  causes  of  the  remark- 
able fluctuations  of  price. 

II.  Tlie  present  situation  and  prospects  of  our 
agriculturists. 

III.  The  question  of  a  protecting  duty. 

SECTION  I. 

Historical  Sketch  ojour  Corn  Trade. 

The  interference  of  our  legislature  with  the 
export  of  corn  dates  from  a  ver}-  remote  yiMa  ;  but 
our  notice  shall  not  be  carried  beyond  the  reign 
of  Elizabeth,  a  reign  which,  in  its  early  years,  ex- 
hibited corn  at  as  low  a  price  as  at  any  period  of 
our  history,  but  became  in  its  progress  as  remark- 
able for  enhancement  as  the  reign  of  George  III. 
England  was  in  those  days,  a  corn-ex])orting  coun- 
tr> ,  if  the  name  of  export  can  be  said  to  belong  to 
a  surplus  produce  hardly  greater  than  that  of  j^ 
single  county  in  the  present  age.  In  the  early 
part  of  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  (\5iH)y  export  was 
permitted  by  act  of  Parliament,  whcne\er  our 
prices  fell  to  lOs.  the  quarter  for  wheat,  and  Qs.  8d. 
for  barley  and  malt ;  prices  remarkably  low,  when 

I  4 


120       Historical  Sketch  of  our  Com  Trade. 

wc  consider  that  our  coin  was,  in  point  of  metallic 
weight  and  fineness,  the  same  as  at  present.  At 
that  rate,  however,  they  did  not  long  continue  ;  a 
considerable  rise  took  phice  before  I.CI70 ;  and  in 
1.593  the  export  limit  was  extended  by  act  of  par- 
liament to  9,0s.  for  the  quarter  of  wheat,  and  lisJ^. 
for  barley  and  malt. 

This  doubling  of  price  in  the  course  of  thirty 
years,  has  not  a  little  embarrassed  political  arith- 
meticians :  it  is  commonly  attributed  to  the  influx 
of  metallic  currency  from  the  American  mines 
before  an  outlet  was  found  for  it  in  India  and 
China,  but  from  our  experience  of  the  limited 
effect  of  such  a  cause  in  subsequent  times,  par- 
ticularly since  the  late  peace,  we  are  inclined  to 
lay  no  little  stress  on  the  general  prevalence  of 
war  throughout  Europe,  from  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  to  that  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  the  enhancement  continued  progres- 
sive; for  in  1623  the  export  limit  was  raised  to 
325.  the  quarter  for  wheat,  and  \Qs.  for  barley  and 
malt.  In  the  succeeding  age,  particularly  under 
Cromwell,  our  markets  were  considerably  higher, 
but  the  rise  was  in  some  degree  nominal,  our  coin, 
though  no  longer  debased  by  government,  being 
deteriorated  by  clipping  and  filing,  and  brought,  at 
times,  no  less  than  20  per  cent,  below  its  legal  value, 
—  an  abuse  not  completely  remedied  till  1717' 

Bounti/  o?i  E.rport.  —  In  the  reign  of  Charles  II. 
the  prices  of  corn  declined,  and  though  several 
acts  were  passed  (in  I66O,  1663,  I67O),  imposing 
a  duty  on  foreign  corn,  their  effect  in  our  market 
was  inconsiderable,  because  our  growth  equalled, 
or  more  than  equalled  our  consumption.  Prices 
accordingly  did  not  rise,   the  agriculturists  com- 


Historical  Sketch  of  our  Com  Trade.      121 

plained,  and  the  epoch  of  the  Revolution  was 
marked  by  a  new  refinement  of  legislation  in  their 
favour.  The  necessity  of  providing^  supplies  for 
the  formidable  contest  with  Louis  XIV.,  led  go- 
vernment to  contemplate  a  land-tax,  and  to  offer 
as  a  douceur  to  the  landed  interest,  a  premium  on 
export,  which,  accompanied  by  a  prohibition  of  the 
import  of  foreign  corn,  implied  a  certainty  of 
increase  of  price,  and  consequently  of  rent.  The 
chief  provisions  of  the  act  were  the  payment  of  a 
bounty  of  5s.  for  every  quarter  of  wheat  exported, 
so  long  as  our  price  continued  at  or  below  485., 
and  Qs.  6d.  for  every  quarter  of  barley  or  malt,  so 
long  as  our  home  currency  for  that  grain  did  not 
exceed  2is. 

A  deficiency  of  documents  in  regard  to  the  ex- 
tent of  our  tillage,  prevents  our  tracing  the  effects 
of  the  bounty  act :  it  doubtless  stinmlated  produc- 
tion, and,  under  ordinary  political  circumstances, 
might,  after  creating  a  temporary  superiority  of 
demand  to  supply,  have  in  some  degree  lowered 
prices ;  but  the  market  was,  during  many  years, 
kept  up  by  causes  not  unlike  those  which  followed 
in  our  day  the  French  revolution,  —  war,  and  a 
more  than  usual  prevalence  of  bad  seasons.  The 
proportion  of  the  latter  in  the  twenty  years  between 
1692  and  1712,  was  not  inferior  to  that  of  the 
twenty  years  between  1792  and  1812;  and  as  our 
drain  of  men  and  capital  for  the  war  in  these  days, 
made  no  slight  approximation  to  that  of  our  late 
contest,  there  were  wanting  to  complete  the  ana- 
logy of  high  price  only  two  of  the  characteristics  of 
our  age,  —  a  depreciated  currency,  and  an  annual 
insufficiency  of  growth. 

After  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  we  enter  on  a  paci- 
fic aera,  on  the  age  of  Fleury  and  Walpole.     The 


£  s. 

ci. 

1   15 

5 

I    15 

2 

1    12 

1 

1    13 

3 

1    19 

3 

mQ       llislorical  Sketch  uf  our  Corn  Trade. 

causes  of  fiuctuation  in  our  corn-market  were  now 
nuicli  siniplifiecl,  and  the  half-centiiry  that  suc- 
ceeded presented  the  Ibllowing  residts : 

Average  Price  of  Wheal  computed  by  the  Winchester   quarter^ 
from  Purchases  made  at  Windsor J'or  Eton  College. 

For  ten  years  ending  with  1725 
Do.         -  ending  with  1735 

Do.         -  ending  with  1745 

Do.         -  ending  with  1755 

Do.         -  ending  with  17(i5 

In  what  manner  are  we  to  explain  so  near  an 
approach  to  uniformity  of  price  during  so  long  a 
period?  By  the  maintenance  of  peace  during 
thirty-fiye  years  out  of  fifty,  and  by  an  exemption, 
in  general,  liom  bad  seasons.  The  case  was  the 
same  with  our  neighbours,  as  appears  from  the 
returns  (see  Appendix)  of  the  prices  of  corn  in 
France.  In  that  country,  as  in  England,  the 
market  during  the  fifty  years  in  question,  presented 
an  average  considerably  lower  than  that  of  either 
the  preceding  or  succeeding  half-century. 

During  the  whole  of  this  period,  we  were  ex- 
porters of  corn ;  the  quantity  varied,  of  course, 
from  year  to  year,  but  w^as  almost  always  sufficient 
to  establish  the  fact,  that  the  market  price  in  Eng- 
land was  little  higher  than  throughout  the  mari- 
time part  of  the  west  of  Europe ;  we  mean  the 
Netherlands,  Denmark,  the  North  of  France,  and 
the  north-west  of  Germany.  The  cheapness  was 
materially  greater  only  in  inland  cUstricts  of  the 
Continent,  where,  as  at  present  in  Lorraine,  the 
south  of  Poland,  or  south-west  of  Russia,  the  want 
of  water  conveyance  kept  down  the  market. 

During  this  half-century  of  stiitionaiy  price,  and 


Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn  Trade.      l'2o 

-of  scanty  agricultural  profits, — this  period,  when 
inclosure  bills  were  so  rare,  and  lease  afler  lease 
was  signed  in  long  succession,  without  any  idea  of 
increase  of  rent,  it  must  not  be  inferred  ihat  our 
tillage  was  on  the  decrease  :  it  evidently  received 
an  extension,  but  somewhat  more  slowly,  as  ap- 
pears by  the  ultimate  result,  than  the  increase  of 
our  population. 

After  1764,  began  a  new  aera ;  our  consumption 
equalled,  and  somewhat  surpassed  our  growth,  so 
that  our  import  predominated  over  export.  This 
change,  so  unsuitable  to  a  season  of  peace,  so  con- 
trary to  calculation,  at  a  time  when  additional 
labour  and  capital  became  applicable  to  agricul- 
ture, was  owing  to  several  reasons, — an  unusual 
proportion  of  bad  seasons ;  the  increase  of  con- 
sumers from  the  extension  of  our  manufactures, 
particularly  cotton  ;  and  in  })art,  doubtless,  to  the 
general  disposition  to  withhold  surplus  capital  from 
the  so  long  unprofitable  investment  of  agriculture. 

Act  o/"1773.  —  The  rise  in  our  market,  whatever 
may  have  been  its  causes,  was  such  in  the  ten 
years  preceding  1773,  as  to  lead  to  an  act  of  a  new 
kind;  an  act  implying  that,  in  regard  to  corn,  Eng- 
land was  to  be  considered  rather  an  importing  than 
an  exporting  country.  It  ])ermitted  the  import  of 
foreign  wheat  whenever  our  own  reached  or  ex- 
ceeded 48.y.  the  quarter  ;  a  hmit  just  and  moderate, 
which,  while  it  relieved  the  consume)-  from  an  ex- 
orbitant rise  on  the  occurrence  of  a  bad  harvest, 
was  productive  of"  no  injury  to  our  agriculture,  the 
prices  of  corn  continuing  to  afford  a  steady  retiuu 
for  the  labour  and  capital  employed.  Om*  marker 
now  exhibited  all  the  ailvantages  of  snjjpiy  duly 
proportioned  to  demand :  in  some  years  a  partial 


124       Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn  Trade. 

import  was  necessary;  in  others,  the  nature  of  our 
crops  enabled  lis  to  export  ;  but  after  I788,  a  time 
of  extension  and  prosperity  to  most  of  our  manu- 
factures, import  decidedly  predominated. 

In  I71U,  the  landed  interest,  not  satisfied  with 
the  advantage  secured  to  them  by  the  act  of  1773, 
carried  it  a  step  farther,  and  obtained  a  law  pre- 
venting import,  except  when  our  wheat  should 
reach  or  exceed  the  price  of  54.9.  the  quarter. 
Whether  this  measure  would  have  operated  to 
raise  prices,  or  by  directing  an  extra  share  of  ca- 
pital to  tillage,  would  have,  in  some  degree,  lower- 
ed them,  we  had  no  opportunity  of  ascertaining,  so 
soon  was  it  followed  by  the  war  of  1793. 

The  late  Wars. — The  wars  of  the  present  age, 
attended  by  an  unparalleled  drain  of  both  labourers 
and  capital,  could  not  fail  to  raise  the  price  of  corn. 
For  some  time,  however,  the  rise  was  gradual,  the 
average  price  of  our  wheat,  during  the  first  seven 
years  of  the  war,  not  exceeding  iSSs.  ;  but  two  bad 
harvests  in  succession,  (1799  and  1800)  altered 
entirely  the  state  of  the  market,  and  carried  prices 
to  a  rate  (6/.  and  upwards)  till  then  unprecedented 
in  our  history.  The  seasons  of  ISOI,  180^2,  and 
1803,  were  favourable,  and  produced  a  fall  to 
nearly  3/.,  a  fall  which,  in  concurrence  with  the 
demands  of  the  Treasury  on  the  land-holders  for 
our  renewed  contest  with  France,  led  to  the  corn 
law  of  1804-,  by  which  the  import  of  foreign  wheat 
was  in  a  manner  prohibited,  until  our  own  should 
be  at  or  above  63.s.,  and  taxed  till  our  own  readied 
665.  These  prices,  high  as  they  then  seemed,  were 
soon  surpassed  by  the  currency  of  our  market,  in 
consequence,  partly  of  an  unfavourable  season 
(1804),  partly  of  the  continued  drain  of  hands  and 


Historical  Sketch  of  our  Com  Trade.       125 

capital  for  the  war.  These  causes  operated  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  over  the  rest  of  Europe,  and 
greatly  lessened  the  relief  which  importation  would 
otherwise  have  afforded  us. 

The  non-convertibility  of  our  paper  currency 
had  existed  since  1797.  and  passed,  in  vulgar  es- 
timate, for  the  principal  cause  of  this  progressive 
rise ;  but  the  degree  of  enhancement  proceeding 
from  it  was  slight  (not  exceeding  3  or  4  per  cent.) 
until  1809.  Ill  that  year  it  was  suddenly  accele- 
rated by  an  unfortunate  concurrence  of  circum- 
stances ;  expenditure  in  Spain,  the  stoppage  of 
neutral  traffic,  and,  above  all,  a  deficient  harvest. 
From  this  time  forward,  our  purchases  of  foreign 
corn  were  made  at  a  sacrifice  of  18,  20,  or  25  per 
cent,  a  loss  incurred  on  the  whole  of  the  very  large 
sum  of  7,000,000/.  expended  on  the  purchase  of 
corn  in  1810.  The  currency  of  our  market  was 
now  between  51.  and  6/.,  and  though,  for  one  year, 
a  rise  was  prevented  by  the  abundant  harvest  of 

1810,  the  case  became  very  difl'erent  after  that  of 

1811,  although  only  partially  deficient.  A  supply 
from  abroad  was  now,  in  a  manner,  out  of  the 
question,  partly  from  the  anti-cominercial  edicts 
of  the  time,  more  from  our  want  of  specie  and 
the  fall  of  our  bank  paper.  Accordingly,  during 
1812  and  1813,  our  prices  averaged  above  6/., 
a  rate  ill  calculated  to  prepare  our  farmers  for 
the  great  and  general  fall  to  be  expected  from 
the  approaching  change  in  the  state  of  Europe. 

The  Peace  of  1814.  — Never  were  the  effects  of 
peace  more  promptly  or  generally  felt,  than  in 
1814.  Import  co-operated  with  favourable  seasons ; 
tlie  price  of  corn  fell  rapidly,  and  it  was  in  vain 
that  parliament  passed,  early  in  1815,  a  new  act. 


l^f)  Fhi<fU(ilio7is  iu  the  Prict  ofCoj^n. 

foH)i(l(liti^  import  till  tlic  home-price  of  our  wheat 
exceeded  80.9. :  the  market  continued  low,  and  for 
a  time  exposed  both  the  farmers  and  the  public  to 
all  the  evils  of  sudden  transition.  In  ISU)  a  defi- 
ciency of  ciop,  more  serious  both  in  England  and 
the  Continent,  tlian  any  in  tlie  present  age,  re- 
versed this  state  of  things,  raised  prices,  and  led, 
during  I8I7  and  1818,  to  an  import  of  unexam- 
pled magnitude.  But  when  in  the  early  part  of 
1819,  the  effect  of  scarcity  was  past,  our  market 
fell,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1820,  an  abundant 
harvest  brought  it  to  the  state  of  depression  under 
which  it  so  long  remained. 

Effect  of  the  Fluctuations  in  the  price  of  Com, 
si7ice  1792.  —  We  are  next  to  examine  the  state  of 
our  market  during  the  last  thirty  years,  with  a  view 
to  its  effect  on  the  situation  of  farmers.  The  war 
commenced  at  a  time  when  corn  was  abundant,  and 
prices  moderate,  wheat  averaging  about  5Ss.  a 
quarter.  The  immediate  effect  of  the  assumption 
of  a  military  attitude,  was  to  withdraw  from  agri- 
culture a  portion  of  labour  and  capital,  to  produce 
a  rise  in  the  ote  of  interest,  and  to  necessitate  the 
abandonment  of  many  projects  of  improvement, 
such  as  drainages,  canals,  and  other  undertakings, 
dependent  for  success  on  a  low  rate  of  interest. 
This  was  productive  of  very  general  distress,  but 
had  little  eflrect  on  the  corn  niarket,  tlie  stock  in 
hand  being  abundant.  In  1794  and  179-5,  a  partial 
deficiency  in  the  crops,  joined  to  the  continued 
operation  of  the  war,  produced  a  considerable  rise, 
and  carried  wheat,  notwithstanding  a  large  pre- 
mium on  import  paid  by  government,  to  1/.  and 
upwards.  This,  however,  was  of  short  duration '. 
in  1796,  the  amount  of  import,  followed  by  a  favour^ 


Fhwtuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.         1^7 

able  season,  reduced  our  market ;  in  1797»  wheat 
did  not,  on  average,  exceed  31.  ^s.  and  its  furtlier 
fall  in  1798  (to  '2/.  lU.),  showed  how  effectually  a 
favourable  season  could,  even  in  the  midst  of  war, 
counteract  the  charges  attendant  on  the  culture  of 
corn.  These  cliarges  without  being  at  all  on  a  par 
w'ith  the  burdens  of  an  atler-period,  were  such  as 
to  make  many  of  our  farmers  hold  the  language  of 
complaint,  and  consider  the  increase  of  expence 
from  the  war  as  materially  exceeding  the  increase 
of  price. 

This  may  be  termed  the  first  a^ra  in  the  war, 
which  had  lasted  six  years  without  })roducing  a 
material  rise,  either  in  rents  or  in  the  average  price 
of  corn.  The  case,  however,  now  underwent  a 
complete  change,  the  occurrence  of  two  bad  sea- 
sons in  succession  (1799  iuid  1800)  raising  prices 
to  a  rate  (.5/.  and  61.)  wholly  unknown  in  our  his- 
torv.  What  was  the  effect  of  these  seasons  on 
the  situation  of  our  farmers  ?  At  iirst  unfavour- 
able, because  a  rise  in  ])rice  (Evidence,  Agricul- 
tural Committee,  p.  36.)  forms  no  equivalent  to 
a  deficiency  of  crop ;  but  prospectively,  it  was 
advantageous,  the  stock  on  hand  being  so  reduced 
as  to  open  a  prospect  of  high  prices  for  some  time 
to  come.  Accordingly,  in  s})ite  of  tlie  additional 
burdens  of  the  period,  among  others  the  income 
tax,  farmers  and  speculators  in  land  were  induced 
to  contract  for  rents  at  an  advanced  rate.  This 
spirit  showed  itself  strongly  in  1800  and  1801, 
but  received  a  sudden  check  from  tlie  favonrabk' 
harvest  of  the  latter  year,  and  the  unexpected  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  France. 

Our  wlieat  now  (1802)  fell  to  nearly  31.  :  the 
eflTect  of  high  prices  was  pronounced  not  only  tem- 
porary but  fallacious  ;  land  was  almost  every  where 


1^8  FluctuatwJis  in  the  Price  oJ'Com. 

declared  to  be  over-let,  and  the  consequent  stagna- 
tion was  on  the  eve  of"  leading  to  a  general  reduc- 
tion of"  rents,  when  the  scene  was  once  more  chang- 
ed by  war.  This  was  followed  by  the  deficient 
harvest  of  1804;  markets  now  rose,  rents  were 
maintained  and  augmented,  the  import  of  corn  was 
subjected  to  additional  restrictions,  and  at  home, 
all  the  causes  which  swell  the  cost  of  production, 
rise  of  labour,  taxation,  interest  of  money,  operated 
in  conjunction.  The  effect  of  all  these,  was  to 
carry  wheat  during  1805,  6,  7»  and  8,  to  an  average 
of  somewhat  more  than  4/.,  although  the  seasons 
were  not  unfavourable. 

This  may  be  termed  the  middle  epoch  in  the 
period  of  war:  agriculture  had  become  profitable, 
and  the  style  of  living  of  our  farmers  was  consider- 
ably altered,  but  their  charges  being  greatly  aug- 
mented, their  profits  were  far  from  unreasonable. 
Of  this  the  best  proof  is,  that  all  the  motives 
to  extension  of  culture,  did  not  produce  a  suf- 
ficiency of  growth  for  consumption.  There  pre- 
vailed among  farmers  a  general  confidence,  an 
extension  of  outlay ;  but  their  pecuniary  ad- 
vantage was  limited  to  increase  of  income,  to  the 
more  comfortable  support  of  their  families ;  a 
substantial  addition  to  property  was,  as  yet,  expe- 
rienced by  very  few-. 

We  now  come  to  a  new^  aera,  — the  five  last  years 
of  the  war,  —  a  time  when  farming  profit,  notvvith- 
standing  an  increase  of  charges,  materially  ex- 
ceeded the  preceding  ratio.  In  1809,  a  deficient 
harvest  raised  prices,  and  the  imports  from  the 
Continent  in  1810,  though  uncommonly  large, 
could  not  bring  them  below  an  average  of  51.  or  6/. 
because  our  currency  was  now  greatly  depreciated. 
No  claiis  derived  such  benefit  from  tiie  fall  of  our 


Fluctuations  ?n  the  Price  of  Corn.  129 

Bank  paper  as  our  agriculturists,  theii*  rent  and 
taxes  being  paid  in  it  without  any  addition,  while 
in  their  sales  they  received  a  full  allowance  for  it^ 
depreciation,  not  only  in  their  corn  and  cattle, 
but  in  their  butter,  poultry  and  other  articles.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  full  execution  was  given  to 
the  anti-conunercial  decrees  of  Bonaparte,  and  to 
our  Orders  in  Council,  measures  which,  without  ab- 
solutely stopping  neutral  navigation,  added  greatly 
to  its  cost,  and  left  us  more  and  more  to  our  own 
resources.  This  was  the  season  also  of  extended 
military  operations  in  Spain,  and  of  the  appropria- 
tion, in  that  country  and  in  Portugal,  of  supplies 
of  flour  from  the  United  States,  which  might  other- 
wise have  found  their  way  to  England.  In  1811 
our  crop  was  not  equal  to  our  consumption,  and  in 
consequence  of  the  want  of  import  fi'om  the  Con- 
tinent, our  markets  experienced  a  great  ad\ance. 
Rents  were  now  raised  rapidly  and  generally :  poor- 
rate,  tithe,  and  labour  received  a  great  increase, 
and  the  collection  of  the  property-tax  from  farmers 
became  more  rigorous ;  drawbacks  which  were 
serious,  certainly,  but  more  than  outweighed  by 
the  benefit  of  high  price.  In  1HV2  and  181.3  the 
harvests  were,  on  the  whole,  favourable;  while  the 
augmented  depreciation  of  our  Bank  paper  (now 
between  20  and  30  per  cent.)  discouraged  im- 
port, and  kept  our  prices  of  wheat  at  the  exor- 
bitant price  of  6/.  and  upwards. 

At  last  came  peace,  followed  by  the  cessation 
of  so  many  of  the  causes  that  had  produced  the 
enormous  rise  of  prices  ;  our  Bank  j)aper  reco- 
vered :  corn  had  fallen  on  the  Continent :  the 
expence  of  freight  was  greatly  reduced,  and  con- 
siderable imports  took  place.  Our  market  ex- 
perienced a  rapid   fall  in  the  summer  and  autumn 

K 


180  Fhicludl'ums  in  the  Price  of  Corn. 

of  1814  ;  a  fail  coiifiniied  by  other  causes, —  a  re- 
(liiclioM  in  the  ])ric'e  of  lal)Our ;  in  the  interest  of 
money;   in  taxatioji  ;  —  while  the  whoJe  was  neces- 
sarily accompanied  by  a  diminution  of  such  charges, 
(seed,  iiorses,  manure,  tithe,)  as  follow,  or  rather 
are   identified  with    the  })rice  of  grain.     A  new 
corn-bill  was  loudly  called  for;  that  of  181.5  was 
passed,  and    our   j)orts    shut  to  import :    but  the 
amount  of  the  stock  on  hand,    and  a  crop  fully 
adequate  to  our  consumption,  kept  prices  at  a  low 
rate,  wheat  fetching  only  55s.  or  58.9.  a  quarter.  Our 
agriculturists  now  experienced  all  the  evils  of  a 
sudden  fall :   rents  though  lowered,  remained  un- 
paid ;   fiU'ming-stock  was  sold  at  a  ruinous  depre- 
ciation ;   tithe  fell  rapidly  ;   and  poor-rate,  though 
not   increased    in   amount,    proved,    under    such 
altered  circumstances,  a  ruinous  burden.     In  this 
state  of  things,  the  want  of  warmth  and  continued 
wet  of  the  summer  of  1816,  were  viewed  by  many 
of  our  agriculturists  as  benefits,  as  the  means  of 
clearing  the  market  of  the  over-stock  of  corn,  of 
giving  efficiency  to  the  recently-enacted  bill,  and 
of  bringing  back  better   prices.     Such,    in   fiact, 
wTre   its   results  :    the    crop,   though  at  one  time 
promising,  never  ripened  in  the  colder  situations  ; 
our  markets   rose,   and  when,   after  a  time,   they 
reached  the  limit  that  allowed  of  import,  the  sup- 
plies from  the  Continent  were,  in  consequence  of 
an  almost  equally  bad  season  there,  paid  for  at 
such  a  price  that  our  currency  for  the  year  1817 
exceeded  ^U-  a  quarter. 

We  are  now^  arrived  at  another  epoch  in  the 
fluctuating  history  of  our  agriculture.  Though 
the  import  of  foreign  corn  continued  during  1818, 
the  average  price  of  wheat  in  that  year  exceeded 
80a".  The  steadiness  of  this  price,  the  revival  of 
15 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.  1'31 

our  manufacturing  industry,  the  moderate  interest 
of  money,  renewed  the  hopes  of  our  farmers,  and 
created,  if  not  a  rise  in  the  amount  of  rent,  a 
general  briskness  in  making  offers.  But  our  im- 
ports had  been  over-done,  and  our  crop  in  1819 
being  an  average  one,  the  market  experienced  a 
dulhiess  and  progressive  decHne.  It  was  m  vain 
that  fartlier  import  was  suspended  ;  our  market 
continued  depressed,  and  all  eyes  were  fixed  on 
the  harvest  of  1S20,  witli  the  singular  view  of 
discovering  wliether  its  abundance  would  prove 
a  source  o^  embarrassment  to  the  landed  interest. 
The  crop,  without  being  particularly  favoured  by 
the  season,  was  found  equal  to  our  consumption, 
which,  joined  to  the  magnitude  of  the  stock  on 
hand,  produced  a  great  fall  of  prices ;  and  the 
crops  of  1821  and  1822  being  in  like  manner  ade- 
quate, our  markets  continued  in  a  very  depressed 
state. 


Tabular  Statement  of  the  Nature  of  the  Crops  atul  Average 
Prices  since  1790. 

Average  price 
Years.  of  wheat- 

£.   s.  d. 

1790,  1,  2.  Peace  and  favourable  sea-")      2  13     0 

sons  -  -  -  J 
1793.  War,   but   season   favour- 1      9  1 1"     8 

able  -  -  -  J 
1794',  5.       A    deficiency  of  crop    in /Average   of)   4.     i     o 

each  year         -  -      1  1 795  &  1796/ 

1796,  7,  8.  Seasons  more  favourable    -j  .^(L  ^  q    \  '^     '^'    ^ 

1799, 1800.  Bad  seasons         -  -      {fsCwTlSOlj  ^     "     ^ 

1801.  A  good  crop  followed  by"] 

peace;  also  by  favour- I  Average   of)    „     -     g 
able  seasons  in  1802  and  f  1802,  3,  4.   / 
1803         ...      J 


152  FluctULitions  in  ihr  Price  oJ'Cum. 


Average 
>  during    the  J.  ^   jj 
years  1814, 
15,  16. 


\ 


Average  price 
Ycu^^.  of  *f"^^a' 

180K  A  deficient  crop,  followed^  Average   ofl   £',  s.    d. 

however     by     average  r  the     years    >■  4     ^l     0 
crops  in  1805,  6,  7.        J  1805,  f3, 7, 8.  J 

1808.  A  partial  deficiency       -      1  Average   of) 

1809.  A  great  deficiency         -      r  the       years  >  5     9     0 

1810.  A  good  crop         -  -      )1809&1810.) 

1811.  A  deficiency  -         -      ^Average   ofl 

1812.  IS.    Crops  favourable,  but  cur- /- the  3  years  >  5   18     S 

rency  depreciated     -      )  1811,12,13.3 

1814.  A  crop  not  exceeding  the  " 

average,  but  a  consider- 
able import,  and  a  de- 
crease both  of  demand 
and  of  farming  charges 
consequent  on  the  peace 

1815.  A  full  average  crop 

1816.  A  great  and  general   de- 

ficiency -  -      J 

1817.  A  crop  somewhat   below")  Average  of) 

an  average         -         -      ■  the       years  J-  4     9     5 

1818.  An  average  crop         -        j 

1819.  A    crop    somewhat  below  1       S   13     O 

the  average      -         -     j 

1820.  A    crop    exceeding     thel       „     „     - 

average  -  -     j 

1821.  An  average  crop  -  —     —         2  14     2 

1822.  An  average  crop        -  —    —         2     3     3 

The  deficiency  of  a  particular  year  is  felt  little  on  the  average 
price  of  that  year,  but  greatly  in  that  of  the  succeeding  year, 
being  seldom  ascertained  till  late  in  autumn. 

The  prices  in  the  above  table  are  taken  from  the  Windsor 
market  to  1813  inclusive;  afterwards  from  the  average  return 
for  England  and  Wales,  which  is  somewhat  lower  than  the 
price  at  Windsor. 

Causes  of'  Fluctuation  in  the  Price  of  Coivi. 

It  is  common  to  ascribe  a  great  share  of  these 
fluctuations  to  the  corn  laws;  but  those  who  have 
written  and  spoken  on  that  subject,  whether  in 
favour  of  or  against  these  laws,  would  have  per- 
formed a  useful  service  had  they  been  more  sparing 
of  argument  and  more  attentive  to  the  facts  con- 
aected  with  our  corn  trade.     The   result   would, 

9 


Fhictuaiiom  in  the  Price  of  Corn.        133 

we  believe,  have  been  a  discovery,  that  the  effects 
attributed  to  our  corn  laws,  whether  by  their  sup- 
porters or  opponents,  have  been  greatly  over-rated, 
and  that  })arliament,  in  attempting  to  regulate  the 
currency  of  oiu-  markets,  might,  as  was  remarked 
by  the  late  Mr.  Whitbread,  be  compared  to  the  phi- 
losopher in  Rasselas,  who  regarded  the  sun,  wind, 
and  rain,  as  under  his  control.     The  bounty  act  of 
1689  had,  doubtless,  for  some  time,  an  operation 
favourable  to  landlords,  enabling  them  to  let  their 
lands  more  readily,  perhaps  on  somewhat  higher 
terms ;  but  after  the  stimulus  of  war  was  removed, 
the  bounty  proved  altogether  unequal  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  prices,  and  certainly  caused  to  our  coun- 
try gentlemen,  as  members  of  the  community  at 
large,   a  loss  greater  than  the  benefit  it  brought 
them  in  the  capacity  of  landlords.     Their  prosper- 
ous day  did  not  arrive  until  afler  lyS^,  when  their 
boasted  aids,  export  and  bounty,  disappeared  to- 
gether.    From  that  time  corn  maintained  a  steady 
price,   or  rather  experienced  a  gradual  rise,   the 
causes  of  which,  as  the  bounty  was  now  inopera- 
tive, will,  we  believe,  be  readily  admitted  to  have 
been. 

First,  and  principally,  an  unusual  proportion  of 
unfavourable  seasons  between  I7641  and  1773. 

Secondly,  that  the  increase  of  capital  and  labour 
applied  to  our  agriculture  was  not  in  proportion  to 
the  increase  of  our  population.  This  arose  fiom 
various  causes  :  the  wars  of  17o()  and  177/3  :  the 
extension  of  certain  manufactures,  particularly 
cotton  ;  and  an  impression,  founded  on  the  expe- 
rience of  the  preceding  half  century,  lliat  agricul- 
ture was  an  unprofitable  })ursuit. 

We  now  come  to  the  act  of  1773,  the  only  act 
K   3 


LSI-  Fl  urinal  ions  in  llw  Price  of  Cum. 

wliicli  seems  to  liave  had  an  operation  steadily  ad- 
vaiilaf^eoiis  to  landlords ;  our  averaf^e  ])rice  of 
wlicat  from  1773  to  I788  being  about  ¥.)s.  a  ([uar- 
ter,  while  hi  France  it  did  not  (see  Appendix) 
exceed  385.  or  39*.,  and  at  Dantzic  41.9.  a  quarter. 
Here  was  a  real  and  steady  superiority  of  price, 
the  maintenance  of  wliicli  was  owing  in  part  to  the 
American  war,  but  in  part  also  to  the  moderate 
nature  of  the  act,  the  price  of  48a.,  pointed  out  by 
it  as  a  kind  of  limit,  offering  no  temptation  to 
capitalists  to  transfer  their  funds  from  trade  or 
manufacture  to  land.  Had  the  import  limit  been 
545.  there  seems  little  doubt,  after  the  proofs  we 
have  had  of  the  practicability  of  extending  our 
tillage,  that  it  would,  ere  long,  have  been  ov^er- 
done,  and  our  growth  rendered  not  only  equal 
but  superior  to  our  consumption.  By  asking  little 
the  landholders  obtained  a  certainty,  and  this  ex- 
ample of  the  success  of  interference,  when  inter- 
ference is  very  slight,  has  a  claim  to  their  serious 
attention  at  the  present  moment. 

TJie  late  Wars. — In  the  period  from  1793  to 
1814,  the  Corn  laws  were  in  general  inoperative, 
the  currency  of  our  market  being  usually  above 
the  import  limit,  and  our  ports  consequently  open. 
No  difference  appears  to  have  resulted  from  the 
restraint  on  import  imposed  by  the  act  of  1804  ;  an 
act  which  had,  we  believe,  the  effect  of  enabling 
landlords  to  make  a  rise  of  rent  more  general  and 
more  approaching  to  uniformity  over  the  kingdom 
in  point  of  time  than  would  otherwise  have  been 
practicable,  but  which  had  certainly  no  effect  iu 
raising  markets,  its  tendency  to  extend  tillage 
balancing,  or  more  than  balancing,  any  tendency  ta 
keep  up  prices  by  an  occasional  and  short  exclusion 
of  foreign  Corn. 


Fluctuations  i/i  the  Price  of  Corn.         135 

What  then  were  the  causes  of  the  unexampled 
rise  of  prices  between  1793  and  181 1  ? 

The  unusual  number  of  bad  or  indifferent  sea- 
sons, not  less  than  seven  (1791-,  1795,  1799,  1800, 
1804,  1809,  1811,)  in  the  course  of  eighteen  years. 

The  great  demand  of  men  for  military  service, 
in  consequence  of  which  tlie  increase  of  the  pro- 
ducers of  corn  failed  to  keep  pace  with  the  increase 
of  the  consumers. 

The  consequent  rise  in  the  price  of  labour,  and 
in  farming  charges  generally. 

The  increase  of  taxation. 

The  prevalence  of  similar  causes  on  the  Conti- 
nent, and  consequent  limitation  of  imj)ort. 

The  depreciation  of  our  currency,  particularly 
after  1809. 

Of  all  the  departments  of  our  national  industry, 
none  received  so  continued  a  stinmlus  from  the 
war  as  agriculture.  Our  manufactures,  particu- 
larly those  of  cotton  and  hardware,  experienced  at 
times  a  greater  impulse  ;  but  the  nature  of  manu- 
facture admitting  of  more  speedily  increasing 
supply  in  proportion  to  demand,  the  briskness  was 
often  temporary,  and  followed  by  seasons  of  dis- 
couragement. Our  tillage,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  hardly  at  any  time  brought  on  a  par  with  our 
increasing  population,  so  that  the  stimulant  of  a 
demand,  equal  to  or'greater  than  the  internal  sup})ly, 
prevailed  throughout  almost  the  whole  })eriotl. 

Causes  of  the  Fall  of  Prices  si?ice  the  Peace.  — 
These  have  been  partly  peculiar  to  this  country, 
partly  common  to  it  with  the  Continent  of  Europe. 
Of  the  latter  description  were 

The  application  of  additional  capital,  and,  in  a 
K   1. 


1.1()  Fluctuations  in  fhf  Prtcf  of  Corn. 

greater  degree,  of  labour,  to  tillage,  since  the  re- 
duction of  military  establishments. 

A  succession  of  seasons  more  favourable  than 
during  the  war ;  the  Continent,  like  England, 
having  had,  since  the  peace,  only  one  bad  summer, 
181(3.  Though,  from  the  extent  of  the  failure  on 
that  occasion,  we  may  consider  it  equivalent  to 
two  seasons  of  ordinary  deficiency,  the  proportion 
of  favourable  seasons  since  the  peace  is  still  con- 
siderably greater  than  diu'ing  the  war. 

Next,  as  to  the  causes  of  decline  peculiar  to  this 
country,  we  have 

The  re-instatement  of  our  paper  currency;   and. 

The  great  reduction  of  freight  and  other  charges 
of  transport ;  a  principal  cause  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  import  in  I8I7  and  1818. 

lAibour  applied  to  Tillage  since  the  Peace.  — 
The  operation  of  several  of  these  causes  is  suffi- 
cientlv  obvious,  but  the  extent  of  one  which  to  us 
appears  of  considerable  importance,  maybe  doubted 
by  many  persons,  particularly  by  those  who  com- 
pute the  extension  of  our  growth  by  the  number  of 
inclosure  bills,  and  w^ho  have  remarked  (see  Ap- 
pendix) the  great  decrease  in  such  acts  since  the 
peace.  To  those  persons  we  would  submit  an 
observation  which,  however  plain,  is  of  the  highest 
importance,  viz.  that  "  the  most  productive  hus- 
bandry is  that  which  is  practised  on  land  already 
under  cultivation."  This  truth  escaped  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821,  but  is 
well  known  to  intelligent  farmers  and  land-survey- 
ors. In  support  of  our  opinion,  we  refer  our  readers 
to  the  evidence  of  a  practical  farmer,  Mr.Becher, 
of  Suffolk,  given  before  the  Corn  Committee  of  1810. 
When  asked  whether  he  considered  the  import  limit 
of  that  time  (63*.)  as  too  low,  Mr.  B.  answered, 
(Evidence,  p.  5.5.) 


Flucluationii  in  tht  Price  of  Corn.  137 

"  I  look  upon  the  price  at  which  wheat  is  now  imported  not 
sufficient  to  encourage  the  culture  of  wheat  to  the  extent  that 
is  necessary  for  the  kingdom  ;  but  I  believe  there  is  not  the 
least  doubt,  if  the  import  price  was  at  845.  instead  of  63^.,  or 
even  higher,  that  the  effect  would  be,  upon  a  notice  given  that 
that  would  be  the  import  price  after  the  30th  September  in  any 
year,  that  the  consumption  of  the  country  would  be  fully  pro- 
vided for  at  home,  even  in  the  first  year  after  such  notice." 

Could  it  be  provided  for  in  the  first  year  without 
cross-cropping  ? 

"  I  believe  that  the  lands  now  sown  with  wheat  are  not  in 
the  high  state  generally  that  they  might  be  ;  and  this  I  am 
aware  of,  that  every  additional  hoeing  of  the  wheat  crop  will 
give,  upon  an  average,  at  least  two  bushels  an  acre.  I  have 
tried  the  experiment  more  than  once  in  the  same  fields,  by  not 
hoeing,  hoeing  once,  and  hoeing  twice :  the  difference  has 
been — with  one  hoeing  two  bushels  an  acre  more  and  upwards, 
and  in  that  hoed  twice  four  bushels  more." 

This  opinion  may  be  followed  up  by  asking 
what  amount  of  additional  labour  is  at  the  dispo- 
sal of  our  farmers,  since  the  peace  ?  A  compari- 
son of  the  population  returns  of  1811  and  18^-21, 
appears  at  first  to  operate  against  our  argument, 
and  to  imply  that  the  increase  of  the  growers  of 
corn  was,  in  the  course  of  these  ten  years,  consi- 
derably below  the  increase  of  the  consumers,  tlie 
former  being  in  the  ratio  of  only  9,  the  latter  of  19 
per  cent,  of  our  population.  But  this  comparison 
is  made  by  a  number  of  fkmiHes,  and  the  effectual 
plan  is  to  calculate  the  able-bodied  labourers.  Now, 
of  these  peace  restored  a  number  to  agricultural 
labour,  and  what  was  of  at  least  equal  importance, 
suspended  the  drain  of  others  as  recruits  for  the 
pubHc  service.  Is  it  practicable  to  reduce  the 
numbers  in  question  to  the  form  of  specific  calcu- 
lation ?  The  proi)ortion  of  the  population  of 
Great  Britain    and   Ireland  employed  m  agricul- 


ins  F/i/rn/a/io/is  in  I  he  l*ricc  of  Corn. 

liiro  in  llie  latter  years  of  the  war,  could  not  (see 
the  Population  Return  of  1811)  be  less  than 
7,0()(),(K)0,  of  whom  the  able-bodied  exceeded 
1,700,000.  Of  these  in  war  there  were  withdrawn 
tor  the  army,  navy,  and  militia  (exclusive  of  local 
^nilitia)  nearly  one-tenth,  say         -         -     170,000 

Whereas  in  peace  the  number  of  the 
agricultural  class  so  withdrawn  is  not   -        30,000 

Leaving  a  difference  of  -  -  M-0,000 
or  one-twelfth  of  the  whole.  

Now  if  we  calculate  the  produce  of  their  laboui- 
on  the  most  moderate  scale,  not  at  a  twelfth  but 
at  a  twenty-fourth  of  our  crop,  the  result  is  an  ad- 
dition to  our  supply  of  more  than  a  fortnight's  con- 
sumption of  our  whole  population,  a  quantity 
which,  small  as  it  may  seem,  was  constderablij 
larger  than  our  average  import  during  the  war. 
And  as  no  article  is  so  much  influenced  as  corn, 
(Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee,  pp.  229 — 
240.)  by  a  slight  addition  to  or  subtraction  from 
the  usual  supply,  an  increase,  such  as  we  have 
mentioned,  is  sufficient  to  cause  a  material  change 
in  the  market.  Viewed  in  connexion  with  the  con- 
version of  pasture  lands  in  Ireland  to  tillage,  it 
will,  we  believe,  be  found  to  afford  a  more  ade- 
quate explanation  of  the  low  price  of  corn,  than  any 
other  cause  except  the  continuance  of  favourable 
seasons.* 

*  See  the  close  of  the  Appendix  to  this  Chapter;  also  the 
close  of  the  Appendix  to  the  Chapter  on  Population. 


139 

SECTION   II. 

Situation  and  Prospects  of  our  Agriadturists. 

VVi:  have  now  explained  the  causes  of  the  great 
change  tliat  has  taken  place  since  the  peace,  of  the 
remarkable  increase  in  the  quantity  and  reduction 
in  the  price  of  our  produce.  Our  next  object  is 
to  exiiibit  the  result  of  this  change,  and  to  convey 
an  idea  of  the  actual  situation  of  our  landlords  and 
farmers. 

Estimate  of  our  Agricultural  Produce  and  Rental. 

Produce. — Annual  value  of  agricultural  pro- 
duce, (not  only  corn  but  wool,  hemp,  flax,  timber, 
&c.)  raised  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

In  1812,  our  produce,  exclusive  of  seed,  was 
computed  by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  in  his  well-known 
work  on  the  "  Resources  of  the  British  Empire," 
(pp.  06—89.)  at  .         _         -  ji^217,000,00() 

Deduct  pasture  and  all  produce 
used  for  the  food  of  horses, 
horned  cattle,  and  the  lesser 
animals,  about        -         -         -       100,000,000 


Value  of  annual  produce  for  the 
food  of  man,  or  for  the  purposes 
of  manufacture         -        -        -  j^  11 7,000,000 


Since  1812,  prices  have  fallen  above  (iO  pcM- 
cent. ;  but  as  Mr.  C.'s  estimate  was  made  greatly 
below  the  currency  of  the  time,  the  deduction 
applicable  to  his  results  does  not  exceed  25  or  30 
])er  cent.     This  deduction  in  prices,  large  as  it  is. 


140  Situation  and  Prospects 

appears  to  be  balanced,  or  nearly  balanced,  by  the 
increase  in  the  quantity  of  our  produce.  To  as- 
certain the  extent  of  such  increase  is  a  matter  of 
great  difficulty,  but  the  probability  of  its  being 
very  large  is  supported  by  several  powerful  con- 
siderations ;  viz. 

The  diffusion  of  improvements  in  husbandry. 

The  addition  to  our  population,  and  the  cessa- 
tion of  a  drain  of  the  able-bodied  men  for  the 
public  service. 

The  excess  of  the  population  and  produce  of 
Ireland  over  Mr.  Colquhoun's  estimate. 

The  conjunct  effect  of  these  causes  may,  we  be- 
lieve, safely  be  computed  to  form  an  addition  of 
25  per  cent,  to  the  quantity  of  our  produce,  and  to 
leave  the  value  of  the  whole  not  far  short  of  Mr. 
Colquhoun's  estimate. 

Rental.  —  In  1814  the  rental  of  England,  Wales, 
and  Scotland  was  carried,  as  appears  by  the  property- 
tax  returns,  to  nearly  ^£^43,000,000 
Add  for  Ireland,  (con- 

jecturally  estimated)    10,000,000 


Together  ^^53,000,000 

Add  for  all  omissions  and  allowances 
on  the  property-tax  returns,  a  sup- 
posed amount  of  -         -         -         .       5,000,000 

The  great  increase  tliat  has  of  late 
taken  place  in  our  produce  having 
been  chiefly  on  lands  already  under 
tillage,  we  add  for  new  land  brought 
into  culture  since  the  peace  only   -       2,000,000 


Making  in  all       .  ^^60,000,000 


of  our  Agriculturists.  141 

Deduct  for  all  abatements  of  rent  since  1814. 
made,  making,  or  which  must,  ere  long,  be  made,  one- 
third,  or  33  per  cent,  of  the  war  rents,  <^^  ^20, 000, 000 

Remainder     ^'1-0,000,000 


a  sum  which  will  probably  form  the  rental  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  when  the  price  of  wheat  shall 
be  steadily  between  .50.9.  and  (iO.^.  a  quarter,  and 
when  farming  charges  shall  be  brought  down  to 
the  peace  standard.  Large  as  is  this  abatement  of 
rent,  it  is  less  great  than  the  fidl  in  the  price  of 
produce,  but  the  improved  husbandry  has  of  late 
made  considerable  progress,  and  the  cheapness  of 
provisions  has  caused  a  great  decrease  of  poor  rate. 

In  no  class  of  the  community  has  the  effect  of 
transition  been  either  so  severe  or  so  long  con- 
tinued as  among  the  agriculturists. 

If  to  the  rental  of  landlords  in  the  latter  years 
of  the  war,  we  add  the  income  of  our  farmers,  we 
shall  find,  (see  Property- tax  returns  for  1812, 
printed  in  181(),)  including  Ireland,  an  aggregate 
of  more  than  100,000,000/.  This,  it  must  be 
allowed,  exceeded  all  due  bounds,  and  a  reduction 
to  75  or  even  to  70,000,000/.,  for  the  total  of 
rental  and  farming  income,  would  have  been 
nothing  more  than  a  fair  participation  in  the  ge- 
neral abatement  attendant  on  peace ;  a  relinquish- 
ment of  a  monopoly  for  a  fair  average  profit.  But 
of  late  years  the  income  of  farmers  is,  in  a  mamier, 
suspended,  and  of  the  rents  they  at  present  pay,  a 
large  proportion  is  drawn  from  their  capitiil. 

Of  the  extent  of  national  injury  arising  from 
this  state  of  things,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from 


I'J.2  Siliialion  and  Prospects 

the  following  estimate  of  the  proportion  borne  by 
Uirriniltiire  to  the  productive  industry  of  the 
country  at  large. 

Proportions 
in  100. 

IVoportion  <tf  the  national  revenue  arising  from  agricul- 
ture at  the  reduced  prices  of  peace,  about     -  -     30 

Proportion  of  our  population  dependent  for  employ- 
ment on  agriculture  (see  the  Population  Return  of 
1821)  in  Great  Britain,  distinct  from  Ireland  -     33 

Proportion  of  national  jjroperty  annually  created,  being 
the  amount  of  corn,  grass,  wool,  hemp,  flax,  timber, 
&c.  after  a  suitable  deduction  from  Mr.  Colquhoun's 
estimate         -  -  -  -  -  -     45 

Proportion  of  national  capital  affected  by  the  pros- 
perity or  decline  of  agriculture,  being  the  value  of 
our  land,  farming  stock,  and  houses  on  farms  and 
estates,  adopting  Mr.  Colquhoun's  mode  of  estimat- 
ing, but  making  a  great  abatement  on  the  prices  of 
1812,  (see  Appendix  to  the  chapter  on  National 
Revenue  and  Capital)  above     -         -  -  -     60 

After  this  statement,  it  is  needless  to  expatiate 
on  the  magnitude  of  the  injuiy  arising  to  our  ma- 
nufacturers, our  shop-keepers,  or  the  Treasury, 
from  the  distress  of  agriculture :  nor  need  we  go 
farther  to  account  for  the  chief  part  of  the  national 
embarrassment  in  1816,  or  of  our  revived  pro- 
sperity in  1818.  It  is  almost  equally  idle  to  discuss 
the  question,  whether  the  agriculturists  are  en- 
titled to  our  sympathy,  or  whether  their  profits, 
towaids  the  close  of  the  war,  were  not  such  as  to 
exceed  all  legitimate  proportion.  Their  case  in- 
volves a  question  of  poUcy  fully  as  much  as  of 
justice,  — the  losses  of  any  great  part  of  the  nation 
forming  the  losses  of  the  whole,  and  any  deficiency 
in  their  contributions  to  the  exchequer  falling  ne- 
cessarily on  the  other  classes. 


irf'our  A<i;ricidturt6ls.  i^S 


Present  Situation  of  our  lAindlords  and  Farmers. 
—  A  reduction  in  the  circumstances  of  farmers 
was  unavoidable,  their  profits  liaving  consisted  less 
in  acquisition  of  capital  tlian  in  additions  to  in- 
come—  additions  which  were  great  only  in  the 
latter  years  of  the  war,  and  arose  chiefly  from  the 
depreciation  of  om-  currency.  With  landlords  the 
case  was  somewhat  different :  their  increased 
receipts  had  been  less  connected  with  depreciation, 
while  their  possession  of  capital  exempted  them 
from  any  immediate  necessity  of  altering  tlieir 
scale  of  expence.  Time  has  been  afforded  tiiem 
to  make  a  deliberate  distinction  between  nominal 
and  real  income ;  between  that  decrease  which 
actually  deducts  from  the  power  of  expenditure, 
and  that  which,  in  consequence  of  the  rise  in  the 
value  of  money,  does  so  only  in  appearance. 
During  the  war  they  had  an  opportunity  of  ob- 
serving how  closely  augmented  expenditure  fol- 
lowed augmented  income ;  it  now  remains  for 
them  to  try  reduction,  and  to  carry  it  to  the  length 
pointed  out  by  the  fall  in  the  price  of  commodities. 
That  fall  does  not,  we  allow,  apply  to  them  so 
largely  as  to  the  lower  and  middling  classes  :  it  has 
taken  place  chiefly  in  the  necessaries  of  life,  and, 
as  yet  at  least,  holds  much  less  in  regard  to  the 
expence  of  the  higher  ranks,  such  as  the  bills 
of  tradesmen,  salaries,  wages  of  servants,  pro- 
fessional fees,  to  which  we  may  add  education  at 
our  public  schools  or  universities,  along  with  the 
cost  of  articles  of  luxury,  such  as  wines,  plate,  and 
ornamental  furniture.  Yet  even  in  these  reiluction 
has  commenced,  and  may  be  carried  much  fiuther 
when  the  upper  classes  think   proper  to  hold   a 


144.  Sihtatioji  and  Prospect  a 

decided  tone,  and  retrench  abuses  engendered  in 
days  of  al)iindance. 

On  com))anng  the  present  situation  of  our  land- 
lords with  what  it  was  in  tlie  latter  years  of  the 
war,  we  are  led  to  compute  the  apparent  or  nomi- 
nal decrease  of  their  income  at  forty  per  cent.,  the 
real  decrease  at  twenty  per  cent. ;  assuming  that 
the  remaining  twenty'  per  cent,  are  counterj)oised 
by  reduction  in  their  expenditure  either  already 
made  or  perfectly  practicable.  We  go,  perhaps, 
too  far  in  supposing  an  actual  loss  to  the  extent  of 
twenty  per  cent. :  if  we  make  allowance  for  the 
repeal  of  the  property-tax,  and  reduction  of  the 
assessed  taxes,  the  loss  should,  doubtless,  be  less  ; 
but,  without  pressing  that  point,  we  proceed  to 
ask  from  what  source  the  extra  income  arose 
durincr  the  w^ar?  Partly  from  the  general  rise  of 
profit  at  tliat  period,  more  from  an  advantage  pecu- 
liar to  agriculturists,  the  monopoly  of  the  market  in 
consequence  of  the  continued  insufficiency  of  our 
growth.  Advantages  such  as  these  are  necessarily 
temporary,  and,  could  the  nature  of  our  situation 
have  been  foreseen,  would  have  been  considered 
by  landlords  as  at  a  close,  as  soon  as  our  political 
circumstances  were  changed,  and  the  country  be- 
came assured  of  peace. 

But  rents,  even  on  this  reduced  scale,  are  not, 
it  may  be  said,  paid  at  present,  nor  are  our  prices 
equal  to  the  cost  of  production,  leaving  rent  wholly 
out  of  the  question.  We  answer  that  no  calcula- 
tion can  be  founded  on  the  circumstances  of  this 
season  of  transition  and  over-stock  ;  but  as  a  great 
part  of  the  distress  arises  from  temporary  causes, 
such  as  the  tardy  reduction  of  farming  charges,  the 
better  plan  is  to  calculate  probabilities,  and  to 
reason  on  a  rate  of  rent,  which  though  not  yet  ge- 


ujoiir  Agriculturists,  145 

nerally  established,  is  rendered  likely  by  ji  concur- 
rence of  circumstances. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  tliis  probable  rate  of 
rent  ?  Several  of  our  principal  •  landlords,  con- 
vinced of  the  inefficacy  of  corn  laws  to  keep  up 
the  market,  have  given  examples  of  successive  re- 
duction, carrying  the  wliole,  since  1814,  to  SO 
or  S5  per  cent,  on  their  war  rents.  Our  hope  is, 
that  such  examples  may  be  imitated  in  all  their 
extent.  Supposing,  for  the  sake  of  illustration, 
that  of  this  deduction  10  or  \5  per  cent,  had  been 
in  general  made  between  the  year  1814  and  the 
date  of  the  examination  of  the  witnesses,  before 
the  Agricultural  Committee  of  18!21  ;  there  then 
remained  to  make  a  farther  abatement  of  20  or  25 
per  cent.,  an  abatement  repeatedly  alluded  to  in 
the  evidence  as  necessary,  acceded  to  by  many 
individuals  since  that  time,  and  which,  as  far  as  we 
are  enabled  to  judge,  is  imperiously  required  by  the 
exigency  of  the  case.  We  shall  suppose,  therefore, 
that  what  is  as  yet  partial,  has  become  general,  and 
tliat  our  landlords,  throughout  the  kingdom,  aware, 
on  the  one  hand,  of  the  increased  value  of  money,  on 
the  other,  of  the  necessity  of  sacrificing  a  part  to  save 
the  remainder,  have  consented  to  this  reduction  ; 
also,  that  the  farmers  succeed  in  the  arduous  task 
of  accomplisiiing  a  corresponding  diminution  in 
labour  and  the  other  charges  of  culture.  Were 
tiiese  grand  points  adjusted,  the  j)rospect  of  our 
agriculturists  would  be  cleared  of  a  part  of  its 
gloom  ;  their  horizon  would  brighten,  and  it  would, 
we  might  hope,  be  no  longer  doubtful  whether  ruin 
or  recovery  is  to  be  their  lot. 

Supposing  this  reduction  effected,  what  price,  it 
may  be  inquired,  would  enable  tlie  farmer  to  dis- 
charge his   engagements,  and  to  earn  a  fair  sup- 

L 


14G  Situation  and  Prospects 

port?  3i^Tty  shillinfrs  for  a  quarter  of  wheat  in 
the  counties  adjacent  to  the  metropoHs,  and  be- 
tween Jifty-Jive  and  sixty  shillings  in  those  where 
labour  is  cheaper.  This  estimate  is  supported  di- 
rectly by  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Rodwell,  (Evidence, 
Report  of  1821,  p.  66.)>and  of  Mr.  Brodie,  (p.  335.) 
while  indirectly  it  is  confirmed  by  all  who,  when 
desired  to  say  the  cost  of  raising  wheat  without 
rent,  fixed  it  at  the  charges  of  1821,  betw^een  55s. 
and  60^.  A  deduction  of  25  per  cent,  would 
bring  the  cost  to  4<5s.,  and  a  market  price  between 
55s.  and  60^.  would  obviously  sui)ply  the  fund  re- 
quisite for  the  payment  of  the  rent,  which  is  in  ge- 
neral a  fourth  or  a  fiflh  of  the  produce. 

How  far  is  the  probabihty  of  55s.  or  605.,  as  a 
medium  price  in  peace,  confirmed  by  other  cir- 
cumstances, in  particular  by  the  average  price  of 
other  countries  ?  Wheat  at  Dantzic  has  avera- 
ged, (Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee,  p.  366.) 
during  the  last  half  century  about  4f5s.  a  quarter  ; 
while  in  the  parts  of  the  Continent,  adjacent  to 
England,  we  mean  the  Netherlands,  and  the  north 
of  France,  45^.  a  quarter  are  generally  considered 
sufficient  for  the  indemnity  of  the  farmer.  This 
difference  supposes  an  advance  of  20  per  cent,  to 
our  farmers  in  consideration  of  their  higher  rents 
and  somewhat  heavier  burdens  in  other  respects. 
After  the  high  prices  of  the  war,  an  average  of  55s. 
or  60^.  appears  low  :  but  in  the  payment  of  labour,  in 
the  power  of  purchase  generally,  it  at  present  is,  or 
ought  to  be  equal  to  80s.  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
war,  and  the  point  is  not  that  which  may  be  ex- 
pected, but  that  which  it  is  practicable  to  attain. 
Add  to  this,  that  under  such  a  price  our  manufac- 
turers would  probably  acquiesce  without  complaint, 
considering  our  national  superiority  in  fuel,  navi- 


uj'  our  As^ricidturists.  147 

gatioii,  and  command  of  capital,  such  as  to  admit, 
without  much  hazard,  of  a  relative  disadvantage 
in  the  cost  of  subsistence. 

How  tar  is  the  probability  of  such  an  average 
confirmed  b}-  a  retrospect  to  history,  to  peiiods  in 
which  our  agriculture  was  prosperous?  In  1804, 
a  price  varying  from  63s.  to  6Qs.  was  accounted 
sufficient  by  Parliament,  under  charges  heavier  than 
those  we  have  now  in  prospect.  During  the  thirty 
years  between  17^)3  and  1793,  our  farmers  made 
few  complaints,  though  the  average  price  of  wheat 
was  49^.  a  quarter,  or  about  15  per  cent,  less  tlian 
we  consider  necessary  tor  the  present  time.  And 
if  we  compare  the  farming  charges  on  the  reduced 
scale  we  have  anticipated,  with  those  previous  to 
1793,  we  shall  find  that  tiie  excess  of  the  former, 
is,  or  ought  to  continue  great  in  one  })oint  onlv, 
—  taxation. 

This  leads  naturally  to  the  inquiry,  '*  how  tar 
**  the  public  burdens,  at  present  defrayed  by  agri- 
"  culture,  exceed  those  of  1792."  In  treating  this 
subject  in  a  preceding  chapter,  we  have  had  occasion 
(p.  59.)  to  estimate  the  increase  of  burden  to  the 
public  at  large  at  12  percent,  on  their  income:  in 
tlie  case  of  the  farmers,  we  shall  make  a  liberal  al- 
lowance, and  suppose  that  from  the  pressure  of 
poor  rate,  the  additional  burden  since  1792,  is 
nearly  20  per  cent.  This,  be  it  observed,  is  burden 
on  mcome,  but  tlie  produce,  of  a  farm  being  com- 
puted by  SLUveyors  at  three  or  four  times  the 
tenant's  income,  (see  the  Property-tax  return, 
1810),  it  follows  that  20  per  cent,  on  income  will 
be  defrayed  by  an  addition  of  .5  or  ()  per  cent,  to 
the  price  of  ithe  produce.  Now  could  the  farniers 
obtain  the  55s.  or  dO^.  which  we  have  termed  a  fair 
average,  the  result  would  be  their  having  a  snrphis 

I.  2 


14,8  Situation  and  Prospects 

above  the  prices  of  1792  sufficient  to  serve  as  a 
counterpoise  to  labour  and  tlie  other  charges  (dis- 
tinct from  taxation),  which  are  higher  at  present 
than  in  1792,  and  which  it  will  be  a  task  of 
great  time  and  difficulty  to  reduce. 

The  reasoning  in  the  preceding  pages,  fair  as  it 
may  seem  to  some,  and  sanctioned  as  it  is  by  the 
example  of  such  men  as  Earl  Fitzwilliam  and 
Mr,  Coke,  may  appear  in  a  very  different  light  to 
others,  who,  whether  landlords  or  farmers,  are  ill 
prepared  to  relinquish  the  hope  of  high  price.  Of 
these  persons,  some  may  still  cling  to  the  imagined 
effect  of  a  protecting  duty,  others,  with  more  plausi- 
bility, may  build  their  expectations  of  an  impro\'ed 
market  on  the  progressive  increase  of  population 
and  on  the  contingency  of  a  deficient  harvest.  It 
is  of  consequence,  therefore,  to  enter  at  some 
length  into  a  consideration  of  these  arguments, 
and  to  attempt  to  bring  into  the  form  of  an  esti- 
mate, results,  which,  at  present,  are  vague  and  un- 
defined. 

Effect  of  increasing  Population  on  the  Price  of 
Corn,  —  The  returns  in  the  present  age  have  shown 
an  increase  m  our  population  to  an  extent  which 
we  had,  for  some  time,  difficulty  in  considering 
correct,  and  which  when  put  beyond  doubt,  was 
ascribed  by  many  to  the  temporary  stimulus  arising 
from  the  war.  It  bids  fair,  however,  to  be  pro- 
gressive, arising,  as  it  apparently  does,  from 
causes  of  a  permanent  nature ;  from  an  improve- 
ment in  the  condition  of  the  lower  orders,  in  diet, 
clothing,  and  lodging,  as  well  as  from  the  preserv- 
ation of  the  lives  of  children  by  vaccination.  But 
those  who  found  on  this  an  expectation  of  rehef 
to  our  agriculturists,  overlook  one  verv  material 


of  our  Agriculturists.  149 

point ;  "  that  the  productive  powers  of  our  better 
soils,  far  from  having  reached  their  te?yni?ius,  may 
be  made  to  yield  a  far  larger  produce  by  additional 
labour  and  the  adoption  of  the  improved  methods 
of  husbandry.*' 

In  support  of  this  apparently  bold  assertion,  we 
refer,  as  well  to  the  already  quoted  arguments  of 
a  practical  agriculturist,  (Mr.  Becher,)  as  to  our 
experience,  as  a  nation,  during  the  last  nine  years. 
No  period  was  more  calculated  to  suggest  the  in- 
ference of  a  limitation  of  the  productive  powers  of 
our  soil  than  the  twenty  years  preceding  1814,  yet 
this  opinion  (sec  the  preceding  section,  page  l-'i?*) 
has  been  completely  disproved  by  the  result  of  our 
agriculture  since  the  peace.  If  we  take  a  wider 
range  than  the  experience  of  the  present  age,  and 
refer  to  the  history  of  this  and  other  countries, 
we  find  France  as  capable  at  present  of  main- 
taining a  population  of  30,000,000,  as  of  supporting 
20,000,000  in  the  beginning  of  the  18th  century, 
or  15,000,000  in  the  beginning  of  the  lyth.  And 
France  may  be  termed  an  example  altogether  in 
pointof  increase  of  produce  from  increase  of  hands, 
manual  labour  forming  the  basis  of  her  agriculture, 
to  the  exclusion,  in  a  great  degree,  of  machinery. 

England  furnislies  a  case  apparently  stronger 
than  France,  the  increase  of  our  population,  during 
the  last  century,  having  been  considerably  more 
rapid,  and  our  soil  beuig  still  equal  to  their  sub- 
sistence. But  we  forbear  dwelling  on  this,  because 
it  may  be  argued  that  the  productive  power  of  our 
agriculture  lias,  particularly  in  the  present  age, 
been  much  promoted  by  means  distinct  from  in- 
crease of  popidation,  we  mean  machiner),  and 
other  aids  arising  from  the  connnand  of  capital. 
We  cannot,  however,  but  express  a  belief)  that  the 


J. 10  Situation  cmd  Prospects 

next  gencratioij  of  our  countrymen  will,  in  aU 
j)rol)al)ility,  raise  a  supply  of  subsistence  as  far 
beyond  ours,  as  ours  is  beyond  tliat  of  the  last  a^^e; 
and  that  our  descendants,  on  comparing  the  two 
periods,  will  feel  no  little  surprise  at  the  negative 
predictions  of  several  of  our  political  economist*;. 
Without  contesting  in  the  abstract  the  principles 
of  the  latter,  we  must  add  that  nothing  is  more 
likely  to  mislead  than  the  assertions  of  those  who 
assign  limits  to  the  extension  of  the  productive 
powers  of  our  soil,  imperfectly  acquainted  as  they 
are  with  its  capabilities,  and  still  more  unable  to 
foresee  the  successive  improvements  that  may,  and 
in  all  probability  will,  be  made  in  husbandry.  How 
greatly  does  our  prospect  of  supply  exceed  their 
anticipation  :  how  large,  for  instance,  would  be  the 
addition  to  the  produce  of  the  West  of  England,  and 
of  Ireland,  were  these  countries  merely  to  adopt  the 
improved  plan  now  generally  followed  in  our  eastern 
and  northern  counties.  (See  Appendix,  p.  [37].) 
Consumers  may  increase  xdthout  raising  Prices.  — 
Our  next  argument,  similar  in  its  object,  is  some- 
what different  in  its  nature.  There  exists  a  per- 
petual tendency  to  removal  from  country  to  town, 
and,  on  com])aring  our  population  lists  at  different 
periods,  we  iind  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  in  other 
words,  the  consumers  of  corn,  gradually  augment 
their  proportion  relatively  to  the  producers.  Both 
classes  increase  their  numbers,  but  in  towns  the 
ratio  is  larger.  We  nuist  be  cautious,  however,  of 
drawins;  from  this  fact  anv  conclusion  as  to  rise  of 
price;  it  merely  marks  the  natural  progress  of  society 
in  an  enhghtened  country  ;  a  progress  easily  traced 
in  our  history  for  more  than  two  centuries,  the 
agriculturists  of  England,  who  now  form  only  33 
'per  cent,  of  our  population,   having,  we   believe. 


of  our  Agricultuiists.  151 

formed  upwards  of  50  or  GO  per  cent,  of  it  in  the 
reigns  of  Elizabeth  and  James  I.  Still  the  supply 
of  produce  has  continued  equal  to  our  increased 
numbers,  and  the  cause  is  obvious,  the  use  of  ma- 
chinery, and  the  adoption  of  various  improvements, 
enabling  the  same  number  of  hands  to  raise  a  much 
larger  quantity  of  subsistence. 

Is  then  no  rise  of  prices  to  be  expected  from  the 
increase  of  our  population  ?  It  certainly  may  be 
expected  under  circumstances  which  giv^e  a  new  or 
different  employment  to  a  portion  of  our  numbers 
-—such  as  appear  to  have  prevailed  on  the  extension 
of  our  cotton  manufactures  afiter  1780,  and  such  as 
evidently  characterise  the  present  emigration  to 
Upper  Canada,  and  the  Western  States  of  America, 
the  larger  proportion  of  the  emigrants  being  agri- 
culturists. To  this  we  add,  that  the  increase  of 
our  numbers  has  in  it  something  encouraging  and 
cheering  :  //  assures,  in  a  great  measurey  the  conti- 
nuance of  tillage  on  our  inferior  soils:  and,  taken  in 
a  more  general  view,  it  keeps  alive  the  expectation 
of  national  improvement  so  fully  described  by 
Mr.  S.  Gray,  and  which  shall  be  noticed  at  greater 
length  when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  subject  of 
popidation. 

Kffccts  of  a  had  Season  on  the  Price  of  Corn.  — 
The  rise  in  our  corn  market,  produced  by  a  bad 
or  even  an  indifferent  season,  is  in  time  qf^^ivar  very 
considerable.  The  difference  between  the  crop  of 
one  year  and  that  of  another  will  be  found,  without 
resorting  to  an  extreme  case,  such  as  1816,  to  be 
frequently  (Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee  of 
1821,  p.  264.)  between  10  and  20  per  cent.  Add 
to  this  that  on  such  occasions  our  purchases  abroad 
are  generally  enhanced  by  the  causes  which  pro- 

T  '4 


1,^2  Situdlion  and  Prospects 

duce  enhancement  in  this  country.  The  public,  par- 
ticularly the  untra veiled  part  of  the  public,  are 
hardly  aware  of"  the  similarity  of  tem])erature 
prevailing  throughout  what  may  be  called  the  corn- 
country  of  Europe,  we  mean  Great  Britain,  Ireland, 
the  north  of  France,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark, 
the  north-west  of  (jermany,  and,  in  some  measure, 
Poland,  and  tiic  nortli-east  of  Germany.  All  this 
tract  is  situated  between  the  45th  and  55th  degrees 
of  latitude,  and  subject,  in  a  considerable  degree, 
to  the  prevalence  of  similar  wands.  Neither  the 
superabundance  of  rain  which  we  experience  in 
one  summer,  or  its  deficiency  in  another,  are  by 
any  means  confined  to  Britain  and  Ireland ;  while 
in  winter,  both  the  intensity  and  duration  of  frost 
are  always  greater  on  the  Continent.  Exceptions 
certainly  exist  in  particular  tracts,  but  in  support 
of  our  general  argument,  we  have  merely  to  recall 
to  those  of  our  readers  who  are  of  an  age  to  recol- 
lect the  early  part  of  the  war,  or  who  have  attended 
to  registers  of  temperature,  the  more  remarkable 
seasons  of  the  present  age.  Thus,  in  179 1-,  the 
spring  was  prematurely  warm  on  the  Continent  as 
in  England :  there,  as  with  us,  the  summer  of 
1798  w^as  dry,  and  that  of  1799  wet:  again,  in 
1811  the  harvest  was  deficient  throughout  the 
north-west  of  Europe  generally,  from  one  and  the 
same  cause,  blight;  while  that  of  1816  was  still 
more  generally  deficient  from  rain  and  want  of 
warmth.  In  regard  to  a  more  remote  period,  we 
mean  the  17th  and  18th  centuries  generally,  if  the 
temperature  has  not  been  so  accurately  noted,  we 
find,  from  the  coincidence  in  prices,  that  it  is 
highlyprobable  that  there  prevailed  a  great  similarity 
between  our  weather  and  that  of  the  Continent : 
thus,  in  France  the  latter  years  of  the  17tli  century. 


of  ow  Agriculturists.  1.53 

the  seasons  of  I7O8  and  I709,  as  well  as  several  of 
the  seasons  between  1764  and  1773,  were  as  un- 
propitious  and  attended  with  as  great  an  advance 
of  price  as  in  England. 

Another  observation  as  yet  little  attended  to, 
but  whicli  has  found  a  place  in  the  Agricultural 
Report  of  1821,  is,  that  an  indifferent  season  is 
not  always  followed  by  a  favourable  one,  but  that 
two,  and  even  more  than  t^vo  deficiencies  of  crop 
occur  sometimes  in  succession.  Such  was  the  case 
in  the  latter  years  of  Elizabeth,  in  the  reign  of 
William  III.,  and  in  our  own  time,  in  1799  and 
1 800.  On  each  of  these  occasions  the  consequences 
were  very  serious,  leading  to  a  distressing  rise  of 
price,  and  showing  all  the  importance  of  making  the 
plenty  of  one  year  conduce  to  the  relief  of  another. 

Less  felt  in  peace  than  in  xvar.  —  But  while  in 
war,  the  effect  of  a  bad  or  indifferent  season  is 
thus  severe,  its  pressure  is  greatl}'  alleviated  by  the 
cheap  freight  and  open  communication  of  a  state 
of  peace.  On  referring  to  the  record  of  our  ])rices 
during  a  century  and  a  lialf  prior  to  1/93,  we  find 
that  throughout  that  long  period  the  effect  of  an 
unfavourable  season  was  to  carry  wheat  from  40*. 
to  50s.  or  55s.,  rarely  to  ()0s.  Now  55s.  or  60s. 
in  these  days  were  nearly  equal  to  70.!>'.  at  the  present 
value  of  money,  and  the  latter  would  probably  be 
the  ciuTcncy  of  our  market  in  the  event  of  a  partial 
deficiency  like  that  of  179.5,  1801-,  1809.  To  carry 
our  peace  prices  higher  would  require  a  fiiihue  as 
general  as  that  of  181(),  or  two  partial  deficiencies 
in  succession  as  in  1799  and  1800.  To  tliose  who 
think  otherwise,  we  submit  two  considerations  ; 
first,  that  the  increase  of  our  numbers  does  not  much 
increase  the  difficulty  of  supplying  our  consump- 
tion at  home;  and  next,  that  the  range  of  foreign 


154  Situation  and  Prospects 

territory  from  which  our  corn  imports  may  now 
be  derived  is  much  wider  than  during  last  century. 
Add  to  this,  that  a  continuance  of  peace  tends 
in  many  ways  to  an  equalization  of  price  between 
difierent  countries.  The  obstacles  to  emigration 
ai'e  then  removed :  the  tempting  jjrotit  attendant 
on  government  contracts  and  other  war  specula- 
tions no  longer  detain  at  home  either  the  individual 
or  his  capital :  the  charges  of  farming  as  of  pro- 
ductive industry  generally,  are  calculated  closely, 
and  a  decided  preference  is  given  to  the  country 
where  those  charges  are  most  moderate.  Another, 
and  a  stiJl  more  substantial  cause  of  equalization  of 
price  is  the  increased  command  of  capital  in  peace, 
the  augmented  means  of  buying  up  the  superabun- 
dance of  one  year  as  a  supply  for  the  demands  of 
the  next.  Among  other  structures  of  recent  date 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Thames,  arc  warehouses  in 
which  corn  may  be  preserved  during  six  or  seven 
years  without  injury :  the  expence,  which  in  the 
case  of  wheat  was,  till  lately,  '^s.  a  quarter,  would 
be  materially  lessened  in  purchases  made  at  the 
present  low  prices,  as  a  portion  of  it  arises  from 
interest  on  the  purchase-money.  (See  Appendix, 
p.  [42].) 

Re-action  of  the  Market  Price  of  Corn  on  the  Cost 
of  its  Production.  —  If  the  influence  of  the  seasons 
has  not  yet  been  duly  appreciated,  much  less  is  that 
tiie  case  in  regard  to  another  cause  of  rise  and  fall 
which  we  admit  to  be  somewhat  complicated  in  its 
nature,  and  tardy  in  its  operation ;  we  mean  the 
re-action  of  tlie  market  price  of  corn  on  the  cost  of 
its  production.  Our  object  will  be  best  understood 
•  by  an  analysis  of  the  charges  of  cultivation,  as  ex- 
hibited in  tlie  subjoined  table. 


of  our  Agriculturists. 


155 


Expence  of  cultivating  100  acres  of  Arable  Land  in  England, 
at  three  distinct  periods,  calculated  on  an  average  of  the  re- 
turns made  to  circular  letters  from  the  Board  of  Agriculture 
to  farmers  in  different  parts  of  the  kingdom. 


1790.        1 

1803. 

1813. 

£    s.     d. 

£ 

s.     d. 

£    s.     d. 

Rent 

88     6     3J 

121 

2     7i 

161   12     7i 

Tithe       - 

20  14.     If 

26 

8     Oi 

38  17     3i 

Rates 

17  13  10 

31 

7     7| 

38  19     2f 

Wear  and  tear 

15  13     5\ 

22 

11   lOi 

31     2  101 

Labour    - 

85     5     4.f 

118 

0     4 

161   12  \\\ 

Seed 

46     4  104 

49 

2     7 

98  17  10 

Manure   - 

48     3     0 

68 

6     2 

37     7     Oi 

Team 

67     4  10 

80 

8     0^ 

134  19     8;^ 

Interest  - 

22  11    lU 

30 

3     8^ 

50     5     6 

Taxes      - 

Total  - 

— 

— 

18     1     4 

411    15   IVf 

547 

10  IH 

771   16     4i 

Note.  The  article  manure  is  underrated  in  the  last  column ; 
were  it  fully  stated,  the  aggregate  of  1813  would  have  ex- 
ceeded 800/. 

This  document  presents  materials  for  reasoning 
of  equal  importance  to  the  agriculturist  and  politi- 
cal economist,  exhibiting  all  the  constituent  parts 
of  the  cost  of  corn,  and  enabling  us  to  explain  both 
the  high  prices  of  a  state  of  war,  and  the  fall 
attendant  on  peace. 

War. — The  effects  of  war  are  first  felt  in  the 
price  of  labour,  the  interest  of  money,  and  the 
direct  taxes.  These  all  operate  to  enhance  corn  : 
the  price  of  seed  is  necessarily  augmented  by  such 
a  rise  :  an  increase  of  tithe,  as  expressed  in  money, 
is  a  consequence  almost  equally  direct :  the  ex- 
pence  of  team  and  manure  cannot,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, be  long  stationary  ;  and  an  advance  of 
poor-rate  has,  ever  since  the  days  of  Queen  Eliza- 


|j(i  SiiiKtlion  and  Prospects 

bc'tli,    followed,   at  no  distant  date,  an  augmented 
price  of  bread. 

Such  was  the  progress  of  farming  cliarges  during 
the  late  wars.  The  early  part  of  the  period  was 
with  our  farmers  a  season  of  complaint,  and  with 
the  exception  of  tenants  on  lease,  the  partial  rise 
in  price,  accompanied  as  it  was  by  high  charges, 
was  accounted  a  disadvantage  to  agriculturists. 
After  1804,  their  situation  improved,  but  it  was  not 
till  1809  that  the  advantage  of  war  to  the  farmer 
became  great  and  general. 

Peace.  —  Next,  as  to  the  reverse  of  the  picture, 
— the  unweaving  of  that  web  wliicli  owed  its  tex- 
tiu'c  to  a  double  war  and  a  depreciated  currency. 
Wages,  interest  of  money,  the  cost  of  horses,  and, 
in  some  degree,  direct  taxes,  have  all  undergone 
reduction  since  the  peace,  in  particular  since  1820: 
a  fall  in  the  price  of  seed  is  a  matter  of  course, 
while  a  diminution  of  tithe  and  a  reduced  charge 
in  the  bills  of  tradesmen,  are  the  eventual  though 
less  direct  results  of  a  decline  in  the  corn  market. 
The  remaining  charges  are  rent  and  poor-rate,  both 
very  difficult  of  reduction,  because  in  the  case  of  land- 
lords the  diminution  of  expenditure  is  not  equal  to 
the  fall  of  corn,  while  in  that  of  the  poor  a  decrease 
in  employment  retards  that  reduction  of  parochial 
charge,  which  would  otherwise  follow  the  cheap- 
ness of  the  necessaries  of  life.  These,  however, 
are  only  postponements  of  an  unavoidable  residt : 
landlords  must  resign  in  peace  the  monopoly  attend- 
ant on  war,  while  to  our  labouring  classes  the  ex- 
tension of  manufactures  consequent  on  the  fall  of 
provisions,  affords  relief,  not  speedv,  perhaps,  but 
eventually  certain. 

Wliat  then   ouscht  to  bo  our  inference  from   the 


ojour  Agricullurhts.  L57 

preceding  reasoning  ?  That  farming  charges  neces- 
sarily rise  with  tlie  niarket-j)rice  of  corn,  and  as 
necessarily  become  reduced  by  its  decline.  Now 
as  the  reduction  of  charge  is  as  yet  by  no  means 
proportioned  to  the  fall  of  })rice,  we  are  justified  in 
anticipating  that  the  former  will  become  general, 
and  afford,  in  any  event,  considerable  rehef  to  the 
farmers. 

Evidence  before  the  Agricultural  Committee.  — 
Our  reasoning  may  be  somewhat  elucidated  by  a 
reference  to  the  answers  of  the  witnesses  examined 
by  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821,  about  the 
cost  of  raising  a  quarter  of  wheat.  They  declared 
55s.  or  QOs.  (Evidence,  pp.37.  55.  72.)  to  be  indis- 
pensable to  meet  the  charges  exclusive  of  rent ; 
but  that  price  will  be  found  to  supply  a  fund  tor 
rent  also,  if  we  suppose  a  general  diminution  of 
twenty -Jive  per  cent,  on  farming  charges.  An 
abatement  of  this  nature  was,  as  we  have  already 
remarked,  evidently  in  the  view  of  several  of  the 
witnesses.  One  of  them,  a  landsurveyor,  declared, 
(p.  191.)  that  a  price  of  Gl.v.,  with  'a  proportional 
reduction  of  charges^  would  afford  a  fair  rent : 
while  another,  a  farmer  residing  in  Suffolk,  ad- 
verted (p.  sn.)  to  the  remarkable  fact  that  2,000/. 
forms  as  efficient  a  capital  at  present  as  3,000/.  in 
1817,  iind  considered  that  in  the  event  of  an  abate- 
ment of  one-fourth  of  rent,  poor-rate,  labour,  tithe, 
and  taxes,  60*.  a  quarter  would  afford  a  fair  ))rofit 
in  his  county.  The  answer  of  a  third  witness 
(p.  33.5.)  is  still  more  remarkable,  for  it  declares  a 
much  lower  price  to  be  sufficient  in  a  quarter  (East 
Lothian)  where  labour  is  somewhat  cheaper,  imd 
tithe  happily  unknown. 

How  fai-  do  these  conclusions  appear  to  be  fami- 


1.58  Situation  and  Prvapccts 

liar  to  the  majority  of  those  who  have  written  or 
given  evidence  on  tlie  state  of  our  agriculture? 
Landsurveyors,  accustomed  to  arithmetical  calcu- 
lation, are  aware  of  these  truths  in  a  general  sense; 
but  the  majority  of  them,  like  the  majority  of  our 
farmers,  long  accustomed  to  a  state  of  war,  have 
still  difficulty  in  considering  as  permanent  the  low 
prices  and  low  charges  of  peace.  Next  as  to  the 
Agricultural  Report  of  1821 ;  — that  valuable  docu- 
ment seems  to  have  been  composed  under  a  con- 
viction similar  to  that  which  we  entertain,  but  un- 
fortunately it  nowhere  exhibits  a  clear  and  pointed 
affirmation  of  the  connexion  between  the  price  of 
corn  and  the  cost  of  raising  it. 

Are  loxv  Prices  likely  to  continue  ? 

We  are  now  to  follo\v  up  the  arguments  on  the 
\ery  interesting  question  of  a  rise  or  fall  in  the 
market  price  of  corn.  Those  in  favour  of  a  rise 
are  — 

1st.  The  expence  of  bringing  into  culture  new^ 
soils  of  inferior  quality  to  meet  the  wants  of  our 
increasing  numbers.  This,  the  chief  argument  of 
theoretical  writers,  is  already  in  a  great  measure 
answered  by  the  result  of  the  last  nine  years  ;  by 
the  evidence  that  the  largest  additional  produce  is 
obtained  from  soils  already  under  tillage  ;  and  that 
the  grand  means  of  increase  consist  in  the  appli- 
cation of  additional  labour  to  such  soils.  Our  in- 
closure  bills  in  tlie  six  years  previous  to  1815 
averaged  11.5  annually  ;  in  the  six  following  years, 
during  which  our  produce  has  increased  so  largely, 
they  averaged  only  -18 ;  a  decisive  proof  tliat  the 
quantity  of  produce  may  be  kept  up  and  augmented 
without  bringing  much  new  soil  under  culture. 


of  our  Agriculturists.  159 

2d.  The  expence  of  keeping  inferior  soils  in  cul- 
tivation, and  the  necessity  of  abandoning  them  if 
low  prices  continue.  This  argument  carries  much 
more  w'eiglit  than  the  preceding,  and  might  pro- 
duce a  kind  of  revolution  in  prices  were  it  not 
counteracted  by  a  cause  of  most  powerful  oper- 
ation, —  the  decrease  in  farming  charges  conse- 
quent on  a  decrease  in  the  price  of  corn.  This 
fact,  joined  to  the  increase  of  our  population,  will 
probably  prevent  the  abandonment,  to  any  great 
extent,  of  inferior  soils.  No  inference  can  be 
drawn  from  the  present  situation  of  our  agricul- 
turists who  labour  under  all  the  evils  of  transition 
and  disproportion ;  subject  at  once  to  heavy  charges 
and  low  prices.  At  a  time  when  we  are  told  from 
so  many  quarters  of  over-cropping,  of  decay  of 
farming  stock,  and  of  multiplied  bankruptcies,  we 
must  necessarily  take  tor  granted  that  the  plough 
will,  to  some  extent,  at  least,  be  withdrawn  from 
the  less  productive  lands.  In  the  parts  of  Scotland 
where  tillage  was  carried  farthest,  this  painful 
alternative  seems  hardly  to  be  avoided :  in  J^ng- 
land,  at  least  in  various  parts  of  England,  the  case 
is  somewhat  different :  tillage  was  not  so  often  car- 
ried to  an  extreme,  and  tlie  solicitude  of  the  land- 
lords (Evidence,  p.  43.)  to  prevent  the  degradation 
of  their  estates  by  paying  for  lime  and  other  requi- 
sites to  the  maintenance  of  good  husbandry,  will 
operate  to  lessen  this  and  other  evils.  Add  to  this 
the  remarkable  fact,  that  after  all  the  extension 
given  to  our  tillage  in  the  present  age,  the  propor- 
tion of  ground  under  the  plough  and  spade  is 
(Napier*s  Supplement  to  the  Encyclopjvdia,  head 
of  France,  p.  373.)  considerably  smaller  in  Eng- 
land than  in  France.  Add  also  another  fact  hardly 
less  important,  that  the  practice  of  drilling  corn,  so 


KJO  Si  hid  hi)  II  (I  IK  J  rrospects 

lately  introduced,  is  particidarly  suitable  to  second- 
rate  soils. 

But  su])posing  that  the  tillage  of  inferior  soils 
were  relinquished  to  a  ceitain  extent  both  in  Eng- 
land and  Scotland,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow 
tiiat  the  amount  of  our  produce  would  decrease  : 
our  labour  must  be  employed  somehow,  and  would 
be  transferred  to  the  riclier  soils.  A  diminution  of 
production  is  altogether  contrary  to  the  disposition 
of  our  countrymen  :  an  increase  of  quantity,  even 
when  an  article  sells  for  a  low  price,  is  more  in 
correspondence  with  their  active  and  enterprizing 
habits.  No  decrease  of  our  agricultural  produce 
took  place  during  the  long  stagnation  of  last  cen- 
tury ;  durhig  the  fifty  years  that  elapsed  between 
1713  and  17()o.  And  if  we  advert  to  a  parallel 
case  in  the  present  age,  that  of  our  West  India 
Sugar  planters,  we  shall  find  that  during  a  number 
of  years,  (180^.  1805,  6,  7,)  their  produce  as  little 
paid  the  expence  of  raising  it,  as  corn  does  at 
present.  A  number  of  estates  were  abandoned;  in 
others,  the  cultivation  was  reduced ;  but  this  was 
so  effectually  balanced  by  the  increased  produc- 
tiveness of  the  richer  soils,  that  very  little,  if 
any,  diminution  took  place  in  the  total  quantity 
raised. 

3d.  A  protecting  Duty  on  Foreign  Cor?i.  —  The 
efficacy  or  non-efficacy  of  such  a  measure  is,  in  a 
great  degree,  matter  of  opinion.  Without  as- 
suming a  decisive  tone  on  either  side,  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  show  in  the  next  section  that  a 
high  duty  would  by  no  means  cause  a  permanent 
rise  in  our  corn  market,  and  that  the  only  safe 
course  is  to  regard  the  last  thirty  years  as  a  period 
peculiar  in  its  circumstances,  and  altogether  dif- 


oJ'oLir  Agriculturists.  161 

i'erent  from  a  season  of  j)eace.  We  ought  in  tlie 
next  place,  to  cany  l^ack  our  view  to  the  period 
preceding  IJOS,  and  ascertain  whether  tiie  increase 
of  the  charge  of  raising  corn  arising  from  taxes  or 
otherwise,  exceeds  the  saving  attendant  on  the  im- 
provements adopted  in  our  luisbandry.  In  that  pro- 
portion only  would  it  be  j)racticable  to  maintain  an 
increase  of  price  :  any  attempt  to  carry  it  higher 
would  be  defeated  by  the  extension  of  our  home 
growth.  Agriculture,  like  trade,  has  its  projectors  ; 
men  ready  to  transfer  to  it  capital  from  other 
pursuits,  and  wlio  would  find,  })articularly  in  Ire- 
land, many  rich  tracts  open  to  tlieir  speculations, 
now  tiiat  there  remains  so  little  inducement  to  keep 
them  in  pasture.  The  only  method,  therefore,  of 
giving  the  established  farmer  a  fair  chance  is,  to 
be  very  s})aring  of  bounties,  protecting  duties,  and 
other  stinudants ;  the  effect  of  which  is  unnatural, 
temporary,  and  eventually  pernicious  to  those  who 
receive  them. 

4th.  Conti/igciic//  (>/'  a  bad  Season.  —  On  this 
bead  we  liave  already  attempted  a  calculation, 
showing  that  in  former  })eriods  of  peace  the  extent 
of  rise  varied  from  10.y.  to  "^O.y.  on  the  (juarter  of 
wheat,  according  to  the  degree  of  failure  in  the 
harvest.  Under  present  circumstances,  this  limited 
advance  is  much  more  likely  to  characterise  our 
markets  than  the  greater  fluctuation  that  took  place 
in  the  late  wars. 

That  our  prices  of  wheat  are  not  likely  to  exceed 
55  or  ()0.y.,  is  confirmed  bv  some  arguments  of  a 
more  consolatory  nature ;  viz. 

IVie  increase  of  our  groxi'lli  from  the  di/fhsiofi  of 
the   improved  ITushandrj/.       Under  this   head    we 
are  disposed  to  class  the  more  general  introduction 
of  drilling ;  the  farther  consolidation  of  small  farms  ; 

M 


H')''2  Situation  and  Proapects 

and  the  more  frequent  a(loj)tioii  of  leases  when 
the  changes  in  our  money  system  shall  have  reach- 
ed their  termination.  For  her  pasturage  England 
is  deservedly  celebrated,  but  her  tillage  is  only  par- 
tially good.  In  no  branch  of  our  national  industrv 
has  improving  exam])le  been  as  yet  less  generally 
followed  :  in  none  has  it  a  wider  field  to  occupy. 

The  reduced  Interest  of  Moneij The  fall  of 

interest  on  public  securities  since  the  peace  is 
about  one  per  cent.,  and  the  prospect  is  in  favour 
of  some  farther  decrease  ;  or  rather,  that  the  reduc- 
tion, at  present  partial,  will  become  general,  and  be 
communicated  to  private  as  well  as  public  securi- 
ties. No  line  of  business  oilers  at  present  a  tempt- 
ing return  ;  nor  is  any  likely  to  withdraw  money 
investments  from  agriculture.  Add  to  this,  that 
from  the  reduced  price  of  all  farming  stock,  the 
appropriation  of  1000/.  to  farming  (Evidence,  Agri- 
cultural Committee,  p.  86.)  is  likely  soon  to  be  equi- 
valent to  that  of  SOOO/.  in  the  time  of  high  prices. 

Such  are  the  principal  arguments  against  any 
material  rise  in  our  corn  market ;  and  if  their 
conjunct  effect  be  merely  to  give  us  the  supply  of 
a  three  weeks'  consumption  above  the  average  of 
our  crops  in  war,  the  result  will  be  a  prevention 
of  high  prices,  so  nearly  did  our  growth  approach 
even  in  former  years  to  our  consumption. 

Contingency  of  War.  —  In  the  event  of  war,  all 
these  anticipations  would  be  overturned :  our  ca- 
pital would  no  longer  be  abundant ;  our  naviga- 
tion no  longer  cheap  ;  while  fiom  no  branch  of 
our  industry  would  labourers  be  more  generally 
withdrawn  for  cjovernment  service  than  from  as-ri- 
culture.  At  present,  however,  we  leave  this  for- 
midable contingency  out  of  the  question:  in  France, 


of  our  Agriculturists,  Ifi^ 

the  only  country  which  immediately  affects  our 
foreign  politics,  there  exist  the  strongest  reasons 
for  adhering  to  a  j)acific  course  ;  and  if  that  govern- 
ment be  induced  for  a  time  to  deviate  from  it,  the 
recurrence  of  a  state  of  war  so  general  as  that 
which  followed  the  French  Revolution,  is  certainly 
not  to  be  expected  in  the  life-time  of  the  })resent 
generation.  Or,  if  we  admit  it  to  be  impracticable 
to  reason  with  confidence  on  so  wide  a  question, 
there  is  at  least  one  point  which  we  may  safely  take 
for  granted,  viz.  that  our  public  men,  in  the  event 
of  a  new  appeal  to  arms,  will  abstain  from  two  of 
the  measures,  which,  more  than  any  other,  contri- 
buted to  raise  our  corn  market,  —  interference 
with  our  currency,  and  the  stoppage  of  neutral 
navigation. 

"  These  they  will  shun  through  all  the  dire  debate, 
And'  dread  those  arms  whose  force  they  felt  so  late."' 

Prospect  of  Relief  to  Fanners.  —  This  question, 
though  a]:)parently  identified  with  that  of  lise  of 
])rice,  will  be  ibund  on  examination  to  rest  on  very 
different  grounds,  and  to  present,  happily,  a  less 
imfavourable  prospect.  Tlu'  reasons  for  this  opi- 
nion are, — 

1.  The  interest  of  all  farmers  wlio  are  not  tenants 
on  lease  (Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee,  pp. 
49.  1*^0.)  is  to  ha\e  not  a  hii;'h,  hut  a  stead ij  price. 
Taken  in  a  ])ermanent  view,  that  ])rice  is  most 
desirable  which  gives  stability  to  our  manufactures, 
and  prevents  our  continental  rivals  from  Inning 
too  great  a  superioHty  over  us  in  the  nuiiii  point 
of  subsistence. 

2.  Our  growth,  if  it  equal,  does  not,  in  ordinary 
seasons,  exceed  our  consumption ;  a  situation  a 
good  deal   different  from  that  of  our  agriculturists 


I(j4  Situation  and  Prospects 

after  the  peace  of  Utrecht.  This  fact,  it"  it  does 
not  justify  the  expectation  of  a  rise  of  price,  affords, 
when  considered  along  with  our  increasing  num- 
bers, a  kind  of  guarantee  of  the  past ;  a  security 
against  the  abandonment,  to  any  great  extent,  of 
the  inferior  soils. 

3.  The  tendency  of  agricultural  charges  to  de- 
crease with  the  market-price  of  corn,  and  of  the 
rate  of  profit  in  every  line  to  approach  to  a  common 
standard. 

4  Tithe. — Since  war  and  high  prices  can  no 
longer  enter  into  the  calculation  of  our  agricul- 
turists, it  becomes  indispensable  for  them,  as  for 
the  equally  unfortunate  sugar  planter,  to  seek  relief 
in  a  reduction  of  expence.  In  this  by  far  the 
most  effectual  step  would  be  a  commutation  of  tithe, 
an  exchange  of  a  crude,  unequal,  and  at  present 
oppressive,  mode  of  providing  for  the  clergy,  for  a 
contribution  from  the  public  generally ;  a  change 
which  would  be  facilitated  by  the  growing  nature 
of  our  financial  resources,  and  for  which,  as  shall 
be  showni  in  a  subsequent  passage  (p.  185),  the 
landed  interest  would  be  able  to  make  an  adequate 
return  to  the  public. 

5.  Poor-rate. — To  this  subject  we  shall  shortly 
appropriate  a  chapter,  and  take  occasion  to  show 
how  little  information  is  as  yet  possessed  either  by 
government  or  individuals,  in  regard  to  various 
essential  points,  such  as  the  different  modes  of 
distributing  relief,  the  number  of  poor  in  work- 
houses, the  allowance  granted  for  children,  and 
finally,  the  proportion  of  disburse  for  law  charges, 
removals,  and  other  outlay,  distinct  from  the  relief 
of  the  poor.  With  such  evidence  of  imperfect 
information,  (acknowledged  in  the  Report  on  Poor- 
rate,  July  15.  182^,)  is  it  too  much  to  question,  whe- 
ther we  act  an  equitable  part  in  continuing  the  pre- 


of  our  Agriculturists.  165 

sent  mode  of  assessment  ?  Without  at  all  entertain- 
ing the  proposition  of  rendering  poor-rate  national, 
we  may  claim  attention  to  the  arguments  for  a 
more  limited  change,  for  rendering  it  an  equal 
tax  on  the  parish  or  district,  the  levy  being  made 
not  on  rent  but  on  income  generally,  and  extending 
to  other  classes  besides  the  farmer  and  householder. 
These  considerations  confirm  the  hope  that, 
eventually,  the  situation  of  our  agriculturists  will 
alter,  and  our  tillage  be  carried  on  without  the  im- 
poverishment of  a  most  useful  and  respectable  body 
of  men.  Still  tlieir  distress  must,  under  any  circum- 
stances, continue  some  time  longer,  and  be  shared 
by  the  numerous  persons  resident  in  towns  whose 
livelihood  depends  on  ministering  either  to  the 
wants  of  tlie  farmer  or  the  luxury  of  the  landlord. 
Every  feeling  mind  must  sympathize  with  those 
industrious  classes,  whether  in  town  or  country, 
whose  ])rivations,  very  different  fiom  those  of  their 
superiors,  too  often  imply  the  renunciation  of  real 
comfort.  They  have,  however,  already  experienced 
considerable  relief  from  reduction  in  their  expen- 
diture;  and  a  cheering,  though  somewhat  indirect 
prospect,  is  opened  to  them  from  the  improved 
condition  of  other  classes.  All  must  allow  that  the 
sum  withdrawn  from  agricultural  income  has  been 
far  too  great  in  its  amoiuit  and  too  sudden  in  its 
deduction  ;  but  it  is  a  consolation  that  it  does  not, 
like  shi})Wrecked  merchandize,  or  the  expence  of 
an  indecisive  cainj)aign,  form  a  total  and  absolute 
loss  to  the  community :  it  is  compensated,  as  tar 
as  the  evil  of  sudden  transition  admits  of  compen- 
sation, by  the  cheaper  maintenance  of  our  manu- 
facturers, the  prevention  of  their  emigration,  and 
the  ultimate  benefit  arising  to  our  agriculturists 
from  their  consumption  on  a  more  liberal  scale. 

M  3 


lOCi 


SECTION  III. 

A  Protecting  Didy. 

We  come  now  to  the  portion  of  our  subject  which 
caused  so  much  discussion  in  tlie  session  of  1822  — 
the  imposition  of  such  a  duty  on  fbreifj^n  corn  as 
shall  afford  protection  to  our  agriculturists.  Our 
reasoning  on  this  head  will  be  found  materially 
different  from  that  of  the  majority  of  parliamentary 
speakers,  the  amount  of  duty  appearing  to  us  a 
secondary  object  to  the  public  at  large  ;  while  to 
our  agriculturists,  it  would,  if  raised  to  an  undue 
height,  be  replete  with  as  pernicious  consequences 
as  the  bounty  act  of  last  century.  Without  further 
preamble,  we  proceed  to  examhie  the  following 
points  :  — 

The  comparative  burdens  on  agricidture  in 
France  and  England. 

How  far  our  manufactures  receive  protection 
from  our  custom  duties. 

The  danger  of  over-extending  our  tillage. 

The  tendency  of  oiu'  commercial  legislation  to 
the  abolition  of  all  restrictions. 

A  populous  Country  not  necessarily  ejrpensive. 

England  is,  after  tlie  Netherlands,  the  portion  of 
Europe  in  which  population  is  both  most  dense  as 
to  numbers,  and  most  closely  connected  by  roads 
and  canals.     Compared  to  us,   the  inhabitants  of 


Duty  on  Foreign  Conu  I67 

France,  on  an  equal  surface,  are  in  the  proportion 
of  only  two  to  three ;  and  the  degree  of  separation 
is  very  materially  increased  by  another  cause  —  the 
inferiority  of  the  roads  and  the  want  of  water  com- 
munication. Germany  is  still  more  interior  to 
England,  both  in  numbers  and  in  frequency  of  inter- 
course ;  and  it  is  needless  to  show  how  much  more 
the  deficiency  prevails  in  the  other  parts  of  Europe, 
in  Spain,  Sweden,  Poland,  Russia.  The  point  at 
issue  is,  to  ascertain  whether  density  of  population 
necessarily  tends  to  raise  prices,  to  render  a  coun- 
try dearer  than  its  scantily  peopled  neighbour? 

That  it  has  in  an  eminent  degree  that  tendency 
is  the  general  impression  and  report  of  those  among 
our  travelling  countrymen,  who  found  their  in- 
ferences on  a  few  points  most  obvious  to  common 
observation,  such  as  the  moderate  price  of  labour 
on  the  Continent,  and  the  no  less  moderate  rate  of 
excise  duties ;  but  they  overlook  the  various  con- 
siderations on  the  opposite  side  of  the  question, 
such  as  the  general  inferiority  of  machinery  and 
workmanship,  the  loss  of  time  caused  by  distance 
from  towns,  and  by  the  necessity  of  doing  })ersonallv 
that  which,  in  a  busy,  commercial  coinmunity,  is 
prepared  by  others,  and  obtained  by  purchase.  In 
a  subsequent  publication,  when  treating  of  '*  Eco- 
nomy and  lletrencinnent,"  we  shall  take  occasion 
to  explain  the  distinction  between  real  and  ap])arent 
saving,  and  describe  the  habitual  waste  of  time  in 
j)etty  occu})ations  by  the  inhabitants  of  ])rovincial 
towns  on  the  Continent :  at  present  our  wish  is 
merely  to  lay  down  the  general  rule,  that  a  popu- 
lation dense,  improved,  affluent,  does  not  neceS' 
sarih/  render  a  country  more  expensix  e  than  one 
that  is  poor  and  thinly  inhabited.  The  diflerence  is 
tit  ilie  mode  of  living,  not  in  the  price  of  the  articles. 

M  4 


lC)H  ()i(y  Afiricultutr ; 

An  increase  of  population,  by  leading  to  an  abridg- 
ment of"  labour,  and  to  the  transaction  of  business 
en  masscy  brings  with  it  a  dispatch  and  an  extent  of 
accommodation  ;  the  saving  from  which  is  equal, 
we  believe  more  than  equal,  to  the  enhancement 
in  provisions  attendant  on  augmented  numbers. 

It  is  not  in  towns  of  moderate  size,  however  near 
each  other,  but  only  in  the  case  of  an  overgrown 
capital,  such  as  London,  Paris,  or  Constantinople, 
that  the  real  and  unavoidable  difterence  of  expence 
becomes  considerable.  Holland  and  England  are, 
it  is  true,  dearer  throughout  all  their  provincial 
towns  than  the  rest  of  Europe ;  but  that  is  owing 
partly  to  style  of  living,  partly  to  high  taxation,  —  to 
the  price  paid  by  either  country  for  the  rank  which 
it  has  maintained  in  the  scale  of  European  })olitics. 
Were  we  to  subject  individual  expenditure  to  an 
analysis,  and  to  keep  separate  the  portion  of  it 
which  results  from  these  causes,  we  should  find 
that  our  actual  prices,  the  purchase  money  of  com- 
modities at  market,  are  not,  on  the  whole,  much 
greater  than  in  other  countries. 

o 

These  remarks  are  general,  and  apply  to  all 
classes  of  society.  We  now  proceed  to  the  point 
more  immediately  in  question,  the  situation  of  our 
agriculturists. 

Comparative    Burdens     on    French    and     British 
Agriculture. 

That  the  pressure  on  our  agricidture  is  greater 
than  on  that  of  our  neighbours  is  sufficiently  known, 
or  rather,  sufficiently  believed ;  for  very  few  per- 
sons have  been  at  pains  to  analyze  the  burdens  on 
either.  On  our  side,  they  consist  of  tithe,  poor- 
xatii,  land-tax,   along  with  a  participation   in   the 


Dutfi  on  Foreign  Corn.  1()9 

assessed  taxes,  tlie  excise  duties,  and  the  customs. 
To  begin  with  the  burdens  directly  apphcable  to 
agriculture — tithe  and  poor-rate  —  we  are  inclined, 
in  consequence  of  tlie  tall  of  corn,  to  anticipate  that 
these  charges,  as  Jar  as  paid  by  the  landed  interest^ 
and  as  far  poor-rale  is  dislinct  from  xcages,  will,  ere 
long,  be  reduced  to  a  sum  of  about  7»00(),()0()/.  for 
both.     The  amount  of  the   land-tax,   adding  the 
redeemed  to  tiie  unredeemed,  is  about  2,000,000/. ; 
making  together  a  sum  of  somewhat  more  than 
9,000,000/.     To  this  formidable  burden  the  French 
may,   with    a   qualification  to  be  mentioned  pre- 
sently, oppose  their  ^owc/er,  or  assessment  on  real 
property;  which,  after  the  ])artial  reduction  of  late 
years,   still  forms  a  charge  of  17  or  18  per  cent., 
not   on    the   rent   merely,  but   on    the   rent   and 
farmer's  profit  together.     Next  come  our  assessed 
taxes,  which,  in  their  present  reduced  state,  are  ]n-o- 
bably   balanced    by   the   porles  et  Jenetres  of  our 
southern  neighbours,    when    added   to   the    mohi^ 
lierj  or  tax  on  the  reputed  value  of  furniture.    Our 
stamps,  swelled  as  they  have  been  during  the  late 
wars,   are   considered  by  our  landlords   as  a  very 
serious  charge,  whether  on  leases,  sales,  or  loans  ; 
and  a  member  of  Parliament,  remarked   for   his 
acquaintance    with    such    subjects  *,    went   lately 
the  length  of  asserting  that  this  charge  was  the 
most   heavily  felt   of  any    by    our    agriculturists. 
Heavy,  however,  as  it  is,  even  after  the  modification 
granted  in  1822,  its  pressure  is  equalled,  in  respect 
to  sales  at  least,  by  the  French  enregisti-ement,  a 
duty  of  no  less  than  5  per  cent,  on  the  })urchase 
money,  which,  added  to  the  other  departments  of 
the  stamps,   produces  an  amount  of  .3,()0(),000/. ;  a 

*  Mr.  Frankland  Lewis. 


170  Otir  Agriculture  ; 

Kun)risiii^  sum    to   collect  from   a  country   never 
renmrkiible  for  its  wealth. 

So  far  we  may  be  said  to  have  preserved  ecjuaHty 
in  our  com})arisons  :  we  now  come  to  j)oints  in 
which  there  necessarily  prevails  a  difference,  though 
less  great  than  is  commonly  imagined.  Thus,  in 
regard  to  the  charges  incurred  in  the  course  of  cul- 
tixation,  \iz.  seed,  manure,  wear  and  tear,  working 
cattle,  —  the  difference,  very  great  during  the  war, 
has  lost,  or  is  now  losing,  much  of  its  amount.  The 
cost,  as  expressed  in  money,  is  still,  we  admit, 
smaller  in  France  ;  but  in  the  case  of  implements, 
and,  in  some  measure,  in  that  of  working  cattle, 
the  difference  means  little  more  than  inferiority  of 
quality  ;  an  inferiority  not  unlike  that  whicli  would 
be  exhibited  by  a  parallel  between  our  agriculture 
of  the  present  age  and  that  of  the  beginning  or 
middle  of  the  last  century.  A  similar  remark  ap- 
plies to  the  domestic  expences  of  a  farmer.  The 
difference  lies  in  the  style  of  living  more  than  in 
the  price  of  the  articles  ;  for  in  two  material  points, 
clothing  and  fuel,  the  cost  is  not  higher  in  England 
than  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Channel.  The  fuel 
of  the  rural  districts  of  France  is  generally  wood  ; 
sometimes,  though  rarely,  it  consists,  as  in  Ireland, 
of  turf  or  peat. 

We  come  next  to  a  highly  important  part  of 
agricultural  disburse,  the  price  of  labour ;  a  point 
in  which  the  balance  is  greatly  in  favour  of  France, 
the  wages  of  an  able-bodied  labourer  not  exceed- 
ing (Chaptal  sur  ITndustrie  Fran^aise,  vol.  i. 
p.  245.)  six  shillings  a  week  without  victuals,  a 
rate  considerabl}'  below  any  reduction  that  we 
can  reasonably  expect  from  the  lall  in  the  price  of 
provisions.  Nor  is  this  advantage  lessened,  as 
some    of  our    countrymen  may  imagine,    by  any 


DuU)  on  Foreign  Corn.  I7I 

personal  inferiority  on  the  part  of  the  French  pea- 
santry, who  repair  to  their  work  at  as  early  hours, 
and  continue  enn-aged  in  it  with  as  much  steadi- 
ness and  activity  as  our  own  labourers.  Add  to 
this,  that  the  saving  we  have  mentioned  is  en- 
joyed by  the  French  farmer  equally  in  the  case  of 
domestic  servants,  whose  diet  is  plain  and  whose 
habits  are  sober.  In  what,  then,  shall  we  be  able 
to  find  on  our  side  of  the  Channel  a  counterpoise 
to  this  essential  advantage? — First,  our  imple- 
ments, particularly  those  of  iron,  being  much 
superior,  enable  men  of  the  same  bodily  power  to 
do  more  work,  or  to  do  it  better.  Secondly,  the 
use  of  machinery,  such  as  thresliing-mills  or  drill- 
ing-implements, is  almost  totally  unknown  in 
France.  Thirdly,  our  farms  are  of  appropriate 
size  ;  while  those  of  our  neighbours,  limited  often 
to  such  petty  occupancies  as  those  of  our  an- 
cestors of  the  l()th  and  17th  centuries,  aiibrd  no 
field  for  the  beneficial  employment  of  either  capital 
or  machinery.  Lastly,  our  farmers,  in  borrowing 
money,  pay  an  interest  less  by  one  or  two  per 
cent,  than  is  required  in  France,  six  or  seven  per 
cent,  being  still  a  very  common  rate  in  that 
country. 

A  long  list  of  tiie  agricultural  disl)ursements  of 
the  two  countries  is  thus  made  to  balance,  and  tlie 
remainder  of  tlie  parallel  is  brought  within  a  com- 
paratively narrow  coiiqiass.  It  may,  in  fact,  be 
considered  as  reduced  to  two  points :  on  the  one 
hand,  the  contingency  of  beueHt  to  the  English 
agriculturist  from  a  protecting  duty;  on  the  other, 
the  heavier  excise  and  customs  to  which  he  is  sub- 
jected. A  protecting  duty  is  not  unknown  in 
France  ;  and,  under  the  provisions  of  the  late 
acts  of  1819  and  18^21,  the  price  of  l(i.y.  or    I7.V. 


172  Our  A<:rkiiliurc  ; 

lor  llio  Winchester  quarter  of  wheat  is  apparently 
secured  to  the  farmer;  but,  in  a  country  which 
i>e?ierally  i!;rows  its  full  consuni})tion,  regulations 
affecting  import  must  be  of  rare  and  temporary 
oj)eration. 

We  pass  over,  therefore,  this  frail  su})port,  and 
proceed  to  the  permanent  and  substantial  points 
of  difference  in  the  condition  of  the  British  and 
French  farmer.  These  will  be  found  in  the  mag- 
nitude of  our  taxes  on  consumption.  Our  custom 
duties,  being  chiefly  on  luxuries,  do  not  very 
greatly  affect  our  agriculturists ;  but,  among  our 
excise  duties,  the  tax  on  leather,  which,  after  the 
late  reduction,  still  forms  a  burden  of  nearly 
1. '50,000/.  on  our  peasantry,  is  unknown  in  France; 
while  our  duties  on  malt,  beer,  and  corn-spirits, 
amounting,  after  the  abatement  made  in  182'2,  to 
the  surprising  sum  of  9,000,000/.  sterling,  are 
feebly  met  by  the  French  taxes  on  wine,  cider, 
and  malt.  In  years  of  over-stock  of  corn,  as  since 
1820,  the  whole  of  the  very  large  sum  w^e  have 
mentioned  may  be  said  to  form  a  charge  on  our 
agriculturists,  exactly  as  the  tax  on  sugar,  in  a 
season  of  over-growth,  falls  on  the  West  India 
planter.  These,  however,  are  happily  extreme 
cases ;  and  we  shall  at  present  suppose  them  out  of 
the  question,  calculating  that  of  such  duties  no 
more  usually  falls  on  our  agriculture  than  the 
portion  paid  for  the  consumption  of  the  farmers 
and  peasantry.  Even  then,  it  will  exhibit  a  sum 
of  8  or  4,000,000/.  sterling ;  a  sum  which,  added 
to  the  1,000,000/.  by  which  our  tithe  and  poor-rate 
exceed  the  French, /o//r/V'r,  may  be  said  to  represent 
the  greater  share  of  public  burdens  (1  or  o, 000,000) 
borne  by  the  British  agriculturist. 

If  we  brino-  these  charo-es  into  the   fonn   of  a 


Dutij  on  Foreign  Corn,  I73 

comparative  per  centage,  we  shall  find  that  the 
Jbncier  in  France  nia\,  after  making  allowance  lor 
all  abatements  and  omissions,  be  computed  at  18 
per  cent,  of  the  rent  and  tanning  profit ;  while  in 
England,  tlie  amount  t)f  Umd-tax,  tithe,  poor-rate, 
and  additional  excise-duties,  tbrm  a  tax  on  rent 
and  farming  income  to  tlie  extent  of  ^Z5  })er  cent. 
The  result  is,  a  heavier  burden  on  the  English  agri- 
culturists, to  the  extent  of  7  or  8  per  cent.,  except 
in  as  far  as  it  receives  an  occasional  counterpoise 
from  the  duty  on  tlie  import  of  tbreign  corn.* 

What  then,  it  may  be  asked,  has  been,  during 
the  present  age,  the  respective  situations  of  the 
agriculturists  in  France  and  this  country?  The 
war  was  productive  of  a  rise  of  rent  in  both  ;  but 
w^hile  in  France  that  rise  was  comparatively  slen- 
der, in  this  country  it  doubled,  and  in  many  "cases 
more  than  doubled,  the  payments  of  179- ;  so  that 
in  181-i  the  landed  rental  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land considerably  exceeded  that  of  their  southern 
neigh])our.  The  rental  of  Fiance,  however,  was 
much  jnore  secure  :  the  price  of  corn  in  that  coun- 
try is  little  lower  in  peace  than  in  war  ;  and  the 
travellers  who  passed  o\er  her  departments  did 
not,  until  last  year,  hear  nnich  of  those  reductions 
of  rent  and  wages  which  among  us  have  been  re- 
quired on  so  large  a  scale  since  the  peace. 

The  price  accounted  sufficient  to  enable  French 
farmers  to  make  a  livelihood  and  ])ay  taxes  is 
about  IJ.v.  the  Winchester  quarter,  in  j)eace. 


We  shall  now  suspend  oiii-  continental  parallel, 
and  bestow  a  few  paragraphs  on  one  of  a  tlifierent 

•  In  Scotland  tlic  burden  is  much  k-ss,  tin-  iigriculturist-;  of 
that  part  of  the  kingdom  being  comparatively  exempt  from 
tithe,  poor-rate,  and  land-tax. 


171  Our  Aixriculturc  ; 

l<iii(l  —  on  the  comparative  situation  of  our  agricul- 
turists aiul  niamifactiu-ers. 

jlrc  our  tnanuj'acturer.s  actually  benefited  by  pro- 
tecting duties?  —  That  such  is  the  case,  and  in  a 
very  considerable  degree  too,  is  the  opinion  of 
the  majority  of  our  agriculturists.  It  is  true,  how- 
ever, only  in  a  sliglit  degree,  as  will  soon  be  ap- 
parent from  the  following  facts. — The  total  value 
of  British  manufacture  annually  prepared,  whether 
for  home  consumption  or  export,  was  computed 
in  1812  by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  at  123,000,000/. 
Since  then  their  quantity  has  greatly  increased ; 
but  as  tlieir  price  has  experienced  a  material  re- 
duction, we  shall  probably  deviate  little  from  the 
truth,  in  assuming  that  sum  as  a  fair  representation 
of  their  present  aggregate  value.  But  of  this  xQiy 
large  amount,  more  than  80,000,000/.  consist  of 
the  three  gieat  articles  of  cotton,  woollens,  and 
hardware ;  none  of  which  receive  protection  from 
custom-duties,  our  manufacturers  being  enabled, 
by  inherent  advantages,  to  repel  foreign  compe- 
tition, and  even  to  meet  our  rivals  in  their  own 
markets.  Thus  oiu'  cottons  are  cheaper  than  those 
of  France,  Germanv,  or  the  Netherlands,  from 
various  causes-— the  import  of  the  raw  material  i^ 
somewhat  less  expensive,  our  machinery  is  superior, 
our  supply  of  fuel  more  abundant,  and  the  capital 
employed  subject  to  a  less  heavy  charge  of  in- 
terest. In  hardware,  we  possess  a  sinnlar  ad\an- 
tage  in  point  of  fuel  and  capital,  with  farther  aids 
in  the  carriage  of  the  ore  by  water,  and  in  a  subdi- 
vision of  labour,  to  which  the  Continent  in  no  de- 
gree approaches.  If  in  woollens  our  su})eriority 
be  less  decisive,  and  if  the  quality  of  French  cloth 
be  more  substantial,  the  fact  is,  that  from  our 
power  of  giving  long  credit  to   Americans  and 


Duly  on  Foreign  Corn,  I75 

others,  we,  as  yet,  retain  possession  of  most  of  the 
foreign  markets. 

We  have  tlius  narrowed,  very  considerably,  the 
extent  of  manufacture  supposed  to  be  benefited 
by  protectino-  duties.  We  miglit  go  a  stej)  farther, 
and  enumerate  various  articles  (such  as  refined 
sugar  or  pottery  ware),  in  which  protection  is  out 
of  the  question;  while  the  remainder  that  are  more 
or  less  ])rotected  by  oiu'  custom-duties  do  not,  ])er- 
haps,  surpass  the  value  of  the  agricultural  produce 
to  which  favour  is  extended  from  the  same  quar- 
ter; our  duties  on  foreign  timber,  flax,  hemp,  tal- 
low, seeds,  madder,  butter,  cheese,  and  rice,  all 
operating,  or  being  intended  to  operate,  in  fii\  our 
of  our  agriculturists. 

We  add  a  few  words  in  regard  to  our  taxes 
on  consumption  generally.  Of  these,  it  does  not 
appear  that  the  agricidturist  has  greater  reason  to 
complain  than  his  mercantile  or  manufacturing 
neighbour.  Those  most  severely  felt  are  on  leather, 
soap,  candles,  and  glass ;  also  those  on  tea  and 
«ugai-,  since  they  were  raised  in  the  course  of  the 
last  war  to  an  immoderate  rate.  But  these,  as  w  ell 
as  tile  farther  imposts  that  form  the  long  list  of 
our  excise  duties,  are  paid  in  connnon  by  residents 
in  towns ;  and  if  the  pressure  of  the  malt-tax 
be  more  heavily  felt  in  the  country,  a  kind  of 
balance  is  afforded  by  the  untaxed  substitutes  for 
groceries,  which  the  country  supplies  to  its  inhabi- 
tants. 

If  against  the  payment  of  land-tax,  we  i)iace  the 
heavier  assessed  taxes  of  towns,  we  find  the  amount 
of  ])ublic  burdens  balanced,  with  the  exception  of 
tithe  and  poor  rate.  These  forming  an  extra  bur- 
den on  agriculture,  and  one  of  gieat  amount,  ])ar. 
liament  have  endeavoured  to  countervail  by  our 


17()  Ottr  /l^ricu/tnrc  ; 

(•(>ni-I:ivvs :   at  one  time  hy  a  bounty  on  export,   at 
allot  her  by  a  restriction  on  import. 

^^'hat,  it  may  l)e  asketl,  was  the  real  motive  on 
the  j)art  of  oovernment  for  these  multitbrm  regu- 
lations— this  long  list  of  duties,  drawbacks,  boun- 
ties ?  Not  to  confer  on  any  of  the  parties,  whether 
agriculturist  or  manufacturer,  an  absolute  advan- 
tage ;  but  to  reconcile  them  to  the  taxes  imposed 
on  the  respective  articles  of  their  produce,  and  to 
prevent  foreigners  from  underselling  them  in  the 
home  market.  Under  this  impressio!i,  and  con- 
sidering the  amount  of  tithe  and  poor-rate  at 
present  a  dead  loss  to  the  landed  interest,  we 
can  hardly  coincide  with  the  argument  in  the  Agri- 
cultural Report  of  18^21  (pp.  '23,  ^24.),  that  our 
landholders  have  not  a  right  to  custom-house  pro- 
tection. Our  hesitation  would  arise  from  a  very 
different  cause  :  first,  from  a  doubt  of  the  efficacy 
of  a  protecting  duty  ;  and,  next,  from  a  dread 
that  the  expectation  which  it  would  so  generally 
excite,  might,  as  in  the  case  of  the  bounty,  lead  to 
excess  of  home  growth. 

Danger  of  an  over-crtension  of  our  Tillage. 

This  danger,  which  some  years  ago  would  have 
been  treated  as  chimerical,  we  now  find  to  have 
as  strong  a  claim  to  attention  and  to  precautionary 
measures,  as  the  hazard  of  an  over-extension  of* 
manufacture.  Of  the  truth  of  this  our  readers 
will  be  satisfied  on  referring  to  our  arguments  in 
the  preceding  section  ;  and,  above  all,  to  the  fact, 
that  with  so  small  a  number  of  enclosure  acts 
(forty-eight  annually),  we  ha\  e  found  the  means 
of  meeting  every  year,  since  the  peace,  the  demand 
of  the  -^00,000  consumers  annually  added  to  oiu: 


Duty  on  Foreign  Corn.  177 

population.  To  what  can  this  be  mainly  owing, 
except  to  tlie  diffusion  of  improved  methods,  to 
the  application  of  additional  labour  and  capital  to 
soils  already  under  tillage  ?  And  who,  in  this  age 
of  agricultural  discovery,  in  this  season  of  abun- 
dant supply,  both  as  to  labour  and  capital,  can 
with  confidence  predict  either  the  limit  or  the 
result  of  such  application  ? 

In  prosecuting  this  incpiiry,  our  readers  may, 
we  believe,  leave  at  once  out  of  consideration  all 
arguments  against  the  increase  of  our  growth, 
fbnnded  on  the  expence  of  reclaiming  poor  soils  ; 
not  that  such  expence  is  over-rated  by  Mr.  Ri- 
cardo  and  others,  but  because  it  is  unnecessary,  a 
larger  produce  being  obtained  by  bestowhig  addi- 
tional culture  on  the  better  soils.  If  in  regard  to 
England  and  Scotland,  our  conclusions  are  called 
in  question,  and  it  is  maintained  that  recourse  to 
inferior  soils  must  ere  long  follow  an  increase  of 
our  numbers,  our  reasoning  can  hardly  be  contested 
in  respect  to  the  sister  island,  where  such  extensive 
tracts  of  fertile  land  await  the  application  of  a 
better  system.  Under  such  circumstances,  what 
security  have  our  established  farmers  against  the 
agricultural  speculator,  except  in  a  measure  at 
first  apparently  disadvantageous  to  them,  we  mean 
the  removal  of  a  tempting  contingency,  and  an 
assurance,  as  far  as  can  be  conveyed  by  legislative 
regulation,  that  the  j)rospects  of  agriculture  are 
not  of  a  nature  to  justify  the  transfer  of  ca})ital 
from  other  lines  of  business?  The  true  interest  of 
both  farmer  and  landlord  is  to  beware  of  extending 
tillage,  to  ada))t  our  growth,  as  nearly  as  they  can, 
to  our  consumption  ;  and  to  keep  tlie  former,  were 
it  practicable,  somewhat  below  the  latter,  sub- 
mitting, asafiter  177^,  to  a  small  hut  regular  import. 

N 


V/fi  Our  Agriculture. 

It  is  that  course  alone  wliich  can  give  assurance 
oi'  a  steady  demand,  of  a  generally  brisk  market. 

The  Corn  committee  of  1813. — This  Committee, 
actuated  by  a  mixture  of"  ignorance  and  selfislmess, 
liardly  to  be  credited  in  men  of  tlieir  station  in 
society,  ventured  to  recommend  the  prohil)ition 
of  import,  except  when  our  own  wheat  shouhl  be 
at  or  above  105.y.  tlie  quarter.  Now,  if  with  the 
compaiatively  small  encouragement  held  out  by  80*. 
our  tillage  has  so  mucli  increased,  how  much 
greater  would  have  been  the  augmentation  had  the 
extravagant  proposition  of  the  committee  been 
adopted  by  parliament  ?  What  an  extent  of  inferior 
soil  would  have  been  brought  under  the  plough  in 
the  course  of  two  years  !  What  an  overstock  on 
tile  market  before  discovering  the  inefficiency  of  a 
corn-law  to  keep  up  prices ! — an  overstock  ad- 
mitting not  of  remedy,  like  excess  of  import,  by 
shutting  our  harbours,  but  remaining  in  force  for 
years,  perhaps  requiring  the  ruinous  alternative  of 
abandoning  land  under  tillage. 

The  ^weekly  Averages. — Among  the  various  ex- 
pedients suggested  by  the  distress  of  late  years, 
was  that  of  comprehending  in  the  returns,  which 
form  our  weekly  averages,  such  Irish  wheat  as  is 
sold  in  England  :  the  result  of  this,  in  consequence 
of  the  inferiority  of  Irish  wheat,  is  to  render  a  return 
of  60,$.  equivalent  as  a  representative  of  price,  to 
625.  or  63i'.  on  the  former  plan  of  taking  the  aver- 
ages. Under  present  circumstances  this  has  no 
practical  effect ;  but  were  our  market  to  rise,  we 
should  soon  see  that  all  expedients  of  this  nature 
tended  to  stimulate  production  to  a  hazardous 
extent. 

Objections  to  a  high  import  duty.  —  After 
these   arguments,    we   may  venture  to  hazard  an 


Duly  on  Foreign  Corn.  179 

opinion,  which  would  otherwise  have  appeared 
not  a  Uttle  paradoxical,  \iz.  that  in  peace  the 
injury  resulting  from  a  high  duty  on  foreign  corn 
would  in  all  })rol)ability  be  greater  to  the  producers 
than  to  the  consumers  of  provisions.  Were  a  high 
duty  imposed,  the  rise  of  price  would  be  temporary: 
extremes  soon  produce  their  own  cure,  and  con- 
sumers might  safely  trust  to  the  extension  of  home 
culture.  The  evil,  however,  would  not  stop  there: 
the  agricultiuist  would  be  sunk  in  distress  by 
overproduction,  and  the  merchants  and  manufac- 
turers would  consequently  be  subjected  to  an  extra 
share  of  the  public  burdens.  Hence  the  impor- 
tance of  maturely  weighing,  not  the  demands  of  a 
particular  class,  but  the  interest  of  the  public  in 
the  most  comprehensive  sense. 

Farther,  the  misfortune  of  the  present  day  is 
less,  the  reduction  of  income  than  the  existence 
of  inequality,  the  evil  of  transition;  and  the  public 
are  entitled  to  expect  such  measures  as  shall  set 
at  rest  this  ruinous  fluctuation.  If  our  present 
desideratum  be  a  general  reduction  of  wages,  sala- 
ries, and  other  money  payments,  not  yet  brought 
to  their  level,  nothing,  it  is  clear,  can  so  effectually 
j)romote  that  object  as  a  moderate  rate  of  duty  on 
foreign  corn  ;  an  assurance,  as  far  as  assurance  can 
be  given,  of  our  market  being  kept  at  a  steady 
])rice.  How  satisfactory  to  merchants,  manufac- 
turers, annuitants,  and,  above  all,  to  farmers,  to 
know  on  what  })robable  price  of  corn  the}-  are  to 
found  their  future  calculations,  to  fix  wages  and 
salaries,  to  regulate  their  domestic  ex})enditure ! 

In  what  manner,  it  maybe  asked,  can  a  reference 
to  the  past  be  jnade  instrumental  in  guiding  us  to 
a  knowledge  of  the  rate  which  forms  a!  fit  protecting 
diitv?     B\'   fixing    our    attention    on    the    cost    of 

.N    'I 


180  Our  Agriculture. 

raising  wheal,  nol  in  a  period  such  as  that  of  the 
last  thirtyyears,  a  period  as  anomalous  in  productive 
industry  as  in  })()litics  ;  but  at  a  time  when  Europe 
enjoyed  that  tranquillity  which  she  has  ha})pily 
now  in  prospect.  Comparing  the  present  and  the 
former  charges  on  our  tillage,  we  shall  find  that 
labour,  team,  manure,  may  and  ought  soon  to  be 
brought  back  to  a  rate  not  much  exceeding  that 
of  1792  :  that  tithe  is  necessarily  proportioned  to 
the  market  price  of  corn,  and  must  follow  its  fall ; 
while  poor-rate,  though  more  difficult  of  reduction, 
ought  to  yield  to  the  substantial  advantage  of 
cheap  provisions,  and  the  opportunity  of  work 
afforded  by  our  manufactures. 

All  those  considerations  are  of  a  nature  to  show 
that  the  late  Corn  bill,  which  admits  foreign  wheat 
when  our  own  attains  the  average  of  7O5.  has  not 
brought  our  import  limit  too  low, 

Tendency  of  our  Legislation  to  ultimate  Freedom  of 

Trade. 

We  shall  now  suspend,  for  a  few  moments,  the 
consideration  of  temporizing  measures,  of  the  ex- 
pedients devised  to  meet  the  pressure  of  the  day, 
and  carry  our  speculations  to  a  more  distant  object ; 
to  the  probable  situation  of  our  agriculturists  and 
manufacturers  of  the  next  generation.  In  their  time, 
our  financial  circumstances  will  probably  by  more 
favourable ;  and  parliament,  relieved  from  imme-» 
diate  urgency,  may  legislate  vdih  no  other  view  than 
that  of  the  permanent  advantage  of  the  public. 

It  was  long  an  opinion  among  our  countrymen, 
that  the  landed  and  commercial  bodies  had  opposite 
interests ;  that  a  tax  imposed  on  the  land  was  of 
no  particular  detriment   to   trade  ;    and   that  the 


Duty  on  Foreign  Corn.  181 

gains  of  our  merchants  were  of  little  consequence 
to  agriculture.  In  tlie  ])resent  age  a  more  ample 
experience,  a  community  of  suffering  on  the  part 
of  these  great  portions  of  the  community,  have 
taught  them  a  more  liberal  doctrine.  It  is  no 
where  more  emphatically  urged  than  in  the  passage 
(p.  ^0.)  of  the  Agricultural  Report  of  18^21,  where 
the  intimate  connexion,  the  strict  dependence  of 
agriculture  and  trade  on  each  other,  are  proved  by 
the  evidence  of  the  last  hundred  years  of  our  history. 
Assuming,  therefore,  that  such  will  be  the  ultimate 
basis  of  our  legislative  measures,  we  are  naturally 
led  to  take  a  view  of  our  productive  industry  some- 
what more  comprehensive  than  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs,  and  to  inquire  on  what  particular  advan* 
tages  our  national  prosperity  has  been  and  is  likely 
to  be  established. 

Advantages  ofyarticular  Countries.  —  Every  conn  - 
try  possesses  its  physical  characteristics,  its  peculiar 
and  distinctive  aptitudes.  If,  adverting  to  the 
early  history  of  civilization,  we  cast  our  eyes  over 
a  map  of  Greece,  and  observe  how  much  interi- 
course  was  there  facilitated  by  maritime  inlets, 
and  by  insular  positions  in  a  sea  of  easy  navigation, 
we  shall  find  it  easy  to  account  for  the  early  im- 
provement of  that  country,  without  ascribing  any 
great  share  of  influence  to  fortunate  accidents,  to 
the  exploits  of  warriors,  or  the  coimsels  of  legis- 
lators. If  we  take  a  wider  range,  and  inquire  by 
what  features  the  physical  structure  of  Europe  is 
discriminated  from  that  of  Asia  or  Africa,  we  shall 
find  its  advantages  consist  partly  in  a  climate 
exempt  from  extremes,  but  more  ijii  the  ample 
means  of  navigation  afforded  by  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  Baltic.     Lastly,  if^  drawing  nearer  home, 

N  .3 


182  Old-  AfrrkuUiuc. 

we  endeavour  to  ascertain  how  it  happened  thai 
Flanders  was  flourisliini;  amidst  the  barbarism  of* 
tlie  thirteentli  and  fourteenth  centuries,  we  shall 
trace  it  principally  to  two  causes  ;  fertility  of  soil 
and  ease  of  water  communication.  The  latter, 
joined  to  the  advantage  of  a  free  government, 
explains  the  still  more  remarkable  growth  of  the 
Dutch  provinces  in  the  seventeenth  century. 

Of  England.  —  By  what  peculiar  advantages  has 
England  been  distinguished,  and  enabled  to  take 
the  lead  of  France  and  Germany,  countries  equally 
favoured  in  soil  and  climate  ?  In  a  religious  and 
political  sense,  our  superiority  has  consisted  in  the 
enjoyment  of  the  reformed  faith  and  a  represen- 
tative government ;  in  a  physical  sense,  in  our 
extent  of  coast,  and  in  the  productiveness  of  our 
coal  mines.  Natural  superiority  of  another  kind 
we  can  hardly  boast :  our  pasture  is,  indeed,  richer 
than  that  of  continental  countries,  and  we  conse- 
quently take  the  lead  in  horses,  cattle,  and,  in  some 
degree,  in  the  woollen  manufacture  ;  but  whatever 
comes  under  the  description  of  agricultural  advan- 
tages, ought,  we  believe,  to  be  left  out  of  the 
question,  and  to  be  considered  as  balanced  by  the 
less  variable  temperature,  the  greater  warmth  of 
the  continent.  Our  farming  is,  indeed,  much  more 
advanced ;  but  is  not  that  the  result  of  indirect 
causes,  of  the  reaction  of  our  trade  and  manu- 
factures, of  the  application  of  capital  to  tillage 
and  pasturage,  and  of  our  tenantry  being  thus  en- 
abled to  occupy  farms  of  suitable  size,  instead  of 
the  insignificant  tenures  still  so  common  among 
tmr  neighbours  ? 

In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  is  this  reason- 
ing applicable  to  the  present  discussion,  the  question 
of  a  protecting  duty  on  corn  ?     Our  answer  is,  that 


Duty  on  Foreign  Corn.  183 

we  should  greatly  mistake  our  uatioual  prospects 
were  we  to  suppose  that  we  liave  as  yet  received 
all  the  benefit  attainable  from  our  superiority  in  the 
grand  points  of  fuel  and  navigation  ;  —  on  the  con- 
trary, it  may  safely  be  asserted,  that  we  are  not  yet 
in  the  midst  of  oiu'  career,  not  half-advanced  in 
the  task  of  turning  these  advantages  to  account. 
Continental  countries  are  making  a  very  slow  pro- 
gress, either  in  navigating  the  ocean,  in  forming 
canals,  or  in  working  coal  mines :  in  each  of  these 
our  superiority  still  offers  an  ample  basis  for  the 
superstructure  of  national  wealth.  It  woidd  pro- 
bably be  such  as  to  enable  our  manufacturers, 
though  taxed  in  regard  to  provisions,  to  maintain 
a  competition  with  their  continental  rivals  ;  but  it 
is  perfectly  clear  that  they  never  will  be  able  to  do 
JuU  justice  to  our  national  advantages  until  placed 
on  a  footing  of  equality  in  that  very  essential  point. 
A  reference  to  our  custom-house  returns  would 
soon  show  how  small  our  export  of  articles,  such  as 
hardware,  glass,  and  even  woollens,  is,  in  compari- 
son with  what  it  might  be,  were  equahty  in  the  price 
of  provisions  added  to  our  otiier  advantages. 

A  free  Import  of  Corn.  —  This  opens  to  our  view 
all  the  advantage  that  woukl  arise  from  a  free 
trade  in  corn,  or  from  the  reduction  of  the  protect- 
ing duty  to  a  lower  scale  than  has  as  yet  been  con- 
tem])iated,  eitlier  by  ministers  or  by  the  most  tem- 
perate of  their  opponents.  *  In  another  place  (see 
Appendix)  we  have  appropriated  a  few  paragra})hs 
to  this  topic ;  and  these,  under  present  circum- 
stances, arc,  perhaps,  all  that  it  is  advisable  to  urge 
in  regard  to  it.  The  landed  interest  are  as  yet  but 
imperfectly  apprised  of  the'extenl  of  its  ultimate 

*  Ricardo  on  Agriculture,  pp.  ^2,  83. 
N    4 


184  Our  Ai<:riculture. 


is' 


advantage  to  them  ;  nor  can  we  expect  that  their 
attention  will,  for  some  time,  be  weaned  from  the 
hi^h  prices,  the  great  nominal  rents  of  the  years  of 
war.  If  our  ministers  are  more  deeply  read  in  the 
science  of  national  wealth,  more  fully  convinced  of 
the  reaction  of  the  ])rosperity  of  trade  and  maim- 
facture  on  agriculture,  they  have  objections  of 
another  kind  ;  they  cannot  but  regard  a  fall  of 
prices  as  a  virtual  augmentation  of  the  public  debt. 
They  are  aware,  likewise,  of  tlie  evils  of  transition  ^ 
and  must,  to  use  the  language  of  the  Agricultural 
Report,  be  anxious  "  to  spare  vested  interests, 
and  to  deal  tenderly  even  with  obstacles  to  im- 
provement, when  long  implanted  in  our  system/' 

To  all  these  difficulties  we  have  to  add,  that  the 
exemption  of  our  agriculture  from  its  extra  share 
of  poor-rate,  and  from  tithe  in  England  as  well  as 
Ireland,  would  be  an  indispensable  preliminary  to  a 
measure  which  would  bring  our  corn  market  almost  as 
tow  as  that  of  the  Continent.  Now  government,  how- 
ever convinced  of  the  impolicy  of  these  burdens  in 
theirpresent  shape,  could  hardly  fail  to  consider  a 
change  in  long-established  assessments,  above  aU,  a 
new  demand  on  our  exchequer,  as  replete  with 
embaiTassment.  Several  of  the  late  measures  of 
ministers,  such  as  the  limitation  of  the  Sinking 
fund,  the  remission  of  the  most  injurious  of  our 
taxes,  tlie  extended  freedom  of  navigation,  the 
transfer  of  the  half  pay  and  pension  list  into  Long 
Annuities,  evidently  proceed  on  sound  calculation. 
They  seem  to  indicate  an  adequate  estimate  of  our 
resources  on  the  part  of  our  ])olitical  guides ;  bufe 
the  free  import  of  corn  would  be  so  gyeat  a  de- 
parture from  our  past  policy,  and  would  involve  so 
many  accompanying  changes,  that  we  can  contem- 
plate it  only  as  a  remote  Jesuit,  as  less  likely  to  be 


Duty  on  Foreign  Corn.  185 

the  consequence  of  any  arguments  that  can  possibly 
be  urged,  than  of  a  continuation  of  lo\v])rices;  which, 
by  reducing  the  cost  of  production,  and  replacing 
our  tenantry  in  nearly  the  same  situation  as  in  1792, 
may  cause  our  corn  laws  to  expire  by  a  natural 
death. 


Such  were  our  views  of  this  interesting  subject  last  year,  on 
sending  to  press  the  first  edition.  Since  then,  there  have  oc- 
curred several  circumstances  favourable  to  an  approximation 
to  a  system  of"  freedom,  and  to  the  hope  of  that  advantage 
which  always  arises  from  the  removal  of  restraints  from  pro- 
ductive industry.  The  lapse  of  time,  the  reduction  of  charges, 
and  the  prospect  of  continued  peace,  have  gradually  accus- 
tomed both  landlord  and  farmer  to  regard  60*.  for  a  quarter 
of  wheat  in  the  light  of  a  remunerating  price :  the  next  step 
may  be  to  consider  it  as  a  kind  of  standard  for  the  duty  on  the 
import  of  foreign  corn.  Now,  so  soon  as  the  landed  mterest 
shall  be  willing  to  permit  import  on  the  average  price  of  our 
wheat  exceeding  60*.,  they  will  be  entitled  to  call  on  the 
public  for  decisive  concessions  in  regard  to  tithe  and  poor-rate, 
—  in  other  words,  by  giving  an  assurance  of  a  permanently 
moderate  price  to  the  consumer,  they  will  have  a  right  to 
demand  that  these  burdens  (tithe  and  poor-rate)  shall  be  shared 
by  the  public  at  large. 

Are  the  recent  measures  of  nn'nisters  of  a  nature  to  promise 
a  concurrence  in  this  plan  of  mutual  concession?  To  this  we 
are  inclined  to  answer  in  the  affirmative,  and,  with  confidence, 
whether  we  look  to  the  personal  change  in  the  Chancellorship 
of  the  Exchequer;  to  the  reduction  so  promptly  made  in  the 
assessed  taxes  ;  to  the  limits  which,  as  far  as  we  can  judge, 
men  in  office  think  it  fit  to  affix  to  the  Sinking  Fund;  and,  above 
all,  to  the  introduction  of  the  too  long  delayed  measure  for 
the  commutation  of  tithe  in  Ireland. 

Of  the  power  of  the  monied  interest  to  come  to  the  relief  of 
their  countrymen  engaged  in  agriculture,  we  shall  treat  in  our 
Goncluding  chapter. 


186 
CHAP,  VI. 

Poor- Rate. 

1  HE  subject  of  poor-rate  has  already  engaged  so 
much  attention  both  in  parUamentary  investigations 
and  pubHshed  works,  that  we  shall  avoid  all  ge- 
neral discussion,  and  confine  ourselves  to  what  may 
be  termed  plain,  practical  topics,  such  as  the  com- 
parative amount  of  money  distributed  at  different 
dates  to  the  poor,  and  the  degree  of  pressure  on 
the  contributors.  We  take  up  the  subject  less  as 
a  national  question,  than  as  an  appendage  to  our 
observations  on  agriculture :  but  oiu*  summary, 
brief  as  it  may  be,  will,  we  trust,  explain  two 
points,  at  present  little  understood  ;  —  the  great 
increase  of  parochial  charge  during  the  war,  when 
labour  in  general  was  so  liberally  paid,  and  the 
very  considerable  reduction  that  is  now  taking 
place,  notwithstanding  the  apparently  less  favour- 
able state  of  our  productive  industry. 

We  propose  to  treat  successively  of  the  — 
Origin  and  progress  of  our  poor-law  system  j 
Its  degree  of  pressure  considered  as  a  tax ; 
Its  effect  on  the  condition  of  the  lower  orders. 

Origm  of  our  Poor  Laws.  —  The  origin  of  the 
English  poor  laws,  a  system  so  chfferent  from  that 
of  neighbouring  countries,  is  to  be  traced  to  two 
causes,  —  the  call,  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation, 
for  a  provision  for  the  poor,  when  depri\ed  of 
charitable  aid  from  monasteries  ;  and  the  enhance- 
ment, both  progressive  and  rapid,  which,  as  ex- 
plained in  the  preceding  chapter,   took  place  in 


Our  Poor  Law  System.  187 

provisions  during  the  l6th  century.  If  the  former 
offered  a  fair  j)lca  for  the  new  system,  the  latter 
presented  the  moie  substantial  grounds,  since  the 
rise  of  wages  seldom  keeps  pace  with  a  rise  in  pro- 
visions. The  conjunct  operation  of  these  causes 
led  to  various  enactments  in  favour  of  the  poor, 
which  were  definitively  consolidated  in  the  act  of 
1601,  —  an  act  prepared  with  all  the  care  and  de- 
liberation characteristic  of  the  ministers  of  Eliza- 
beth, and  which  would  never  have  received  a  per- 
nicious extension  had  its  execution  fallen  into 
proper  hands.  Its  provisions  were  intended  at  first 
for  the  relief  of  merely  the  aged  and  infiim,  and 
led  to  little  beyond  the  degree  of  aid  afforded  at 
present  to  the  poor  in  Scotland  or  in  France ;  but, 
from  unfitness  on  the  part  of  annually  changed 
overseers,  and  from  the  remissness  always  attendant 
on  the  disposal  of  pubHc  property,  when  unchecked, 
the  act  received,  in  time,  a  wider  construction. 
It  was  interpreted  into  an  obligation  to  find  work 
for  the  unemployed  generally,  as  well  as  to  make 
up  to  those  who  had  children  the  disproportion 
which  in  dear  seasons  took  })lace  between  the  price 
of  bread  and  the  I'ate  of  wages. 

Our  poor-rate  became  thus  a  fund,  not  merelv 
for  charitable  ])urposes,  but  for  the  equalization 
of  wages  ;  a  counteqjoise  to  the  fluctuations  arising 
from  inclement  seasons,  or  from  any  cause  ])ro- 
ducti\e  of  a  rapid  fall  in  the  \alue  of  moneA. 
This  result,  certainly  well  intended,  and  which  at 
first  sight  seems  of  beneficial  operation,  is  found, 
on  trial,  to  be  replete  with  all  that  irregidarity  and 
abuse  vvliich  it  is  so  difficult  to  avoid  in  any  int(^r- 
ference  with  the  natural  course  of  productixc 
industry.  Of  tiiis,  a  striking  jirnof  is  given,  not 
only   hi   this  countiT,    but  in    the    New  England 


188  Our  Poor  Law  System; 

states,  and  in  the  state  of  New  York  ;  for  even  in 
these,  the  countries  of  tlie  world  in  which  the  pay 
of  the  hiboiirer  is  most  Hberal,  the  number  of 
paupers  has  become  large.  They  are,  happily,  the 
only  foreign  coimtries  in  which  our  example  has 
been  imitated.  On  the  continent  of  Europe,  the 
public  institutions  afford  j)rotection  only  against  in- 
firmity and  extreme  penury  :  even  Holland,  so  long 
noted  for  its  hospitals  and  charities,  has  not  a  poor- 
rate  on  the  comprehensive  plan  of  England. 

Its  Progressive  Extension.  —  Our  records  of  the 
distribution  of  relief  to  tlie  poor  during  the  seven- 
teenth century  are  very  imperfect :  its  amount, 
however,  must  have  been  considerable  in  the  first 
half  of  the  century,  in  consequence  of  the  con- 
tinued rise  of  corn  during  the  reign  of  James  I., 
and  part  of  that  of  Charles  I.  But  during  the 
thirty  years  that  intervened  from  I66O  to  I69O, 
the  price  of  corn  w^as  on  the  decline,  and  the 
country  experienced  in  no  great  degree  either  the 
visitation  of  inclement  seasons  or  the  burden  of 
military  expenditure.  In  the  reigns  of  William  and 
Anne  the  case  was  far  different;  an  enhancement  of 
corn  consequent  on  bad  seasons,  on  war,  and  in- 
terrupted navigation,  concurred  with  the  disorder 
in  our  currency  to  render  a  state  of  suffering 
general  among  the  lower  orders,  and  to  give  a 
melancholy  corroboration  to  their  claims  for  paro- 
chial relief  The  number  of  persons  receiving 
such  aid  is  said  (Clarkson  on  Pauperism),  to  have 
amounted,  towards  the  close  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  to  as  large  a  portion  of  our  popidation 
as  at  present,  viz.  a  tenth  part  of  the  inhabitants 
of  England  and  Wales.  The  amount  of  money 
•collected   ibr  this  purpose   has  not  been  put   on 


its  Origin  and  Progress.  189 

record :  it  is  said,  somewhat  loosely,  but  without 
much  appearance  of  exaggeration  *,  to  have  ap- 
proached at  the  period  in  question  to  a  million 
sterling ;  a  burden  heavily  felt  in  these  days  of 
limited  rental,  and  productive  consequently  of  great 
complaints. 

The  long  peace  and  reduced  price  of  provisions 
which  followed  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  were  both 
conducive  to  the  decrease  of  poor-rate,  and,  not' 
withstanding  an  increase  in  our  population,  we  find 
that,  in  tlie  middle  of  tlie  century,  viz.  in  the  three 
years  ending  with  17''50,  its  amount  did  not  (Reports 
on  the  Poor  Laws  in  1817  and  1821)  exceed  an 
average  of         -  -  -  -         700,000/, 

After  1760,  the  charge  for  the  poor  participated 
in  the  general  charge  which  took  place  in  the  state 
of  prices,  and  amounted  in  that  year  to  96.5,000/., 
while  at  a  subsequent   date,  in   1770,    it   was   car. 

ried  to 1,306,000/. ; 

so  much  did  the  effect  of  indifferent  seasons  and 
the  enhancement  of  corn  counterbalance  the  othei-- 

wise  favourable  circumstances  of  the  latter  period . 

the  enjoyment  of  peace,  the  extension  of  our 
manufactures.  Next  came  the  contest  with  our 
colonies,  along  with  the  various  losses  attendant 
on  interrupted  export,  and  the  suspension  of  un- 
dertakings dependent  on  a  low  interest  of  money, 
the  result  of  which,  in  concurrence  with  other 
causes,  carried  the  charge  of  poor-rate  in  I78O 
to 1,774,000/. 

The  peace  of  1783,  though  favourable  in  tlie 
main,  was  not  unaccom})anied  by  the  evils  of 
transition.  Our  protluctive  industry  partook  at 
first  of  the  discouragement  excited  In  the  loss 
of  oyr  colonies  ;  and   though    it    soon    exhibited 

Sir  F.  Eden  on  the  State  of  the  Poor. 


190  Our  Poor  Law  System; 

symptoms  of  vigour,  and  even  of  prosperity,  the 
price  of  bread  was  kept  up  by  the  incHtterent  har- 
vests of  17<S8  and  1789.  When  to  this  we  add 
the  increase  of  our  population,  and  make  allowance 
for  the  progressive  introduction  of  abuse  into  a 
system  subject  to  so  little  check  or  control,  we 
need  not  be  surprised  that  in  1790,  the  sum  col- 
lected for  the  poor  amounted,  when  joined  to  the 
minor  rates  for  highways,  church,  and  county 
charges,  to 2,567,000/. 

2Vie  late  Wars.  —  Such  was  the  state  of  our 
poor-rate  at  the  beginning  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution, the  time  when  we  entered  on  a  course  of 
circumstances  productive  of  a  contiiuied  fall  in  the 
value  of  money.  As  wages  seldom  rise  in  propor- 
tion to  a  rise  in  provisions,  an  increase  of  poor- 
rate  is  the  necessary  consequence.  Previously  to  the 
war  of  1793,  the  augmentation  of  our  rates  had 
been  gradual,  a  century  elapsing  before  they 
doubled,  a  ratio  of  increase  little  greater  than  that 
of  our  population.  But  after  1793,  the  concurrent 
efiect  of  war,  and  indifferent  seasons,  rendered  the 
price  of  bread  so  disproportionate  to  the  wages  of 
country  labour,  that  in  1800,  the  poor  rate,  ex- 
clusive of  the  highway,  church,  and  county-rate, 
amounted  to  -  -  -     3,861,000/. 

In  1810  to  -  -  -     5,407,000/. 

And  in  1812  to     -  -  -     6,680,000/. 

The  peace  of  1814  opened,  in  some  respects,  a 
new  aera.  It  was  followed,  as  is  well  known,  bv  a 
rapid  fall  in  the  price  of  corn,  which  continued 
during  two  years ;  and  had,  notwithstanding  the 
many  new  claims  for  parish  i-elief  arising  from  want 
of  work,  the  effect,  on  the  whole,  of  a  partial  reduc- 
tion of  the  poor-rate.  This  is  apparent  from  the 
subjoined  table. 


its  Oris^in  and  Pros:ress. 


191 


RETURNS  FOR  ENGLAND  AND  WALES. 


YEAR 

ending  Easter, 

]813. 

Easter,  1814. 

25th  March, 

181.5. 

£. 

£. 

£. 

Total    money   received 

by  poor-rate,  and  in 

a  smaller  degree  by 

church-rate,high\vay- 

rate,  county-rate,  &c. 

in  England  and  Wales 

8,651,438 

8,392,728 

7,460,855 

To  these  sums  are  to  be 

added  charitable  do- 

nations, whether  aris- 

ing    from     land     or 

money,   managed  by 

the    clergy,    church- 

wardens, or  overseers : 

Annual  average 
Expenditure. 

238,310 

238,310 

238,310 

For     the     maintenance 

and  relief  of  the  poor 

6,679,658 

6,297,331 

5,421,168 

Law-suits,    removal    of 

paupers  andexpences 

of  overseers  or  other 

officers     -         -         - 

325,107 

332,966 

324,665 

Families  of  miJitia-men 

and      other      militia 

charges    - 

24^,202 

188,576 

105,394 

Church-rate,       county- 

rate,      highway-rate, 

&c. 

£. 

1, 61 4,87 1 

1,692,990 

1,657,627 

8,865,838 

8,511,863 

7,508,854 

The  average  of  the  two  years  1815  and  1816  was. 
Church,  county,  and  highway-rate         -         -         e^;  1,212,918 
Maintenance  and  relief  of  the  poor,  including  law- 
suits, removal  of  pauper*,  aad  expence  of  overseers  5,714,506 

In  all     -     -     ^6,937,425 


lO-^ 


Our  Poor  X.niio  Si/stem  ; 


Increase  afler  1816.  —  'J'lic  poor-rate  was  thus 
in  progress  of  reduction,  both  as  to  the  amount 
levied,  and  the  number  relieved,  when  a  general 
re-action  took  place,  in  consequence  of  the  high 
price  of  provisions  that  followed  the  bad  harvest 
of  X816, 


Relief  and 

AVERAGE 

Maintenance  of 

Church-rates. 

the  Poor  ;  also 

County-rates, 

OF 

Law  Suits,  Re- 

Highway-rates, 

TOTAL. 

moval  of  Paupers 

and  Militia- 

TWO  YEARS. 

and  Expence  of 
Officers. 

charges. 

.4'. 

€. 

£. 

1816  and  1817 

6,918,217 

1,210,200 

8,128,417 

1817  and  1818 

7,890,148 

1,4-30,292 

9,320,440 

1818  and  1819 

7,531,650 

1,300,534 

8,932,185 

1819  and  1820 

7,329,594- 

1,342,658 

8,719,655 

Year  ending  1 
Easter  1821  j 

6,94-7,660 

Do.   1822 

6,335,820 

The  amount  of  our  payments  was  highest  during 
the  interval  (1817,  1818,  1819,)  when  a  high 
price  of  corn  unfortunately  concurred  with  the 
derangement  of  productive  industry  arising  from 
our  great  national  transition. 

Since  1819  the  amount  of  this  formidable  charge 
has  experienced  a  progressive,  though  very  gra- 
dual  reduction. 
The  year  ending  Easter  1819,  was  less  than  the 

year  ending  Easter  1818,  by        -       5  per  cent. 
Do.  ending  18^20,  less  than  1819,  by       3 
Do.  ending  1821,  less  than  1820,  by       5 
Do.  ending  1822,  less  than  1821,  by       9 


Total  reduction  since  1818, 


QQ 


its  Origin  and  Progress. 


193 


For  the  year  ending  2oth  March,  1823, 
the  returns  as  yet  received  exliibit 
a  diminution,  which,  joined  to  a 
further  reduction  in  the  year  now 
in  progress,  justifies  our  assuming 
the  total  of"  our  j)resent  expenditure 
for  the  poor,  at  less  than 


jf6,000,000 


NUMBER  OF  PERSONS  RELIEVED. 


Poor  permanently  re- 
lieved in  workhouses 

Ditto,  ditto,  out  of  work- 
houses (without  reck- 
oning children) 

Parishioners  relieved  oc- 
casionally 

Total  of  paupers  7 
relieved     -     -  J 

YEAR 

endinr;  Easter, 

1813. 

Easter,  1814. 

March  25tb, 
181.5. 

97,223 

434,441 
440,249 
971,913 

94,085 

430,140 
429,770 

88,115 

406,887 
400,971 

953,995 

895,973 

Workhouses. — The  preceding  return  exhibits  in 
a  se])arate  line  the  nimiber  of  poor  living  in  work- 
houses. This  plan  is,  in  a  manner,  })eculiar  to 
England;  the  pubhc  establishments  in  other  coun- 
tries being  confined  to  hospitals  or  houses  of  cor- 
rection. Tlie  workhouse  plan,  originally  adopted 
above  a  century  ago,  received  a  great  extension 
from  an  act  passed  in  1782,  commonly  called  Gil- 
bert's Act,  from  the  name  of  the  member  of  parlia- 
ment by  whom  it  was  framed.  This  act,  aiming 
to  combine  the  advantages  of  an  assemblage  of  a 


101-  Our  Poor  Law  Systetn  ; 

number  of  poor  on  one  spot,  of  a  minute  division 
of  labour,  and  a  joint  management  of  disburse,  em- 
powered all  magistrates  to  consider  any  large  work- 
house as  a  common  receptacle  for  the  poor  tlirough- 
out  a  diameter  of  twenty  miles.     Sound  as  these 
reasons  apparently  were,  the  plan  has  as  yet  been 
by  no  means  successful :  proper  care  has  seldom 
been  taken  to  separate  the  inmates  of  the  work- 
houses according  to  their  age  or  their  habits  ;  nor 
has  the  division  of  employment  been  at  all  carried 
to  the  necessary  length.     Their  earnings  have  con- 
sequently been  insignificant,  and  the  charge  to  the 
parish  amounts,  in  general,  to  9/.,  10/.,  or  even  12/. 
per  head,  while  half  the  sum  would  suffice,  if  paid 
to  the  poor  at  their  own  habitation's.     It  is  thus  in 
some  measure  fortunate  that  the  limited  extent  of 
our  workhouses  hardly  admits  above  100,000  indi* 
viduals, 

Scotland  and  France.  —  It  is  a  general  notion  in 
England,  that  Scotland  has  no  poor  laws, — a  notion 
originating  in  the  very  satisfactory  circumstance  of 
the  lightness  of  her  poor  rate.  But  there  are  and 
have  long  been  in  that  country  statutes  enacting  that 
certain  funds  shall  be  faithfully  applied  to  the  relief 
of  the  poor.  These  funds,  however,  are  levied  by  a 
very  easy  process:  first,  from  collections  made  at  the 
parish  church  ;  next,  from  the  interest  of  money  or 
rent  of  land  bequeathed  by  individuals  for  the  use 
of  the  poor;  and,  lastly,  from  a  moderate  assessment, 
paid  in  general  half  by  the  landlords,  the  other  half 
by  the  rest  of  the  parish.  In  1817,  a  year  of  scarcity 
and  distress,  the  total  poor-rate  collected  in  Scot- 
land was  119,000/.,  of  which  nearly  70,000/.  pro- 
ceeded from  charitable  collections  and  donations  ; 
the  remainder  from  assessment.     The  latter,  how- 


it.f  Origin  and  Progress,  1 95 

ever,  did  not  extend  over  the  whole  of  Scotland, 
being  levied  only  in  the  low  country,  particularly 
in  the  districts  containing  manufacturers ;  while 
the  mountainous  counties  of"  the  nortli  remained, 
&s  they  have  always  been,  exempt  from  assessment. 

The  paupers  in  Scotland  are  in  the  proportion  of 
only  one  injhrti/,  a  proportion  which  would  doubt- 
less have  been  increased,  had  the  price  of  com, 
and  the  attendant  operation  of  the  English  poor- 
laws,  continued  as  in  I8I7  and  1818;  for  it  is  a 
remarkable  fact,  that  the  distribution  of  a  parish 
allowance  to  manufacturers  in  England  operates 
as  a  serious  compai*ative  disadvantage  to  their 
humble  brethren  in  the  north.  Thus,  when  in  a 
depressed  branch  the  wages  are  equal  to  oidy  85. 
or  9*.  a  week,  the  allowance  of  poor-rate  to  the 
English  manufacturer  may,  and  generally  does, 
carry  his  receipt  to  10.y.  or  12.s. ;  a  difference  which 
has  had  the  eflbct  of  inducing  a  number  of  the 
Scottish  workmen  to  forsake  their  homes. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  have  been  the  causes 
of  so  material  a  difference  in  the  management  of 
the  poor  in  Scotland  and  in  England  ?  The  two 
countries  embracing  the  Reformation  in  the  same 
period,  and  falling  under  the  sway  of  the  same 
sovereign  soon  after  the  enactment  of  the  poor- 
law  of  1601,  the  jegulations  were  originally  similar; 
but  in  Scotland  their  execution  was  vested,  not  in 
temporary  officers,  such  as  churchwardens  and 
overseers,  but  in  the  landholders,  clergymen,  and 
elders  or  deacons,  whose  functions  were  })erma- 
xient,  and  whose  personal  accpiaintance  with  the 
poor  enabled  them  to  act  with  discrimination.  The 
good  effects  of  tiiis  plan,  evinced  as  tlicy  have  been 
by  the  practice  of  two  centuries,  induced  the 
Committee  on  the  Poor   Laws  in  181 7,  to  recom- 

o  i 


196  (^lif  1*001^  J-'d'i^'  System  ; 

mend,  that  in  England  the  overseer  should  be  a 
permanent  officer  with  a  salary,  and  should  act,  if 
necessary,  for  several  districts  ;  a  practice  that  has 
since  been  adopted  with  a  beneficial  result  in  a 
number  of  the  parishes  and  townships  of  England. 

In  France,  before  the  Revolution,  the  poor  were 
supported,  as  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  other  Catholic 
countries,  chiefly  by  the  abbeys,  priories,  and  other 
beneficial  establishments.  These  sources  of  income 
being  absorbed  in  the  sweeping  changes  of  the 
Revolution,  there  took  place  in  the  Assemblee 
Legislative y  in  1791,  a  long  discussion  on  the  fittest 
mode  of  providing  for  the  poor :  the  result  was  a 
decided  determination  to  avoid  the  English  plan, 
but  to  provide  at  the  public  charge  a  fund  of  about 
2,000,000/.  a  year,  for  the  relief  of  the  aged  and 
infirm  throughout  the  whole  of  France.  In  the 
disorders  of  succeeding  years,  great  defalcations 
took  place  in  regard  to  this  fund ;  but  in  the  reign 
of  Bonaparte  there  were  imposed,  or  rather  revived, 
octrois^  or  dues  on  wines,  cider,  spirits,  and  other 
articles  of  consumption,  paid  on  the  introduction 
of  these  articles  into  towns.  The  imposition  of  a 
tax  was  in  these  davs  a  matter  of  far  greater  dif- 
ficulty  in  France  than  in  this  country  ;  and  the 
revival  of  the  octrois  was  for  a  time  attempted 
only  as  a  fund  for  charitable  purposes  ;  but  when 
the  public  became  accustomed  to  this  mode  of  con- 
tribution, its  rate  was  augmented,  and  the  proceeds 
rendered  available  to  a  variety  of  local  purposes. 

In  addition  to  the  aid  arising  to  the  poor  from 
these  dues,  collections  are  made  in  France  by 
subscription  in  the  depth  of  winter,  or  on  the 
occurrence  of  extraordinary  distress  ;  and,  finally, 
in  a  season  of  general  hardship,  such  as  the  \nnter 
that  followed  the  bad  harvest  of  ISlfi,  occasional 


its  Origin  and  Progress.  197 

issues  are  made  from  the  public  treasury,  on  the 
appHcation    of  mayors    or    local   magistrates.     In 
Paris  there  are  a  number  of  hospitals  :  in  the  large 
provincial  towns  there  are,  in  general,  two ;  one 
for  the  sick,  the  other  for  the  aged.     These  insti- 
tutions, however,  are  managed  with  all  the  laxity 
and  want  of  method  so  common  among  our  southern 
neighbours:  mendicity  is  unrestricted,  and  prevails 
in  many  places  to  a  reprehensible  degree.     In  fact, 
the  dweUings  of  the  lower  orders  throughout  France 
generally,  whether  in  the  country  or  in  the  suburbs 
of  a  town,  exhibit  to  an  English  eye  a  very  bare 
and  denuded  appearance.     But  to  account  for  this 
general  aspect  of  poverty  by  the  want  of  parochial 
aid,  would  be  as  erroneous  as  to  ascribe  the  comfort 
of  the  lower  orders  in  Holland,  to  the  aid  afforded 
by  charitable  contributions.     In  that  country,  as  in 
England,  the  better  lodging  and  better  furniture 
of  the  poor  are  the  result  of  long-continued  com- 
mercial activity ;  of  that  ample  supply  of  work,  of 
those  habits  of  care,  cleanliness,  and  order,  which, 
in  the  course  of  time,  it  imparts  to  the  agricultural 
portion  of  the  conununity. 

Poor  Rate  considered  as  a  Tad\ — Our  next,  and 
equally  interesting  object  of  inquiry,  regards  the 
contributors  to  the  poor-rate,  and  the  comparative 
degree  of  pressure  imposed  on  them  at  different 
periods.  And  here  our  readers  must  be  prepared 
for  our  making  a  large  deduction  from  the  increase 
of  burden  indicated  by  the  mmierical  returns  of 
poor-rate  during  the  lat^  wars ;  a  deduction  justi* 
fied  on  two  grounds, — the  depreciation  of  the 
money  in  which  it  was  paid,  and  the  increase  in 
the  number  of  the  contributors.  In  what  manner, 
it  may  be  asked,  do  the  latter  receive  an  increase  ? 

o  S 


\9» 


Poor  Rale  cwisidered  as  a  Tax. 


Of  those  who  pay  poor-rate  it  may  be  safely  as- 
sumed, that  the  augmentation,  in  point  of  number, 
is  on  a  par  with  the  general  augmentation  of  their 
countrymen ;  and  we  shall  probably  not  err  by 
assuming,  that  our  national  resources  increase  in 
proportion  to  oiu'  numbers.  This  opinion,  already 
advanced  in  our  pages,  and  about  to  be  more  fully 
developed  in  the  sequel,  we  shall  for  the  present 
consider  as  admitted,  and  extract  from  the  work 
of  a  diligent  and  benevolent  enquirer  into  such 
subjects,  (Barton  on  the  Labouring  Classes,  I8I7,) 
a  table  in  which  these  different  considerations  are 
taken  into  account. 

Table  of  the  Annual  Expenditure  for  the  Poor,  comfuted  tukh 
rejerence  to  the  Price  of'  Corn,  and  the  general  Increase  of  our 
Population. 


Periods. 

Average 
Price  of 
Wheat. 

Average  of 

Annual 
Expenditure 
on  the  Poor. 

Forming  a  Charge  per 

Head  on  the  whole 

Population  of  the 

Kingdom. 

From  1772  to  1776 
1781  to  1785 
1799  to  1803 
1811  to  1815 

s.     d. 

48  2 

49  2 
84     8 
93     2 

£. 
1,556,804 
2,004,238 
4,267,965 
5,072,028 

44  pints  of  wheat. 
53     Do. 
5U  Do. 
50*  Do. 

To  judge  from  this  sketch,  the  burden  of  the 
poor-rate,  estimated  not  by  the  price,  but  by  the 
quantity  of  subsistence,  had  actually  begun  to  de- 
cline before  the  close  of  the  war ;  but  instead  of 
pressing  any  inference  on  this  head,  we  point  the 
attention  of  our  readers  to  tlie  near  approach  to 
uniformity  in  the  real  charge  at  the  time  of  the 
greatest  apparent  variation.  This  inference  is 
farther  confirmed  by  the  following  extract  from  a 


Poor  Rate  considered  as  a  Tax. 


199 


pamphlet  on  Pauperism,  by  Mr.  W.  Clarkson,  pub- 
lished in  1815. 


Year. 

Population  oi  England 
and  Wales,  about 

Total  of  Rates, 

including  Highway, 

Churcli,  and 

County-rates. 

Nunaber  of 
Paupers  relieTed. 

1688 

1766 

17831 

1785J 

1792 

1803 

5,300,000 
7,728,000 

8,016,000 

8,675,000 
9,168,000 

£.665,362 
1,530,804 

2,004,238 

2,645,520 
4,267,965 

563,964 
695,177 

818,851 

955,326 
1,040,716 

In  the  fifty  years  that  elapsed  between  I764  and 
1814,  the  increase  ot"  our  population  was  as  7  to 
11,  and  the  rise  in  the  price  of  provisions  exceeded 
the  proportion  of  7  to  13.  Here,  accordingly,  the 
two  great  causes  of  increase  of  poor-rate  operated 
in  concurrence;  and  in  1814  it  was  incumbent  on 
us  to  be  prepared,  not  only  for  an  augmentation  of 
claimants  in  the  proportion  of  11  to  7>  but  for  an 
increase  of  expcnce  in  their  maintenance,  in  that 
of  13  to  7  ;  the  two  together  forming,  when  com- 
pared to  the  return  of  1764,  a  sum  (^4  to  7)  more 
than  triple  the  responsibility  of  that  year.  Is  it 
then  matter  of  surprize,  that  5,000,000/.  should  go 
no  further  in  its  discharge  in  1814,  than  1,500,000/. 
in  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  George  III. 

Wages  paid  by  Poor  Rate.  —  It  is  a  great,  tliough 
very  common  error,  to  account  poor-rate  a  hondjide 
tax,  an  actual  sacrifice  to  its  apparent  extent  But 
the  leading  rule  of  our  system,  particularly  in  the 
west  of  England,  is,  to  afford  relief  to  tlie  lower 
orders  on  a  conjunct  calculation  of  the  price  of 
bread,  arid  the  number  of  children  in  a  family.    An 

o  4 


^00  Poor  Halt  considered  as  a  Tad'. 

allowance  made  on  this  plan  represents  less  the  de- 
gree of  distress  prevalent  in  the  country,  than  the 
difference  between  the  market  price  of  provisions, 
and  the  existing  rate  of  wages ;  a  rate,  perhaps, 
transmitted  with  little  variation  from  years  of 
greater  cheapness.  It  is  thus  that  our  poor-law 
system  was  rendered,  during  the  late  wars,  an  ex- 
pedient for  preventing  a  rise  of  ivages,  as  far  at 
least  as  regarded  country  labour,  on  the  avowed 
ground,  that  wages  once  raised  cannot  be  reduced 
without  the  greatest  difficulty. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  effect  of  the 
war  on  the  price  of  labour  generally  ?  To  increase 
the  demand,  and  to  place  a  number  of  the  lower 
orders  in  towns,  whether  manufacturers  or  me- 
chanics, in  a  better  situation  tlian  before,  notwith- 
standing the  rise  in  provisions.  In  no  department 
did  it  render  the  demand  greater  than  in  agricul- 
ture, and  in  none  did  the  wages  of  the  labourer 
experience  a  greater  rise  in  Scotland ;  but  in  Eng- 
land, at  least  in  most  parts  of  England,  from  the 
effects  of  an  artificial  system,  the  case  was  very 
different.  Wages  were  subjected  to  regulation ; 
and  their  rise,  though  considerable,  being  inade- 
quate to  the  rise  of  corn,  the  unavoidable  result 
w^as  a  great  increase  of  poor-rate.  It  is  only  thus 
that  we  find  it  possible  to  explain  the  remarkable 
anomaly,  that  in  a  period  when  farming  was  flou- 
rishing beyond  example,  the  number  of  agricul- 
tural paupers  should  increase  in  a  proportion  fully 
equal  to  that  of  our  trading  and  manufacturing 
districts.  This  was  exemplified  in  Bedfordshire 
and  Herefordshire,  the  two  counties  which  em- 
ploy the  largest  proportion  of  their  inhabitants  in 
agriculture. 


Poor  Rale  considered  as  a  Tad\  201 

Extract  from  the  Report  on  the  Poor  Laws,    1817,  p.  8, 


Expended 

on  Paupers  in 

1776. 

Average  expen- 
diture of  1783, 
84,   85, 

£16,728 
20,977 

In  1803. 

In  1815. 

Herefordshire 
Bedfordshire 

£10,.592 

16,663 

£48,067 
38,070 

£59,256 
50,371 

There  is  thus  no  doubt,  tliat  a  part  of  the  poor- 
rate  ought  to  be  deducted  from  our  estimate  of  it  as 
a  tax,  and  considered  in  the  Hght  of  an  equivalent 
for  wages.  If  it  be  asked,  what  proportion  should 
thus  be  deducted,  we  must  answer,  by  admitting, 
that  the  enquiry  is  complicated,  involving  a  refer- 
ence to  the  rate  of  wages  in  Scotland  and  the 
counties  in  the  north  of  England,  where  poor-rate 
is  comparatively  light.  The  proportion,  besides, 
must  differ  materially  under  different  circum- 
stances, in  consequence  of  the  greater  or  less  de- 
mand for  labour.  In  this  uncertainty,  and  in  the 
absence  of  tlie  necessary  documents,  we  are  con- 
fined to  a  conjectural  estimate ;  but  if  a  third  of 
our  poor-rate  is  to  be  thus  accounted  for,  we  ex- 
clude the  idea  of  a  tax  or  sacrifice  to  the  extent 
of  nearly  :2,000,0()0/.  annually,  during  the  last  ten 
years. 

Mode  of  Assessment.  —  Amidst  the  various  sug- 
gestions entertained  during  the  agricultural  di.s- 
tress  of  LSlG)  was  that  of  rendering  the  burden  of 
poor-rate  national,  instead  of  parochial  ;  of  paying 
it  out  of  a  general,  instead  of  a  local  fund.  This 
proposition  is  noticed  here,  merely  to  show  its  ab- 
solute inexpediency.  Under  our  ])resent  system, 
it  could  be  accompanied  by  no  adc(iuate  checks, — 
by  no  satisfactory  rule   lor   restricting  either  the 


202  Poor  Rate  considered  as  a  Tax. 

number  or  the  allowance  of  the  pensioners,  fn 
Scotland,  in  France,  in  short,  in  all  countries  with 
which  we  are  acquainted,  the  relief"  of  the  poor  is 
defrayed  by  a  local  contribution.  But  whiJe  we 
determine  to  keep  up  the  distinction  of  parishes 
and  townships,  and  to  obhge  each  to  provide  for 
its  poor,  there  apj)ear  to  be  strong  reasons  for  a 
change  that  would  be  perfectly  compatible  with 
the  maintenance  of  local  distinction  :  we  mean 
new-modelling  the  assessment  of  property.  At 
present  the  whole  falls  on  land  and  houses ;  but 
would  not,  we  may  ask,  the  income  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  parish  generally,  returned  on  a  plan 
somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  property  tax,  form 
a  much  more  equitable  basis  of  repartition  ;  parti- 
cularly since  the  landed  interest  appear  to  have 
lost  their  principal  stay — the  counterpoise  af- 
forded by  the  corn  laws. 

The  yearly  rental  of  the  land  and  houses  of 
England  and  Wales,  on  which  poor-rate  was 
collected  in  1803,  was  not  (Clarkson  on  Pau- 
perism) returned  at  more  than £24',00O,00O 

The  latter  years  of  the  war  exhibited  both  a  large 
increase  of  rental  and  a  more  correct  return, 
the  amount  assessed  being  (Report  on  the 
Poor  Laws,  1817)  not  less  than 51,898,000 

But  increase  of  demand  followed,  or  rather  ac- 
companied, increase  of  means  :  the  rate,  3*.  T^cf. 
in  the  pound  in  1803,  was  not  below  Si.  4rf.  on 
the  far  larger  sum  assessed  in  the  years  1812, 
1813,  1814-.  At  present,  whatever  be  the  offi- 
cial allotment,  the  burden  bears  an  equal  pro- 
portion to  our  resources,  because,  since  the 
fall  of  corn,  the  rental  of  land  and  houses  in 
England  and  Wales  can  hardly  exceed    .     .     .     •i5,000,000 

In  1805,  the  sum  collected  for  the  use  of  the 
poor  was  below  4,000,000/. ;  and  if,  in  some  years 


Our  Poor  Law  System^  S^c. 


^3 


hence,  it  be  reduced,  as  we  anticipate,  (see  Appen- 
dix to  tlie  chapter  on  Agriculture,  p.  [35])  to  a  sum 
(4,. 500,000/.)  not  greatly  exceeding  that  amount, 
it  would  form  a  charge  of  from  two  shillings  in 
the  pound  on  the  actual  rent  of  our  land  and 
houses,  (4,5,000,000/.) ;  but,  if  levied  on  the  in- 
come of  '  tlie  parishioners  generally,  4,500,000/. 
would  form  a  rate  of  less  than  one  shilling  in 
the  pound. 


Did  Increase  qf  Wages  and  Poor-rate  counter- 
balance the  Enhancement  of  Provisions  ?  —  It  would, 
we  believe,  be  a  mistake,  to  imagine  that  the  in- 
crease of  wages  and  parochial  aid  dining  the  war, 
counterbalanced  to  the  country  labourer  the  en- 
hancement of  produce,  and  had  the  effect  of  ren- 
dering his  situation  more  comfortable  than  in  the 
preceding  period.  A  very  different  conclusion  is 
suggested  by  the  following  calculation  made  by 
Mr.  Barton,  who,  in  his  pamphlet  on  the  '•  State  of 
the  Labouring  Classes,"  pubhshed  in  I8I7,  shows, 
that  whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in  towns, 
wages  in  the  country,  estimated  by  their  power  of 
procuring  subsistence,  experienced  a  considerable 
diminution  in  the  sixty  years  between  I76O  and 
1820. 

Statement  shoxving  the  Proportion  of  the   Wages  of  the  Country 
Labourer  to  the  Price  qf  Com. 


Periods. 

Weekly  Pny. 

Wheat  per     ,  Wages  in  Pints 
Quarter.            of  Wheat. 

174-2  to  1752 

1761  to  1770 

1780  to  1790 

1795  to  1799 

1800  to  1808 

s.     d. 

6  0 

7  6 

8  0 

9  0 
11     0 

s.      d. 
30     0 
42     6 
51     2 
70     8 
86     8 

102 
90 
80 
65 
60 

204 


Old-  Poor  Law  Sj/slem  ; 


Happily  the  other  articles  of  the  expenditure  of 
the  lower  orders,  in  particular  clothing,  were  en- 
hanced in  a  far  less  degree  than  bread.  Without 
that  advantage,  their  situation,  favourable  as  was 
the  period  to  our  agriculture,  would  have  been 
deteriorated,  as  will  at  once  appear  by  a  reference 
(see  Appendix)  to  the  table  of  the  constituents  of 
family  expence  in  the  middle  and  lower  classes. 
We  there  find,  that  while  provisions  of  home  growth 
form  hardly  30  per  cent,  of  the  disburse  of  the 
middle  classes,  they  amount  to  50  per  cent,  of 
the  more  rigorously  calculated  out-lay  of  the  lower 
orders. 

A  still  more  serious  confirmation  of  the  import- 
ance of  the  price  of  corn  to  the  poor,  will  be 
found  in  another  short  extract  from  Mr.  Barton's 
tables.  Inefficacy  in  point  of  relief  has  seldom 
been  urged  against  our  poor-law  system,  but  the 
following  return  shows  that  it  is  far  from  being 
completely  successful  in  preventing  an  increase  of 
suffering,  and  even  increase  of  mortality,  among 
the  poor  and  their  children,  in  times  of  scarcity. 
The  return  comprises  seven  manufacturing  dis- 
tricts in  England,  distinct  from  each  other. 


Years. 

Average  Price  of  Wheat 
per  Quarter. 

Deaths. 

1801. 
1804. 
1807. 
1810. 

,v.       d. 

118     3 
60     1 
73     3 

106     2 

55y965 

44,794 
48,108 
54.864 

It  was  thus  equally  desirable,  on  grounds  of  lui- 
manity  and  of  policy,  that  the  price  of  provisions 
should  experience  a    reduction.     It  was  in    18^20 


its  Effect  on  the  Condition  oj'tlie  Lower  Orders.  205 

that  this  took  place  on  a  large  scale  ;  and  the  fall 
of  wages,  though  considerable,  being  still  far  from 
proportioned  to  it,  the  condition  of  the  lower 
orders,  at  least  of  all  who  can  find  employment,  has 
experienced  a  favourable  change,  ^^'ere  we  in 
possession  of  returns  to  a  late  date,  Mr.  Barton's 
parallel  of  weekly  pay  and  price  of  wheat,  given  in 
our  preceding  page,  might  be  continued  to  the 
present  year,  and  would  exhibit  an  approximation 
to  the  wages  of  the  middle  of  last  century  ;  in 
some  measure  in  the  smallness  of  tlie  money 
amount,  more  in  its  efficiency  in  the  purchase  of 
provisions. 

But  without  such  a  return,  enough  appears  to 
establish  the  important  fact,  that  notwithstanding 
the  relief  afforded  by  an  increase  of  poor-rate,  the 
condition  of  the  labouring  classes  experiences  a 
veiy  unfavourable  change  on  the  enhancement  of 
corn  ;  while,  in  return,  it  is  greatly  to  their  advan- 
tage, that  the  provisions  sliould  fall,  and  rates  be 
reduced.  Need  we  then  wonder,  tliat  in  1810  the 
framers  of  the  Bullion  Ue})ort  should  have  consi- 
dered the  situation  of  the  country  labourer  dete- 
riorated by  a  continuance  of  high  j)rices,  notwith- 
standing  the  increase  of  parochial  aid  ;  or,  that 
after  18^20,  ministers  shouhl  have  accounted  the 
})ul)hc  tranquillity  so  firmly  secured,  as  to  admit  of 
a  large  reduction  in  our  army. 

Objections  to  our  Poor  Lan's.  —  We  come  next 
to  the  objections  urged  against  our  ])()()r-laws,  \  iz. 
that  tliey  induce  the  labouring  class  to  contract 
premature  marriages,  depress  their  circumstances 
by  an  undue  increase  of  their  numbers,  and  ac- 
custom them  to  a  state  of  humiliating  dependance. 
Admitting  that  these  charges  are  considerably  ex- 


g06  Our  Poor  Law  Sijtem ; 

aggeratecl,  (since  the  poor  increase  their  numberR 
ahnost  as   quickly  in  Scotland,  wliere  there  is  so 
little  ])arochiji]  aid,)  a  sufficient  ])roof()f  the  radical 
defects   or  absurd  misapplication  of  our   system  is 
afforded  by  the  fact,  that  aid,  originally  restricted 
to  the  aged  and  infirm,  should  be  extended  to  more 
than  a  twelfth  part  of  our  })opulation  ;  for  the  per- 
sons receiving  parish  relief  in  England  and  Wales, 
amount,  without  reckoning  children,   to  nearly  a 
million.     But,  unluckily,  we  cannot  speak  with  ap- 
probation of  the  course  as  yet  pursued,  in  regard 
to  the  poor  in  almost  any  other  country.     That 
which  is  followed  in  Scotland  is  charged  with  a  degree 
of  indifference  to  their  sufferings  in  dear  seasons; 
a  time  when   (Evidence  of  P.  Milne,  Esq.  M.  P., 
before  the  Poor  Law  Committee)  necessity  prompts 
labourers  to  undertake  taskwork  at  reduced  rates, 
and  frequently  to  exceed  their  strength.    A  similar 
feeling  must  have  occurred  to  most  of  our  country- 
men who  have  lived  in  France,   or  other  countries 
of  the  Continent,  and  witnessed  the  habitual  pri\a- 
tions    of  even   the   sober  and  industrious,  among 
those  of  the  lower  orders  who  happen  to  have  fa- 
milies.    Hence,  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  many 
benevolent  minds  to  relinquish  our  poor-law  sys- 
tem,   defective  as  it   is,  or  to  forego  the  hope  of 
solving  that  most  interesting  problem,  the  means 
of  lessening  to  them    the  difficulty  of  rearing  a 
family. 

Reduction  ofTcuces  on  the  Necessaries  of  Life. — 
To  attain  this  humane  object,  the .  better  plan,  we 
believe,  is  to  abandon  our  attachment  to  system, 
and  to  relinquish,  as  soon  as  in  our  power,  whatever 
is  artificial  in  our  regulations.  No  contrivance,  how- 
ever ingenious,  no  combination,  however  plausible, 


its  Effect  on  the  Condition  of  the  Jjoxver  Order's.  207 

can  be  so  advantageous  as  the  plain  rule  of  enabling 
the  poor  to  provide  for  themselves.  Much  has 
been  lately  done  to  this  effect,  by  the  reduction  of 
the  duties  on  salt  and  leather  :  let  our  grand  object 
be,  the  removal  of  the  remaining  obstacles,  whether 
existing  in  the  shape  of  taxes  on  the  necessaries  of 
life,  or  of  restrictions  on  employment,  such,  for 
example,  as  arise  from  our  duties  on  coals  carried 
coastwise  or  by  canal. 

A  tax  on  a  necessary  of  life  has,  in  regard  to  the 
poor,  the  same  operation  as  the  enhancement  of 
corn  :  wages  do  not  become  proportionally  aug- 
mented, and  a  new  pressure  falls  on  those  who  are 
least  able  to  bear  it.  The  great  addition  to  the 
tax  on  leather  imposed  in  1813,  was,  doubtless,  for 
a  time,  an  absolute  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  lower 
orders.  That  they  are  indemnified,  or  partly  in- 
demnified, in  the  rate  of  wages,  at  times  when  their 
services  are  in  demand,  we  do  not  deny ;  but  the 
equivalent  is  uncertain,  the  sacrifice  immediate  and 
unavoidable. 

From  this  painful  consideration,  we  turn  to  the 
consolatory  reflection,  that  *'  any  reduction  of  the 
taxes  on  the  necessaries  of  life,  may,  with  con- 
fidence, be  considered  the  foreruinier  of  a  reduc- 
tion of  poor-rate."  The  more  the  charges  on  the 
necessaries  of  life,  in  this  country,  are  approxi- 
mated to  those  of  the  Continent,  the  more  we 
perform  towards  confirming  the  superiority  of  our 
manufacturers  ;  resting  the  su})port  of  our  lower 
orders  on  the  basis  of  the  wide  xvorldy  instead  of 
Kngtand,  and  substituting  for  an  eleemosynary 
grant,  the  earnings  of  independent  labour.  Is  it 
necessary  that  we  should  specify  the  advantages 
with  which  our  countrymen  enter  on  the  field  of 
competition  with   their    continental    neighbours  :-* 


^208  Our  I'oor  Laxi'  Si/slem ; 

Tliey  have  tfi^  aid  of"  productive  mines,  of'extensive 
water  cominunication,  of  a  minute  subdivision  of 
labour,  of  habits  formed  during  successive  ages  to 
industrious  pursuits.  These  grounds  of  superiority, 
imperfectly  perceived  by  P^ngUslimen  who  have 
remained  at  home,  are  amply  appreciated  by  all 
who  have  witnessed  tlie  slow  progress,  the  deficient 
resources,  the  general  backwardness  of  most  coun- 
tries on  the  Continent. 

But  while  the  benefit  arising  from  this  reduction 
is  admitted,  the  pi'acticability  of  carrying  it  to  any 
considerable  extent  may  be  questioned  by  those 
who  look  to  the  magnitude  of  the  wants  of  govern- 
ment. These  persons,  however,  would  soon  modify 
their  objections,  and  extend  their  hopes,  were  they 
to  give  due  attention  to  a  few  fundamental  truths ; 
such  as,  '*  that  the  proceeds  of  a  tax  by  no  means 
decrease  in  proportion  to  the  reduction  of  its  rate  ;'* 
and  "  that  new  and  unforeseen  resources  are 
opened  by  the  extended  activity  consequent  on 
such  reduction."  Whenever  circumstances  shall 
admit  of  giving  a  complete  latitude  to  the  course 
we  recommend,  the  public  may  safely  take  for 
granted,  that  England  will  have,  if  not  fewer  pau- 
pers, at  least  few^er  real  sufferers  from  po\erty 
than  any  country  in  Europe. 

Could  this  highly  desirable  result  be  attained, 
our  upper  classes  would  find  their  duties  towards 
the  poor  greatly  simplified.  They  would  be  justi- 
fied in  confining  their  interference  and  aid  to 
cases  of  urgency  ;  such  as  an  inclement  season,  a 
great  and  general  transition  like  that  from  war  to 
peace,  or  from  peace  to  war ;  or,  finally,  to  a  time 
when,  as  is  at  present  the  case  of  the  lace-manu- 
facturers on  the  Continent,  a  midtitude  of  persons, 
habituated  to  work  of  a  particular  kind  only,  find 


its  Effect  on  the  Condition  of  the  Loiver  Orders.  ^201) 

their  earnings  suddenly  reduced  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  machinery.  Assistance  tluis  conferred 
would  be  substantial  charity  ;  exempt  in  its  conse- 
quences from  the  hazard  and  mischief  attendant  on 
our  poor-law  system,  and,  on  that  account,  doubly 
gratifying  to  benevolent  minds  —  to  those  who, 
eager  to  bestow,  are  M'ithheld  only  by  a  doubt  of 
their  donations  producing  a  beneficial  residt. 


^10 


CHAP.  VII. 

PopuIatio7i. 


Few  subjects  in  the  range  of  political  science  have 
given  rise  to  more  opposite  theories  than  that  of 
Population.     It  is  now  fully  a  century  and  a  half 
since   our    venerable    countryman,    Judge    Hale, 
taking  doubtless  for  granted,  like  a  number  of  rea- 
soners  in  a  more  advanced  age,  that  the  quantity 
of  food  in  a  country  is  limited  by  physical  causes, 
declared  gravely  from  the  bench,  that  "  the  more 
populous  we  are,  the  poorer  we  are.'*     And  the 
present  age  has  witnessed  the  promulgation  of  a 
doctrine   of   kindred   import,    though    somewhat 
more  elaborately  expressed,  viz.  "  that  population 
is    imperatively   limited    by   subsistence."      This 
opinion,  proceeding  from  a  writer  of  extensive  re- 
search and  professorial  rank,  has  been  very  gene- 
rally received,   not  only  in   England,   but  in  the 
country  of  Dr.  Smith  ;  a  quarter  where  political 
economy    forming   more   particularly   a   study,    a 
rigid  scrutiny  of  its  merits  might  naturally  have 
been  expected. 

Of  the  various  answers  to  Mr.  Malthus,  the 
most  substantial  in  argument,  though  far  from  the 
most  attractive  in  style,  is  the  work  entitled  the 
**  Happiness  of  States,"  pubhshed  in  1815,  by 
Mr.  S.  Gray ;  a  work  of  which  the  leading  prin- 
ciples were,  some  time  after,   developed  in  a  more 


Population  J  S;c.  211 

condensed  and  popular  form.*  Far  from  coin- 
ciding with  the  uncomfortable  doctrine,  that  in- 
crease of  numbers  leads  to  increase  of  poverty, 
Mr.  G.  maintains,  that  augmented  population  forms 
the  basis  of  individual  as  well  as  of  national  wealth. 
He  has  been,  on  the  whole,  fortunate  in  the  events 
that  have  followed  the  publication  of  his  opinion, 
the  present  abundance  of  subsistence  being  parti- 
cularly calculated  to  relieve  the  alarm  of  those 
who  considered  our  numbers  likely  to  outrun  our 
means  of  support.  Still  the  public  mind  is  far 
from  being  completely  satisfied  in  regard  to  the 
benefit  arising  from  augmented  population  :  the 
reasoning  in  its  favour  is  not  yet  clear  and  con- 
vincing; while  the  occasional  want  of  work  among 
our  lower  orders  is  attributed  by  many  to  a  popu- 
lation increasing  too  rapidly  for  employment,  if 
not  for  subsistence.  In  this  view  of  the  subject, 
we  are  far  from  joining,  and  proceed  to  investigate 
it  at  some  length,  in  the  hope  of  finding  not  only 
a  confirmation  of  the  consdlotary  and  cheering 
doctrine  of  Mr.  Gray,  but  of  being  enabled  to 
found  on  it  a  practical  measure ;  to  discover  in 
the  increase  of  our  numbers,  the  means  of  lessen- 
ing our  financial  pressure. 

Our  principal  topics  of  enquiry  shall  be  — 

The  condition  of  society  in  an  early  age ; 

The  change  effected  by  increase  of  ])0})ulation  ; 

How  far  subsistence  is  limited  by  physical  causes; 

The  state  of  Europe  in  regard  to  increase  of 
numbers  and  wealth. 

•  In  two  lesser  works,  entitled,  respectively,  "  All  Classes 
productive  of  National  Wealth,"  8vo.  1S17  ;  "Gray  v.  Malthas, 
the  Principles  of  Population  ami  Protluction  Investigated," 
8vo.  1818. 

■>  o 


0]« 


SECTIOX  I. 
Increase  of  Population. 

Penury  of  an  early  Age. — The  predilection  with 
which  the  popular  writers  of  almost  every  country 
have  contemplated  a  primitive  age,  and  the  colour- 
ing cast  over  it  by  romantic  imaginations,  have 
had  the  effect  of  misleading  the  majority  of  readers, 
and  rendering  them  strangers  to  the  privations  ex- 
perienced by  their  ancestors.  These,  however, 
were  multiform  and  grievous ;  such,  in  short,  as 
to  form  a  most  striking  contrast  to  the  comfort  of 
an  advanced  state  of  society  ;  and  if  in  England 
we  are  happily  unable  to  find  an  existing  likeness 
to  a  rude  age,  the  sister  island  will  amply  supply  it. 
The  Irish  peasant,  occupying  a  hovel  without 
furniture,  and  carrying  on  his  cultivation  with 
wretched  implements,  may  convey  to  us  an  idea  of 
the  state  of  England  five  or  six  centuries  ago,  as 
well  as  of  the  present  state  of  a  great  part  of  the 
east  of  Europe,  of  Poland,  Russia,  Hungary,  and 
tlie  inland  provinces  of  Turkey.  The  improve- 
ment of  these  countries  at  present,  appears  to  an 
English  traveller  extremely  slow  ;  but,  aided  as  it 
is  by  the  introduction  of  settlers  from  Germany 
and  other  parts,  it  is,  of  course,  far  less  tardy  than 
the  advancement  of  Euro})e  in  the  Gothic  ages, 
when  all  were  equally  backward.  In  those  days, 
a  few  cottages  formed  a  hamlet,  and  many  cen- 
turies elapsed  ere  the  hamlet  became  a  village.     In 

15 


Increase  of  Population.  SJ13 

point  of  property,  extremes  predominated :  on  the 
one  side  was  tlie  lord,  on  the  other  his  vassals  ; 
while  the  middle  class  were  few  in  number,  and 
uncomfortable  in  circumstances. 

Fjffect  of  increasing  Populadon. — What  a  different 
aspect  of  society  is  exhibited  after  a  progress  m 
the  useful  arts,  accompanied  as  it  is  by  the  rise  of 
towns  and  general  mcrease  of  population  !  If  we 
compare  sucli  countries  as  Russia,  Pohuid,  Hungary, 
or  the  Highlands  of  Scotland,  witli  the  more  tiiickly- 
peopled  districts  of  the  Continent,  such  as  the 
provinces  of  Holland,  Zealand,  Flanders,  Nor- 
mandy, or,  on  our  own  side  of  the  Channel,  with 
such  counties  as  Lancashire,  Warwickshire,  the 
West  Riding  of  York  (to  say  nothing  of  Middle- 
sex), we  find  a  surprising  difference  in  the  number 
and  comfort  of  the  middle  class.  A  return  of  an- 
nual income,  from  the  first-mentioned  countries, 
would  exhibit  a  few  princely  fortunes,  with  a  long 
succession  of  names  below  the  limit  of  taxation  : 
in  the  otiier,  it  would  show  a  mmiber  of  gradations 
]ising  above  each  other  in  a  manner  almost  imper- 
ceptible. How  different  is  the  England  of  the 
present  age,  from  the  Enghuul  of  feudal  times, 
when  we  could  not  (see  the  Appendix,  j).  [7''5].)  boast 
twenty  towns  of  3,000  inhabitants  each,  and  when 
the  Commons  or  middle  class  were  too  unim])()rt- 
ant  to  hold  a  share  in  the  representation,  until 
brought  forward  by  the  crown  as  a  counterpoise 
to  the  aristocracy.  , 

Gradual  Transition  J'rom  Penurij  to  C\nnJort. — In 
what  manner  does  the  transition  from  penury  to 
comfort,  in  general  take  place?  If  not  ahogether 
caused  by   density  of  jjopulation,    it  must  be  al- 

V  S 


^21^  Population:  — 

lowctl  to  have  very  close  connexion  with  it;  the  con- 
junction of  individuals  in  villages  and  towns  being 
productive  of  a  degree  of  accommodation,  comfort, 
and  finally,  of  refinement,  which  would  be  alto- 
gether beyond  their  reach  in  an  insulated  position. 
In  these  assemblages  the  acqidsition  of  one  comfort 
creates  a  desire  for  another,  until  society  eventually 
attains  the  high  state  of  polish  Avhich  we  at  present 
witness  in  several  countries  of  Europe.  All  this, 
says  Mr.  Gray,  leads  the  consumer  to  make  fresh 
demands  on  the  producer  ;  demands  reciprocated 
by  the  latter  on  the  former,  in  a  different  line  of 
business.  Hence,  the  dependence  of  one  class  on 
another ;  hence,  the  prosperity  caused  to  agricul- 
ture by  the  success  of  trade,  and  to  trade  by  the 
success  of  agriculture.  It  is  of  no  great  conse- 
quence to  our  argument,  whether  these  wants  are 
of  first  or  of  second  necessity,  that  which  is  deemed 
a  superfluity  in  one  country,  being  often  accounted 
no  more  than  a  comfort,  a  requisite  in  another. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  criterion  of  the 
difference  in  wealth  and  general  improvement  be- 
tween different  countries  ?  The  relative  density, 
not  of  population  generally,  but  oi  town  population. 
This  is  apparent  in  almost  every  link  in  the  chain 
of  European  civilization,  Holland  having  in  the 
seventeenth  century  taken  the  lead  of  England, 
exactly  as  England  at  present  takes  the  lead  of 
France  ;  France  of  most  parts  of  Germany,  and 
Germany  of  Spain  and  Poland.  The  distinc- 
tion of  town  population  from  population  gene- 
rally, is  important,  for  were  the  same  advantage 
to  belong  to  districts  strictly  rural,  Ireland  would 
claim  an  equal  rank  with  England,  and  Flanders 
take  precedence  of  Holland.  It  is  in  towns  only 
that   we   reap  the   advantage    of  collective   over 


Its  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes.   0,15 

scattered  population  ;  —  an  advantage  consisting 
in  extensive  markets ;  a  minute  subdivision  of 
employment ;  the  greater  dispatch  and  finish  of 
workmanship,  and  a  supply  of  occupation  to  indi- 
duals  of  every  age  and  every  degree  of  capacity. 

Nexo  Settlers. — It  is  but  too  common  among 
unthinking  persons  to  consider  new-comers  as  un- 
profitable intruders, — as  dealers,  not  customers, — 
as  sellers,  not  buyers.  This,  however,  is  but  a 
superfcial  view,  a  first  impression,  for  there  is 
very  little  reason  to  doubt  that  in  one  way  or  an- 
other these  persons  will  disburse  in  proportion  to 
their  earnings.  When  it  happens  that  they  or  any 
other  part  of  the  community  do  not  make  such 
disburse,  the  only  source  of  detriment  to  the 
public  is  the  practice  (now  very  rare)  of  hoard- 
ing ;  for  money  saved  and  lent  at  interest  becomes 
of  service  to  the  community,  increasing  the  capital 
of  the  country,  and  lowering,  or  contributing  to 
lower,  the  premium  paid  for  its  use.  We  may 
safely  take  for  granted,  that  much  public  advan- 
tage arises  from  the  arrival  of  new  settlers,  whether 
manufacturers,  such  as  England  and  Prussia  ac- 
quired from  France  on  the  repeal  oi'  the  edict  of 
Nantes,  or  agriculturists,  such  as  Canada  and  the 
United  States  are  now  receiving  fi:om  us. 

Population,  however,  is  generally  augmented 
less  by  settlers  from  a  distance,  than  by  a  local 
increase ;  by  an  excess  of  births  over  deaths  :  a 
mode,  which,  very  different  from  the  easy  acqui- 
sition of  foreigners  of  mature  age,  implies  a  long 
and  often  a  heavy  charge,  until  the  ^outli  ol' cither 
sex  acquire  the  strength  or  knowledge  requisite 
to  their  support;  requisite,  in  tlie  language  of  the 

p   1. 


'216  Population :  — 

economist,  to  constitute  tliem  "  producers  as  well 
as  consumers.*'  Though  in  such  a  case  the  acqui- 
sition of  new  meml)crs  is  mucli  more  dearly  pur- 
chased, the  effect  in  a  statistical  sense  is  the  same 
as  in  the  case  of  arrivals  from  abroad. 

Is  the  amount  of  Subsistence  limited  hij  Physical 
Causes?  —  We  now  approach  the  much-disputed 
point  of  the  physical  limits  to  increase  of  popu- 
lation ;  to  the  question,  whether  it  is  imperiously 
limited  by  subsistence,  or  possesses  the  pow^r  of 
augmenting  subsistence  in  proportion  to  its  own 
increase.  The  well-known  argument  of  Mr.  Mal- 
thus  is,  that  population,  if  unchecked,  would 
proceed  in  a  geometrical  ratio  (1,  ^,  4,  8,  If),  32, 
&c.),  while  the  supply  of  food  cannot,  he  thinks, 
be  brought,  by  the  greatest  efforts  of  human  skill 
and  industry,  to  increase  otherwise  than  in  the 
arithmetical  ratio  of  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  &c.  This 
position  he  illustrates  by  a  reference  to  the 
United  States  of  America ;  a  coinitry  where  the 
abundance  of  food  is  so  great  as  to  admit  of  the 
inhabitants  doubling  their  number  each  succeeding 
generation,  the  3,000,000  of  1775  having  become 
6,000,000  in  1800,  with  a  probability  of  increasing 
to  12,000,000  in  1825,  and  so  on  progressively. 

That,  as  far  as  regards  physical  considerations, 
there  is  both  an  ability  and  a  tendency  in  mankind 
to  double  their  numbers  in  every  generation,  we 
readily  admit ;  also,  that  wherever  sucli  redupli- 
cation does  not  take  place,  the  causes  are  to  be 
sought  in  checks,  such  as  the  poverty  that  deters 
from  marriage,  the  occurrence  of  pestilential  dis- 
ease, or  some  other  preventive  of  the  increase  of 
numbers.  So  far  we  agree  with  Mr.  Malthus  ;  but 
in  regard  to  his  second  proposition,  the  causes  that 


75  Subsistence  limited  by  Vhysical  Causes  ?     -^ly 

limit  the  increase  of  food,  we  must  observe  that 
the  subject  has  as  yet  been  by  no  means  satisfac- 
torily ilhistrated,  tlie  attention  of  the  different 
writers  on  the  subject,  whether  liimself^  Mr.  Ri- 
cardo,  or  others,  iiaving  been  fixed  too  nnich  on 
the  necessity  of  having  additional  land  to  afford  the 
produce  required,  and  too  little  on  the  increase 
derived  from  bestowing  additional  labour  on  the 
same  soil.  What  wxm'c  the  circumstances  of  the 
period  when  Mr.  Malthus'  book  was  composed?  It 
was  a  period  of  war,  of  deficient  croj)s,  of  continued 
enhancement  of  agricultural  produce ;  and  the 
author,  like  the  public  at  large,  was  necessarily 
unacquainted  with  our  power  of  augmenting  the 
supply,  a  powder  so  remarkably  displayed  since 
our  seasons  have  become  more  favourable,  and 
peace  has  restored  to  agriculture  a  sufficiency  of 
labourers. 

Average  Increase  of  Population. — In  attempting 
a  com})utation  of  the  average  increase  of  our  mun- 
bers,  we  begin  by  making  an  exce})tion  of  the 
United  States,  peculiar  as  are  the  advantages  pos- 
sessed by  that  country.  They  consist  in  a  territory 
of  vast  extent ;  a  river  navigation  of  great  im- 
portance ;  a  people  enjoying  unrestricted  inter- 
course with  the  civilized  world,  and  closely  con- 
nected in  language  and  habits  with  the  most 
commercial  and  colonizing  country  of  Euro])e. 
Such  an  example  is  necessarily  rare,  and  ought  to 
be  considered  an  extreme  case :  a  more  satisfactory 
result  as  to  the  average  increase  of  })oj)ulation 
would  be  obtained  from  a  combination  of  cases, 
among  which,  assuming  the  United  States  as  the 
example  of  the  most  rapid  augmentation,  we  may 
take,  as  the  second,  England,  in  which,  under 
circumstances  more  favourable  than   on  the  C'on- 


« 1 8  Population  :  — 

tincnt  of  Europe,  but  less  so  than  on  tlie  other  side 
of'tlie  Atlantic,  population  has  doubled  within  the 
last  century,  and  bids  fair  to  double  again  in  sixty 
or  seventy  years.     As  a  farther  exanij)le,  we  may 
take  France,  where,   though   the   records  are  far 
from  accurate,  the  doubling  of  the  population  has 
as  yet  required  a  term  of  from  100  to  120  years. 
Other  countries  exhibit  a  greater  or  less  degree  of 
slowness  in   the  ratio   of  increase,    and  as  these 
returns   apply  to   them  when   exempt   from    the 
visitation  of  war,  pestilence,  or  any  violent   check 
to  increase  of  numbers,    Mr.  Gray's  inference  is, 
that  the  average  furnished  by  the  whole  may  be 
assumed  as  indicative  of  the  natural  progress  of 
population. 

After  thus  endeavouring  to  establish  the  natural 
ratio  of  increase,  Mr.  Gray  proceeds  to  argue  that 
such  increase  is  no  farther  limited  by  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  food,  than  by  the  difficulty  of  obtain- 
ing clothing  or  lodging,  because  the  supply  of  food, 
though  apparently  restricted  by  a  physical  cause, 
is,  on  a  closer  examination,  found  to  depend  on 
the  amount  of  capital  and  labour  applied  to  raising 
it.  In  arguing  this  very  interesting  question,  Mr. 
Gray  and  the  other  opponents  of  Mr.  Malthus, 
woidd  do  well  to  guard  against  the  charge  of  over- 
confidence,  and  to  begin  by  making  a  distinct  ad- 
mission of  the  difficulty  of  raising  a  family,  a  task 
which  to  the  middle  classes  is  one  of  laboiu"  and 
anxiety ;  to  the  lower,  of  toil,  privation,  and  often 
of  distress.  Of  this  heavy  burden,  what  portion  is 
to  be  ascribed  to  the  charge  of  food  ?  In  the  mid- 
dle classes,  food  forms  (see  Appendix,  p.  [11].)  be- 
tween SO  and  40  per  cent,  of  the  whole  expence  of 
a  family ;  but  in  the  lower  above  50  per  cent.,  con- 
stituting thus,  the  grand  article  of  charge  in  that 
13 


Is  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Caitses  ?  '210 

class  in  which  the  pressure  of  a  family  is  most 
severely  felt. 

After  this  precautionary  statement,  we  may 
safely  allow  Mr.  Gray  and  his  followers  to  give  a 
latitude  to  their  inferences,  comprehensive  as  they 
are,  viz. :  — 

That  the  quantity  of  subsistence  in  the  world 
may  be  augmented  in  the  same  manner,  and  by  the 
same  means,  as  the  quantity  of  our  clothing,  or  the 
size  of  our  dwellings  ;  and, 

That  an  addition  to  our  numbers  implies  no 
diminution  of  individual  income  or  property. 

Such  assertions  would  have  appeared  not  a  little 
extraordinary  during  the  greatest  part  of  the  war, 
when  a  continued  insufficiency  in  our  agricultural 
produce  favoured  so  strongly  the  negative  doctrine 
of  Mr.  Malthus :  they  would  have  been  received 
also  with  no  small  surprise  during  I8I7  and  1818, 
when  a  scarcity  of  provisions,  a  general  irregu- 
larity in  the  state  of  our  productive  industry, 
concurred  to  produce  apprehension  in  regard  to 
our  increasing  numbers.  But  a  different  lesson 
has  since  been  taught  us:  we  have  now  evidence  that 
numbers,  increased  greatly  beyond  anticipation, 
may  draw  their  subsistence  from  the  same  terri- 
torial surface ;  that  the  amount  of  produce  may  be 
greatly  augmented  without  bringing  new  soil  into 
cultivation.  A  similar  result  from  a  similar  cause 
is  at  present  exhibited  on  the  Continent  of  Europe. 

Comparison  of  the  present  ivith  former  Periods.^ 
How  far  does  the  preceding  opinion  appear  to  be 
confirmed  by  a  general  retrospect  to  the  past? 
During  the  twenty  years  that  elapsed  between 
169*2  and  1712,  the  average  price  of  wheat  (about 
\'U.  per  quarter,)  had  been  such  as  to  aflbrd,  in 


^20  Population  :  — 

these  days  of  low  rent  and  cheap  labour,  an  ample 
inducement  to  the  extension  of  tillage.  It  was 
consequently  considered  as  having  reached  its 
tenni?ius,  and  no  idea  was  entertained  of  the  prac- 
ticability of  any  considerable  addition  to  our  pro- 
duce. The  result,  however,  ])roved  very  different, 
for  though  during  the  half  century  that  followed 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  our  population  received  (see 
Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Po])ulation  Return 
of  18'^!,  p.  29.)  an  augmentation,  including  Ireland, 
of  fully  3,000,000,  the  increase  of  our  agricultural 
produce  was  such  as  more  than  counterbalanced 
that  new  demand.  This  was  apparent  from  the  aver- 
age price  of  wheat,  which  during  that  long  period  did 
not  exceed  35s.  the  quarter.  —  Were  it  true  that 
the  acquisition  of  subsistence  becomes  more  dif- 
ficult as  our  numbers  increase,  we  should  naturally 
expect  to  find  the  greatest  abundance  in  a  remote 
ao-e  ;  in  times  when  the  number  of  consumers  was 
small,  relatively  to  the  extent  of  territory.  But 
if  we  look  back  to  the  earliest  periods  of  authentic 
history,  to  the  ages  \vhen  Greece  and  Italy  were 
most  thinly  peopled,  we  find  neighbouring  tribes 
maintaining  sanguinary  struggles  with  each  other, 
the  motive  of  which,  as  far  as  regarded  the  lower 
orders,  was  the  hope  of  acquiring  additional  ter- 
ritory, and  increased  means  of  subsistence.  It  is 
thus  that  we  are  to  explain  the  obstinate  warfare 
for  small  but  fertile  districts,  such  as  the  plain 
of  Thyria,  the  plain  of  Tanagra,  the  Colles  Tuscu- 
lani ;. —  to  say  nothing  of  contests,  in  a  record  of 
higher  authority,  for  the  valleys  of  Palestine,  or 
the  banks  of  the  Jordan.  Had  siibsistence  been 
abundant  in  these  days,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
towns  of  Greece  would  have  shown  less  eagerness 
in  emigrating  to  new  colonies ;  while   at   Rome, 


Is  Siibs'istencc  I'lmitcd  hi/  P/n/sica/  Causes  ?    oo\ 

the  demand  of  an  Agrarian  law  would  have  been 
a  less  powerful  le\er  in  the  hand  of  deniagonues. 
But  to  confine  our  examination  to  our  own  country, 
and  to  times  comparatively  recent,  how  diflerent 
is  the  present  situation  of  our  lower  orders  from 
that  of  their  forefathers  luider  Henry  A'^III.,  or 
under  our  admired  Elizabeth,  when,  without  any 
disposition  to  sexerity  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign 
or  her  ministers,  the  number  of  capital  punishments 
(Speech  of  Mr.  Fowel  Buxton  on  our  criminal 
code,  May,  18'21),  averaged  no  less  than  five  hun- 
dred annually  !  Various  causes,  in  particular  the 
■want  of  education,  must  have  contributed  to  this 
unfortunate  prevalence  of  oflfences  ;  but  can  any 
be  supposed  to  have  operated  so  largely  on  the 
part  of  the  commonalty,  as  the  difficulty  of  ob- 
taining subsistence,  although  in  that  age  our  popu- 
lation did  not  exceed  a  third  of  its  present  number? 
But  what,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  cause  of 
this  difficulty, — of  the  sup])ly  of  subsistence  being 
so  scanty,  when  the  number  of  consumers  was  so 
small?  Of  this  problem  the  solution  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  unproductiveness  of  even  the  fairest 
tracts  so  long  as  they  remain  in  a  state  of  nature. 
Whatever  be  the  serenity  of  the  climate  or  the 
richness  of  the  soil,  they  continue  unavailing  to 
any  useful  purpose,  until  the  a])plication  of  labour. 
By  labour  only  can  over-luxuriance  be  corrected, 
the  forest  cleared,  a  superabundance  of  watei- 
removed  from  one  spot,  a  deficiency  of  it  supplied 
in  another.  It  is  to  the  performance  of  tasks  Hke 
these,  the  most  acceptable  of  any  in  an  early  age, 
that  we  trace  the  honours  so  liberally  bestowed  '\\\ 
ancient  mythology,  —  tlie  apotheosis  of  the  warrior 
who   drained   the   Lcrn;ean   marsh,  and  combati-d 


222  Popvlalioji :  — 

the  savage  occupants  ol"  the  woods.  But  we  arc 
under  no  necessity  of  dwelhng  on  an  age  of  tra^ 
dition,  on  a  scene  embelhslied  hy  fiction  :  if  we 
turn  to  plain  reahty,  — to  the  times  in  which  we  hve, 
and  to  a  people  noted  for  their  adherence  to  the 
pursuit  of  substantial  profit ;  ifi  in  short,  we  fix 
our  attention  on  the  western  states  of  America, 
or  on  Upper  Canada,  we  shall  find  an  example 
abundantly  convincing  of  the  unproductiveness  of" 
the  finest  tracts  until  improved  by  labour  and 
capital. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  illustrations  from 
history,  but  as  our  limits  hardly  admit  of  detail, 
we  extract  from  one  of  the  works  already  men- 
tioned (Gray  versus  Malthus),  a  summary  of  the 
leading  ideas  in  the  opposite  systems  of  population. 

Mr,  Malthus' s  leading  Ideas.  Mr.  Grays  leading  Ideas. 

The  increase  of  population  has  The    increase    of   population 

a  tendency  to  overstock,  and  tends  to  increase  the  average 

to  lessen  the  average  amount  amount   of  employment  to 

of   employment    to    indivi-  individuals, 
duals. 

The  increase  of  population  has  The  increase  of  population  has 

a  natural  tendency  to  pro-  a     tendency     to     increase 

mote  poverty.  wealth,  not  collectively  only, 

but  individually. 

From  the  conclusions  of  Mr.  Malthus  we  dissent 
almost  entirely ;  to  those  of  Mr.  Gray,  we  would 
suggest  the  following  modification  : 

Increase  of  population,  when  acco77ipa?iied  hy 
improvement  in  agriculture^  manufacture,  and  the 
useful  arts  generally^  has  a  tendency  to  augment 
both  the 

Average  amount  of  employment ;  and 

Our  wealth,  not  collectively  only,  but  individually. 


Is  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes  ?     223 

Mr.  Mai  thus.  Mr.  Gray. 

The  amount  of  subsistence  The  amount  of  population  re- 
regulates  the  amount  of  gulates  the  amount  of  sub- 
population,  sistencc,  in  the  same  way  as 

it  regulates    the    supply  of 
clothing    and    housing,    be- 
cause with  the  exception  of 
occasional  famines,  the  quan- 
tity   of    subsistence    raised 
depends  on  the  amount  of 
labour  bestowed  on  it. 
Population  has  a  natural  tend-     Population  has  a  tendency  to 
ency  to  increase  faster  than         increase,  but  this   increase 
subsistence.  carries  in  itself  the  power  of 

supplying  its  wants. 

Here,  also,  we  are  desirous  to  introduce  a  re- 
ference to  the  progress  of  improvement,  since, 
although  the  application  of  labour  on  the  part  of 
an  increasing  and  iuiim})roving  society,  like  the 
peasantry  of  Ireland  and  Brittany,  augment  the 
quantity  of  the  mere  necessaries  of  life,  the  hazard 
of  famine  can  be  prevented  only  by  improvement 
in  agriculture,  or  in  those  arts  of  which  the  pro- 
ducts enable  a  people  to  purchase  subsistence 
from  their  nciglibours.  The  early  marriages  of 
the  Irish  without  the  certainty  of  wages,  or  a 
stock  of  implements  and  furniture,  are  productive 
of  incalculable  suffering. 

That  the  supply  of  food  may  be  extended,  by 
labour  and  capital,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  su])- 
ply  of  manufactures  and  buildings,  we  readily  ad- 
mit ;  but,  as  in  the  case  of  four-htths  of  mankind, 
food  forms  by  fiir  the  greatest  article  of  cliarge, 
and  is,  consequently,  the  most  difficult  of  acqui- 
sition, we  are  fully  prepared  to  excuse  tliose  who, 
in  their  writings,  have  over- rated  the  lal)our  ol' 
procuring  it.  From  the  unquahfied,  imd  some- 
times confident  tone  of  Mr.  Crray,  an  inhabitant  o) 


0^21,  PopuldUuii  :  — 

Canada  or  tlie  United  States  mi^lit  fiill  into  the 
i^rievous  miscalculation,  that  to  procure  food  for  a 
faniily  in  Europe,  was  a  task  of  no  greater  diffi- 
culty than  in  his  own  country,  where  a  grant  of* 
land  may  be  had  on  such  easy  terms. 


Progressive  Increase  of  Population  in  Europe. 

Tiie  arguments  in  the  preceding  table  are  of  ge- 
neral application,  referring  to  the  state  of  mankind 
in  every  age  and  country.  To  give  the  question 
a  more  specific  form,  we  shall  now  introduce  a  few 
statistical  results,  and  explain  in  what  manner  are 
effected  tliose  improvements  in  agriculture  and  the 
useful  arts,  which  we  consider  as  conferring  the 
ability  to  support  an  augmented  population. 

Effects  of  Soil  and  Climate.  —  Fertility  of  soil  is 
too  directly  conducive  to  increase  of  numbers,  to 
require  illustration  ;  but  in  point  of  climate,  we 
cannot  avoid  remarking  that  the  superiority  of  one 
part  of  Europe  over  another,  is,  as  far  at  least  as 
regards  the  productive  pow  er  of  the  soil,  much  less 
than  is  commonly  imagined.  The  great  art  of  the 
husbandman  consists  in  adapting  the  object  of  cul- 
ture to  the  peculiarity  of  the  temperature.  In 
various  parts  of  Scotland,  accounted  half  a  century 
ago  unfit  tor  wheat  culture,  the  progress  of  im- 
provement has  led  to  raising  that  grain  not  only  in 
abundance,  but  of  a  quality  fit  for  the  London 
market ;  while  in  the  boasted  climate  of  the  south 
of  France,  the  season  is  often  too  dry  for  wheat, 
and  the  frequent  failure  of  that  crop  seems  to  point 
out  maize  as  a  more  appropriate  object  of  tillage. 
In  regard  to  potatoes,  the  culture  of.  which  is  so 
directly  connected  with  density  of  population,  the 


Causes  of  il^  Increase  in  Europe.         ^25 

warmest  and  finest  climate  of  tlie  Continent  has  no 
superiority  over  our  own.  It  is  tlius  only,  when  in 
extremes,  as  in  the  bleak  tracts  of  Russia,  Sweden, 
and  Norway,  that  climate  has  operated  materially 
to  restrict  })roduce  and  population  :  the  physical 
superiority  of  the  south  of  Euro})e,  whate\er  may 
be  its  eventual  eftect,  has  not,  as  yet,  been  such  as 
to  outweigh  the  political  advantages  of  the  north. 

Effect  of  Communication  by  Sea,  Rivers,  Canals, 
Roads. — The  effect  of  prompt  communication  in 
promoting  commercial  intercourse  is  sufficiently 
ap])ai-ent,  but  its  tendency  to  increase  the  popula- 
tion oi'  towns  may  require  some  explanation.  What, 
in  the  first  place,  are  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  the 
inhabitants  of  towns  over  those  of  the  country;  by 
a  collected  over  a  scattereil  population  ?  TJiey 
consist  in  a  more  ample  field  for  sale  or  purchase  ; 
a  better  division  of  employment ;  greater  dispatch 
and  finish  of  workmanship  ;  —  a  more  varied  supply 
of  occupation,  so  as  to  suit  individuals  of  almost 
any  degree  of  strength  or  capacity.  Now  these 
advantages,  arising,  in  a  large  town,  from  concen- 
tration of  numbers,  may,  in  a  great  degree,  be  en- 
joyed by  places  comparatively  small  and  distant 
from  each  other,  when  connected  by  rivers,  canals, 
<)r  a  line  of  sea-coast.  Such  was  the  origin  of  the 
prosperity  of  Greece  ;  such,  at  present,  is  the  cause 
that  the  maritime  part  of  her  population  make  in 
their  contest  with  the  Turks  a  figure  not  unworthy 
«f  their  ancestors.  It  is  thus  that  the  several  towns 
of  Holland,  Zealand,  and  Flanders,  have  for  many 
centuries  nuiintained  an  active  intercourse  with 
each  other  ;  that  Paris  is  so  closely  connected  with 
Rouen  and  Havre  de  Grace ;  that  Switzerland 
maintains  by  the  Rhine  an  intercourse  with  Hol- 

Q 


i220  Population :  — 

land ;  and  that  in  England,  particularly  since  the 
multiplication  of  canals  within  the  last  seventy 
years,  the  conveyance  of  coal,  iron,  salt,  and  other 
bulky  commodities,  is  so  much  facilitated.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  want  of  such  intercourse  is,  as  we 
shall  see  presently,  the  principal  cause  of  the 
backwardness  of  Spain,  Poland,  the  south  of 
Germany,  and,  in  no  inconsiderable  degree,  of 
France. 

Effect  of  the  Protestant  Religion.  —  The  adop- 
tion of  the  reformed  faith  has  been  found  conducive 
to  the  increase,  not  only  of  individual  comfort,  but 
of  the  population  of  tow^ns  in  the  countries  into 
which  it  has  been  introduced.  Among  its  other 
effects,  are  a  more  general  diffiision  of  education, 
and  an  exemption,  in  the  case  of  the  labouring 
classes,  from  the  loss  of  time  attendant  on  the  end- 
less holydays  of  the  catholic  church.  In  agricul- 
ture, the  operation  of  these  advantages  is  less 
apparent,  most  countries  sufficing  wholly,  or  nearly, 
to  their  own  consumption,  while  the  insulated  po- 
sition of  the  husbandman  prevents,  in  a  great 
measure,  the  benefit  arising  from  competition  and 
frequent  personal  conmiunication.  But  in  manu- 
factures, particularly  in  those  prepared  for  foreign 
sale,  the  case  is  very  different ;  the  ease  of  tran- 
sporting them  to  a  distant  market,  and  of  comparing 
their  respective  quality  and  price,  opens  a  wide 
field  of  competition,  and  awards  the  preference  to 
superior  skill  and  ingenuity.  Accordingly,  though 
the  catholics  of  Europe  are,  collectively,  much 
more  numerous  than  the  protestants,  the  far  larger 
share  of  exported  merchandize  proceeds  from  pro- 
testant  countries,  the  labour  of  the  !•  lemings,  the 
French,  and  the  northern  Italians,  forming  a  feeble 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.          22? 

counterpoise  to  those  of  the  Silesians,  the  Saxons, 
the  Prussians,  and,  abo\  e  all,  of"  our  countrymen. 
In  Ireland,  linen  weaving,  the  only  great  branch 
of  manufacture,   is  almost  wholly  in  the  hands  of 
protestants. 

We  proceed  to  apply  this  reasoning  to  the  pro- 
gress of  population  in  Europe,  avaiUng  ourselves  of 
the  official  returns  which  have  been  made  in  most 
countries  in  the  course  of  the  present  age,  and 
which  supply  the  following  abstract :  — 

Inhabitants 
per  square  Mile. 
East  Flanders                   -                   -                 -  55^ 
West  Flanders              ....  420 
Holland  (Province  of)           ....  362 
Ireland            -----  237 
England  distinct  from  Wales           -                 -  232 
Austrian  Italy,  viz,  the  Milanese  and  the  Ve- 
netian States                 -                 -                 -  219 
The  Netherlands,  viz.  the  Dutch  and  Belgic 

Provinces,  collectively  ...  214 

Italy  -  -  -  .  179 

France  -  ...  150 

The  Austrian  dominions  -  -         -  112 

The  Prussian  dominions  -  -  100 

Denmark  ....         -  73 

Poland         ....  -  60 

Spain  .....  58 

Turkey  in  Europe  (conjectural)  -  -  50 

I      Sweden  (distinct  from  Norway  and  Lapland)  -  25 

'      Russia  in  Europe  -  -  -  23 

Here  are,  indeed,  some  very  remarkable  diifer- 
ences  in  po})ulation,  and  to  trace  this  diversity  to 
its  source,  is  uii  object  of  no  slight  interest. 
f  Flanders  possesses,  in  a  high  degree,  the  main 
causes  of  dense  ))opulation,  fertility  of  soil,  and 
ease  of  communication,  having  on  the  uortli  the 
,sea  and  the  Scheldt,  while  the  flatness  of  its  sur- 

Q  2 


228  I'opu/alion  .•  — 

face  admits  of  easy  intersection  by  canals.  Acconl- 
inf^Iy,  so  early  as  the  IStli  century,  when  ])r()duc- 
tive  industry  was  in  its  infancy  in  every  jiart  of 
Europe,  except  Pisa,  Venice,  Genoa,  and  a  few 
other  towns  of  Italy,  Bruges  was  a  phice  of  com- 
mercial eminence,  a  kind  of  centre  for  the  inter- 
course of  the  north-west  of  Europe.  In  this  it  was 
succeeded  by  Antwerp  and  Amsterdam ;  but 
though  Flanders  has  long  ceased  to  have  much 
foreign  trade,  its  population  and  manufacturing 
industry  have  not  declined.  The  great  articles  of 
its  produce  are,  corn,  hemp,  and  flax  ;  of  its  ma- 
nufactures, linen,  lace,  leather,  and,  in  later  times, 
cotton.  Of  cities,  it  contains  only  two,  Ghent  and 
Bruges,  and  their  conjunct  population  does  not  ex- 
ceed 9(),0()().  But  it  abounds  in  towns  and  vil- 
lages which  are  populous,  though  not  noticed  in 
history,  and  hardly  in  geography. 

Of  the  Dutch  provinces,  tha  most  remarkable 
for  population,  as  for  other  characteristics,  are  Hol- 
land and  Zealand.  On  the  ground  of  fertility  they 
have  little  claim,  to  density  of  numbers,  the  soil 
being,  in  general,  ill  adapted  to  tillage ;  but  in 
ease  of  water  communication,  they  surpass  every 
other  part  of  Europe.  The  mouths  of  the  Rhine, 
Maese,  and  Scheldt,  aflbrd  capacious  inlets  for 
foreign  commerce,  while  the  level  surface  of  the 
territory  admits  of  easy  intersection  by  canals. 
These  provinces  possessed,  consequently,  consider- 
able population  and  trade  before  the  l6th  century, 
when  their  })rosperity  was  confirmed  by  the  adop- 
tion of  tlie  protestant  religion,  and  by  the  establish- 
ment, after  a  long  struggle,  of  an  independent 
government. 

How  far  does  fertility  of  soil  account  for  the  in- 
crease of  population  in   England  ?     Inferior  to  se- 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.  ^29 

veral  tracts  on  tlie  Continent,  such  as  Flanders  oi* 
the  Milanese,  but  more  fertile  than  the  mountains 
of  S])aui  or  the  sandy  levels  of  the  north  of  Ger- 
many, the  soil  of  England  may  be  said  to  hold  a 
medium,  and  to  have  a  claim  to  rank  with  the 
average  of  the  French  and  Austrian  territory.  This 
degree  of  fertility  would  have  determined  a  popu- 
lation in  the  })resent  age  of  perhaps  150  to  the 
square  mile :  the  additional  inunber  is,  as  far  as 
regards  phijsical  causes,  to  be  attributed  to  our  in- 
sular position,  and  the  productiveness  of  our  mines, 
particularly  of  coal ;  advantages  which  lead  so 
directly  to  the  increase  of  our  manufacturers,  sea- 
men, and  traders.  In  ease  of  inland  navigation, 
England  is  second  only  to  the  Dutch  provinces. 

Inland  Countries  :  Austria  a?id  Prussia.  — From 
these  examples  of  maritime  prosperity,  we  pass  to 
inland  countries,  and  begin  by  the  dominions  of 
Austria,  which,  with  a  slight  exception,  are  at  a 
distance  from  the  sea,  traversed  by  few  navigable 
rivers,  and  by  hardly  any  canals.  Though  equal 
to  France  or  England  in  fertility,  the  communi- 
cation between  the  different  pi'ovinces  is  difficult, 
the  ])rogress  of  improvement  extremely  slow,  ma- 
initactures  backward,  and  the  town  population  very 
limited.  Prussia,  in  like  manner,  has  few  harbours 
or  navigable  rivers,  indifferent  roads,  and  canals 
that  are  only  in  their  infancy:  the  majoritv  of  her 
subjects  enjoy  the  atlvantage  of  the  protestant  reli- 
gion, and  of  an  education  less  imperfect  than  that 
of  their  southern  neiglfoours  ;  but  her  j)()piilati()n 
is  thin,  in  conse([uence  of  a  great  part  of  her  ter- 
ritory being  sandy  or  marshy. 

A  still  stronger  example  of  the  disadvantage  of 
an   inland   position  is  afforded  by   Poland.      That 

Q  3 


S.'JO  Population  :  — 

country,  without  possessing  all  the  fertility  vul- 
garly ascribed  to  those  which  export  corn,  is  not 
naturally  below  the  average  productiveness  of  Eu- 
rope. Its  climate,  if  in  winter  it  ))artake  of  the 
rigour  of  Russia,  is  in  summer  favoural)le  to  corn 
culture,  and  the  great  impediment  to  the  increase 
of  its  produce  is  not  a  mountainous  surface,  but  a 
cause  more  within  the  remedying  power  of  indus- 
try—  extensive  marshes.  Still,  its  town  population 
is  scanty  and  wretched,  the  causes  of  which,  in  a 
political  sense,  are,  long  continued  niisgovernment, 
a  bigotted  creed,  the  almost  total  neglect  of  edu- 
cation ;  in  a  physical,  the  difficulty  of  transporting 
commodities,  the  extent  of  sea-coast  being  small, 
the  roads  proverbially  wretched,  and  the  access  to 
the  interior  by  the  Vistula,  circuitous,  and  too 
confined  for  so  large  a  tract  of  country. 

France.  —  Between  these  extremes,  our  ancient 
rival  forms  a  medium,  possessing  a  considerable  ex- 
tent of  coast,  but  labouring  also  under  the  disadvan- 
tage of  an  inland  territory,  square  in  its  form,  slightly 
penetrated  by  navigable  rivers,  having,  as  yet,  very 
few  canals,  and  roads  good  only  in  particular  di- 
rections. Compared  to  the  Austrian  or  Prussian 
states,  France  is  an  improved  country,  but  the 
case  is  far  otherwise  when  put  in  competition  with 
the  Netherlands  or  England.  Superior  to  our  island 
in  climate,  and  equal  to  it  in  soil,  she  is  greatly  in- 
ferior in  density  of  population,  and  still  more  in  the 
average  income  of  individuals.  Of  her  population, 
two-thirds  (above  twenty  millions)  live  in  the  coun- 
try, and  her  peasantry  partake,  in  many  provinces, 
of  the  poverty  of  those  of  Ireland.  In  the  size  of 
her  towns,  this  great  kingdom,  so  long  the  dread 
of  our  forefathers,  and  of  Europe,  has,  in  the  last 
and   present  age,   been    altogether   surpassed   by 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.         231 

England  and  Scotland;  for  though  our  island 
boast  only  half  her  population,  the  distribution  of 
it  is  made,  in  a  manner,  far  more  conducive  to 
efficiency  in  a  commercial  and  financial  sense. 
This  is,  at  once,  apparent  from  a  comparison  of  the 
twelve  principal  towns  in  each. 

Population  Return  o/^1821. 


ENGLAND    AND    SCOTLAND. 

FRANCE. 

London,  Westminster, 

Soutlnvark,  and  the 

adjoining  parishes     - 

1,225,694 

Paris   - 

- 

-     720,000 

Glasgow  with    suburbs 

147,043 

Lyons 

. 

-      1 1 5,000 

Edinburgh   with   Leith 

and  their  suburbs     - 

158,23.5 

Marseilles 

. 

-      102,000 

Manchester,  with  Sal- 

ford 

133,788 

Bordeaux 

- 

92,000 

Liverpool    - 

118,972 

Rouen 

. 

86,000 

Birmingham  with  Aston 

106,722 

Nantes 

- 

77,000 

Bristol  and  suburbs 

87,779 

Lille 

- 

60,000 

Leeds  and  suburbs 

83,796 

Strasburg 

- 

50,000 

Plymouth,  with  Dock 

and  suburbs 

61,212 

Toulouse 

- 

50,000 

Norwich    -        -        - 

50,288 

Orleans 

. 

42,000 

NewcastleonTync,with 

Gateshead 

46,948 

Metz 

. 

42,000 

Portsmouth  with  Port- 

sea             ... 

45,648 

Nimes 

- 

40,000 

Ireland. — In  our  enumeration  of  towns  we  have 
omitted  those  of  Ireland,  because  the  situation  of 
that  country  is  })eculiar.  Possessing,  in  point  of 
navigation,  maritime  and  inland,  advantages  equal 
to  those  of  England,  her  towns  are  comparatively 
small,  her  manufactures  considerable  in  one  pro- 
vince only.  To  what,  then,  is  owing  the  remark- 
able density  of  her  population  ?  To  two  causes, 
fertility  of  soil,  and  the  habit  on  the  part  of 
the  peasantry,  of  subsisting  on  a  food,  the  pro- 
duce of  which,  on  a  given  spot,  is  miicii  larger 
tlian  that  of  the  wheat,  the  rye,  or  the  oats,  which, 
in  other  parts  of  Europe,  form  the  basis  of  na- 
tional subsistence. 

Q  4 


'23^2       Population  :  —  Connection  between  its 

//<7///.  —  Few  countries  surpass  Italy  in  natural 
;ul\;uitages  j  in  soil,  in  (•liniate,  extent  of  sea 
coast,  and,  in  her  nortliern  part,  in  the  means 
of  inland  navigation.  But  a  higotted  creed  has 
confirmed  the  indolence  inspired  by  the  climate, 
and  her  unfortunate  division  into  petty  states,  has 
prevented  measures  for  the  advancement  of  her 
productive  industry.  Thougli  more  populous 
than  France,  her  inhabitants  have  a  smaller  aver- 
age income  :  the  want  of  a  concentrated  govern- 
ment may  be  considered  the  cause  of  lighter 
financial  burdens,  but  the  advantage  is  balanced 
or  more  than  balanced  by  the  loss  of  that  rank 
among  the  states  of  Europe,  to  which  this  coun- 
try is  entitled  by  her  population  and  geographical 
position. 

Spain  has  a  climate  on  the  whole,  favourable, 
but  in  respect  to  territorial  surface,  it  is,  after 
Switzerland,  the  most  mountainous  country  in 
Europe.  Having  been  all  along  deprived  of  the 
blessings  of  good  government  and  enlightened 
religion,  the  physical  obstacles  to  communication 
between  one  district  and  another,  have  been  very 
little  lessened  by  exertion  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants  ;  the  roads  are  few  and  indiHerent, 
while  of  canals  there  are  hardly  any.  Her  great 
extent  of  sea  coast,  ought,  it  may  be  thought,  to 
have  remedied  these  disadvantages,  but  the  small 
number  of  her  navigable  rivers  has  confined  this 
benefit  to  the  outskirts  of  her  territory,  leaving  the 
interior  untraversed  and  almost  unopened.  Thus, 
Avith  the  exception  of  Catalonia,  Biscay,  and  part 
of  Andalusia,  Spain  exhibits  all  the  backwardness 
of  a  country  deprived  of  water  communication; 
Portugal  is  more  favourably  circumstanced  ;  she 
has  two  great  inlets  from  the  ocean,  the  Tagus 


Increase  and  the  Increase  of  IVealth.       'Zoo 

and  Doiiro  ;  her  towns  are  less  thinly  scattered, 
and  without  siirpassinii;  S])ain  in  climate  or  soil,  slie 
is  enabled  to  pay  a  larger  revenue  in  proportion  to 
her  population. 

Russia  and  the  north  of  Sweden,  form  an  ex- 
ample of"  extreme  thinness  of"  popuhition,  conse- 
quent, partly  on  rigour  of"  climate,  i)artiy  also  on 
difficulty  of  intercourse. 

Co7inection  heticeen  Increase  of  Numbers  and  In- 
crease of  Wealth.  —  Having  thus  ex})lained  the 
increase  of  popuhition  in  Europe,  Me  are,  in  the 
next  place,  to  examine  the  circumstances  con- 
nected with  the  increase  oj'  licallh. 

Qui-  experience  since  the  peace,  unfortunate 
as  it  has  been  to  particular  classes  of  the  commu- 
nity, has  put  beyond  doubt  one  material  'point, 
we  mean  our  ])ower  of  sul)sisting  an  increased  po- 
pulation. Tlie  case  of  England  is  that  of  Eiuope 
at  large,  and  even  anti-popuhitionists  can  Iiardlv 
apprehend  that  such  abundance  is  tcm])orary,  or 
tJiat  the  civilized  world  is  at  all  in  hazard  from  in- 
sufficiency of  subsistence.  Equally  little  can  they 
deny  that  increase  of  national  wealth,  has,  for  a 
long  time,  accompanied  increase  of  munbers. 
Such  has  evidently  been  the  case  in  France,  in 
Germany,  in  the  countries  along  the  Baltic,  and, 
above  all,  among  ourseKes. 

]5ut  while  the  facts  are  undoubted,  the  inteience 
that  the  increase  of  wealth  is  closely  connected 
with  increase  of  numbers,  will  not  be  so  reatlily 
granted.  From  the  adherents  of  Mr.  Malthus,  it 
is  not  to  be  looked  for,  nor  do  we  expect  it  for 
some  time  from  the  majority  of  our  ])ul)lic  men. 

Their  objections  to  it  however  will,  we  l)elie\e,  be 
lessened  by  a  qualification  similar  to  what  we  have 


!234<        Populalion  :  — Omncction  between  its 

already  suggested,  viz.  that  our  arguments  for 
*♦  an  increase  of  wealth  from  increase  of  nujubers 
are  urged  only  in  regard  to  a  society  advancing 
in  a  knowledge  of  agriculture,  manufacture,  and 
the  useful  arts  generally." 

After  inserting  this  important  condition,  we  may 
with  confidence  propose  some  interesting  questions, 
such  as  '•  whether,  when  the  same  portion  of  public 
burdens  is  distributed  over  a  greater  number  of  per- 
sons, the  pressure  on  the  individual  is  not  neces- 
sarily lightened?"  Our  revenue  arises  chiefly  from 
consumption :  each  individual  bears  his  part,  and 
the  50,000,000/,  at  present  paid  by  somewhat  less 
than  1.5,000,000  of  inhabitants  in  Great  Britain, 
will  obviously  give  a  smaller  average  per  head 
when  they  shall  come  to  be  shared  among  a  popu- 
lation of  16,000,000.  Our  next  question  is,  "whe- 
ther the  effect  of  augmented  numbers,  in  adding 
to  the  revenue,  has  not  been  remarkably  exemplified 
in  the  present  age  :  whether  it  had  not  an  impor- 
tant share  in  swelling  the  product  of  our  taxes 
during  the  war,  and  in  preventing  their  diminution 
since  the  peace  ?"  If  these  preliminary  points 
are  admitted,  we  may  proceed  to  put  the  more 
general  question,  whether  "  when  a  greater  popu- 
lation is  maintained  in  equal  comfort  on  the  same 
territory,  the  wealth  and  power  of  the  community 
are  not  increased?"  This  approaches  so  nearly  to 
a  self-evident  proposition,  that  we  shall  not  hesitate 
to  take  for  granted,  that  as  to  national  income  and 
power,  no  doubt  can  be  entertained  of  an  increase 
attendant  on  the  increase  of  our  numbers.  It  re- 
mains that  we  investigate  its  etiects  in  another  sense. 

Increase  of  Income  to  the  Indhi  dual.  —  Hasan 
augmented   population  a  tendency  to   expand  or 


Increase  and  the  Increase  of  Wealth.       'iS5 

contract  tlie  separate  earnings  of  its  members? 
The  present  may  be  termed  tlie  age  of  statistical 
returns,  the  first  period  in  history  in  which  the 
governments  of  the  civilized  part  of  the  workl 
have  called  periodically  for  returns  of  population. 
It  has  also  been  an  aera  of  great  fluctuation  in  the 
property  of  individuals ;  yet  amidst  all  the  com- 
plaints of  losses  arising  at  one  time  from  the  ex- 
penditure of  war,  at  another  from  want  of  employ- 
ment or  superabundance  of  produce,  we  have  no- 
where seen  it  argued  that  the  circumstances  of  our 
population  have  undergone  deterioration  from  the 
increase  of  their  numbers.  Of  this  one  main  cause 
is,  that  the  necessity  of  providing  for  a  family  is 
the  strongest  of  all  stimidants  to  the  reniuiciation 
of  indolent  habits,  to  the  productive  employment 
of  time  and  capital.  What  a  contrast  in  the  result 
of  the  labour  of  the  parent  who  necessarily  adheres 
to  a  uniform  pursuit,  and  of  him  who,  exempt 
from  the  calls  of  a  family,  is  at  liberty  to  pass  his 
time  in  speculation,  indecision,  and  change !  In 
nothing  is  the  advantage  of  a  mercantile  conunu- 
nity,  like  England,  Holland,  or  the  United  States 
of  America,  more  conspicuous  over  most  countries 
of  the  Continent  of  Euroj)e;  where  fanciful  changes 
and  visionary  pursuits  are  so  common,  and  where  the 
upper  classes,  or,  as  they  are  styled,  the  noblesse, 
so  frequently  pass  their  lives  without  a  definite 
object,  and  seek  to  escape  trouble  by  aNoidiug  \\\v 
responsibility  of  a  family. 

Let  us  not,  however,  be  understood  as  asserting 
that  the  increase  of  our  population  cannot  be  too 
rapid,  or  as  making  light  oi"  the  pressure  on  the 
parents  of  a  numerous  family  ;  a  pres.sure  whicii 
in  general  implies  the  necessity  of  renouncing  the 
gratifications  of  leisure,  and  ofnhnost  "  sacrifjciwg 


'2:H')        J *()/)// /a //(>//  :  —  Conncc/ion  belwccn  its 

cnjoynicMit  (()r  tlif  means  of  living."  That  tliis  is 
applicabk'  to  the  middle  as  well  as  to  the  lower 
classes,  we  are  fully  convinced ;  and  if  we  do  not 
dwell  on  it  more  largely,  it  is  because  we  have 
already  adverted  to  it,  and  our  ])resent  enquiry 
regards  the  effect  of"  increasing  numbers  in  a  sense 
strictly  statistical. 

Mr,  Gray,  not  content  with  stipulating  for  an 
e(iuality  of  circumstances  to  the  rising  generation, 
goes  a  step  farther,  it  being  one  of  the  fundamental 
articles  of  his  creed,  that  an  increase  in  the  num- 
bers of  a  nation  or  society,  tends,  not  only  to 
keep  up,  but  to  improve  the  income  of  its  mem- 
bers:  that  the  80/.  forming  the  average  income  of 
indi\idual  workmen  in  one  age,  may,  and,  in  fact, 
is  likely  to  become  SlUin  the  next;  or  to  express 
it  in  a  comprehensive  form,  that  "  the  more  varied 
the  classes  of  a  community,  the  more  they  con- 
duce to  the  welfare  of  each  other,"  To  this  inter- 
esting and  important  conclusion  we  are  ready  to 
assent,  provided  the  increase  of  income  be  con- 
sidered as  dependent  less  on  increase  of  numbers, 
than  on  the  circumstances  under  which  (see  p.  9.9^2.') 
such  increase  takes  place. 

Hoii:  far  exemplified  in  the  State  of  Europe.  — 
We  proceed  to  put  this  doctrine  to  the  test,  by  a 
reference  to  the  returns  of  taxation  and  other 
public  biu'dens,  in  different  countries  of  Europe. 
These,  we  are  aware,  do  not  furnish  an  unexcep- 
tionable criterion  of  national  wealth,  as  the  pro- 
j)ortion  of  public  burdens  may  differ  from  circum- 
stances imconnected  with  the  state  of  })roductive 
industry,  such  as  the  greater  or  less  participation 
of  a  particular  country  in  war,  since  the  adoption 
of  the  funding  system.  They  form,  however,  the 
least  defective  basis,  the  nearest  approximation  to 


232 

- 

3  2 

0 

165 

- 

2  15 

0 

214 

- 

1  10 

0 

150 

- 

1  4- 

0 

112 

- 

0  12 

4. 

100 

- 

0  13 

4. 

73 

- 

0  16 

3 

58 

- 

0  11 

G 

25 

- 

0  10 

0 

23 

- 

0  9 

9 

Increase  and  lite  Jiiorasc  uj'  J  Teal  lit.      ^SJ 

the  truth  hi  the  })ieseiit  imperfect  state  of  pubhe 
surveys  ;  for  few  countries  liave  been  the  object  of 
an  assessment  so  directly  calculated  to  convey  an 
estimate  of  national  wealth,  as  the  property-tax 
of  England  or  \\\e  fancier  of  France. 

I'opulatioii        I'roportion  of  Public  Burdsns 
per  square  ^lile.        paid  by  eacli  IndiviiUial. 

Englanddistinct  from  Scot-)  '      " 

land  and  Wales  -   j 

England,      Scotland,      and  \ 

Wales,  collectively        -    j 
The  Netherlands  * 
France  -  -  - 

The  Austrian  Empire 
The  Prussian  Dominions 
Denmark  -  -         - 

Spain  ... 

Sweden 
Russia  in  Europe 

The  maritime  provinces  of  Holland  and  Zea- 
land, are  perhaps  as  heavily  taxed  as  England,  the 
charge  of  defence  against  the  sea,  added  to  the 
interest  of  a  heavy  debt,  contracted  during  two 
centuries,  rendering  the  total  assessment  probablv 
equal  to  our  31.  ^.s'.  per  head.  France  exliil)its  a 
medium  in  her  taxes  as  in  her  population  :  while 
in  our  case,  the  increase  of  taxation  since  179v?  has 
been  more  than  double  the  increase  of  our  popu- 
lation, in  France  the  proportion  of  the  former  lias 
outstripped  that  of  the  latter  only  by  a  fourth,  or 
^5  per  cent.  8till  the  axerage  payment  ])er  head 
is  much  greater  in  France  than  in  the  Austrian 
empire,  a  country  fully  ecpial  to  France  in  fer- 
tility, but  more  thinly  peopled,  because  it  is  dexoid 
of  the  means  of  communication  afibrded  to  France 
by  a  consideraI)Ie  extent  of  coast. 

*  The  repartition  of  taxes  is  here  very  unequal,  the  Dutch 
provinces,  particularly  those  of  Holland  and  Zealand,  paying 
nmch  more  than  1/.  10.?.  a  head,  the  Belgic  considerably  less. 


<i3H  ropidation  .  — 

The  population  of  DtMiinark,  though  more  thinly 
spread  tluu)  tluit  of  Austriu  or  Prussia,  pays  a  larger 
average  contribution,  the  chief  cause  of  which  must 
hi'  the  extent  of  water-communication. 

Rural  Fopu/almi  ;  ita  slationarij  Condition.  — 
Of  the  poverty  of  rural  population,  examples  are  but 
too  abundant  in  every  part  of  Europe,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  England  and  Holland :  we  confine  our 
notice,  however,  to  those  quarters  that  are  popu- 
lous, and  which  ought  to  be  comparatively  exempt 
from  poverty,  did  the  same  rule  hold,  as  in  the  case 
of  town  population.  That  such  is  far  from  being 
the  case  is  apparent  from  the  following  return  : 

Population  Payment  per  Head, 

per  square  Mile.  only. 

£    s.  d. 

Ireland  -  -         -         237  -         0  11  0 

The  Milanese  and  Venetian )         ^iq  .         ()  10  0 

territory  "         -  j 

The  Neapolitan  Dominions  15i  -         0     8  0 

AVhat,  it  ma}'  be  asked,  are  the  causes  of  the 
stationary  condition,  we  may  almost  say  the  here- 
ditaiy  poverty  of  cottagers  ?  Their  insulated  po- 
sition ;  their  want  of  ready  co-operation  with  their 
neighbours,  for  purposes  of  labour ;  and  the  im- 
perfect subdivision  of  employment  even  in  their 
own  families.  For  most  kinds  of  manufacturing 
and  mechanical  labour,  such  a  situation  is  decidedlv 
unfavourable,  since  it  offers  neither  stimuLiting  ex- 
ample, nor  the  means  of  directing  the  exertion  of 
others.  In  a  state  of  society  like  that  of  the  Irish 
peasantry,  the  acquisition  of  food  is  almost  the 
only  consideration  ;  the  son  subsists  liimself  and 
his  family  on  the  potatoes  raised  on  a  patch  of 
land,  separated  from  the  occupancy  of  his  father. 


its  stationary/  Condition.  239 

and  regards  lodfring,  clothing,  and  still  more,  fur- 
niture, as  secondary  objects.  In  such  a  situation, 
what  connection  can  there  be  between  increase 
of  numbers,  and  increase  of  individual  income  ? 
Mr.  Gray  coukl  here  trace  liardly  a  single  feature 
of  the  animating  picture  he  lias  drawn  of  a  country 
with  augmenting  numbers :  yet  it  seems  to  form 
rather  a  qualification  than  a  contradiction  of  his 
doctrine ;  and  to  prove  nothing  at  variance  with 
his  creed  in  regard  to  a  population  differently  cir- 
cumstanced ;  we  mean  so  placed  as  to  be  near  to, 
and  in  a  state  of  co-operation  with  each  other. 

Town  Population.  —  What  a  contrast  to  this  sta- 
tionary condition  is  exhibited  by  the  progress  of 
towns,  whether  we  go  back  to  the  days  of  antiquity, 
or  fix  our  attention  on  modern  history :  whether 
we  contemplate  Tyre,  Carthage,  Athens,  Syracuse, 
in  the  former ;  or  Pisa,  Genoa,  Venice,  Bruges, 
Antwerp,  Amsterdam,  in  the  latter;  or,  finallv, 
look  to  tlie  growth  of  the  towns  of  our  own  coun- 
try in  the  present  age.  Widely  different  as  is  this 
})rogress,  according  to  difference  of  situation,  we 
can  hardly  trace  in  any  country  an  example  of 
numbers  collected  in  one  spot,  without  an  accom- 
panying increase  of  wealth.  Even  such  a  place  as 
Debreczin,  in  Hungary,  an  assemblage  of  1<0,UOO 
souls  in  a  succession  of  cottages,  fiords  relief  from 
the  poverty  that  reigns  throughout  the  greatest 
part  of  that  backward  and  thinly-])eopled  region. 

In  what  consist  the  advantai>-es  of  a  concentrated 
population?  In  the  subtlivision  of  labour;  in 
the  power  of  making  the  exertions  of  nuniy  con- 
cur to  one  object;  in  the  means  otgi\ing  em- 
ployment, of  some  kind  or  other,  to  persons  the 
most  difierent   in   education  and  attainments,      lu 


))r()|)()rti()ii  as  employment  becomes  subdivided, 
the  eflicieiicy  ofihe  individual  is  increased,  and  the 
same  labour  enables  him  to  furnish  commodities, 
superior,  either  in  quantity  or  quality,  generally  in 
l)Oth.  Iksides,  an  assemblage  of  numbers  is  highly 
favourable  to  those  discoveries  and  inventions,  the 
effect  of  which,  whether  in  agricultin-e,  manufacture, 
or  mechanics,  is  to  increase  so  remarkably  the  pro- 
ductive })0wers  of  a  country,  to  render  the  articles 
produced  so  much  chea])er  and  better.  It  admits, 
we  believe,  of  no  doubt  that  the  rate  of  wages  in  a 
capital,  such  as  London  or  Paris,  or  in  a  large 
town,"  such  as  Manchester,  Birmingham,  or  Rouen, 
exceeds  those  of  a  small  town  in  a  degree  greater 
than  the  difference  in  the  expence  of  living. 

The  resources  of  collected  })oj)ulation  have  been 
exemplified  in  the  Dutch  provinces  of  Holland  and 
Zealand,  during  two  centuries,  by  the  payment  of 
an  amount  of  taxation  almost  unparalleled  in  the 
annals  of  finance.  At  a  time  when  in  England, 
the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  lived,  as  at  present 
in  France,  in  the  open  country,  Holland  had  accu- 
mulated the  larger  part  of  her  population  in  towns; 
and  though  their  numbers  have  now  experienced  a 
decrease,  Amsterdam  and  the  eight  cities  situated 
within  a  circuit  smaller  than  one  of  our  middle 
sized  counties,  still  contain  a  population  of  more 
than  400,000,  a  density  exceeded  only  by  London 
and  Paris,  and  which,  rapidly  as  the  numbers  of 
our  manufacturers  increase,  will  hardly  be  sur- 
passed in  the  present  age  by  the  poj)uIation  of 
either  our  cotton,  our  woollen,  or  our  hardware 
districts. 

These  districts,  however,  aiul  the  parts  of  our 
island  rendered  populous  by  navigation,  already 
confirm  the  result  exhibited  bv  Holland,  the  aver- 


its  stationary  Cotiditiun.  241 

age  income  of  individuals  being  considerably  greater 
in  these  than  in  tlie  less  populous  parts  of  our 
island.  This  was  a|)parent  from  the  returns  made 
under  the  Property-tax  Act.  In  like  manner  in 
France,  the  returns  made  to  government  under  the 
J()ncier,  or  tax  on  the  income  of  landlords,  farmers, 
and  house  pro})rietors,  show  that  the  revenue  not 
only  of  the  public,  but  of  tlie  individual,  is  smaller 
where  the  numbers  are  thinly  scattered,  —  smaller 
in  the  mountainous  departments  of  the  south,  than 
in  the  more  fertile  and  populous  districts  of  the 
north.  In  the  main  articles  of  food  and  fuel,  the 
peasantry  are  often  better  provided  than  the  lower 
orders  in  towns,  but  in  other  respects,  there  are  on 
the  Continent  the  same  reasons  as  in  England  for 
allotting  the  superiority  in  property  to  the  latter. 
It  is  in  a  large  association  only  that  activity  and 
talent  find  an  adequate  field  ;  that  the  command 
of  capital,  the  co-operation  of  assistants,  can  be 
turned  to  account :  there  is,  hence,  no  comparison 
between  town  and  country  in  the  proportion  of 
those  who  from  poverty  attain  the  comfort  of  a 
middle  station  ;  to  say  nothing  of  those  who  reach 
a  high  rank  in  the  scale  of  property. 

Farther,  as  every  country  raises  food  for  the  far 
greater  ])art  of  its  consum])tion,  density  of  town- 
population  implies,  in  general,  an  advanced  state 
of  agriculture :  it  is  along  with  such  density  that 
we  find  extensive  farms,  a  general  ap})lication  of 
machinery,  and  a  variety  of  improvements  which 
enable  cultivators  to  send  to  market  a  much  larger 
proportion  of  produce  than  can  be  spared  in  a 
country  like  the  centre  and  south  of  France,  where 
all  work  being  done  by  manual  labour,  the  larger 
share  of  the  produce  is  necessarily  consumed  by 
those  who   raise  it.     In  all   respects,   therefore,  a 

R 


JJ42  Population  :  — 

Dumerous  town-population  seems  to  us  a  proof  of 
wealth  ;  an  evidence  of  the  tendency  of  individual 
as  well  as  national  income,  to  increase  as  society 
advances  in  improvement.  (See  Appendix,  p. [7^].) 

Subsistence  more  easy  of  Acquisition  as  Society 
advances.  —  The  late  wars,  remarkable  as  they  were 
ibr  the  fi-equent  recurrence  of  bad  seasons,  ex- 
hibited no  examples  of  local  suffering  equal  to 
those  which  marked  the  latter  yciU's  of  the  lOth 
and  17th  centuries ;  the  scarcities  in  the  reigns  of 
Elizabeth  and  William.  The  cause  is  to  be  sought 
in  the  general  ease  of  communication  arising  ti'om 
the  improvement  of  our  roads,  canals,  and  maritime 
navigation  ;  also  in  the  more  ample  means  of  pur- 
chase afforded  to  the  lower  orders  by  the  diffusion 
of  employment,  chiefly  mechanical  and  manufac- 
turing, throughout  almost  every  corner  of  the 
island.  One  part  of  the  kingdom  is  thus  enabled 
to  come  to  the  rehef  of  the  other,  and  prices  are 
kept  nearly  on  an  equality  throughout.  To  this 
source  of  relief  at  home,  is  added,  particularly  since 
the  peace,  a  supply  from  abroad,  arising  from  the 
extension  of  tillage  over  countries  in  a  manner  un- 
known to  our  ancestors.  In  our  chapter  on  Agri- 
culture, (p.  152.)  we  took  occasion  to  remark  tliat 
that  which  formerly  constituted  the  corn  country 
of  Europe,  meaning  the  country  producing  corn  in 
sufficiency  for  export,  is  comprised  between  the 
45th  and  55th  degree  of  latitude,  and  has  a  simi- 
larity df  climate  greater  than  is  supposed  by  those 
of  our  countrymen  who  have  not  travelled  or 
studied  the  temperature  of  the  Continent.  This 
remark  applies  to  the  Netherlands,  the  north  of 
France,  the  north  of  Germany,  Denmark,  and  even 
to  part  of  Poland,  all  too  similar  to  our  country  in 


Acquisition  of  Subsistence.  ^-iS 

latitude  and  vicinity  to  the  sea,  to  escape  a  par- 
ticipation in  those  causes  of  deficiency,  whether 
arising  from  want  or  excess  of  rain,  which,  from 
time  to  time,  affect  our  harvests.  But  the  exten- 
sion of  tillage  along  the  shores  of  the  Kuxine,  and 
the  increased  cultivation  of  the  United  States,  af- 
ford new  sources  of  supply :  these  countries  are 
distant,  indeed,  and  the  amount  of  import  from 
them,  must,  from  the  cost  of  conveyance,  neces- 
Barily  be  limited  ;  but  as  it  will  proceed  from  cli- 
mates not  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  causes  which 
lead  to  deficient  crops  in  the  north-west  of  Europe, 
it  will  of  course  be  available  in  the  day  of  need. 

These  different  inferences,  whether  deduced 
from  historical  or  geographical  authority,  may  be 
admitted  by  the  adherents  of  Mr.  Malthus,  and 
when  viewed  in  connection  with  our  present 
abundance  of  subsistence,  may  be  allowed  to  be  of 
a  nature  to  relieve  a  few  generations  from  the  ap- 
prehension of  scarcity  ;  but  the  anti-populationists 
will  still  contend  that  their  principle  is  correct, 
and  that  a  time  must  come  when  the  world  will 
be  exposed  to  the  misery  of  over  population.  The 
argument  is  thus  brought  to  a  kind  of  ne  phis  ultra, 
but  even  on  this  final  and  decisive  ground  we  are 
not  afraid  to  meet  our  antagonists.  Without  de- 
nying that  there  is  in  the  womb  of  time,  a  period 
when  population  will  attain  its  complement,  we 
contend  that  such  a  period  is  far  more  distant, 
and  the  intermediate  increase  of  our  numbers 
likely  to  be  far  greater  than  enters  into  the  con- 
ception of  either  our  opponents,  or  the  ])ublic  at 
large.  Nor  does  it  follow  that  when  such  a  period 
shall  arrive,  it  must  be  necessarily  a  })eriod  of 
misery:  —  but  to  waive  all  speculation  on  this 
mysterious  point,  and  to  confine  ourselves  to  that 

R  ^Z 


2 1'  1'  ropulalion  :  — 

■which  is  of"  nearer  interest,  we  sliall  briefly  ;i;ive  our 
reasons  for  the  opinion  that  our  ])osterity,  f()r  many 
generations  at  least,  are  hkcly  to  increase  their 
numbers  with  less  difficnlty  than  has  been  expe- 
rienced by  us  or  our  ancestors. 

1.  Our  fundamental  doctrine,  that  increase  of 
produce  depends  less  on  the  extent  of  newly-culti- 
vated soil,  than  on  the  number  of  hands  employed 
on  the  old,  will  be  found  proof  against  tiie  scAcrest 
analysis.  It  is  supported  equally  by  the  experience 
of  the  present  age,  and  the  general  evidence  of 
history :  it  supposes  besides,  a  proportion  between 
demand  and  supply, — that  ability  on  the  part  of 
labour  to  obtain  its  reward,  which  corresponds  so 
clearly  with  the  benevolent  ordinations  of  Provi- 
dence. 

2.  From  the  great  diversity  of  soil  and  climate  in 
tlie  cultivated  portion  of  the  globe,  scarcity  is  never 
general :  "  when  famine  was  in  other  lands,  in  the 
land  of  Egypt  there  was  bread."  If  this  applied  to 
an  age  when  civilization  extended  over  hardly  ten 
degrees  of  latitude,  how  much  more  does  it  hold 
at  present,  and  how  greatly  do  the  advantages  aris- 
ing from  improvements  perpetually  in  progress, 
increase  the  power  of  mankind  to  turn  to  account 
the  bounty  of  nature  ?  Extended  communication 
by  water  enables  even  distant  countries  to  supply 
the  deficiency  of  each  other ;  while  in  the  same 
territory  improved  methods  of  preserving  corn, 
additional  gianaries,  augmented  capital,  all  concur 
to  enable  tlie  inliabitants  to  kee})  over  the  surplus 
of  one  year,  as  a  pro\  ision  tor  the  possible  failure 
of  the  next. 

3.  The  labour  employed  in  raising  subsistence, 
becomes  progressively  more  effectual,  the  source  of 
a  larger  prodiice,   as  society  advances.     This   is 


Acquisitmn  of  Subsistence.  245 

evinced  in  two  ways ;  one,  the  use  of  improved 
implements,  is  obvious  to  the  common  observer ; 
the  other  the  supply  of  the  requisite  produce  by  a 
smaller  number  of  agriculturists  compared  to  other 
classes,  is  less  obvious  and  requires  the  evidence 
of  statistical  documents.  A  census  of  our  ances- 
tors, taken  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  would  have 
given,  under  the  head  of  agriculturists,  above  50 
persons  in  100,  instead  of  the  33  of  tlie  ])resent 
day.  The  majori^r  of  our  present  po})ulation  are 
tluis  enabled  to  reside  in  towns  and  villages,  and 
are  rendered  disj)osable  for  other  purposes :  the 
himibler  orders  employ  themselves  in  supplying 
clothing  or  lodging;  a  higher  class  minister  to 
the  amusements,  the  education,  or  the  luxury 
of  the  rich  ;  while  the  highest  of  all  are  exempt 
from  the  necessity  of  following  any  occupation 
whatever.  Confining  our  view  to  the  topic  at  pre- 
sent under  discussion,  in  what  light  may  we  con- 
sider the  persons  who  minister  to  our  luxuries? 
They  may  be  said  to  fbi'm  a  reserve  of  caj)ital  and 
labour  a])plicable  to  the  increase  of  subsistence,  in 
a  case  of  imperious  necessity. 

A  population  return  in  France,  or  almost  any 
])art  of  the  Continent,  exhibits,  it  is  true,  a  larger 
number  of  residents  in  country  than  in  town,  but 
many  of  the  former  are  producers  of  other  articles 
than  food:  the  flax,  the  hemp,  the  madder  of  their 
fields,  the  wool  of  their  flocks,  the  timber  of  their 
forests,  the  hides  of  their  cattle,  are  all  constituents 
of  supply  or  ingredients  of  consumption,  quite 
distinct  from  the  raising  of  provisions. 

4.  As  society  advances,  and  a  i)art  of  the  lower 
orders  })artici})ate  in  the  comfort  of  the  middle 
classes,  food  forms  ])rogressively  a  less  considei'- 
able  proportion  of  their  expenditure.     In  a  })opu- 

R  3 


24G  Popidalion  :  — 

lation  like  that  of"  Irelaiul,  tlie  chief  part  of  France, 
and  the  |)o{)rer  counties  of  P^nghuul,  food  constitutes 
above  (iO  per  cent,  of  the  total  family  charge  ;  but 
in  our  more  populous  rural  districts,  in  our  larger  vil- 
lages, and  in  our  towns  generally,  the  proportion  (see 
the  Appendix,  p.  [11],)  is  little  above  .50  per  cent. 
What  does  this  im})ly,  but  the  enjoyment  of  greater 
comfort  on  the  part  of  our  lower  orders,  the  pos- 
session of  a  fund  with  which  to  ])urchase  clothes 
and  furnitiu-e  in  years  of  plenty. /-^nd  to  pay,  in  years 
of  scarcity,  the  extra  price  required  for  provisions  ? 
Hence,  the  less  severe  pressure  of  high  prices  of 
food  on  a  po{)ulation,  such  as  that  of  Holland  and 
England,  than  on  one  devoid,  in  a  manner,  of  ex- 
changeable commodities,  such  as  the  peasantry  of 
Poland,  Russia,  or  the  inland  districts  of  the  High- 
lands of  Scotland. 

Ought  Government  to  take  Measures  for  promote 
hig  Population.  —  "  The  maxim  of  the  politician,*'* 
says  Mr.  Gray,  '*  ought  to  be  to  take  care  of  popu- 
lation, as  population  will  take  care  of  subsistence 
and  of  every  other  species  of  supply."  Though  con- 
vinced that  there  is  much  more  truth  in  this  than 
in  most  political  apophthegms,  we  do  not  go  quite 
so  far  as  Mr.  G.,  and  have  no  wish  to  keep  in  the 
back  giound  the  case  of  a  population  like  that  of 
Ireland,  Brittany,  and  Poland,  in  which  increase 
of  numbers  is  attended  by  a  verv  slight  increase  of 
comfort  to  the  individual,  or  of  strength  to  the 
public.  Nor  do  we  assert  that  even  in  a  country 
the  most  fortunately  constituted,  increase  of  popu- 
lation can  bring  with  it  a  speedy  cure  to  a  dis- 
ordered state  of  productive  industry,  such  as  has 
existed  among  us  since  the  peace.  In  the  case> 
for  example,  of  agriculturists,  distressed  by  a  su* 


Prospect  of  its  Increase.  247 

perabundance  of  liome  growth,  little  relief  is  to  be 
anticipated  from  increase  of  consumers,  because 
the  producers  can  hardly  fail  to  augment  their 
numbers  in  ail  equal  proportion,  leaving  relief  to 
arise  from  the  extension  of  home  manufacture,  thfe 
removal  of  hands  from  country  to  town,  or  other 
causes  uncertain  in  the  tiiiie  of  their  occurrence, 
and  distinct,  in  a  great  measure,  from  the  general 
increase  of  our  numbers. 

Next,  as  to  men  in  office,  on  whom  Mr.  G.  seems 
to  think  it  incumbent  to  take  measures,  more  or 
less  direct,  to  i)romote  population,  we  confine  our 
exhortation   to  a  passive  course,  satisfied  if  they 
do    nothing   to    obstruct  the   natural    increase    of 
numbers.     Let  them   carefully  guard  their  minds 
against  the  notion  which  so  naturally  follows  the 
creed  of  limited  subsistence  ;  viz.  that  the  discou- 
ragement of  marriage,   or  the  loss  of  lives  in  the 
field,  and  in  unhealthy  colonies,  are  not,  in  a  sta- 
tistical   sense,   a   great  misfortune,    because    they 
operate,    forsooth,     as    checks    to    superabundant 
luniibers.  —  In  regard  to  population,  as  to  national 
wealth,  the  plain  rule  is  to  avoid  interf6rdhce,  to 
take  no  step   for  the  })urj)ose  of  giving  a  new  di- 
rection to  the  course  of  events,  but  to  remove  ob- 
stacles wherever  such  hav6  been  interposed  by  the 
mistaken,    though    well    intended   intervention    of 
preceding    legislators.     As    to    town    population, 
with  all  our  conviction  of  its  advantage,  both  to 
the  individual  and  the  community,  we  should  in- 
finitely regret  the  adoption  of  any  measure  to  in- 
crease  its  relative  amount.     Let  the  tide  flow  in 
its  natural  course :  the   duties  of  government  evi- 
dently extend   no  farther  tlian  keeping  open  the 
channel. 

K  4< 


^^48 


J'ojjulalion  :  ■ 


\Vc  sliiill  now  turn  aside  from  general  reasoning 
and  direct  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  data  of"  a 
more  specific  character,  to  an  estimate  of  the  ])0- 
pulation  and  resources  of  the  different  states  of 
Europe : 


STATISTICAL  TABLE  OF  EUROPE,  IN  1823. 


Persons 

Taxes 

Proportion 

Total 

to  a 

and  public 

of  such 

Population. 

square 

burdens 

burdens 

mile. 

generally. 

per  head. 

Norway,    including    Fin- 

£.  s.     d. 

mark          -        .        . 

950,000 

6 

Sweden,    Norway,     and 

Swedish  Lapland 

3,600,000 

10 

Sweden,     distinct     from 

Norway   and   Swedish 

Lapland     -         -         - 

2,600,000 

25 

1,300,000 

0    10     0 

Russia  in  Europe    - 

37,000,000 

23 

1  8,000,000 

0      9      9 

Scotland ;  viz.  the  High- 

lands distinct  from  the 

low  country 

30 

Turkey  in   Europe,   not 

ascertained,  but  proba- 

bly not  above 

8,000,000 

50 

5,000,000 

0   12      6 

Poland,  before  the  parti- 

tion           -        -        - 

15,000,000 

53 

Poland,  the  present  king- 
dom of,  distinct  from 

the  provinces  incorpo- 

rated with  the  Austrian, 

Russian,  and  Prussian 

dominions 

2,850,000 

60 

1,200,000 

0     8      8 

Sardinia,  island  of 

520,000 

57 

Spain     -         -         -         . 

11,000,000 

60 

6,000,000 

0   11      0 

Denmark,     exclusive    of 

Faroe  and  Iceland 

1,600,000 

73 

1,300,000 

0   16      3 

Hanover        -        -        . 

1,300,000 

90 

900,000 

0   14     0 

Portugal         -        -        . 

3,700,000 

90 

3,000,000 

0    16      3 

Switzerland,  the  twenty- 

two  cantons 

1,750,000 

91 

430,000 

0      5      0 

(The  pecuniary  burden 

is  very  small,  but  the 

Swiss  are   liable  to 

military  service.) 

Wales    -        -        -        - 

740,000 

96 

The  Austrian  empire,  in- 

cluding Lombardy,  and 

Austrian  Poland 

29,000,000 

112 

18,000,000 

0   12      4 

The  Prussian  dominions 

10,500,000 

100 

7,000,000 

0    13      4 

Europe  taken  vullectivelij. 


^249 


Persons 

Taxes 

Proportion 

Toul 

to  a 

and  public 

of such 

Population. 

square 

burdens 

burdens 

mile. 

generally. 

per  head. 

£.    5.      d. 

Bavaria           -         _        . 

3,600,000 

120 

2,500,000 

0   14     0 

Sicily,  isliind  of 

1,655,000 

1.32 

Dominions  of  the  king  of 

Sardinia,  viz.  Piedmont, 

part  of  the  Milanese, 

the  Genoese  territory. 

Savoy,  and  the  island 

of  Sanlinia 

4,000,000 

148 

2,200,000 

0    110 

States  of  the  Church 

2,450,000 

150 

900,000 

0      7      6 

The    Neapolitan     domi- 

nions, inchidins  Sicily 

6,700,000 

154 

2,700,000 

0     8      0 

France,  including  Corsica 

30,700,000 

150 

37,000,000 

1      4     0 

Scotland ;  the  low  coun- 

try  distinct    from   the 

Highlands 

150 

2     0     0 

Great    Britain    exclusive 

of  Irelxind  (the   taxes 

coniputed  according  to 

the  value  of  money  on 

the  Continent 

14,500,000 

165 

40,000,000 

2    15     0 

Wirtemberg  -         _         . 

1,400,000 

170 

1 ,000,000 

0    14      4 

Saxony           ... 

1,200,000 

170 

900,000 

0    15      0 

Jtaly,    exclusive  of  Sicily 

1 7,000,000 

179 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland 

collectively 

21,500,000 

182 

44,000,000 

2     0     0 

The  Netherlands* 

5,300,000 

214 

8,000,000 

1    10     0 

Austrian,    Italy,    or    the 

Lombardo  -  Venetian 

kingdom 

4,000,000 

219 

2,000,000 

0    10     0 

Ionian  islands,  republic  - 

230,000 

230 

J  00,000 

0      8      9 

England,    distinct    from 

Wales 

11,600,000 

232 

56,000,000 

3      2     0 

Ireland            ... 

7,000,000 

237 

4,000,000 

0   11      0 

Holland,  province  of     - 

760,000 

362 

West  Flanders 

630,000 

420 

East  Flanders 

610,000 

554 

P^urope    collectively,    a- 

bout           ... 

200,000,000 

58 

180,000,000 

0    IS      0 

*  The  repartition  of  taxation  is  here  very  unequ.al,  tlic  Dutch  provinces, 
particularly  those  of  Holland  and  Zealand,  paying  inucli  more  tlian  \l.  lO.v.  a 
head  ;  the  Belgic  much  less. 


Tliese  returns,  both  as  to  population  and  j)ul)lic 
burdens,  are,  in  general,  taken  iioni  ollieial  docu- 
ments:  they  require,  liovvever,  a  tew  e.\j)lanations; 
thus. 


*i5()  Population :  -^ 

Extent  in  squaYe  Miles.  —  The  amount  assigned 
to  England,  Scotland,  and  Wales  is  taken  from 
official  returns,  but  in  regard  to  Ireland  and  most 
j)arts  of  the  Continent,  the  statements  are,  in  some 
measure,  conjectural,  and  to  be  considered  only  as 
approximations. 

Our  Public  Burdens.  — ThQ  sum  of  44,000,000/. 
as  the  aggregate  of  our  public  burdens,  may  appear 
greatly  below  the  mark,  but  it  is  formed  by  two 
important  deductions  firom  our  present  payments  ; 
first,  by  taking  credit  for  a  farther  reduction  of 
our  taxes,  and,  in  the  next  place,  by  making  an 
abatement  (of  20  per  cent.)  from  the  numerical 
amount  of  our  burdens,  to  bring  their  value  on  a 
par  with  those  of  the  Continent,  with  which  they 
are  here  compared. 

Taa:ation  of  Rural  Districts. —  It  may  be  ob- 
jected to  the  preceding  table,  that  an  estimate 
founded  on  taxation  does  not  do  justice  to  the 
property  of  a  rural  population,  who,  in  many  parts 
of  the  Continent,  seem  almost  to  escape  the  grasp 
of  the  exchequer.  This  exemption,  however,  is 
limited  chiefly  to  excise  dues,  and  is,  in  a  great 
measure,  balanced  by  a  heavy  land-tax,  which, 
under  different  names  in  different  countries,  forms 
the  basis  of  continental  taxation,  and  is  included 
in  the  column  of  public  burdens. 

Population  per  Square  Mile.  —  Mr*  S.  Cifray  as^ 
sumes,  (Happiness  of  States,  p.  421.)  that  an  indi- 
vidual for  every  two  acres,  or  320  persons  for  a 
square  mile,  would  be  a  fair  complement  of  popu- 
lation for  the  soil  and  climate  of  Europe.  From 
this  rate,  however,  we  are  still  at  a  great  distance. 


Europe  taken  collectively,  251 

having  attained  it  only  in  Flanders  and  Holland : 
in  England  and  Ireland  we  are  likely,  if  we  pro- 
ceed  as  in  the  present  age,  to  reach  it  in  somewhat 
less  than  twenty  years. 

In  Iceland  the  proportion  is  little  more  than  one 
person  to  a  square  mile,  but  the  lowest  extreme 
of  European  population  is  exhibited  in  Lapland, 
where  tliere  is  not  more  than  one  inhabitant  to 
two  or  three  square  miles. 

Europe  taken  collectively.  —  Our  estimate  is 
greater  in  regard  to  population,  and  smaller  in 
respect  to  public  burdens  than  that  which  is  at 
present  current  on  the  authority  of  German  statis- 
ticians ;  but  the  latter  made  their  computation  in 
or  before  the  year  I8I7,  since  which,  population 
has  increased,  and  taxation  has  experienced  a 
partial  reduction. 

If  those  of  our  readers  who  are  familiar  with 
history,  will  compare  tiie  present  state  of  Europe 
in  population  and  revenue,  with  what  it  was  two 
or  three  centuries  ago,  they  will  })erceive  a  degree 
of  extension  that  is  hardly  credible.  How  feeble 
do  we  find  tiie  establishments  of  France,  even  when 
administered  by  Sully  ;  of  England,  when  guided 
by  liurleigh  ;  of  Aus.tria,  when  stinudated  by  tlie 
vigour  of  Charles  V.,  if  we  compare  them  to  those 
of  the  same  powers  at  the  present  day  !  The  army 
of  Henry  IV.  of  France,  was,  when  at  the  highest, 
only  40,000  men :  the  revenue  of  queen  Elizabeth 
was  600,000/.  *  Even  the  Spain  of  Phihp  II.,  aided 
by  the  mines  of  America,  is  found,  when  her  re- 
venue and   her  army  are  brouglit  to  the  test  of 

•  Napier's    Supplement    to   tlie    Kiuvcloi>.   F^rit.  uiuk'r  the 
heads  of  Englaiul  and  France. 


•^.O^  ropidalioii  :  — 

acc'iiniLc  coini)iitati()ii,   to  have  been  on  a  j»a)  with 
onlv  tlio  second-rate  powers  of  our  a^e. 

\V'hat  a  striking  example  is  here  afibrcleil  of  the 
tendency  to  rapid  improvement  in  those  connnu- 
nities  which  have  overcome  the  difficulties  of  pri- 
mitive ignora)ice,   and  in  which  safety  is  afforded 
to   persons    and   property !     More  than   that  tiie 
inhabitants  of  the  Continent  can  hardly  be  said 
to  have  received  at  the  hands  of  their  respective, 
go\'ernors,  since  if  some  sovereigns  have  been  dis- 
anguished  by  active  measures  for  promoting  im- 
provement, the  beneficial  result  of  their  labours 
has  been  balanced  or  more  than  balanced  by  am- 
bition and  unnecessary  warfare  on  the  part  of  their 
brethren.     How  much  more  effectually  would  the 
latter  have  consulted,  not  merely  the  happiness  of 
their  subjects,   but  the  increase  of  their  political 
power,  had  they  never  unsheathed  the  sword,  but 
been  content  to  allow  individual  industry  to  work 
its  way,  augmenting  the  number  and  wealth  of  the 
community  by  a  silent  but  sure  increase  ! 

It  would  be  idle  to  lament  what  cannot  be  re- 
called ;  but  in  regard  to  the  future,  we  may  be 
allowed  to  indulge  a  hope  that  the  sovereigns  of  the 
Continent  will  pursue  a  more  enlightened  course  ! 
How  wide  a  field  of  improvement  is  open  to  them, 
if  they  will  merely  labour   to    transfer    to   their 
respective   territories   the    degree  of  agricultural 
knowledge  introduced  into  this  country !     No  En- 
o'lishman  who  has  not  travelled  can  form  an  idea 
of  the  general  backwardness  of  the  Continent,   of 
the  poverty  of  the  farmers,   the   awkwardness   of 
their  implements,  the  deficiency  of  their  buildings. 
If  we  cross  the  narrow  seas  and  fix  our  attention 
on  the  districts  of  the  Continent  said  to  be  farthest 
advanced,   such  as  Flanders,   Nojinandy,    or   the 
Paj/s  de  JScauce,  we  shall  find  their  machinery  so 


Prosjjcct  ()/'  I  he  Continent  and  of  England.  Q5S 

rude,  and  their  work  ])erfbrmed  in  so  great  a  de- 
gree by  manual  labour,  that  the  productive  pow- 
ers of  their  soil  might  be  doubled  by  the  mere 
application  of  the  discoveries  and  inventions  that 
have  taken  place  in  our  eastern  and  northern  coun- 
ties. If  we  carry  our  observation  farther,  and 
calculate  how  nnich  i-emains  to  be  done  in  the 
neglected  plains  of  Hungary  and  Poland,  in  the 
half-irrigated  'provinces  of  S])ain,  Italy,  and  even 
the  south  of  France,  the  inference  is,  that  Europe, 
that  boasted  seat  of  cultivation,  is  not  peopled  to 
the  extent  of  a  fiftli  of  the  numbers  it  may  be  ren- 
dered capable  of  supporting. 

The  prospect  of  England.  —  Let  us  not,  how- 
ever, imagine,  that  the  advancement  of  the  Conti- 
nent would  have  the  effect  of  lessening  the  relative 
superiority  of  this  coimtry ;  on  the  contrary,  those 
advantages  which  have  enabled  us  to  take  the  lead 
—  extent  of  water  communication,  richness  of 
mines,  command  of  capital,  superiority  of  civil  in- 
stitutions, formed  habits  of  business,  —  are  all  calcu- 
lated to  confirm  our  ])re-eminence,  and  even  to 
lead  us  forward  in  a  (juicker  ralio  than  our  neigh- 
bours. To  comprehend  this  fully,  the  reader 
ought  first  to  acquire  the  conviction,  that  national 
improvement  is  hkely  to  be  ])rogressive,  and  hns 
at  })iesent  no  more  reached  a  limit,  than  it  had 
thirty,  fifty,  or  one  hunflred  years  ago.  To  accpii- 
esce  in  the  notion,  tliat  tiie  present  mode  of  tilling 
the  ground,  of  navigating  the  ocean,  or  ])erfbrniing 
mechanical  laboiu-,  is  the  best  thai  can  he  (l(>\isi'(l, 
is  the  ])art  of  the  indolent  and  unthinking;  such  is 
the  creed  of  the  spiritless  Asiatic,  of  the  unenlight- 
ened peasant,  and  the  almost  e(|nallv  unenlightened 
manufacturer  in  mauv  parts  of  the  Continent    of" 


I254<  Population. 

Europe.  In  this  country,  happily  the  discoveriea 
that  MO  rapidly  succeed  each  other,  afford  a  proof 
that  we  have  not  yet  advanced  half  way  in  the 
extension  of  our  national  resources.  Of  this,  a 
more  ample  developement  shall  be  given  in  our 
concluding  chapter,  when  we  shall  shew  how 
surprisingly  we  have  gained  on  our  political  rivals, 
in  the  course  of  the  last  century,  and  how  little  we 
have  at  present  to  dread  at  their  hands — consi, 
derations  calculated  to  confirm  the  public,  in  an 
approval  of  the  pacific  system  which  we  have  now 
so  fortunately  adopted,  and  to  satisfy  the  appre- 
hensive among  our  countrymen,  that  with  a  steady 
adherence  to  such  a  course,  the  day  of  trial  in  the 
finances  of  England  will  ere  long  be  surmounted. 


Q65 


CHAP.  VIIL 

National  Revenue  and  Capital. 

JriAviNG  appro])nated  several  chapters  to  an  ex- 
amination of  tlie  condition  of  the  country,  under 
the  separate  heads  of  Agriculture,  Population, 
and  Poor-rate,  we  are  now  to  make  an  attempt  of 
a  more  comprehensive  nature,  and  to  bestow  a 
chapter  on  our  National  Revenue  and  Capital 
generally.     This  will  lead  us  to  discuss 

The  amount  of  our  taxable  income. 

The  connection  between  its  increase  and  the 
increase  of  our  population  ;  and  lastly, 

The  fluctuations  it  has  experienced  in  the  thirty 
years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  French  Revolution. 


Estimate,  by  tfte  late  Mr.  Colquhoun,  of  Pro-perty  created  in 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  in  the  Year  1812. 

Agriculture  in  all  its  branches,  (including  pas- 
ture) .....  €217,000,000 

Mines  and  minerals,  including  coals       -             -  9,000,000 

Manufactures  in  every  branch                 -             -  1 1 4',0(K),000 

Inland  trade  and  banking            ...  ;i-5,(K)0,000 

Foreign  commerce  and  shipping              -             -  4(),(XX),000 

Coasting  trade                 ....  2,000,000 
Fisheries,  exclusive  of  the  colonial  fisheries  of 

Newfoundland              ...             -  2,000,000 

Foreign  income  remitted             -             -             -  .'5,000,000 

Total      -  -     480,000,000 


^56  Ndlional  Revenue. 

Siicli  WHS  the  amount  of  the  property  created 
in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  in  181^  ;  since  which 
there  have  occurred  two  very  material  clian^^es,  — 
a  great  increase  in  the  quantity,  and  a  still  greater 
decrease  in  the  prices.  The  latter,  in  the  case  of 
agriculture  amounts  to  60  per  cent;  in  that  of 
manufactures  to  40  or  50  per  cent.  ;  but  as  Mr. 
Colquhouu's  estimate  was  made  greatly  below  the 
currency  of  the  time,  20,  or  at  the  utmost,  2.5  per 
cent.,  will  form  a  sufficient  deduction  from  its 
amount.  To  this  we  find  an  ample  counterpoise 
iji  the  increase  of  quantity  arising  from 

The  additional  produce  on  the  part  of  the  hands 
restored  to  labour  by  the  peace  ; 

The  increase  of  our  population  since  1812;  and 

The   progress  of   improvement   in   agriculture 

and  manufactures,  by  which  the  same  number  of 

liands  are  enabled  to  produce  a  considerably  larger 

quantity. 

The  result,  therefore,  is,  that  even  at  reduced 
prices,  the  value  of  the   produce  of  the  present 
year,  equals  or  exceeds  that  of  1812  ;  but  as  ^\y. 
Colquhouu's  calculation  included,  under  the  head 
of  agriculture,  a  very  large  sum  for  produce,  such 
as  oats,  hay,  grass,  &c.  appropriated  to  the  food  of 
liorses  and  cattle,  and  as  our  object  is  to  confine 
our  table  to  articles  for  the  consumption  of  man, 
or  for  the  purposes  of  manufacture,  we  assume  the 
total  at  3.50,000,000/.     That  sum,  then,  we  con- 
sider as  representing  the  amount  "of  the  property 
annually  created  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  ;  in 
other  words,  the  amount  of  our  animal  production. 
Of  this   large    sum,    what    pr()])ortion,    in   this 
land  of  taxes,  can  be  considered  as  exempt  from 
the  visit  of  the  assessor  ?     About  2.5  per  cent.,  as 
appears  trom    the    calculations  in  the  Appendix, 


National  Revomc,  257. 

leaving  for  our  taxal)le  income,   somewhat  more 
tlian  260,000,000.     Thus, 

Estimate  (four  Taxable  Income,  in  1823^ 

(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.)  t 

Rent  ol"  laiul  returned  in 
18 14-,  at  4-:},0{X),000/.,  and 
probably  amounting,  after 
allowing  for  all  deduc- 
tions, omissions,  and  eva- 
sions in  the  returns,  to     -         £4'8,000,000 

Add   for  land  brought   into 

culture  since  the  peace    -  2,000,000 

Together         -  50,000,000 

Deduct  for  all  abatements 
of  rent  since  the  peace^ 
made,  making,  or  which 
must  ere  long  be  made, 
one  third,  or  33  per  cent.  17,000,000 

Probable  rental  in  peace      -  33,000,000 

Deduct  furtlicr  for  tempo- 
rary deficiencies  on  the 
part  of  farmers,  at  this 
time  of  peculiar  pressure  3,000,000 

"         €30,000,000 

Tithe;  amount  in  1812  (see  Returns  of  Property 
Tax)  4-,700,000/. ;  at  present  computed,  after 
making  an  addition  for  the  increase  of  pro- 
duce, and  an  abatement  for  the  great  fall  of 
prices  ....  -       4,000,0001 

Rental  of  houses,  returned  at  nearly  16,000,000/. 
in  1814;  since  wliicli,  the  houses  are  aug- 
mented in  number  by  15  per  cent.,  and  as 
rents  have  fallen  only  partially,  we  compute 
the   amount   at  -  -     17,(XX),000 

Farming  income,  which,  during  the  latter  years 
of  the  war,  was  sO  large  as  to  equal  the  rental 
of  our  land,  but  which  is  at  present  so  greatly 

Carried  forward       -     51,000,000 


258  Natio7ial  Revenue. 

lirought  forward        -     51,(XX),000 
reduced,    we    estimate,    with    a   view   to   the 
future,  at  the  medium  rate  of  6  per  cent,  on 
200,000,000/,  the  supposed  amount  of  capital 
invested  in  agriculture  -  -  -     12,000,(XK) 

Income  from  trade  and  professions,  comprising  not 
only  manufacturing  and  mercantile  profits,  but 
income  from  mines,  docks,  canals,  tolls,  iron- 
works ;  likewise  salaries,  as  far  as  derived  from 
the  concerns  of  individuals  ;  to  the  exclusion, 
however,   of  all   incomes   below  50/.   a  year, 
This  portion  of  our  national  revenue,  returned 
during    the   war   at    30,000,000/.,    and    which, 
if  augmented  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of 
our  numbers,  should  at  present  be  35,000,000/., 
we  compute,  in  consequence  of  the  change  in 
the  value  of  money,  and  the  decrease  of  bu- 
siness, at  a  great  reduction,  say        .         .         -    22,000,000 
Wages  and  all  incomes  below  50/.  a  year,  com- 
puted  on    a   population,    which,  (exclusive  of 
Ireland)    is   now  nearly   15,000,000,    but  from 
which  somewhat  more  than  a  third  is  deducted 
for  persons  either  above  or  below  the  station  of 
those  receiving  wages.     This  large  deduction 
comprizes  not  merel}^  paupers,   but  cottagers 
and  all  others  whose  mode  of  life  is  such  as  to 
lead,  in  a  very  slight  degree,  to  the  consump- 
tion of  taxed  articles.     The  result,  estimated 
on  a  population  of  9,000,000  working  at  the  re- 
duced wages  of  peace,  but  adding  the  earnings 
of  women  and  children  to  those  of  the  men,  is     90,000,000 
Interest  of  our  debt,  funded  and  unfunded,  since 

the  reduction  of  the  5  per  cents.  -  -     30,000,000 

Conjectural  amount  of  interest  from  other  money 
securities ;  viz.  mortgages,  private  securities 
generally ;  also  public  securities,  such  as  bank 
stock,  East  India  stock,  foreign  stock,  in  short, 
all  securities  distinct  from  those  of  our  govern- 
ment .....  20,000,000 
Income  of  the  army,  navy,  civil  list,  and  public 
offices,  after  allowing  for  the  late  retrenchments. 


Carried  forward       -     225,000,000 


Natiofial  Revenue.  259 

Brought  forward       -  225,000,000 
and   leaving  out  the  proportion  expended  in 

Ireland                 ....  15,000,000 


Total  of  Great  Britain  24-0,000,000 

Ireland  :  taxable  income  computed  during  the 

war  at  35,000,000/.;  at  present  at       -  -     25,000,000 

(See  Appendix,  p.  [79].)  ■ 

Total  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  265,000,000 

Of  which,  lost  to  taxation,  being  expended  abroad 

by  travellers  and  emigrants                       -  4,000,000 


Remainder     -     261,000,000 


Ireland. -^The  total  produce  of  land  and  labour 
in  Ireland  cannot,  from  the  magnitude  of  the 
population,  be  below  7t>,000,000/.  a  year,  but  the 
cottagers  are  so  numerous  and  their  mode  of  living 
so  inferior  to  that  of  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  that 
the  portion  of  national  income  expended  on  taxed 
articles  can  hardly,  (})articularly  since  the  fall  of 
rents,  and  the  general  decline  of  incomes,)  exceed 
the  25,000,000/.  whicli  we  Iiave  introduced  into 
the  table. 

Increase  of  National  Income  since  1792.  —  The 
last  thirty  years  have  been  a  j)eriod  equally  re- 
markable for  financial  as  for  political  revolutions. 
Do  we,  it  maybe  asked,  possess  the  means  of  form- 
ing, with  any  degree  of  accuracy,  an  estimate 
of  the  increase  of  national  income  since  179'^? 
Such  an  estimate,  wliether  in  peace  or  war,  is  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty :  the  improvements  in 
our  land,  our  houses,  our  furniture  ;  the  additions 
to  our  towns,  our  harbours,  our  manufacturing 
establishments,  in  the  present  age,  arc  obvious, 
and  have  been  great  beyond  example  j  but  as  no 
record  can  express  the  amount  of  expenditure  in- 

s  2 


^60  National  Revenue, 

curred,  or  the  success,  necessarily  very  various,  of 
sucli  investments  of  capital,  it  remains  with  the 
inquirer  to  seek  a  standard  of  com])utation.  For 
this  we  are  in  some  measure  prepared  by  the  re- 
searches in  the  preceding  chapters ;  and  by  fol- 
lowing up  that  course  of  reasoning  we  shall  probably 
be  enabled  to  reduce  to  a  systematic  form  that 
which  seems  at  present  involved  in  contradiction. 
The  cause  of  the  changes  since  1792,  we  are  dis- 
posed to  seek  in  — 

Fluctuations  in  the  activity  of  our  productive 
industry  ; 

Fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money ; 

The  increase  of  population. 

Of  these  different  causes  the  first  and  second 
have  already  been  illustrated  (Chap.  II.  and  III.) 
at  considerable  length ;  and  whatever  may  be 
wanting  in  regard  to  them  shall  be  supplied  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  our  volume.  At  present,  there- 
fore, we  confine  our  attention  to  the  etiect  of  the 
third  cause, — increase  of  numbers  ;  —  adopting  the 
principles  laid  dowm  in  our  chapter  on  Popidation, 
and  applying,  or  endeavouring  to  apply  them,  to 
the  circumstances  of  the  present  age. 

Connexion  between  the  increase  of  Numbers  and 
increase  of  National  Income. — We  have  already  re- 
marked tliat  no  adherent  of  Mr.  IMalthus,  whatever 
might  be  his  objection  to  increase  of  numbers,  has 
alleged  that  our  lower  orders  have  made  a  descent 
in  the  scale  of  comfort ;  nor  does  the  surprising 
increase  of  our  population  in  the  present  age  ap- 
pear (Chapter  on  Poor  Rate,  p.  199.)  to  have  carried 
the  proportion  of  our  paupers  to  our  total  numbers, 
much  beyond  what  it  was  a  century  ago.  We  are 
far  from  maintaining  that  marriages  in  humble  life 


National  Revenue.  261 

are  contracted  with  the  requisite  prudence,  or  that 
the  parents  of  a  numerous  family  can  avoid  a  long 
and  serious  struggle  :  our  argument  merely  is,  that 
the  situation  of  tlie  lower  classes  generally,  is  not 
altered  for  the  worse.  It  is  the  characteristic  of  a 
civilized  and  industrious  society,  like  the  inhabitants 
of  Holhmd,  England,  or  Scotland,  to  make  suc- 
cessive discoveries  in  the  means  both  of  augmenting 
produce  and  diminishing  expense  ;  improvements 
by  whicli,  whether  effected  in  agriculture,  maiui- 
facture,  navigation,  or  trade,  a  country  is  enabled 
to  support  many  more  inhabitants  in  equal  comfort. 
Increase  of  numbers  therefore  is,  even  in  the  case 
of  the  lower  orders,  conduciv^e  to  increase  of  tax- 
able income  ;  for  w^e  have  already  had  occasion  to- 
show  what  large  sums  are  annually  brought  into 
the  exchequer  by  the  duties  on  beer,  spirits,  to- 
bacco, groceries  ;  all  of  which  enter  into  the  con- 
sumption of  the  classes  in  question,  particularly 
when  resident  in  towns. 

The  lo-west  class  of  Poor,  —  How,  it  may  be 
asked,  stands  the  question  of  increase  (^f  income, 
in  regard  to  a  po})nlation  of  such  primitive  habits 
as  the  cottagers  of  Ireland,  or  the  mountaineers  of 
Scotland,  accustomed  to  confine  their  demands  to 
mere  subsistence?  In  such  a  case,  an  increase  of 
numbers  implies  a  correspondent  increase,  not  of 
taxable  income,  but  of  the  produce  which,  like 
potatoes  or  ])read,  constitutes  the  mere  necessaries 
of  life  ;  and  the  result  is  an  addition  to  our  })opu- 
lation  of  individuals,  who,  though  able  to  earn  their 
subsistence,  can  be  said  to  add  to  our  'political 
strengtli  in  hardly  any  other  sense  than  as  recruits 
for  the  public  service,  or  as  mere  manual  labourt'rs, 
being  unable  to  make  the-  sacrifice  requisite  tbr 
Jearning  the  buf^iness  of  an  aitisan. 

s  8 


'i6'i  Nalional  Revenue. 

The  connexion  between  increase  of  numbers, 
and  increase  of  wealth,  will  appear  more  clearly, 
if  we  liave  recourse  to  arithmetical  statement,  and 
if  we  subject  to  an  analysis  the  250,0()0,0(X)^.  con- 
stituting the  taxable  income  of  the  nation.  This 
will  exhibit  the  following  proportions  : 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

(Taxable  Income,  exclusive  of  the  pay  of  the  Army 
and  Navy.) 

Arising  from  wages  and  salaries,  and  of  course, 

directly  affected  by  increase  of  population    -    £100,000,000 

From  capital  and  labour  combined,  a  portion 
of  national  income,  which  also  is  much  in- 
creased by  increase  of  population         -         -         50,000,000 

From  rent  of  land,  houses,  or  interest  of 
money,  which  are  influenced,  though  in- 
directly, and  in  an  inferior  degree,  by  the 
increase  of  numbers  ...  .       100,000,000 


Total  -  '250,000,000 

That  the  increase  of  taxable  income,  as  far  as 
such  arises  from  wages  and  salaries,  is  in  corre- 
spondence with  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  re- 
quires no  demonstration :  the  same  holds  in  regard 
to  professional  men,  to  merchants,  to  master  manu- 
facturers, in  short,  in  respect  to  every  line  in  which 
income  depends  on  personal  ei'ertion.  Thus,  land 
in  the  hands  of  the  farmer,  like  money  in  those  of 
the  merchant,  is  productive  in  proportion  to  the 
labour  w^hich  it  is  made  to  put  in  motion.  So  far 
the  connexion  is  clear  and  undoubted ;  the  case,  it 
may  be  said,  is  somewhat  different  in  regard  to  a 
Jixed  income^  whether  derived  from  real  or  per- 
sonal property ;  but  even  in  that,  the  effect  of  in- 
creasing numbers  is  great,  producing,  as  is  w^ell 
known,  an  increasing  demand  for  both  land  and 
money  capital.  In  proof  of  this,  we  have  merely 
to  take,  as  an  example,  the  almost  daily  case  of  a 


National  Revenue.  ^QS 

family  becoming  numerous ;  the  consequent  repar- 
tition of  the  paternal  property,  and  the  increase  of 
productive  power  given  to  the  portion  that  is  put 
in  a  state  of  activity. 

Fluctuations,  of  Income  since  lyf)^. — These  ar- 
guments will  readily  be  accounted  applicable  in  a 
general  sense,  and  for  ordinary  times ;  but  what 
shall  furnish  a  rule  for  computing  national  income 
in  so  fluctuating  a  ])eriod  as  that  through  which 
we  have  passed  since  179- ■''  The  question  is  cer- 
tainly very  complicated,  and  seems  at  first  to 
admit  of  no  clear  solution  ;  for  while  a  calculator, 
in  forming  an  estimate  twelve  or  fifteen  years  ago, 
could  hardly  have  failed  to  pronounce  the  war 
liighly  favourable  to  the  increase  of  our  wealth 
(our  debt  forming  apparently  no  counterpoise  to 
the  increase  of  our  resoiuces),  a  statement  pre- 
pared since  our  years  of  distress  would  convey  a 
very  different  result.  In  France,  the  Revolution 
has  been  styled,  the  "  queen  of  all  earthly  re- 
\'erses ;"  but  we  might  almost  hazard  an  opinion 
that  the  effect  of  that  convulsion,  viewed  in  regard 
to  change  of  property  and  in  all  the  extent  of  its 
duration  (now  aho\e  thirty  years),  has  been  as 
great  in  this  country  as  in  tliat  which  gave  it 
birth.  Among  our  neighbours,  the  change  was 
more  sudden,  directed  more  against  a  particular 
class,  and  bringing  with  it,  too  often,  the  melan- 
choly consequence  of  loss  of  lite;  but  with  us  it 
has  been  more  comprehensive,  tor  the  alteration 
in  the  value  of  money  has  come  home  to  every 
class  and  condition.  If  in  France,  government  an- 
nuitants suffered  during  the  war  a  much  greater 
reduction  tlian  heie,  (here  is  no  comparison  be- 
tween the  two  countries  in  the  extent  of  fiuctua- 

s  4 


9(54  National  Revenue  ; 

tion  in  the  circumstances  of  a  far  more  numerous 
class — the  farmers.  Their  j)rosperity  during  tlie 
war  and  their  decline  since  the  peace,  have  both 
been  much  more  in  extremes  among  us,  than  on 
the  Continent. 

An  Estimate  of  them  attempted. — Amidst  all 
these  changes  in  indiv^idual  property,  is  it  practi- 
cable to  discover  any  rules  of  general  application, 
any  data  on  wliich  to  found  a  comparison  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  public  of  the  present  day 
with  those  of  the  public  of  1806  or  1792?  This 
task  may,  perhaps,  be  found  less  difficult  than  it 
appears.  In  a  community  so  great  and  so  varied 
as  the  population  of  these  kingdoms,  the  ease  of 
one  part  is  often  cotemporary  with  the  em])arrass- 
ment  of  another ;  and  there  prevails,  in  the  gene- 
ral result,  a  tendency  to  a  balance,  an  approacli  to 
Tiniformity  which  would  hardly  be  credited  by 
those  who,  in  drawing  their  inferences,  allow  tliem- 
selves  to  be  forcibly  struck  by  the  fluctuation  of 
particular  classes.  It  was  tluis  that  our  revenue 
stood  its  ground  during  all  the  trials  of  the  war 
and  the  no  less  trying  interval  that  has  followed : 
it  is  thus,  also,  that  the  amount  of  our  exports  and 
imports  has  continued  to  bear  a  proportion  to  two 
regulating  circumstances  (the  value  of  money  and- 
the  increase  of  our  population),  amid  all  the  ano- 
malies, introduced  by  restrictions,  prohibitions,  li- 
cences ;  it  is  thiis  that  at  present,  the  distress  of 
the  producer  of  corn,  is  accompanied  by  a  tempo- 
rary advantage  to  the  consumer.  The  ])olitical 
arithmetician  is,  therefore,  in  some  measure,  justi- 
fied in  forming  a  conclusion,  which,  without  this 
collateral  support,  might  appear  vague  and  unten- 
able;   viz.    "  That  though   the  circumstances   of 


its  Increase  since  179^.  ^2iS5 

individuals,  separately,  are  so  much  altered  since 
1792,  those  of  any  given  number,  whether  100, 
1000,  or  10,000,  are  more  nearly  on  a  par  than  is 
generally  supposed." 

This  reasoning  is  calculated  to  lead  to  the  infer- 
ence, that  our  national  income,  (at  least  that  of 
Great  Britain  distinct  from  Irehmd),  has  increased 
since  179~  in  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  our 
population.  We  have,  however,  no  wish  to  press 
this  point,  it  being  of  little  consequence  to  our 
argmnent,  whether  the  proportion  of  the  one,  has 
been  greater  or  less  than  that  of  the  other.  It  is 
enough  that  we  obtain  assent  to  one  leading  con- 
sideration, viz.  that  the  surprising  addition  to  our 
numbers,  since  1792  (50  per  cent.)  is,  as  far  as  can 
be  ascertained,  unaccompanied  by  any  general  de- 
terioration of  ))rivate  circumstances.  The  changes 
in  such  circumstances  have  been  almost  infinite, 
but  there  seems  no  reason  to  imagine  that  the 
number  of  families  or  individuals,  who  have  experi- 
enced a  decHne,  exceeds  that  of  those  who  have 
improved  their  circumstances. 

But  are  we,  it  may  be  said,  authorized  to  assume 
an  equality  in  tiie  individual  income  of  this  coun- 
try between  179'^,  a  season  of  tranquillity,  and  the 
present,  which  is  one  of  general  embarrassment? 
To  this  argument,  unluckily  of  great  weight,  we 
oppose  one  of  equal,  or  almost  equal  power;  viz. 
the  great  comparative  increase  of  our  tovvn-j)oj)u- 
lation,  the  extent  of  which,  as  income  inc?'cases  so 
much  more  in  town  than  in  the  comilri/  (C'lia])ter  on 
Population,  p.  240.)  would  ha\  e  justified  us,  luul 
our  present  circumstances  been  as  tranquil  and 
secure  as  in  1792,  in  assuming  an  increase*  of  na- 
tional property  considerably  beyond  that  of  the 
50  per  cent,  indicated  by  oiu-  numbers. 


266  National  Ravenue  ; 

Without,  therefore,  affecting  precision  in  a  calcu- 
lation where  it  is  evidently  unattainable,  we  shall 
adopt  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  as  an  approx- 
imation to  a  basis  for  calculating  the  increase  of 
our  national  revenue.  Proceeding  on  this  ground, 
we  shall  exhibit  in  the  tabular  form,  the  aug- 
mentation that  has  taken  place  since  1792,  pre- 
mising that  our  chief  materials  are  the  population 
and  property-tax  returns,  and  that  for  the  period  of 
war,  we  make  a  considerable  addition  on  tlic  score 
of  extra  wages  and  profits. 


its  Increase  since  179^.  2(J7 


Conjectural  Amount  of  our  National  Revenue  or  Taxable  Income 
at  different  Periods,  from  1792  to  1822. 

Great  Britain  distinct  from  -^ ^  ,„„„  Totals,  also  in 

Ireland.  Money  of  1,92.        M^ney  of  1792. 

In   1792,  our  taxable  income 

appears    to    have   been   as 

stated  in  p.  35.  about  -      £125,000,000 

In   1806:  increase  calculated 

in  the  ratio  of  the  increase 

of  our    population,    18  per 

<;ent.  in  14  years         -         -  22,-500,000 

Together  -         -       1477500,600 

Probable    addition    from    the 

higher    wages    and    higher 

profits  of  a  sate  of  war     -  22,500,000 

Total    of  taxable    income    in 

1806  .         -         -         .  170,000,000 

In    1813    or    1814:    Increase 

of   national    income    since 

1806,     calculated     in     the 

ratio    of    the    increase    of 

population,     1 1    per    cent. ; 

thus : — 
National  income  in   1806,    as 

above         ....       _14.7,500,000 

Add  1 1  per  cent.  -         -       ~  16,500,000 

Together  -         -  16t,(XX),(X)0 

Probable    addition    from    the 

higher    wages    and    higher 

profits  of  a  state  of  war       -  24,(KK),000 

Total    of  taxable    income    in 

18L'J  or  1814  -         *  188,000,000 

Great  lirilain  and  Irciand. 

1823.      Increase    of    taxable 

income  in  the  ratio  of  the 

population,     15    per    cent. 

since  1814;  thus:  — 
Amount  in  1814  -         -  164,(K)0,01K) 

Add  15  per  cent  -         -  24,(XX),000 

Add     farther      the     taxable 

income  of  Ireland 

25,000,000/.  equal  in  money 

of  1792  to  -         -         -  21,000,000 

Total  of  our  taxable  income  in 

1823,  (in  money  of  1792)  209,000,(XK) 


^)S  Nation'nt  Revenue  ; 

These  results,  which,  we  repeat,  are  only  ap- 
proximations, convey  a  clear-  idea  of  the  effect  of 
increasing-  population  on  national  income.  The 
next  point  is,  the  diffei'ence  of  numerical  amount 
produced  by  the  rise  or  fall  in  the  value  of  money. 

Great  Britain  distinct  from  ^  ^  TJctQ    '      ,Money  of  subse- 

Irelt^iul.  ^  .    '  quent  years. 

1792:  Taxable  income  as  per 

preceding  table  -         -       £125,000,000 

1806:  Do.  per  do.  -         -         170,000,000 

After  the  general  rise  of 
prices  that  took  place  be- 
tween 1792  and  1806, 
170,000,000/.  in  money  of 
1792,  was  in  the  transac- 
tions of  1806,  equivalent  to  220,000,000 

And  an  actual  return  of  our 
national  revenue  or  taxable 
income  in  the  currency  of 
1806,  would  probably  have 
given  a  sum  of  220,000,000/. 

1813  or  1814:  Taxable  income 

as  in  last  page  -         -         188,000,000 

The  rise  of  prices,  in  all  60 
per  cent,  since  1792,  render- 
ed this  sum  equal  in  all 
money  transactions  in  1813 
and  1814,  to  nearly  -  300,000,000 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

1823.     Taxable  income  as  in 

last  page       -       -         -      -         209,000,000 
The  calculation   in  regard  to 

the  A'alue  of  money  is  now 

reversed,      prices      having 

fallen,    or,   in   other    words 

money  having  risen  in  value 

between    1814    and     1823, 

nearly  30   per    cent.     Still 

it    is    about    30   per    cent. 

lower  than  in  1792,  so  that 

the     last     mentioned    sum 

209,000,000/.      money      of 

1792),  is  equal  in  the  cur- 
rency of  1822,  to  about  270,000,000 
A  sum  not  materially  different 

from    the    amount    of    the 

table  •  of    taxable     income 

contained  in  p.  258. 


its  Increase  since  17 9^^' 


2C9 


Our  next  object  is  to  inti'oduce  our  burdens 
into  this  comparative  table,  and  to  calculate  their 
proportion  at  ditierent  periods  to  our  revenue. 


Statement  of  our  Public  Burdens  and  National 
Revenue,  calculated  for  distinct  Periods.  The 
Public  Burdens  include  Taxes  {before  deducting 
the  Ed'pence  (f  Collection),  Poor-rate,  and  Tithe. 

Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 


Years. 


1792 
1806 
1814 


Public   Burdens. 


£22,000,000 
60,000,000 
80,000,000 


Our  National  Re- 
venue or   Taxable 

IllCOUK'. 

£125,000,000 
220,000,000 
300,000,000 


Proportion  of  Bur- 
den to  Revenue. 


nearly  18  to  100 
27  to  100 
27  to  100 


Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  {see  Appendix,  p.  [85].) 
1823       I     64,000,000    |      260,000,000    |  25  to  100 


That  we  may  divest  tins  statement  of  the  in- 
tricacies attendant  on  the  difference  in  the  value 
of  money  at  different  periods,  we  subjoin  a  table, 
in  winch  the  sums  on  both  sides  are  reduced  to  a 
common  standard,  viz.  the  money  of  1792. 

Great  Britain  distinct  lioni  Ireland. 


Years. 


1792 
1806 
1814 


Public  Bur- 
dens, in  I^Ioney 
of  1792. 

£22,000,000 
46,000,000 
50,000,000 


Our  National  Re- 
venue or  Taxable 
Income  in  Money 
of  1792. 


^125,000,000 
170,000,000 
188,000,000 


Proportion  of  Bur- 
dens to  Revenue. 


nearly  18  to  100 
27  to  100 
27  to  100 


Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  [see  Appendix,  p.  [85].) 
1823    I      50,000,000  1      200,000,000   1  25  to  100 


The  reduction  to  a  common  standard  is  useliil 
in  several  respects,  particularly  in  correcting  the 
exaggerated  estimate,   which,   during  the  wai-,  we 


*270 


National  Rcve7iuc 


were  iiccustomed  to  make  of  botli  our  burdens  and 
our  resources. 

France;  her  National  Income.  —  We  conclude 
our  chapter  by  a  brief"  parallel  between  this  country 
and  her  most  powerful  neighbour.  The  national 
income,  by  which  we  mean  the  aggregate  of  indi- 
vidual income,  is,  in  one  sense,  somewhat  greater 
in  France  than  in  this  country  ;  but  in  regard  to 
the  portion  of  it  that  is  taxable,  the  advantage 
will  be  found  on  our  side,  in  consequence,  chiefly, 
of  our  greater  town-population  :  thus, 

Comparative  Sketch  oj'  National  Income  expended 
on  taxed  Articles, 


Great  Britain 

and 

Ireland. 


France,  after 

adding  to  the 

actual  receipts 

20  per  cent,  for 

the  greater  value 

of  money. 


Rent  of  land  and  farmer's  profit  at 

peace  prices. 
Tithe 

Rent  of  houses  .  -  -  - 
Income  arising  from  commerce, 
manufactures,  and  professions, 
as  far  as  such  are  of  50/.  and  up- 
wards; also  income  from  mines, 
docks,  canals,  tolls,  &c. 
Small  incomes  (below  50/.)  and 
wages  of  all  accustomed  to  con- 
sume taxed  articles,  as  beer, 
tea,  sugar,  tobacco,  in  England ; 
or  wine,  cyder,  tobacco,  sugar, 
coffee,  in  France. 


50,000,000 

5,000,000 

18,000,000 


24,000,000 


60,000,000 
18,000,000 


18,000,000 


-100,000,000 


110,000,000 

Together    -197,000,000   206,000,000 
Such  is  the  amount   of  income'  \ 

arising  from  the  land  and  labour  of| 
either  country.  To  this  we  now 
make  an  addition  of  great  import- 
ance as  a  source  of  taxation,  what-] 


Parallel  wit//  France. 


271 


1    France,  after 

_,  .    .        adding  to  the 
Great  Britain      ^^^^^^  ^^^-^^^^ 

and            2Q  p^^  ^.^^^^  f^^ 
Ireland.         ^^^^  greater  value 
of  money. 

Brought  forward 
ever   may  be  thought  of  it  as  a 
constituent  of  national  wealth. 
Income  from  money  in  the  public 
funds,  or  lent  on  private  secu- 
rities         

Received    from   government,  dis- 
tinct  from   the   interest    of  the 
public    debt ;    viz.   the    pay    of 
the  army,  the  navy,  the  public 
offices,  the  civil  list,  the  miscel- 
laneous services,  after  allowing 
for  the  late  reductions 

Total  taxable  income  *     -     - 

£ 
197,000,000 

50,000,000 
18,000,000 

£ 
206,000,000 

25,000,000 
19,000,000 

265,000,000    250,000,000 

*  Any  discrepancies  between  this  column  and  that  in  page  25,  arise  from 
the  latter  exhibiting  the  returns  of  Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 


Wages.  —  To  put  the  two  countries  so  nearly  on 
a  par  in  regard  to  wages,  may  seem  hardly  fair 
towards  France,  su])eric)r  as  that  country  is  in  po- 
pulation, and  reduced  as  wages  in  some  measiu'e 
have  been,  and  are  likely  to  be  among  us.  But  in 
a  calculation  of  national  revenue,  the  magnitude 
of  the  po})ulation  of  France  ought,  in  a  great 
measure,  to  be  kept  in  the  back  ground,  many 
millions  being  cottagers,  who,  as  in  Ireland,  do 
little  more  than  maintain  themselves  on  their  })etty 
occupancies,  consuming  few  articles  productive  to 
the  exchequer,  and  adding  little  to  the  national 
strength,  otherwise  than  by  recruits  foi-  the  mi- 
litary service.  Wages  are  highest  among  a  town- 
})opulation,  in  which  England  takes  greatly  the 
lead.  Add  to  this,  that  in  all  Catholic  countries 
there  is  a  considerable  loss  of  wages  from  holidays. 


'27^      National  Revenue  ; — Parallel  mlli  France. 

Rent  of  Houses.  —  In  this  respect,  France  was 
formerly  entitled  to  rank  before  us  ;  but  houses  in 
a  riual  district  yield  very  Httle  rent ;  and  while 
French  towns  arc  comparatively  stationary,  ours 
have  been  and  continue  in  a. state  of  rapid  in- 
crease. 

Comparative  Prospects  ofEnglnnd  and  France. — 
This  interesting  question  shall  be  discussed  at 
considerable  length  in  our  chapter  on  Finance, 


^7' 


CHAP.  rx. 

Effect   of  the  late    Wars  on   Propertt/,  individual 
and  national. 

1  HE  researches  we  have  already  had  occasion  to 
make  in  regard  to  our  agriculture  and  national 
revenue,  prepare  us,  in  a  considerable  degree,  for 
the  farther  and  more  comprehensive  enquiry  to 
which  this  chapter  is  appropriated.  In  the  invest- 
igations connected  with  it,  we  shall  studiously 
avoid  discussing  the  policy  or  impolicy  of  our  great 
contest ;  the  practicability  of  avoiding  it  in  the 
outset,  or  of  terminating  it  in  an  earlier  stage.  We 
shall  avoid,  in  like  manner,  any  parallel  between 
the  magnitude  of  our  sacrifices  on  one  hand,  and 
the  benefit  resultin<>;  on  the  other  from  restorino 
the  equilibrium  of  the  Continent.  Nothing,  in- 
deed, would  be  more  hopeless  than  an  attempt  to 
produce  any  thing  like  uniformity  of  opinion  on 
such  a  subject.  The  oppositionist,  in  his  review 
of  the  events  of  the  last  thirty  years,  takes  littft* 
account  of  the  danger  that  arose  afler  1795,  from 
the  aggrandizing  spirit  of  the  French  govern 
ment;  nor,  while  urging,  and  urging  jusUy,  tiie 
insignificance  to  us  of  most  causes  of  continental 
quarrel,  does  he  make  due  allowance  lor  the  im- 
portance of  the  Netherlands,  and  the  alarming  ad- 
dition whicii  their  possession  made  to  the  power 
of  France.  The  ministerialist,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  equally  confident  and  indiscriminating,   making 

T 


'^7'!'       E(](rl  of  fhr  Idle  IVars  oji  Propcrl/f, 

no  ailmissioM  of  the  occasions  on  wliicli  (as  in  179^^^ 
iind  I8O7)  onr  government  acted  an  aggressive 
part,  and  justifying  the  attack  on  Copenhagen  as 
he  wonhl  the  defence  ol"  Spain.  From  tiie  delu- 
sion that  the  war  was  a  source  of  permanent  wealth, 
we  now  begin  to  be  awakened ;  but,  in  otiier  re- 
spects, we  are  yet  far  distant  from  the  time  when 
the  public  shall  be  enabled  to  view  the  transactions 
of  this  eventful  age  with  the  calmness  of  historical 
enquiry.  It  will  be  for  a  succeeding  generation  to 
appreciate,  on  the  one  hand,  the  ferment  produced 
by  the  French  Revolution ;  on  the  other,  the 
course  by  which  our  political  guides,  had  they 
been  aware  of  the  little  dependence  to  be  placed 
on  foreign  allies,  and  of  the  aid  to  be  derived  for 
the  maintenance  of  order  from  the  upper  and  mid- 
dle classes  at  home,  might  have  endeavoured  to 
conduct  our  affairs  during  the  period  of  alarm. 
The  hazardous  alternati\'e  of  an  appeal  to  arms 
would  probably  have  been  avoided,  had  our  coun- 
cils been  guided  by  a  Burleigh  or  a  Walpole ;  or 
had  he  who  was  placed  at  our  helm  in  those  critical 
times,  been  of  an  age  to  derive  from  personal  re- 
flection and  experience  that  knowledge  in  which 
he  was  necessarily  deficient,  and  the  want  of  whicli 
was  so  feebly  supplied  by  the  coadjutors  witli 
whom  our  system  of  parliamentary  influence 
obliges  a  minister  to  become  connected. 

Political  Economists, — The  discrepancy  that 
prevails  among  politicians  is  equally  remarkable 
among  political  economists.  To  the  follower  of 
Smith  and  Say,  all  war  seems  impolitic  and  unne- 
cessary ;  in  his  eyes,  the  whole  of  military  array, 
the  training,  equipping,  and  maintaining  of  fleets 
and  armies,  is  an  absolute  sacrifice,  the  loss  of  the 


Individual  and  National.  QJ5 

labour  of  the  most  valuable  part  of  our  population. 
It  is  with  great  diHiculty  that  he  can  be  brought  to 
allow  that  war  brings  with  it  even  a  temporary 
aliment  to  its  consuming  powers.  Mr.  Say,  the 
political  economist  of  France,  after  visiting  this 
country  in  the  first  year  of  peace,  published  the 
following  remarks. 

"  Ministers  and  public  men  in  England  are  as 
yet,  (he  wrote  with  reference  to  our  ministry  of 
I8O7),  far  from  having  a  just  sense  of  the  folly 
and  ruinous  tendency  of  war :  their  progress 
has  not  kept  pace  with  the  progress  of  the  nation. 
The  misfortunes  of  England  take  their  rise  in  the 
higher  regions,  like  the  hail  and  the  tempest :  her 
blessings  spring  from  beneath,  like  the  fruits  of  an 
inexhaustible  soil.  The  taxes  have  not  only 
doubled,  but  tripled  since  1792  j  and  still  the  war 
expenditure  greatly  exceeded  their  amount.  The 
consequence  is,  an  enormous  enhancement  of 
prices ;  mercantile  men  are  obliged  to  do  business 
on  very  slender  profits,  and  what  is  still  worse, 
many  of  the  manufactured  articles  aj*e  sadly  fallen 
from  their  former  reputation.  My  French  readers,** 
he  adds,  "  will  be  surprized  to  find  in  my  pages 
an  opinion  so  much  at  variance  with  the  current 
notion  that  England  is  the  land  for  the  easy  and 
ra])id  attainment  of  fortune  ;  but  the  reality  is 
widely  different  from  the  appearance." 

A  very  different  picture  of  the  effect  of  war  is 
given  by  Mr.  8.  Gray,  to  whom  we  have  so  fre- 
quently referred  in  our  chapter  on  population,  and 
who  came  several  years  ago  before  the  public,  as  the 
author  of  a  system  bearing  the  emphatic  name  of 
"  productive."  The  pages  in  which  that  doctrine 
is  recommended  to  the  world,  contain  a  number 
of  arguments  on  tlic  connexion  between  govern- 


276       Fifjict  of  flic  late  IVars  on  ProjK-rti/, 

mcMit  expenditure  and  the  increase  of  individual 
income,  taxes  being  considered  hy  Mr.  Gray  in 
the  Hght  of  useful  stimulants  to  our  national  in- 
dustry. He  has  the  merit  of  detecting  several 
imperfections  in  Dr.  Smith's  definition  of  product- 
ive and  unproductive  labour;  but  in  reasoning  on 
our  war  expenditure,  he  evidently  fails  to  distin- 
guish between  a  temporary  and  a  lasting  excite- 
ment, and  assumes,  from  the  circulation  of  money 
raised  by  loans  and  taxes,  as  much  advantage  as 
if  war  prices  were  necessarily  permanent,  and  as 
if,  on  concluding  peace,  we  could  consider  our- 
selves exempt  from  the  frightful  reaction  experi- 
enced during  the  last  nine  years. 

To  these  opposite  authorities,  each  tending  in 
some  degree  to  an  extreme,  we  add  the  observ- 
ations of  a  third  writer. 

"  Notwithstanding  the  immense  expenditure  of  the  Enghsh 
government  during  the  late  wars,  there  can  be  Httle  doubt  but 
that  the  increased  production  on  the  part  of  the  people  has 
more  than  compensated  for  it.  The  national  capital  has  not 
merely  been  unimpaired,  it  has  been  greatly  increased ;  and 
the  annual  revenue  of  the  people,  even  after  the  payment  of 
their  taxes,  is  probably  greater  at  the  present  time  than  at 
any  former  period  of  our  history.  For  the  proof  of  this,  we 
might  refer  to  the  increase  of  population, —  to  the  extension 
of  agriculture,  —  to  the  increase  of  shipping  and  manufactures, 
—  to  the  building  of  docks, — to  the  opening  of  numerous 
canals,  as  well  as  to  many  other  expensive  undertakings;  — 
all  denoting  an  increase  both  of  capital  and  of  annual  produc- 
tion."    {Ricardo  on  Political  Economi/,  second  Edition,  p.  170.) 

This  passage  presents,  perhaps,  too  favourable  a 
a  view  of  our  situation  ;  and  ought,  before  we  can 
receive  it  as  a  true  picture,  to  be  accompanied 
by  two  admissions.  First,  that  though  our  na- 
tional income  has  increased,  our  burdens  have  aug- 
mented in  a  still  greater  ratio ;  and,  secondly,  that 
in  any  estimate  of  our  wealth  expressed  in  money 


Individual  and  National.  '^77 

in  the  present  day,  a  considerable  deduction  is  to 
be  made  from  an  estimate  in  179^,  on  account  of 
the  inferior  \a\\\q  of  money.  It  is  fair,  however, 
to  add,  that  this  passage  was  written  at  a  time 
(1816)  when  the  fall  of  prices  was  only  beginning, 
and  w^hen  we  were  unable  to  calculate  the  extent 
of  fluctuation  and  loss  arising  from  the  war. 
Since  then,  seven  eventful  years  have  elapsed, 
and  have  disclosed  a  succession  of  circumstances 
beyond  the  reach  of  foresight,  but  replete  with  in- 
struction when  examined  in  the  order  of  their  oc- 
currence. With  this  advantage,  we  now  follow 
up  the  enquiry,  and  instead  of  reasoning  in  general 
terms,  like  the  writers  we  have  quoted,  we  shall 
endeavour  to  build  on  a  secure  foundation,  and 
proceed,  as  in  our  preceding  chapters,  by  a  series 
of  calculations  and  specific  results.  Our  arrange- 
ment shall  be  as  follows  : 

Losses  incurred  during  the  prosecution  of  the 
war. 

Losses  attendant  on  the  transition  from  war  to 
peace. 

Comparative    amount   of  our    national    income 
in  war  and  peace. 

Have  our  public  men  understood  our  financial 
situation  ? 

Losses  io  our  produclivc  Indus/ny  on  a  Trans- 
ttionfrom  Peace  to  JVar.  —  Tliese  losses,  unknown 
in  a  great  measure  to  the  younger  part  of  the  pre- 
sent generation,  will  long  live  in  the  recollection 
of  those  who  are  of  an  as:e  to  remember  the  bank- 
ruptcies  of  1793.  These  pervaded  eciiially  our 
commercial,  manufacturing,  and  agricultural  inte- 
rests, and  affected  almost  all   whose  undertakings 

T   S 


278       EtP^c^  '.'/  '^'^  '^'^^  IVars  on  Properlj/, 

were  not  supported  by  snl)stantial  capital.  To 
frhat  was  a  pressure  so  general  to  be  ascribed  ?  To 
the  sudden  and  extensive  change  that  took  place  ; 
to  a  demand  on  the  part  of  government  for  men 
and  money ;  and  to  the  consequent  necessity  of 
abandoning  various  undertakings,  the  profit  of 
which,  ahnost  always  less  than  is  vulgarly  imag- 
ined, could  be  made  to  answer  only  by  the  aid  of 
a  low  rate  of  interest  and  moderate  price  of  labour. 
Ih  these  days,  as  at  present,  our  countrymen  were 
speculative,  eager  to  embark  on  new  enterprises, 
and  apt  to  trust  to  prospective  advantages  for  those 
means  of  providing  for  payments  which  their 
limited  capital  did  not  afibrd.  This  sanguine  dis- 
position may  be  termed  the  great  feature  that  dis- 
tinguishes our  countrymen  and  the  North  Ameri- 
cans from  the  traders  and  agriculturists  of  the 
continent  of  Europe,  among  whom  the  same  oc- 
cupation is  so  often  followed  from  father  to  son, 
with  little  idea  of  change  or  attempt  at  extension. 
But  our  spirit  of  enterprise,  however  favourable 
to  discovery  and  improvement,  is  necessarily  at- 
tended by  a  revolution  in  the  circumstances  of 
individuals  on  the  occurrence  of  any  political 
change.  The  blow  first  strikes  establishments  of 
the  most  adventurous  character,  and  goes  on  to 
involve  others  injured  by  the  failure  of  the  first, 
and  possessing,  like  them,  few  resoiu"ces  against  an 
unforeseen  demand.  Embarrassments  of  this  de- 
scription were  felt  chiefly  in  the  first  and  second 
years  of  the  war,  during  the  interval  that  luiavoid- 
ably  elapsed  before  the  capital  and  labour  dis- 
turbed in  their  employment  by  the  war,  could 
receive  a  new  direction,  and  be  invested  anew  in  a 
productive  form. 


Individual  and  National.  279 

From  this  almost  tbrgottcii  tlieme,  we  proceed 
to  a  part  of  the  subject  much  more  familiar  to  the 
majority  of  our  readers;  to  au 

Estimate  of  the  Burden  arising  from  Government  Expenditure 
during  the  War. 

Interest  of  the  debt  contracted  during  the  war, 
after  allowing  for  the  reduction  of  the  5  per 
cents.  -  .  -  .  .  €22,000,000 

The  annual  amount  of  half-pay  and  pensions  in 
the  army,  navj',  and  civil  service,  arising  from 
the  war,  is  at  present  (1823),  about  4-,5()0,0(K)/. ; 
but  consisting  almost  all  of  life  annuities,  may 
be  computed  equal  to  a  permanent  burden  of  -       2,000,000 

Exclusive  of  this,  the  expence  of  our  army  and 
navy  is  very  greatly  augmented  since  1792, 
partly  from  the  extension  of  our  foreign  pos- 
sessions, partly  from  causes  unconnected  with 
the  war,  such  as  the  increase  of  our  population, 
and  the  necessity  of  enforcing  the  collection  of 
the  revenue  in  Ireland.  As  yet  the  charge  of 
our  army  and  navy  (distinct  from  half-pay  and 
pensions),  exceeds  that  of  1792  by  6,000,000/., 
but  from  the  prospect  of  continued  peace,  and 
the  general  fall  of  prices,  we  may  anticipate  a 
farther  eventual  reduction  of  1,000,000/.  Of 
the  remaining  5,000,000/.,  we  put  to  the  ac- 
count of  the  war,  somewhat  more  than  half, 
viz.  .  .  .  -  -       3,000,000 

Add,  for  increase  of  the  civil  list,  salaries,  pen- 
sions in  consequence  of  the  war  and  of  the  rise 
caused  by  it  in  prices  -  -  -       2,()()0,()00 

Other  war  charges  not  enumerated  -  -       1,000,000 


Total         .        -  C  30,000,000 


Such  is  the  amount  of  burden  arisini:;  from  our 
war  expenditure;  lui})pily,  however,  there  are  al- 
leviating considerations. 

r  4 


li.SO        iljfci/  of  I  he  lalv  H'cirs  on  l*roprr/i/. 

Deductions  from  our  apparent  Burdens. 

Tadation  of  other  Countries. — It  is  in  some  re- 
spects a  matter  of  little  difficulty  to  understand 
the  financial  relief  \vhicl»  we  have  in  prospect ; 
such,  for  example,  as  the  decrease  in  our  half-pay 
and  pensions,  ejther  by  the  occurrence  of  deaths, 
or  a  transfer  for  long  annuities  ;  but  the  case  may 
not  be  quite  so  clear  in  regard  to  a  deduction  of 
another  kind,  we  mean  that  which  arises  from  a 
**  community  of  the  pressure  of  taxation  on  the  civi- 
lized world  at  large.'*  Yet,  however  real  our  Idsses 
from  the  war,  however  inferior  our  national  wealth 
to  what  it  would  have  been,  had  peace  been  unin- 
terrupted, we  cannot  be  said  to  have  incurretl  ab- 
solute injury,  or  to  labour  under  any  permanent 
disadvantage,  in  as  far  as  similar  burdens  have 
been  imposed  on  those  who  are  our  competitors 
in  the  career  of  productive  industry.  This,  we 
say,  though  perfectly  aware  of  the  folly  of  the  doc- 
trine that  one  nation  gains  by  impoverishing  an- 
other. Our  argument,  when  attentively  examined, 
will  be  found  to  rest  on  a  very  different  basis : 
war,  at  all  times  a  losing  game,  would  be  doubly 
so,  w^ere  our  opponents  to  escape  a  participation 
in  the  pecuniary  pressure  ;  our  productive  labour- 
ers would  soon  emigrate,  and  pursue  their  industry 
in  untaxed  countries.  To  brinsf  our  ars^ument  to 
a  point :  if  in  England  tlie  late  wars  ha\'e  increased 
the  proportion  of  burden  to  income  by  twelve 
per  cent.,  and  if  in  France,  Germany,  or  the 
Netherlands,  the  comparative  increase  be  five  or 
six  per  cent.,  our  loss,  serious  as  it  is,  can  hardJy 
be    considered    as    exceeding  the  difierence  *,    we 

^0 


Individual  and  Naliunal.  t^81 

mean  that  in  whatever  regards  tiie  liazard  of  rival- 
ship,  or  the  injury  from  foreign]  competition,  our 
disadvantage  is  limited  to  the  extra  six  or  seven 
per  cent. 

Ou7^  War  Todies. — Our  next  modification  of  our 
losses  is  also  of  a  very  extensive  character,  though 
it  does  not  happen  to  form  a  deduction  from  the 
preceding  table.  It  comprises  no  less  than  the 
lurger  portion  of  the  mm  raised  bij  "jcar  tojces^  which, 
though  (see  Chapter  II.  p.  24.)  of  very  great 
amount,  we  are  disposed  to  consider  as  defrayed 
out  of  the  extra  profits  of  a  state  of  war ;  so  largely 
were  the  gains  of  the  public,  whether  in  the  shape 
of  interest,  salary,  wages,  or  profit  of  stock,  in- 
creased by  the  circulation  of  the  money  raised  by 
our  loans.  In  making  this  great  allowance,  we  are 
perfectly  aware  that  in  many  cases,  particularly  after 
oiu'  unfortunate  Orders  in  Council,  our  merchants 
and  manufacturers  paid  their  taxes,  as  our  farmers 
at  present  pay  their  rent,  not  from  income  but  f  ironi 
capital.  We  are  aware,  also,  that  the  resources 
which  supplied  our  war  taxes  were,  in  a  great  mea- 
sure, temporary,  and  of  a  natiue  to  disap})ear  with 
the  stimulus  that  excited  them  :  but  our  estimate 
is  confined  to  the  years  of  war ;  and  we  arc  pro- 
bably justified,  on  considering  all  circumstances,  in 
making  the  preceding  deduction,  important  as  it  is. 

Public  Works,  such  as  Canals,  Roads,  and  Bridges, 
—  These,  however  commendable  in  the  intention, 
are  expedient  as  undertakings  only  when  the 
returns  are  such  as  to  afford  a  fair  interest  for  the 
capital  invested.  From  the  high  price  of  labour 
and  materials  in  the  latter  })art  of  the  war,  most 
speculations  of  the  kind,  such  tor  example  as  the 
new  bridges  of  the  metro))olis,  wcic  attended  with 


'282  I']lF'cf  o/'t^ii'  ^(if^-  IVars  on  V roper tij, 

a  far  greater  cliarge  than  if  they  had  been  post- 
poned and  executed  in  peace.  The  same  holds  in 
regard  to  our  agriculture,  in  which  a  large  share  of 
the  outlay  was  incurred  on  the  assumption  of  high 
prices.  Even  in  the  case  of  our  manufacturing 
machinery,  a  part  erected  when  labour  was  high,  is 
no  longer  necessary  or  profitable,  now  that  labour 
is  reduced.  Still,  a  great  part  of  such  loss  is  merely 
in  appearance,  and  resolves  itself  into  the  different 
value  of  money:  the  canal  share,  which,  in  1813, 
cost  100/.,  may  be  said  to  indemnify  its  owner,  if  it 
at  present  fetches  y^/.,  because  that  sum  is  at  pre- 
sent equal  in  the  power  of  purchase  to  the  100/.  of 
1813.  Such  investments  of  property  involve  an 
absolute  loss  only,  in  as  far  as  they  fall  below  tliat 
proportion,  a  case  at  present  unfortunately  loo 
frequent. 

Tithe. — This  portion  of  our  burdens  is  difJerent, 
in  several  respects,  from  general  taxation.  Its 
amount,  as  expressed  in  money,  increased  sur- 
prisingly during  the  war,  in  consequence  of  two 
causes,  —  the  enhancement  of  produce,  and  tlie 
extended  cultivation  attendant  on  the  increase  of 
our  numbers.  How  far  did  the  payment  of  this 
increased  amount  prove  of  detriment  to  our  re- 
sources ?  It  was  defrayed  by  that  portion  of  the 
community,  who,  so  long  as  the  war  lasted,  were 
most  able  to  defray  their  burdens.  On  the  public 
at  large,  its  pressure  was  not  apparent ;  in  an  indi- 
rect sense,  however,  that  pressure  was  great,  for 
tithe  operated  as  an  obstacle  to  ctdiiration^  and 
greatly  restricted  the  amount  of  our  produce,  at  a 
time  when  it  would  have  been  most  desirable  to 
increase  it. 

Poor-Rate.  —  In  tliis  respect,   the   estimate  of 


Individual  ami  National,  283 

burden  during  the  late  wars  is  subject  to  consider- 
able qualification.  The  increase  of  the  rate  having 
been  as  great  in  agricultural  as  in  manufacturing 
districts,  although  in  the  former,  work  was,  all 
along,  abundant,  the  inference  is,  that  the  rise 
was,  in  a  great  measure,  iiominaly  and  would  other- 
wise have  been  paid  in  the  shape  of  wages.  Add 
to  this  the  decrease  of  rates  in  tlie  last  and  present 
year,  with  the  probability  of  a  progressive  diminu- 
tion, and  we  shall  find  that  the  portion  of  burden 
attributable  to  the  war  is  by  no  means  so  great  as 
might  be  inferred  from  the  numerical  statements 
of  the  poor-rate. 

The  National  Debt.  —  After  all  these  allowances, 
it  may  be  incumbent  on  us  to  answer  the  question, 
whether  we  *'  consider  our  national  debt  as  forming 
an  actual  loss,  an  absolute  addition  to  our  public 
burdens?'*  This  question,  idle  in  the  view  of  the 
attentive  enquirer,  is  by  no  means  superfluous  in 
regard  to  the  cursory  observer,  to  those  who  im- 
agine our  debt  a  property  which,  without  the  war, 
would  have  had  no  existence,  a  responsibility  of 
little  importance  because  due  among  ourselves. 
All  such  notions  we  entreat  our  readers  to  dismiss 
from  their  minds,  and  to  consider  our  debt  as  not 
less  real  for  being  due  to  our  countrymen.  It  is  the 
record  of  money  expended,  gone  for  ever;  and 
involving,  as  far  as  our  burdens  exceed  those  of 
other  countries,  a  series  of  disadvantages.  Had 
we  had  no  war,  the  capital  and  labour  that  has  led 
to  the  formation  of  our  debt  would  not  have  been 
unemployed ;  it  would  have  been  put  in  activity 
by  other  causes,  and  received  its  increase  in  a  dif- 
ferent form.  The  product,  we  allow,  would,  j)r{). 
bably,  have  been  smaller,  because  the  ratio  of  in- 


284        J\ff'^^^  uflhc  Idtc  IVars  on.  Propcrtij, 

crease,  whether  iiom  interest,  profit  of  stock,  or 
personal  exertion,  would,  in  a  state  of  continued 
peace,  have  been  much  less  considerable. 

Effect  of  the  War  on  the  Habits  of  Individuals. 
—  The  increase  of  wealth   arising  from  the  war 
was  much  more  an   increase  of  income  than  of 
property.     In  the  latter  sense  the  war  was  bene- 
ficial to  those  only  who  had  formed  their  habits  in 
a  season  of  tranquil  occupation,  of  moderate  profit, 
and  who,  from  their  experience  and  time  of  life, 
were  capable  of  reaping  the  new  harvest  without 
abusing  it.     The  case  was  very  different  with  those 
who,  entering  on  business  during  the  war,  took  for 
granted  that  circumstances  would  continue  as  they 
found  them,  and  made  no  provision  for  a  reverse. 
The  characteristics  of  this  youthful  generation  may 
be  said  to  have  been  a  general  confidence,  a  habit 
of  early  expence,   a  repugnance  to  the  cautious 
perseverance  of  former  days.     The  extent  of  evil 
arising  from  such  a  source   can  be  computed  by 
those  only  whose  observation  has  embraced  a  wide 
range,  who  have  marked  throughout  the  present 
age  the  frequent    substitution    of  adventure   for 
industry,  and  the  reiterated  loss  of  capital  when 
entrusted  to  the  young  and  inexperienced. 

Losses  on  ttie  Transition  from  War  to  Peace. 

No  period  of  our  history  affords  an  example  of  a 
change  so  sudden  and  so  extensive  as  that  which 
took  place  in  the  state  of  our  productive  industry 
after  the  peace  of  1814.  For  the  relinquishment 
of  foreign  colonies,  and  for  an  active  rivalship  in 
manufacture,  on  the  part  of  the  continent  of 
Europe,  the  public  were  prepared  ;  but  they  had, 
in  a  manner,  lost  sight  of  the  great  diflference  be- 
tween government  expenditure  in  peace  and  war  ; 


Individual  and  National.  ^85 

and  the  few  who  took  this  difference  into  account, 
imagined  that  the  diminution  of  demand  at  home 
would  be  balanced  by  our  exports  to  newly 
opened  markets  in  America  and  Asia.  These 
persons  were  by  no  means  aware  either  of  the  mag- 
nitude of  our  circulation  at  home  arising  from  war 
expenditure,  or  of  the  substantial  difference  be- 
tween an  assiu'ed  payment  in  England,  and  the 
hazard  attendant  on  transactions  with  distant  coun- 
tries. Many  anticipated  a  partial  reduction  of 
wages,  but  not  a  general  want  of  work  ;  a  dimi- 
nution of  mercantile  and  manufacturing  profit  to 
a  certain  extent,  but  in  no  degree  proportioned  to 
that  which  took  place.  Yet  the  years  of  peace 
have  been  marked  by  no  calamity  of  a  general 
nature  ;  by  no  such  bankruptcy  as  the  South  Sea 
or  Mississippi  scheme ;  by  no  territorial  cessions, 
like  the  relinquishment,  at  the  peace  of  1783,  of 
our  North  American  provinces;  by  no  insuruection 
in  our  colonies  ;  no  successful  rivalship  on  the  part 
of  competitors  either  in  manufacture  or  navigation. 
Magnitude  of  the  Change.  —  ^\'hat,  tlien,  were 
the  causes  of  our  great  and  unexpected  embar- 
rassments? Not  a  reduction  of  our  means  con- 
sidered physically  or  intrinsically,  but  a  general 
change  in  the  mode  of  rendering  them  productive ; 
a  sudden  removal  of  the  stimulus  arising  from  tlie 
war.  In  no  former  contest  had  our  military  esta- 
blishments been  carried  to  such  a  height :  the 
number  of  our  militiamen,  soldiers,  and  sailors,  dis- 
charged, amounted  to  between  two  and  three  hun- 
dred thousand,  while  the  individuals  em])I()yed  in 
the  manufacture  of  clothes,  arms,  stores,  in  the 
supply  of  provisions,  tlie  navigation  of  transports, 
amounted,  perhaps,  to  two  hundred  thousand  more. 
The  macfnitude  of  the  transition  will  be  best  shown 


28(i        mH'f'f  <}flli<^'  Ifitc  IVars  on  Propcr/i/, 

by  a  brief  comparison  of  the  sums  expended  by 
oineninient  in  tlie  iivc  last  years  of  the  war,  and 
the  ti\  e  first  years  of  peace  : 

YEAUS    OF    WAR. 

1811.  -  £   92,200,000       181 4-.  -  i^l  17,000,000 

1812.  -    103,400,000       1815.  -    110,0()0,(KK) 

1813.  -    121,000'000         Average  -  108,720,000 

YEARS  OF  PEACE. 

1816.  -     72,000,000       1819   -     59,000,000 

1817.  -     66,300,000        1820  -     61,000,0(X) 
1818  -     67,000,000         Average  -  64-,660,00G 

Peace  thns  caused  an  immediate  reduction  of 
more  than  forty  millions  in  the  amoinit  of  the 
money  distributed  by  government  to  pay  cm})loy- 
ment,  or,  in  other  words,  to  stimulate  productive 
industry.  Add  to  this  that  during  the  war  most  of 
our  establishments  had  been  formed  on  a  large 
scale,  a  scale  that  supposed  a  power  of  demand,  a 
ca])acity  of  payment  much  greater  than  was  found 
to  exist  after  the  peace.  This  w-as  the  case  in 
regard  not  only  to  great  offices,  but  private  esta- 
blishments of  the  most  dissimilar  character  j  manu- 
factures, mercantile  houses,  seminaries  of  education, 
and  a  variety  of  undertakings,  almost  all  of  which, 
w^hether  in  the  metropolis  or  provincial  towns,  were 
adapted  to  a  community  increasing  not  only  in  its 
numbers,  but  in  its  power  of  expenditure. 

The  means  by  w^hich  we  were  enabled  to  pay 
such  heavy  contributions  during  the  war  have  been 
already  explained.  Exempt  from  continental  com- 
petition, the  public,  or  at  least  four-fifths  of  the 
public,  had  at  that  time  the  power  of  indenniitying 
tbemselves  for  their  taxes  by  an  increased  rate  of 
charge.  This  was  the  case  of  the  land-holder,  the 
farmer,  the  owner  of  houses,  the  receiver  of  tithe : 


Individual  and  National.  287 

it  was  the  case,  likewise,  of  persons  cxercisiiii^  pro- 
fessions, of  those  receiving  sahiries,  and  of  the  very 
mnneroiis  class,  whose  dependence  is  on  wages.  At 
the  peace,  all  or  almost  all  was  reversed  :  agricnl- 
turists,  merchants,  manufacturers,  fell  from  their 
'vantage  ground,  and  prosperity  was,  during  several 
years,  confined  to  aimuitants,  to  whom,  since  1S20 
or  1821,  we  are  enabled  to  add  the  majority  of  the 
labouring  classes.  It  must  not  be  interred  ti-om 
this  that  our  consumption,  whether  of  agricultuial 
or  manufactured  produce,  experienced  an  absolute 
diminution  ;  for  our  numbers,  as  was  shown  at  the 
time  by  the  extent  of  new  buildings,  and  subse- 
(piently  by  the  population  returns,  were  annually 
on  the  increase  j  but  partly  from  the  economy  in- 
troduced by  altered  circumstances,  more  from  an 
augmentation  of  supply,  the  increase  of  buyers  did 
not  equal  the  increase  of  sellers,  and  a  general  fall 
of  prices  became  unavoidable.  Finally,  our  dis- 
tress was  aggravated  in  no  slight  degree  by  the  ab- 
sence of  many  of  our  countrymen  of  the  upper  and 
middling  classes,  who,  whether  as  travellers  or  as 
residents  on  the  Continent,  incurred  an  expendi- 
ture of  several  millions  annually  abroad,  at  the  time 
it  was  most  wanted  at  home. 

Distress  of  Foreign  Countries. — Similar  causes 
of  embarrassment  were  unfortunately  in  operation 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  In  former  wars  the 
evils  of  transition  had  been  felt  in  few  countries, 
and  to  a  comparatively  small  extent;  but  in  IS  13 
and  181 1<,  almost  all  Europe  had  been  in  military 
array,  and  every  country  felt  the  sudden  change 
from  disembodying  of  armies,  cessation  of  go\ern. 
ment  purchases,  and  an  overstock  of  productive 
labourers.      Add   to  this,    tiiat   our   greatest   cus- 


^8S         E[Jrct  of  I  he  late  IVars  on  Proper! jj, 

tomers,  tlie  United  States  of  America,  had  siift'ered 
so  severely,  Hist  from  the  stoppage  of  their  naviga- 
tion, and  afterwards  from  the  return  of  peace,  as 
to  be  far  less  able  to  pay  for  our  goods  than  during 
the  continuance  of  tiie  war.  The  consequence 
was  that  our  foreign  trade,  though  not  diminisiied, 
and  even  partially  increased  in  amount,  failed, 
from  irregularity  in  the  payments,  to  prove  an 
efficient  source  of  relief. 

Temporary  Revival  of  Activity  in  1818. — The 
extent  of  our  suffering  might  have  been  in  some 
degree  lessened,  had  our  real  situation  been  earlier 
known,  or  had  it  not  undergone  considerable  fluc- 
tuation in  the  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the 
peace.  The  year  1811-  produced  two  great  re- 
sults; a  fall  of  corn,  and  a  reinstatement  of  the 
value  of  bank  paper.  Both  continued  during  1815 
and  1816,  but  the  bad  harvest  of  the  latter  year 
renewed  the  operation  of  our  corn  laws,  and  being 
followed  by  a  revival  of  trade  and  manufacture, 
accustomed  us  anew  to  high  prices,  gave  a  tempo- 
rary increase  to  the  revenue,  and  suspended  the 
measures  that  might  otherwise  have  been  taken  for 
a  general  adaptation  of  our  burdens  to  oiu*  means  ; 
we  mean  a  reduction  of  salaries  and  those  other 
incomes  in  regard  to  which,  from  the  sums  being 
previously  fixed,  the  course  of  circumstances  has 
not  had  free  operation.  Our  second  period  of  dis- 
tress (beginning  in  1819)  thus  came  on  us  as  un- 
expectedly as  the  first,  and  we  are  now,  in  the 
ninth  year  of  peace,  discussing  those  points  which 
it  had  been  of  infinite  importance  to  us  to  have 
understood  from  the  moment  that  the  overthrow 
of  Buonaparte  opened  the  prospect  of  a  general 
change. 


Individual  and  National  289 

Our  probable  Situation  had  the  War  been  avoided, 
—  We  shall  close  these  remarks  by  a  brief  calcula- 
tion of  what  would  probably  have  been  our  finan* 
cial  situation,  supposing  political  science  to  have 
been  as  well  understood  at  the  time  of  the  Freilch 
revolution  as  at  present,  and  our  statesmen  equally 
convinced  of  the  close  connexion  between  the  pre- 
servation of  peace,  and  the  increase  of  national 
prosperity.  Had  such  been  the  case,  we  may 
fairly  assume  that  our  cabinet  would  either  not 
have  interfered  in  the  war  at  all,  or  would  have 
made  peace  in  1793,  as  soon  as  the  French  were 
driven  within  their  frontiers.  For  tranquillity  at 
home  they  would  probably  have  trusted  to  mea- 
sures of  police,  to  the  aid  of  an  armed  force,  and  to 
the  support  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes  of 
society.  The  troubled  aspect  of  the  times,  and 
the  necessity  of  arming  the  executive  branch  with 
power  both  to  repress  sedition,  and  to  effect  such 
measures  as  the  union  with  Ireland,  and  the  equal 
collection  of  taxes  throughout  the  kingdom,  would 
doubtless  have  obliged  us  to  increase  our  army  and 
carry  our  expenditure  considerably  beyond  that  of 
179^»  The  result  might  have  been  that  our  taxes 
and  poor-rate  which  in  179^,  amounted  (including 
Ireland)  to  about  20,000,000/.,  might  by  this  time 
have  been  carried  by  a  gradual  increase  to  28  or 
30,000,000/.  In  other  respects  also,  our  situation 
would  have  been  exempt  from  the  extraordinary 
fluctuations  we  have  witnessed.  Thus  the  price  of 
wheat  would,  even  after  the  double  failure  of  crop 
in  1799  and  1800,  hardly  have  exceeded  .SOj;.  mo- 
derate as  would  have  been  the  charges  on  import. 

In  a  state  of  peace  the  attention  of  our  ministers 
miglit  Uave  been  bestowed  on  measures  of  internal 

u 


f290        Kf]Wl  of  (hi'  laic  J  Tars  on  Proper/ 1/, 

improvement,  sucli  as  cominutation  of  tithe,  e(|iial- 
ization  of  poor-rate,  or  the  removal  of  commercial 
restrictions,  all  necessarily  })ostponed  during  a 
contest,  which  not  only  absorbed  their  time,  but 
obliged  them,  from  their  dependence  on  the  support 
of  particular  interests,  to  submit  to  a  tacit  continu- 
ance of  abuses.  If  we  are  told  that  the  average 
rate  of  profits  and  wages  being  smaller  in  peace 
than  in  war,  our  national  income  would  not  in  the 
former  alternative  have  been  so  large,  our  answer 
is,  that  while  we  admit  the  quicker  increase  of  in- 
vidual  income  during  war,  we  have  to  bring  against 
it  a  formidable  deduction  in  the  losses  attendant 
on  the  transition  to  peace.  Or  if,  to  avoid  argu- 
ment, we  limit  our  estimate  of  loss  arising  from 
the  war  to  a  sum  of  which  the  interest  is  15  or 
18,000,000/.  a  year,  we  allow  even  then  that  we 
have  incurred  a  burden  equal  to  the  revenue  of 
the  Austrian  or  Russian  empire. 

The  late  Wars  examined  hy  moral  Considerations. 
—  We  proceed  to  bestow  a  few  sentences  on  the 
events  of  the  late  war,  considered  on  higher 
grounds  than  those  of  mere  calculation.  The  ap- 
parent triumph  of  injustice,  in  national  as  well  as 
individual  transactions,  has,  as  is  well  known,  often 
embarrassed  candid  inquirers,  and  reduced  them 
almost  to  question  the  interference  of  Providence 
in  the  course  of  human  affliirs.  Among  our  neigh- 
boLU'S  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  Channel,  scepti- 
cism received  an  unfortiniate  extension  at  the  time 
of  the  revolution ;  an  extension  to  be  attributed 
partly  to  the  youth  and  unthinking  character  of 
many  of  the  reformers,  partly  to  the  odium  to 
which  the  Catholic  clergy  exposed  themselves  by 


Individual  and  National,  f291 

their  o))po.sition  to  the  new  cause.  During  many 
years  the  success  of  a  restless  despot  seemed  to 
confirm  the  doubts  of  the  intervention  of  a  higher 
power,  since  it  was  not  till  the  Continent  luid  been 
overrun,  that  political  justice  resumed  its  course. 

But  if  such  impressions  may  be  expected  in  a 
country  where  religion  wears  a  form  ill  calculated 
to  obtain  the  conviction  of  a  reflecting  mind,  ought 
M^e  to  have  expected  in  England  a  favourable  re- 
ception to  such  a  doctrine  as  that  of  our  national 
wealth  being  augmented  by  war?  Hap])ily  no 
such  conclusions  are  suggested  by  the  writings  of 
those  who  have  most  successfully  investigated  the 
sources  of  national  prosperity;  by  the  labours  of 
Turgot,  Smith,  or  Say.  If  to  describe  the  structure 
of  the  human  frame  ;  to  explain  the  connexion  and 
the  subserviency  of  its  various  parts,  has  been 
declared  ecpiivalent  to  a  hynm  in  praise  of  its  divine 
Author,  not  less  is  that  testimony  due  to  the  study 
of  the  causes  of  the  success  of  productive  industry. 
Researches  into  that  subject,  when  prosecuted  in 
the  spirit  of  im})artiality,  tend  more  and  more  to 
establish  the  connexion  between  equity  and  j)ros- 
perity,  between  fairness  in  principle  and  success  in 
practice. 

This  connexion,  we  can  safely  assure  t)ur  readers, 
is  no  philanthropic  dream,  but  is  practically  recog- 
nized by  the  directors  of  our  mercantile  policy. 
The  system  of  prohibition  and  high  duties,  so  long- 
in  favour  with  our  ancestors,  is  now  renounced,  and 
our  Board  of  Trade  has,  during  the  last  eight  years, 
acted  on  the  conviction  that  the  increase  of  our 
wealth  is,  in  a  great  measure,  dependent  on  the 
increase  of  that  of  our  neighbours.  Further,  if  we 
pass  in  review  our  mercantile  history  during  the 
wai-,  and  discriminate  the  gain  and  loss  of  particular 

V   2 


929^      Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  PropctHi/,      , 

classes,  we  shall  find  that  the  change  of  circum- 
stances since  the  peace  has,  in  general,  been  sucli 
as  to  constitute  a  fair  retribution  to  those  who  had 
either  benefited  or  suffered  by  fluctuation.  Annui- 
tants have  been  relieved  from  their  long  depression, 
and  now  find  their  income  restored,  or  nearly  re- 
stored, to  its  former  value.  Of  our  countrymen  at 
present  in  a  state  of  suffering,  we  may  be  permitted 
to  remark  that  they  belong  in  general  to  the  classes 
whose  gains  were  greatest  during  the  war ;  a  re- 
mark made  without  the  slightest  intention  of  weak- 
ening their  claim  to  relief  j  since  not  humanity  only, 
but  the  public  interest  (see  the  chapter  on  Agri- 
culture, p.  142.)  calls  on  us  to  prevent  their  farther 
depression.  And  we  have  adverted  to  their  case 
merely  to  show  the  transient  and  unsubstantial 
nature  of  gains  derived  from  a  state  of  war  ;  —  the 
frightful  recoil  to  be  apprehended  by  those  who 
imagine  that  in  them  they  have  found  a  source  of 
permanent  advantage. 

The  result,  therefore,  is,  that  the  late  war,  so 
long  accounted  a  source  of  national  wealth,  in\'olv- 
ed  a  sacrifice  of  property  not  inferior  to  the  sacri- 
fice of  lives.  To  this  double  drain  in  our  resources, 
what  has  been  the  grand  counterpoise  ?  Our  pro- 
gress in  the  arts  of  peace  :  the  power  of  extracting 
a  larger  supply  of  subsistence  from  our  soil ;  a 
larger  revenue  from  our  labour  and  capital.  By 
what  criterion  are  we  enabled  to  compute  the 
amount  of  the  addition  thus  obtained  ?  We  know 
of  none  more  satisfactory  than  a  return  of  the  num- 
bers added  to  our  population  and  supported  by  our 
resources;  a  subject  replete  with  satisfactory  conclu- 
sions, and  which  we  have  already  discussed  at  con- 
siderable length.  At  present,  without  recurring  to 
our  arguments  on  that  head,  we  shall  merely  ad- 


Individual  and  National.  593 

vert  to  a  very  common,  but  a  very  erroneous  notion, 
that  "  the  rapid  increase  of  our  numbers  in  the  pre- 
sent age  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  war.*'  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  case  in  regard  to  the  middle 
classes,  the  wages  of  many  of  the  lower  orders, 
particularly  those  of  the  country  labourer,  bore,  even 
when  added  to  tlie  poor-rate  (see  the  chapter  on 
Poor-rate,  p.  ^03.),  a  smaller  proportion  to  the  ex- 
pense of  rearing  a  family  than  in  peace.  Now,  as  the 
lower  orders  form  by  far  the  most  numerous  portion 
of  the  nation,  and  tlie  circumstances  affecting  them 
are  decisive  of  the  general  increase  of  our  numbers^ 
we  can  by  no  means  join  in  ascribing  the  surprising 
augmentation  in  the  present  age  to  the  excitement 
arising  from  the  w^ar,  although  that  opinion  may 
have  (Lord  Liverpool's  speech,  Mai'ch  1822-)  the 
sanction  of  ministerial  authority.  It  has  continued 
with  equal  rapidity  since  the  peace,  and  our  rulers 
may,  we  believe,  trace  it  with  confidence  to 
causes  of  a  cheering  and  permanent  character ;  to 
the  effect  of  vaccination,  to  the  improvement  in  the 
lodging,  cleanliness,  and  sobriety  of  the  lower 
classes. 

In  thus  dwelling  on  the  evils  of  war,  our  object 
is  not  to  join  with  the  decided  Oppositionists,  in 
lamenting  wliat  cannot  be  recalled,  or  in  affixing 
a  general  censiu'e  on  a  course  of  policy,  whicJi 
though  reprehensible  in  some  respects,  admitted  in 
many  others  of  vindication  from  the  conduct  of  our 
enemies  ;  or  of  defence,  from  tlie  limited  Ibrcsight 
of  hiunan  nature.  Our  purpose  is  strictly  statistical, 
and  our  wish  is  merely  to  impress  on  the  pubhc  a 
consideration  of  great  im])ortance  to  tlieir  future 
welfare,  viz.  that  the  injury  to  national  j)rosperity 
resulting  from  war,  however  it  may  be  palliated  or 
j)ostponed,  is  eventually  of  most  serious  magnitude, 

r  3 


29 1        mf(^(^t  of  the  lale  Wars  on  Proper!  i/. 

even  when,  in  a  military  sense,   tlie   issue  oi'  the 
contest  lias  j)rove(l  triumphant. 

We  now  proceed  to  a  more  enlivening  theme,  — 
to  a  survey  of  the  present  state  of  our  pi'oduetive 
industry,  and  of  the  prospect  opened  to  us  by  a 
continuance  of  peace.  To  our  reasoning  on  this 
head  we  shall  endeavour  to  give  a  definite  form  by 
bringing  it  before  the  eye  of  the  reader  in  the 
shape  of  arithmetical  calculation.  We  begin  our 
table  \yith  the  year  1813,  as  the  last  in  which  our 
prices  bore  the  stamp  of  a  state  of  war.  In  com- 
paring this  with  the  present  year,  we  keep  in  view 
two  important  facts. 

1.  The  increase  of  our  population,  which,  since 
1813,  is  about  15  per  cent. 

2.  The  fall  in  the  price  of  commodities,  in  other 
words  the  reduction  of  expence,  w^iich  to  most 
classes  w^e  compute  at  2.5  and  to  some  at  35  per 
cent. 

An  attention  to  these  facts  is  indispensable  to  a 
correct  estimate  of  our  situation  :  we  should  other- 
wise fall  into  the  common  error  of  considering  our- 
selves rich  or  poor,  merely  as  prices  happened  to 
be  high  or  low.  The  complexity  of  the  following 
table  will,  w^e  trust,  disappear  after  an  attentive 
examination. 


s  > 


596       Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Vropert^, 

The  reader,  who  shall  bestow  a  little  time  on 
studying  this  table,  will  not,  we  trust,  be  lojig  in 
finding  his  labour  repaid,  and  in  making  the  satis- 
factory discovery  that  the  decrease  of  our  financial 
means  since  the  peace  is  by  no  means  so  great  as 
is  commonly  supposed. 

Remarks  on  Col.  II. — Interest  of  Money.  —  The 
surplus  in  the  receipts  of  our  monied  liffen  above 
their  expenditure  supplies,  is,  as  is  well  known,  an 
annual  fund  for  investment,  and  as  there  has  been 
of  late  no  opportunity  of  making  loans  to  our  ex- 
chequer, this  surplus  has  sought  a  vent  in  advances 
to  private  individuals,  or  to  the  French,  American, 
and  other  foreign  governments.  We  have  accord- 
ingly made  in  our  table  a  large  addition  to  the 
estimated  amount  of  interest  arising  since  the  peace 
from  such  investments. 

Agriculturists. — Though  the  increase  of  number 
in  this  class  since  1813  has  been  considerable,  and 
has  evidently  been  accompanied  by  a  corresponding 
increase  of  produce,  we  have  declined,  for  ob- 
vious reasons,  to  suppose  it  productive  of  increase 
of  income. 

Tithe.  —  Here  the  same  objection  does  not  alto- 
gether hold,  tithe  not  having  experienced  either  so 
great  a  rise  in  war  or  so  great  a  decline  since  the 
peace. 

Wages. — Under  the  head  of  wages,  -we  have 
supposed  between  200  and  -300,000  men  with- 
drawn at  the  peace  from  the  militia,  army,  and 
navy,  and  have  added  the  amount  of  their  proba- 
ble earnings,  (6,000,000/.),  to  the  head  of  wages. 


Individual  and  National.  297 

A  corresponding  deduction  is  made  under  the 
head  of  income  to  individuals  in  the  pubhc  ser- 
vice. The  great  diminution  in  tliis  branch  puts 
in  a  striking  hght  the  stagnation  attendant  on  the 
transition  iiom  war  to  peace. 

Ireland.  —  The  untaxed  income  of  Ireland  rests 
(see  Appendix  p.  78.)  on  a  very  different  cal- 
culation from  her  taxed  income,  and  must,  from 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  her  peasantry,  have 
received  a  very  large  augmentation  since  1813. 

Remarks  o?i  Col.  IV. — Reduction  of  Expence. — 
We  may,  perhaps,  be  charged  with  making  a  some- 
what too  large  allowance  in  this  respect,  the  saving 
compared  to  1813  being,  in  various  situations,  not 
yet  carried  to  the  extent  of  25  per  cent.  Our 
answer  is,  that  peace  being  evidently  the  policy  of 
our  government,  tliere  is  a  probability  of  reduction 
continuing,  and  of  that  which  has  not  taken  place 
in  the  ])resent  year,  being  accomplished  in  the 
next. 

Farmers,  —  Amidst  all  the  distress  of  this  re- 
spectable part  of  the  nation,  it  is  some  satisfaction 
to  perceive  the  large  reduction  in  their  disburse  for 
labour  and  other  farming  charges. 

The  Lower  Orders.  —  These  form  so  great  a  por- 
tion of  the  connnunity,  that  we  can  hardly  ad\ert 
too  often  or  too  attentively  to  their  situation.  The 
transition  from  war  to  peace  bore,  doubtless,  veiy 
heavy  on  ])articular  classes,  j)rincipally  manufac- 
turers, whose  wages  were  very  low  at  a  time  when 
provisions  were  by  no  means  cheap.  Since  1820, 
however,  circumstances  have  altered  greatly  in  their 


298       VS'c^  ofllic  late  IVars  on  Propoiij, 

fiivoiii',  tlit3  fall  of  i)rovi.sions  having  rendered  22^. 
a  week  equivalent,  in  the  j)Owei'  of'purcliase,  to  Si)s. 
during  the  war.  If  this  fall  was  too  <rieat  and  too 
rapid,  it  is  at  least  a  satisfaction  that  tlic  advantage 
of  it  sliould  have  accrued  to  the  most  necessitous 
})art  of  the  community.  Viewing  this  very  nu- 
merous body  collectively,  we  find  their  situation, 
whether  in  town  or  country,  more  comfortable  at 
present  than  at  almost  any  period  within  our 
recollection. 

Remarks  on  the  Table  generally.  —  In  comparing 
the  amount  of  national  revenue  at  different  periods, 
it  is  fit  to  keep  in  view  the  increasing  number  of 
consumers,  in  other  words,  of  individuals  to  be  sup- 
ported from  that  revenue.  This  increase,  including 
Ireland,  amounts  to  nearly  3,000,000  for  the  ten 
years  that  have  elapsed  since  1813.  For  this  sur- 
prising addition  to  our  numbers,  allowance  is  made 
in  Col.  II.,  but  as  it  may  be  thought  from  the  esti- 
mate in  Col.  III.,  that  our  means  are  not  adequate 
to  the  support  of  this  new  charge,  v,e  must  remind 
the  reader,  that  increased  po])ulation  happily  brings 
with  it  the  means  of  supporting  itself,  and  that  on 
comparing  Cols.  II.  and  V.,  he  will  discover  that, 
even  after  makins;  a  deduction  from  the  favour- 
able  part  of  our  statement,  our  present  means  of 
affording  wages,  salaries,  and  income  of  different 
kinds,  are  not  inferior  to  our  means  during  the 
war,  by  more  than  10  per  cent.  Now  a  reduction 
of  the  income  of  the  community  to  the  extent  of 
10  per  cent,  would  not,  had  it  been  equal  and 
general,  have  proved  disastrous  :  it  wouhl  liave 
necessitated  a  diminution  of  expense,  and  have 
given  a  general  check  to  sanguuie  expectation,  but 
could  never  have  been  the  cause  of  severe  distress. 


Individval  and  National.  299 

But  the  transition  unfortunately  took  place  in  a 
very  unequal  manner,  for  while  in  the  case  of  the 
landholders,  tlie  decrease  of  income  appears  to  be 
20  per  cent.,  and  in  that  of  farmers  not  less  than 
(30  per  cent.,  annuitants  on  the  ])ublic  funds  have 
benefited  or  will  soon  benefit  to  an  extent  of  20  or 
2.5  per  cent. 

In  what  order  or  succession  did  these  reductions 
of  income  take  place  ?  First,  in  the  army,  the 
navy,  and  the  classes,  such  as  contractors  and  ma- 
nufacturers, who  derived  their  support  from  go\ern- 
ment :  the  agriculturists  followed  almost  imme- 
diately, in  consequence  of  the  unchecked  import  of 
\'oYe\<m  corn  durinc;  1814.  Trade  and  manufac- 
tures,  though  luuliminished  as  far  as  regarded  ex- 
port, experienced,  during  several  years,  a  great  de- 
crease at  home,  from  the  cessation  of  government 
purchases,  and  an  overstock  of  hands  from  the  dis- 
charge and  non-enlistment  of  men  for  the  armv 
and  militia.  Among  the  liberal  professions,  the 
medical  suffered  a  direct  surcharge  from  an  obvious 
cause :  the  same  held  in  regard  to  the  civil  service 
of  government,  and  if  in  the  law  and  the  church, 
the  overstock  has  been  less  rapid,  it  has  not  been 
the  less  certain,  so  nuich  does  stagnation  of  demand 
in  any  of  the  great  departments  affect  the  com- 
munity at  large. 

Oitr  pahi/c  Burdens  ;  their  caviparatire  Pressure 
in  War  and  Peace.  —  Since  the  peace,  the  numeri- 
cal amount  of  our  burdens  has  been  considerably 
diminished,  the  repeal  of  the  property-tax,  along 
with  the  reduction  of  the  duties  on  malt,  salt,  and 
leather,  ha\  ing  formed  (previously  to  the  reduction 
of  the  assessed  taxes)  a  dimiiiulion  of  nearly 
2(),000,()(K)/.  This  sum,  howevi-r,  large  as  it  is, 
has  been  balanced,  or  nearly  balanced,  by  the  ri>e 


300       IW^ct  (ftfie  late  Wars  on  Projyertt/y 

in  the  value  of  money;  the  65,000,0(XJ/.  which  we 
have  paid  annually  since  the  peace,  having  formed 
an  amount  of  equal  value  with  the  80  or  85,000,000/. 
paid  at  the  close  of  the  war.  There  was  thus  no  real 
reduction  of  our  burdens  until  the  present  year, 
and,  unfortunately,  from  the  evils  of  transition, 
from  the  sudden  diminution  in  the  income  of  par- 
ticular classes,  our  taxes  have  been  found  a  burden 
of  greater  pressure  since  the  peace,  than  during  the 
'vvar. 

Effect  on  our  Public  Debt  of  the  Rise  in  the  Value 
of  Money.  —  We  come  now  to  the  circumstance  in 
the  series  of  our  transitions,  whicli,  more  than  any 
other,  has  contributed  to  increase  the  burden  of 
our  taxes.  To  comprehend  this  fully,  the  reader 
should  bear  in  mind,  that  government  stands  per- 
manently in  the  capacity  of  a  debtor;  that  its  respon- 
sibility is  represented  not  in  land,  houses,  or  what 
is  technically  termed  real  property,  but  in  money ; 
and  that  whatever  raises  the  value  of  money, 
increases  the  pressure  of  its  debt.  During  the 
long  depreciation  of  money  attendant  on  the  war, 
the  payment  of  9  or  10,000,000/.  of  interest,  at  the 
Treasury,  required  no  gi'eater  drain  on  the  national 
resources,  than  the  payment  of  7  or  8,000,000/. 
previous  to  1793.  This  fact,  long  known  to  our 
finance  ministers,  formed  during  a  time  the  basis 
of  very  confident  calculations  ;  so  long  as  high 
prices  were  kept  up,  so  long  did  our  leading  men 
at  tlie  Treasury  and  in  Parliament  imagine,  that 
the  pressure  of  the  debt  contracted  during  the 
war,  would  be  alleviated  by  the  continued  deprecia- 
tion of  money.  At  the  peace,  indeed,  a  degree 
of  re-action  or  rise  in  the  value  of  money  was 
anticipated;  but  in  the  opinion  of  the  public, 
as  of   go%^erament,    that   re-action   was  likely   to 


Individual  and  National.  ,'301 

be  slight.  Had  such  proved  the  case  ;  had  the 
price  of  com  been  kept  up  both  liere  and  on 
the  Continent,  the  evils  of  transition  would  have 
been  comparatively  slight,  and  our  national  bur- 
dens would  have  been  less  severely  felt.  Their 
pressure  would  ha\'e  gradually  decreased  as  our 
numbers  augmented,  and  we  might  have  con- 
sidered the  expence  of  the  contest  as  in  a  great 
measure  liquidated  from  two  sources, — the  extra 
profits  of  labour  and  capital  which  had  supplied 
our  war  taxes,  and  the  depreciation  of  that  money 
debt,  which  represented  the  undischarged  burden. 
But  all  such  calculations  were  disappointed  :  re- 
action took  place  on  a  large  scale ;  and  without 
experiencing  any  direct  increase  of  charge,  the 
public  were  subjected  to  serious  embarrassment 
from  the  general  diminution  of  the  sums  paid  for 
rent,  salaries,  wages,  in  short,  for  almost  every 
thing  except  the  income  of  annuitants. 

Has  this  increase  of  burden  been  accompanied 
by  any  circumstances  of  alleviation  ?  In  })rivate 
life  we  have  for  some  time  experienced  relief  from 
the  reduction  of  our  exi)enditure  ;  but  what  is  tiie 
situation  of  government  ?  It  feels  the  pressure  on 
more  than  two-thirds  of  its  disburse  ;  the  benefit 
on  less  than  one-third.  The  former  consist  of 
interest  of  debt,  military  and  naval  pay,  pensions, 
half-pay,  sahiries,  and  retirement  allowances,  all  of 
a  fixed  amount  in  money,  and  all  virtually  iiicreascd 
as  the  price  of  commodities  has  fallen.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  reduction  of  government  charge 
from  the  fall  of  prices,  was,  till  very  latel}',  ex))e- 
rienced  only  in  the  victualling  of  our  navy,  the 
purchase  of  stores,  and  in  a  portion  of  the  miscel- 
laneous services. 

These  discoveries  may  be  said  to  c:onstiUite  the 


30^^  yV/r-  lali'  Jl'ars  ; 

denoiiemcnl  of  the  iiiyst(M*ioiis  financial  drama  that 
has  been  actinp,-  chning-  the  last  thirty  years.  Our 
power  of  ])ccuniary  contribution,  so  often  and  so 
Joudly  ascribed  to  generosity  in  the  sacrifice  of 
our  wealtli,  may  now  be,  in  a  great  measure, 
traced  to  causes  of  a  huml)ler  cliaractcr  ;  to  an 
increase  of  our  productive  industry,  founded  on 
loans,  and  to  a  great,  but  temporary  rise  of  prices. 
Both  of  these  remarkable  features  in  our  situation 
were  expected  to  be  permanent ;  but  the  I'ise  of 
prices  lias  disappeared,  and  to  the  extension  of  our 
productive  industry,  circumstances  were  long  un- 
favourable. Add  to  this,  that  though  from  the 
time  of  the  overthrow  of  Bonaparte,  the  prospect  of 
continued  peace  produced  a  radical  change  in  our 
situation,  our  ministers  w  ere  tardy  in  bringing  for- 
ward any  measure  of  finance  founded  on  that 
change,  or  on  the  confidence  with  which  we  may 
anticipate  an  increase  of  our  wealth  and  numbers. 
In  fact,  until  the  present  year,  we  made  little  pro- 
gress towards  relief,  unless  we  account  as  such  a 
more  correct  knowledge  of  our  situation  ;  a  dis- 
covery of  certain  errors  ;  a  perception  of  the  tran- 
sient nature  of  the  aids  on  which  we  relied  during 
the  first  years  of  peace. 


Have  our  public  men,  since  1793,  undei'stood 
our  financial  situation  ?  —  After  ascertaining  the 
existence  of  such  general  misapprehension,  it  is 
impossible  to  avoid  asking  M'hether  several  impor- 
tant circumstances  in  our  situation  and  prospects 
have  not  been  unknown  to  our  political  guides. 
Were  they  aware  during  the  war,  that  the  extension 
of  our  productive  industry  was,  in  a  great  degree, 


Conduct  of  our  Public  Men  since  179o.     303 

artificial,  and  must  tlccline  witli  that  government 
expenditure  whicli  called  it  forth  ?  Looking  to 
the  amount  of  the  interest  of  our  ])ublic  debt,  of 
our  pensions  and  othei*  fixed  payments,  did  they 
or  did  they  not  foresee  that,  on  the  cessation  of  this 
artificial  stimulus,  the  natural  course  of  circum- 
stances would  cause  a  rise  in  the  value  of  money, 
and  a  consequent  increase  of  pressure  ?  To  what 
degree  do  these  considerations  affect  the  reputation 
of  Mr.  Pitt,  the  leader  in  that  course  of  j)olicy, 
which,  in  a  military  sense,  produced  so  brilliant  a 
result,  —  in  a  financial,  so  nnich  embarrassment? 
That  Mr.  Pitt  was  at  first  averse  from  the  war 
with  France,  is  apparent,  from  several  circum- 
stances, whether  we  refer  to  the  declaration  of 
respectable  Avriters*,  or  to  the  undeniable  fact, 
that  a  state  of  war  was  altOi>'ether  contrarv  to  his 
])lans,  for  the  reduction  of  our  ])ublic  burdens. 
That,  after  the  campaign  of  1791'  had  disclosed 
the  weakness  of  our  allies,  and  the  strenj^th  of 
France,  he  lamented  oiu-  involving  ourselves  in  the 
contest,  there  seems  little  rcason  to  doubt :  but 
when  the  country  was  fairly  engaged  in  it,  and  our 
resources  were  called  into  full  activity,  it  accorded 
with  his  confident,  and  persevering  character,  to 
maintain  the  struggle,  in  the  hope  of  recovering 
the  Netherlands  so  unfortunately  lost.  Hence  a 
continuance  of  the  contest,  notwithstanding  the 
defection  of  our  allies  and  the  financial  diflicnities 
of  1797;  hence  those  war  taxes,  which  no  odier 
minister  would  have  ventured  to  ])roj)ose,  and 
certainly    no    other    would     have     succeeded     in 


*  Nichols'  Recollections  of  George  HI.  and  .1.  Allan's  Bio- 
graphical Sketch  of  Fox,  in  Napier's  Supplement  to  the  Ency- 
clopaedia Hritannica.  page  ;J61. 


3(H  The  late  IVars ; 

raising :   hence  also,  our  second  attack  on   France 
by  the  coalition  of  1799. 

But  the  perseverance  of  Mr.  Pitt  was  not  blind 
persistency :  on  a  renewed  experience  of  the  weak- 
ness of  our  allies,  on  a  proof  of  the  sufferings  of 
the  country  from  heavy  taxation  and  deficient 
harvests,  he  felt  the  expediency  of  peace,  retired 
from  office  to  facilitate  its  conclusion,  and  gave  it, 
when  not  responsible  for  its  conditions,  a  sanction 
imequivocal  and  sincere.  His  ardour  in  1803  for 
the  recommencement  of  war,  admits  of  a  less  satis- 
factory solution  :  it  discovered  much  more  the  zeal 
of  a  combatant,  than  the  discretion  of  a  senator ; 
a  disposition  to  sink  the  admonitory  recollections  of 
our  late  struggle  in  ardour  for  a  new  contest.  He 
warned  us  once  in  Parliament  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  expense,  and  of  the  necessity  of  ])reparing  our- 
selves for  sacrifices  greater  than  before  ;  but  his 
caution  was  general  and  cursory,  unaccompanied 
by  any  private  admonition  to  the  inexperienced 
ministry  of  the  day,  or  any  advice  to  delay  hosti- 
lities, until  circumstances  should  give  us  an  assu- 
rance of  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the  great 
powers  of  the  Continent.  His  last  great  measure, 
the  attack  on  France  by  the  coalition  of  1805, 
was,  doubtless,  on  the  whole,  injudicious,  prepon- 
derant as  France  then  was  in  military  strength,  the 
whole  under  the  guidance  of  a  single  head.  Still 
it  may  be  added  t]iat  it  is  by  no  means  uncommon 
with  men  of  ability  to  fall  into  the  miscalculation 
made  by  Mr.  Pitt  on  that  occasion  ;  and  to  anti- 
cipate, as  a  matter  of  course,  judicious  conduct  on 
the  part  of  their  coadjutors.  Every  impartial  man 
must  allow,  that  it  would  have  been  carrying 
mistrust  to  an  extreme,  to  have  apprehended  the 
commission  of  faults  so  gross  as  those  which  led  to 


Conduct  ofourjmblic  Men  since  1793.      305 

the  disasters  of"  Ulm  and  Aiisterlitz.  And  those 
who  are  surprised  that  a  man  of  talent  should 
misplace  his  confidence,  or  should  calculate  on 
others  acting  with  the  discrimination  natural  to 
himself,  will  be  at  no  loss  to  find  similar  examples 
in  the  conduct  of  the  most  eminent  men  of  the  age: 
in  that  of  Lord  Wellington,  when  he  expected  dis- 
cretion from  Blucher ;  and  in  that  of  Bonaparte, 
when  he  allowed  the  command  of  Spain  to  remain 
in  the  hands  of  Jourdan  ;  or  when,  at  a  subsequent 
date,  he  committed  that  of  his  main  body  at 
AVaterloo,  to  Ney. 

Since  the  distress  that  has  followed  the  peace  of 
1814,  it  has  been  publicly  said,  that  the  embarrass- 
ment likely  to  ensue  to  our  productive  industry 
on  the  cessation  of  the  war  expenditure  of  govern- 
ment, had  not  escaped  the  foresight  of  Mr.  Pitt. 
Such  assertions  are  often  made  loosely  and  in- 
accurately ;  but  the  one  in  question  seems  to  rest 
on  probable  grounds.  Mr.  Pitt  was  no  stranger 
to  the  limited  produce  of  our  revenue  in  peace;  he 
had  felt  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  first  years 
of  the  contest,  and  the  surprising  relief  afforded 
to  the  Treasury  by  the  imposition  of  war  taxes. 
He  could  thus  hardly  fail  to  be  aware  that  the 
spring  given  to  our  national  industry  was,  in  a 
great  measure,  artificial ;  still  less  could  he  be  un- 
conscious of  the  ultimately  injurious  operation  of 
loans  and  taxes  when  carried  to  an  extreme.  Nor 
is  it  incompatible  with  such  impressions,  that  he 
should  for  a  time  have  overlooked  the  inferences 
which  they  seem  so  naturally  to  suggest,  and  have 
been  hurried  along  by  ardour  in  the  contest,  by  an 
earnestness  to  obtain  a  present  advantige  at  the 
hazard  of  a  future  burden.  It  is  not  when  en- 
gaged in  the  bustle  of  business,  that  the  mind  is 


30C)  The  Uitc  Wars  ; 

capable  of  reposing  on  itself,  of  meditating,  pa- 
tiently and  impartially,  the  result  of  iavourite 
measures.  How  few  plans  of  remote  operation, 
of  a  nature  that  requires  continued  thought  in  the 
combination  or  length  of  time  in  the  execution, 
originate  with  men  in  office  !  Add  to  this  that  the 
great  evils  of  our  financial  system,  the  depreciation 
of  our  bank  paper,  the  extreme  pressure  of  taxa- 
tion took  place  not  only  after  Mr.  Pitt's  death, 
but,  in  some  measure,  in  consequence  of  a  devia- 
tion from  his  principles.  Never  would  he  have 
given  his  sanction  to  such  a  measure  as  our  Orders 
in  council ;  or  if,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  we 
suppose  him  to  have  been  led,  by  urgency  or  by 
plausible  argument,  to  their  adoption,  will  any  one 
maintain  that  he  would  have  been  likely  to  persist 
in  so  absurd  a  course  during  four  years,  until  it, 
in  a  manner,  drove  the  Americans  to  the  alterna- 
tive of  war — a  war  carried  on  between  us  and 
our  best  customers — a  war  in  which  it  was  appa- 
rent that  injury  to  our  opponents  must  be  almost 
as  pernicious  to  our  national  industry,  as  injury  to 
ourselves. 

The  responsibility  of  a  great  part  of  our  exist- 
ing biu'den,  is  thus  transferred  from  j\Ir.  Pitt  to 
his  successors,  of  whose  measures,  in  regard  to 
neutrals,  from  September,  I8O7,  to  May,  181  !2,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  give  a  satisfactory  explanation. 
They  imphed  a  total  unconsciousness  of  the  pre- 
carious state  of  our  paper  currency,  and,  in  regard 
to  trade,  either  a  disavowal  of  principles  generally  , 
admitted,  or  a  readiness  to  infringe  those  princi- 
ples for  temporary  purposes — purposes  that  could 
have  no  decisive  effect  on  the  result  of  the  grand 
struggle  with  France.  In  1812  began  a  different 
aera :  our  Orders  in  council  were  withdiawn ;  peace 

10 


Conduct  of  our  jmhlic  Men  since  1793.     307 

was  repeatedly  offered  to  the  United  States  of 
America ;  and,  at  a  subsequent  date,  no  harsh 
treaty  of  commerce  was  imposed  on  France  in  the 
day  of  her  adversity.  Add  to  this,  that  since  the 
peace,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  give  a  falla- 
cious prop,  ])y  bounties  or  prohibitions,  to  any  of 
our  suffering  interests.  Admirable  rules  of  con- 
duct these,  and  yet  in  regard  to  our  finances,  we 
must  repeat,  that  ministers  have  not  been  prompt 
in  rendering  the  national  resources  instrumental  to 
the  national  relief!  Their  fault  appears  to  have 
lain,  not  as  is  usual  with  governments,  in  inter- 
fering with  the  course  of  productive  industry,  but 
either  in  deficient  foresight  in  regard  to  the  changes 
occurring  in  our  situation,  or  in  deficient  vi- 
gour in  acting  on  such  changes.  Take  for  ex- 
ample the  rise  in  the  value  of  money,  a  natural 
consequence  of  a  return  to  a  pacific  system, 
and  one  which,  with  some  temporary  exceptions, 
has  been  regularly  gaining  ground  since  1814. 
Would  Mr.  Pitt,  had  his  life  been  prolonged,  have 
delayed  until  the  ninth  year  of  peace  a  reduction 
of  public  salaries,  an  ada])tation  of  government 
payments  to  the  augmented  value  of  the  money 
in  which  these  payments  were  made  ?  Is  it  not  more 
likely  that  he  would  have  long  shice  anticipated 
the  result  of  the  general  change,  and  have  given, 
in  his  own  case,  a  decided  example  of  what  he 
would  have  exacted  from  others?  Farthcj-,  is 
it  probable  that  in  peace  he  would  have  adheied 
blindly  to  the  financial  routine  pursued  during  the 
war,  without  attempting  some  measure,  ibunded 
on  the  circumstances  that  have  predominated  in 
our  situation  since  1814, — the  reducetl  interest 
of  money,  and  the  prospect  of  long  continued  peace, 
in  consequence  of  the  conviction  amuially  gaining 

X  -2 


.■^OS  The  Idle  Wars  ; 

ground  that  a  state  of"  war  is  as  contrary  to  policy 
as  to  humanity,  and,  from  our  growing  power,  far 
less  necessary  for  defence  than  when  France  was 
so  preponderant? 

If  ministers  are  open  to  the  charge  of  deficient 
vigour  in  finance,  in  what  manner  can  tlie  im])ar- 
tial  reasoner  characterize  the  conduct  of  their  })ar- 
liamentary  opponents  ?  On  their  part  there  existed 
no  motive  for  reserve,  in  regard  to  pubhc  distress; 
no  dread  of  disseminating  alarm,  by  the  proposi- 
tion of  change ;  yet  the  investigations  of  most  of 
the  Opposition  members  have  been  confined  to  in- 
sulated points,  their  objections  to  specific  grants. 
Where,  in  the  long  list  of  those  who  opposed  the 
war,  did  we  find  a  speaker  capable  of  giving  the 
House  or  the  country  a  distinct  conception  of  the 
operation  of  our  augmented  expenditure  ;  of  the 
temporary  nature  of  the  activity  caused  by  it  dur- 
ing war ;  of  the  unfortunate  re-action  to  be  appre- 
hended at  a  peace  ?  Where,  on  the  part  of  those 
who  have  combated  the  measures  of  ministers 
since  the  peace,  do  we  find  a  comprehensive  view 
of  our  national  means,  the  suggestion  of  any  mea- 
sure of  a  new  or  of  a  general  character,  adapted 
to  our  present  circumstances  ?  To  what  shall  we 
ascribe  this  deficiency  of  resource,  this  scanty 
measure  of  statistical  knowledge  on  both  sides  of 
the  House  ?  To  a  cause  to  which  we  have  owed 
no  small  share  of  our  political  disappointments  in 
the  present  age — an  education  on  the  part  of  our 
representatives  very  little  suited  to  their  functions 
as  men  of  business.  This  topic  has  a  claim  to  our 
attentive  examination,  for  by  nothing  has  the  situ- 
ation of  the  public  during  the  present  age,  been 
more  materially  affected. 


Educalion  of  our  public  Men.  309 

Education  of  our  public  iVf^w.— The  course  of 
study  followed  m  this  country,  in  the  case  of  young 
men  destined  for  public  life,  is  remarkable  as  in- 
dicative of  the  tenacity  with  whicli  established 
usages  maintain  their  ground.  Previous  to  the 
17th  century,  the  acquisition  of  Latin  was  indis- 
pensable to  a  polite  education,  no  modern  language 
being  in  these  days  a  depository  of  elegant  learn- 
ing, or  a  received  medium  for  the  correspondence 
of  either  men  of  letters  or  diplomatists.  It  is 
thus  tliat  we  are  to  account  for  the  interchange  of 
voluminous  epistles  in  Latin,  between  the  scholars 
of  Italy,  Germany,  France,  and  England,  as  well 
as  for  the  study  of  the  classical  languages  by  fe- 
males of  rank,  as  was  exemplified  in  the  case  of 
Queen  Elizabeth,  of  Lady  Jane  Grey,  and  of  the 
daughters  of  Sir  Thomas  More.  The  colleges 
added  in  these  days  to  our  universities,  were  natu- 
rally confined  to  the  branches  of  literature  famihar 
to  the  founders  ;  and  in  no  part  of  Euroj)e  has  this 
limitation  been  more  strictly  maintained,  or  the 
changes  suggested  by  modern  discoveries  been 
less  adopted,  tlian  at  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  ii' 
academical  cliairs  have  been  provided  for  cliemis- 
try,  for  moral  oj-  for  natural  philosopliy,  an  ad- 
herence to  the  established  usage  of  these  seminaries 
has  prevented  their  being  generally  attended,  and 
continues  to  confine  the  labours  of  our  youth  (o 
mathematical  and  classical  ])ursuits,  to  which  alone, 
are  awarded  honours  at  the  public  examinations. 

The  study  of  mathematics  has  obviously  little 
connexion  with  the  business  of  life,  or  with  tin- 
intended  profession  of  nine-tenths  of  those  who 
pursue  it.  The  evidence  by  which  the  inferences 
of  the  student  are  there  guided,  is  of  a  nature  al- 
together different  iVom  that  which  he  will  be  ealleil 

X  S 


.':{1()  The  late  Wars  ; 

on  to  wcigli  in  iiis  intercourse  with  the  worki,  in 
the  transaction  of  business,  in  the  discrimination  of 
character.  On  this  we  shall  not  enlarge,  as  it  will, 
of  course,  be  readily  admitted,  and  the  defence  of 
the  study  made  to  rest  on  its  *'  tendency  to  improve 
the  reasoning  powers  of  youth  :'*  but  would  it  not, 
we  may  ask,  be  practicable  to  attain  equal  im- 
provement in  that  respect  by  directing  their  la- 
bours to  subjects  connected  with  their  future 
occupation  ?  Taking  for  example  young  men  in- 
tended for  public  life,  would  it  not  be  preferable 
to  seek  an  exercise  for  their  intellect  in  the  history 
of  our  country  as  related  by  Hume,  or  in  the  con- 
clusions of  political  economy  as  exhibited  in  the 
writings  of  Smith  or  Say  ?  By  liistory  they  woidd 
be  introduced  to  a  knowledge  of  characters,  such  as 
they  are  likely  to  meet  on  the  stage  of  life ;  while 
political  economy  would  lead  them  to  the  examin- 
ation of  subjects  which  they  wdll  be  called  on  to 
discuss,  and  which  they  will  find  as  yet  very  im- 
perfectly understood.  In  regard  to  impressions 
of  a  higher  kind,  the  tendency  of  these  studies  to 
convey  liberal  views,  to  prove  the  connection  be- 
tween the  justice  of  a  government  and  the  wel- 
fare of  its  subjects,  between  the  course  of  public 
events  and  the  ordination  of  Providence,  we  have, 
we  trust,  said  enough  in  a  prececUng  paragraph  of 
this  chapter. 

Classical  erudition,  says  an  elegant  wTiter*,  is 
by  the  custom  of  England  more  pecidiarly  called 
learning ;  and  we  admit  that  in  education,  its  claim 
to  attention  is  powerful,  even  when  we  keep  out  of 
view  its  fascinating  appeals  to  the  imagination,  and 

*  Sir  James  Mackintosh  on  the  character  of  Fox,  in  tjie 
collection  by  Dr.  Parr,  under  the  name  of  Philopatris  Varvi- 
censis. 


Education  of  our  public  Men.  311 

are  content  to  contemplate  it  with  a  mere  reference 
to  utility.     The  record  of  instructive  facts,   the 
delineation  of  character,    the   illustration   of  the 
rides  of  composition,  the    exemplification  of  the 
finest  precepts,  all  belong  to  the  writers  of  Greece 
and  Rome,  and  warn  us  to  beware  of  neglecting  to 
cultivate  that  grateful  soil.     Of  this  we  are  so  fully 
satisfied,  that  our  doubts  are  confined  to  the  time 
requisite  to  acquire   a  knowledge   of  the  critical 
niceties   of  the  languages,    and   to  the   question 
whether  we  ought  not,  in  most  cases,  to  be  satisfied 
with  that  progress  which  enables  us  to  comprehend, 
with  tolerable    accuracy,    the    sense    of  a  writer. 
And  here,  fortunately,  the  line  of  chstinction  seems 
to  admit  of  being  traced  with  considerable  confi- 
dence.   By  the  youth  intended  for  an  active  pursuit, 
for  the  bar,  the  pulpit,   or  the  senate,   philological 
researches  need  hardly  be  carried  furtlier  than  is 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  understand  the  meaning 
of  an  author,  while  a  more  minute  and  scrupulous 
investigation  is  incumbent  on  him  who  directs  his 
labours  to  the  instruction  of  others,  or  cultivates 
literature  in  retirement  with  all  the  advantaixe  of 
the  command  of  time.     But  why,  it  may  be  said, 
cannot  the  two  be  combined  by  persons  intended  for 
active  professions  ?  To  do  so  would,  we  apprehend, 
be  to  underrate  the  sacrifice  of  time  indispensable  to 
the  attainment  of  thorough  knowledge,  and  to  lose 
sight  of  the  scrupulous  care  with  which  the  eight 
or  ten  years,  in  general  allow'cd  for  education,  nuist 
be  appropriated,  if  we  mean  to  avoid  the  frequent 
error  of  misapplying  our  labour,    of  undertaking 
studies  which  we  may  be  unable  to  follow  up. 

Condiicl  of  public  AJJairs  since  179-'>.  —  Let  iis 
proceed  to  make  a  brief  application  of  these  re- 
marks to  the  statesmen  of  the  present  age  ;  to  the 

X  4 


312  "The  late  Wars ; 

men  who  guided  our  councils  in  tiic  stormy  j)eriod 
of  the  French  revolution.  How  different,  in  all 
probability,  would  have  been  the  course  of  their 
policy  had  their  early  impressions  partaken  more 
of  the  light  to  be  derived  from  the  study  of  recent 
periods  of  history,  from  an  attentive  observation  of 
foreign  countries.  Had  they  possessed  a  more 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  national  character  of  the 
French,  of  the  degree  in  which  the  invidious  distinc- 
tion between  the  titled  and  untitled  classes  was  kept 
up,of  the  circumstances  which  rendered  a  revolution 
as  much  the  wish  of  the  majority  of  the  nation  as  it 
was  in  this  country  in  1688,  our  ministers  would 
have  known  with  how  much  qualification  the  decla- 
mations of  Burke,  and  the  assertions  of  the  emigrants 
were  to  be  received.  In  regard  to  this  country,  they 
would  probably  have  discovered  that  the  support 
of  the  middle  and  upper  classes  afforded  a  sufficient 
safeguard  against  the  danger  of  innovation  without 
resorting  to  the  alternative  of  war.  Or,  supposing 
that  after  the  loss  of  the  Netherlands  in  1792,  and 
the  alarm  given  to  our  sovereign  and  our  nobility 
by  the  violence  of  the  Jacobins,  it  became  impos- 
sible to  avoid  an  appeal  to  arms,  how  different,  with 
the  know^ledge  we  have  supposed  in  our  political 
guides,  Avould  have  been  the  conduct  of  the  war? 
Had  they  been  aware  of  the  backward  state  of  tlie 
countries,  in  particular  Austria,  on  which  we  relied 
for  military  co-operation,  of  that  blind  adherence 
to  old  usage,  that  deference  to  family  rank  and 
court  influence,  which  clogged  the  wheels  of  go- 
vernment and  restrained  the  energy  of  the  people, 
is  it  likely  that  our  ministers  would  ha\e  counselled 
an  offensive  course  against  a  nation  emancipated 
from  those  fetters,  and  which  conferred  its  appoint- 


Educal'wn  of  our  public  Men.  313 

merits,  whether  civil  or  iniHtary,  by  very  different 
rules  ? 

If  from  foreign  affairs  we  turn  to  our  interior 
situation,    is  it  likely,   we  may  ask,   that,   with  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  productive 
industry,  our  ministers  would  have  been  so  deluded 
by  appearances  as  to  mistake  a  rise  in  the  })rice  of 
commodities  for.  an  increase  of  national  wealth,  or 
to  imagine  that  war  could,  under  any  circumstances, 
be  conducive  to  commercial  prosperity  ?  Had  they 
studied  the  lesson  to  be  learned  in  the  history  of 
Holland,  and,  in  some  degree,  in  our  own,  (since 
intervals  of  stagnation  have  followed  almost  every 
war  since  the  revolution,)  our  public  men  Mould 
have  anticipated  a  reaction  at  a  peace,  and  have 
carefully   circumscribed  their  expenditure  during 
the  war.     If  we  examine  the  discussions  that  have 
from  time  to  time  taken  place  on  one  very  material 
question, — the  state  of  our  currency, — we  shall  hnd 
the  speeches  of  our  leading  men  indicate  little  more 
than  an    elementary    knowledge  of    the    subject. 
These  discussions  began  in  1810,  when  if  we  could 
not  resume  cash  payments,  we  miglit  ha\  e  desisted 
from  our  measures  against  neutral  navigation  ;  but 
the  degree  to  which  the  restraint  imposed  on  that 
navigation  affected  the  credit  of  our  bank  paper  was 
unknown  to  parliament-,  and  inadequately  felt  by 
the  Cabinet.      Nothing   consequently  was   done  ; 
and,  when  at  a  subsequent  date,  and  under  \qv\ 
different  circumstances,  we  mean  in   ISl'J,  parlia- 
ment did  interfere  with  the  currency,  the  measure 
was  ill-timed,    and   tended,    if  not   to   aggra\ate 
the  evil,   to  mislead   tiie  public  in  regard   to  its 
cause. 

After  all  these  examples  of  error,  does  it  seem 
necessary  to  add   that   the  labours  of  our  ])ubhi 


3li<  Tlic  Idle  Wars. 

men  ought  to  be  modelled  on  a  new  plan  ?  To  gi\  c 
a  cursory  attention  to  a  multiplicity  of  topics,  leads 
to  a  knowledge  very  little  beyond  that  of  first  im- 
pressions :  to  obtain  a  satisfactory  conviction,  to 
place  our  opinions  on  a  firm  basis,  it  is  indispensable 
to  make  a  selection,  to  restrict  the  objects  of  en- 
quiry, and  to  give  a  long  continuance  to  our 
research  and  reflection  on  the  prescribed  themes. 
Looking  round  in  private  life,  and  extending  our 
view  to  men  of  eminence  generally,  commercial  as 
well  as  professional,  what  else  tlian  this  limitation 
of  object  and  perseverance  in  pursuit,  do  we  find  to 
form  the  basis  of  such  characters,  and  to  distinguish 
them  from  the  credulous  multitude,  from  those  who 
listen  with  ready  acquiescence  to  every  plausible 
assertion  ?  If  the  habits  of  our  representatives  are 
different,  if  they  unfortunately  betray  the  absence 
of  such  discrimination  and  perseverance,  ought  it 
to  be  matter  of  surprise,  that  delusion  should  have 
prevailed  among  them  during  so  many  years  :  that 
a  temporary  rise  of  prices  and  increase  of  activity, 
should  have  been  mistaken  for  a  permanent  aug- 
mentation of  national  wealth  ;  and  that  the  unwel- 
come discoveries  of  late  years,  the  Jinale  of  which  is 
no  less  than  a  suspension  of  their  incomes,  should 
have  come  on  them  by  surprise  ? 


315 


CHAP.  X. 

Value  of  Moneij. 

iSPXTION  I. 

Fliutuatiun  in  the  Value  of  Moniy  or  in  the  Price  of 
Commodities. 

1  HE  fluctuation  in  prices  consequent  on  the  great 
political  transitions  of  the  age,  has  been  already 
discussed  in  our  second  chapter :  at  present  our 
object  is  to  pursue  the  same  inquiry  on  a  more 
comprehensive  plan,  and  to  carry  back  our  views 
to  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  former  ages. 
Changes  of  this  nature  rank  among  the  most  in- 
teresting subjects  of  inquiry  in  political  economy. 
To  the  reader  of  history,  a  knowledge  of  them 
is  indispensable  to  the  formation  of  a  correct  es- 
timate of  the  price  of  labour,  of"  tlie  public  revenue, 
and  of  the  comparative  wealth  of  a  nation  at  dif- 
ferent periods  ;  while,  in  a  practical  view,  an  ac- 
quaintance with  this  subject  is  of  very  serious 
interest,  as  connected  with  the  future  value  of 
bequests,  leases,  and  time-contracts  generally.  The 
discussion  naturally  divides  itself  into  the  ibllowing 
heads  :  — 

The  tendency  of  prices  to  fluctuate. 

The  impracticability  of  foreseeing  or  })reventing 
such  fluctuation. 

A  plan  for  lessening  its  injurious  operation. 


316         Fliichcatioii  in  llw  Value  (jf  Moiiey. 

Fuhlications  on  the  Flucliialion  of  Prices. — The 
tlocuments  for  forming  an  estimate  of  these  changes, 
have  as  yet  been  given  to  us  scantily  and  im})er- 
fectly,  the  subject  never  having  engaged  the  atten- 
tion of  government,  and  but  lately  that  of  any  of 
our  public  bodies.  In  France,  a  country  little 
remarked  for  statistical  research,  the  attempts 
hitherto  made  to  compare  the  rate  of  prices  at  dif- 
ferent periods  have  been  confined  to  a  few  literary 
men  :  in  England,  one  of  the  earliest  was  that  of 
Bishop  Fleetwood,  who  collected  prices  of  wheat 
during  a  number  of  years  from  the  13th  to  the 
17th  century,  and  reduced  them  to  money  of  our 
present  standard.  His  labours,  published  in  I707, 
formed  the  chief  materials  for  the  reasonings  of 
Dr.  Smith,  whose  life  was  not  prolonged  until  the 
publication  (in  1797)  of  a  very  valuable  addition 
to  such  collections  by  Sir  Frederick  Eden,  in  his 
work  on  the  "  State  of  the  Poor,"  the  copious  ma- 
terials of  which  have  been  termed  iijb?is  perennis 
for  succeeding  inquirers. 

In  1798  there  appeared  in  the  Transactions  of  the 
Royal  Society,  a  tabular  statement  by  Sir  George 
Shuckburgh,  which,  from  the  clearness  of  its  form 
(See  Appendix),  and  the  confidence  of  its  deduc- 
tions, obtained  much  more  credit  than  it  deserved, 
being  far  from  correct,  even  in  the  fundamental 
points.  In  1811,  the  late  Arthur  Young,  alarmed 
at  the  impression  made  on  the  public  by  the  Report 
of  the  Bullion  Committee,  and  dreading  a  con- 
traction of  paper  currency  attended  by  a  fall  in  the 
price  of  agricultural  produce,  entered  into  re- 
searches of  great  extent,  both  as  to  the  past  and 
current  prices  of  commodities,  and  published  tlie 
whole  in  a  pamphlet,  entitled  "  An  Inquiry  into 
the   Progressive    Value  of  Money  in    England.*' 

9 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.         81 7 

This  tract,  however  inaccurate  in  a  theoretical 
sense,  has  a  claim  to  attention,  as  well  for  the 
value  of  its  materials,  as  for  a  correction  of  the 
mistakes  of  Sir  George  Shuckhurgh.  Since  1811, 
serious  beyond  example  as  has  been  the  fluctuation 
of  our  prices,  there  has  appeared  no  treatise  of  con- 
sequence on  the  su])ject  until  Mr.  Tooke's  valuable 
publication  on  "  High  and  Low  Prices  since  1792.'* 

Historical  Skctcli  of  the  Fluctuation  of  Prices. — 
It  is  a  prevalent  notion  that  the  money  prices  of 
commodities  have  been  progressively  rising  since 
the  Norman  conquest,  or  even  since  the  earliei* 
period,  when  the  luxury  of  Rome,  and  the  revenue 
paid  to  it  by  tributary  provinces,  disappeared  be- 
fore its  rude  invaders  from  the  north  and  east. 
To  this  opinion,  however,  there  are  several  strong 
objections.  Tiie  supply  of  gold  and  silver  from 
the  mines,  was,  during  the  middle  ages,  scanty  and 
precarious ;  while  the  numbers  of  the  society  re- 
quiring the  use  of  the  precious  metals,  in  other 
words,  the  population  of  the  west  and  central  part 
of  Europe,  were,  in  some  degree,  in  a  state  of 
increase.  Dr.  Smith,  reasoning  on  the  i)rice  ol' 
commodities  generally,  from  the  price  of  corn,  and 
foundinjr  his  view  of  the  latter  on  the  collections 
of  Bishop  Fleetwood,  assumes,  that  from  the  year 
1200  to  1550,  there  was  no  considerable  rise  of 
prices ;  and  that  such  rise  did  not  begin  till  the 
reign  of  Elizabeth,  the  time  when  the  American 
mines  became  productive  on  a  large  scale.  The 
import  from  that  quarter,  small  as  it  would  a})pear 
in  the  present  age,  was  sensibly  telt  at  a  time  when 
silver  was  very  little  used  in  manufiictuio,  and  not 
largely  in  plate  :  its  amount  was,  uniler  such  cir- 
cumstances, almost  wholly  added  to  the  circulating 


;>18         Ftuctuat'ion  in  the  Value  of  Moneij. 

medium  of  Europe.  This  addition  was  considered 
by  Dr.  Sniitli  the  main  cause  of*  the  rise  of  ])rices 
which  continued  until  towards  the  year  1(3,50,  wlien, 
from  circumstances  on  which  we  shall  enlarge  pre- 
sently, prices  ceased  to  rise,  and  became  either 
stationary  or  declining.  This  state  of  things  lasted 
until  ly^'i'j  when,  as  is  well  known,  a  new  ajra 
commenced  and  continued  until  1814. 

Effect  of  a  State  of  War. — Dr.  Smith's  view 
of  the  progressive  value  of  money  is  admitted 
by  Mr.  Young,  but  neither  of  these  writers  has 
thought  of  tracing  a  correspondence  between  the 
fluctuations  in  the  precious  metals  in  the  l6th  and 
17th  centuries,  and  the  political  transactions  of 
Europe.  A  state  of  war  tends,  as  we  have  showni 
in  a  preceding  chapter,  greatly  to  advance  prices, 
and  the  rise  in  the  reign  of  Elizabetli  may,  in  no 
inconsiderable  degree,  be  ascribed  to  the  increase 
of  military  establishments  in  that  age,  to  our  de- 
fensive attitude  against  Philip  II.,  to  the  obstinate 
contest  carried  on  between  him  and  his  insurgent 
subjects  in  the  Netherlands,  to  the  ci\dl  wars  of 
France,  and  to  the  troubled  state  of  Germany.  On 
the  other  hand,  after  the  treaty  of  Westphalia,  the 
chief  part  of  Europe  enjoyed  tranquillity,  and  the 
effect  on  trade  and  agriculture,  of  reduced  armies 
and  diminished  taxes,  is  described  by  Sir  W.  Temple, 
in  a  manner  that  strikingly  resembles  the  state  of 
this  country  and  the  Continent  since  the  late  peace. 

This  political  change  accounts  for  the  decline  of 
prices  that  prevailed  after  16.50,  but  the  applica- 
tion of  our  theory  is,  it  must  be  allowed,  less  clear 
after  167^,  when  war  was  renewed  on  a  great 
scale,  and  continued,  with  comparatively  little  in- 
termission, during  forty  years.     Add  to  this,  that 


Fluctuation  in  t)ie  lvalue  of  Money.        319 

there  took  place,  during  all  that  time,  an  import  of 
specie  from  America,  to  an  extent  somewhat  in- 
creased ;  viz.  to  the  amount  of  three,  four,  or  five 
millions,  annually.  In  what  manner,  under  the 
operation  of  this  double  cause  of  enhancement,  are 
we  to  account  for  prices  experiencing  no  great 
or  permanent  rise?  Perhaps  by  the  following 
considerations  :  — 

1.  An  increased  use  of  the  precious  metals,  in 
plate,  manufactures,  and  ornaments,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  general  increase  of  wealth. 

2.  An  augmented  export  of  them  to  the  eastern 
w^orld,  chiefly  through  the  means  of  the  Dutch 
East  India  Company. 

3.  The  fact,  that  previous  to  I672,  the  supply 
of  agricultural  produce  in  England,  as  in  the  north- 
west of  Europe  generally,  had  become  somewhat 
more  than  equal  to  the  consumption  ;  an  excess  of 
which  the  effects  are  generally  felt  for  a  long 
series  of  years. 

The  peace  of  Utrecht  was  the  commencement 
of  a  period  of  general  tranquillity ;  government 
expenditure  was  reduced,  labourers  were  restored 
to  agriculture,  and  the  decline  of  prices  became 
general  and  progressive.  In  vain  did  our  land- 
holders look  to  the  bounty  on  the  export  of  corn, 
for  a  counteraction  of  the  fall  in  the  market:  they 
exported  largel}',  and  received  premiums  on  a 
liberal  scale,  but  their  abundant  growth  kept  down 
the  home  market,  and  the  excess  of  sup})ly  over 
consumption  continued  during  half  a  century,  ter- 
minating only  in  176k  Nor  is  it  at  all  j)iobable 
that  it  would  have  ceased  at  that  time,  peace  hav- 
ing been  but  lately  concluded,  had  we  not  had  a 
succession    of   indifferent   seasons :    these   raised 


320        Fliicluation  in  the  Value  oj  Money. 

prices,  ami  the  contest  that  ensued  with  our  colo- 
nies, prevented  their  fall. 

After  1783,  the  restoration  oi'  peace  tended, 
naturally,  to  reduce  prices,  hut  its  effect  was 
retarded  hy  several  causes,  in  particular,  the  de- 
mand of  hands  for  our  manufactures,  and  the 
occasional  occurrence  of  indifferent  seasons.  After 
1792,  the  progress  of  enhancement  was  accelerated 
in  an  unexampled  degree  hy  the  general  state  of 
war  consequent  on  the  French  revolution.  A  rise 
of  prices  progressive  during  twenty  years,  and 
amounting  at  last  to  more  than  fiO  per  cent,  ahove 
those  of  1792,  overturned  time-contracts  through- 
out the  kingdom,  depressing  annuitants  while  it 
raised  tenants  on  lease,  with  various  other  classes, 
above  their  former  station,  —  an  elevation,  unfor- 
tunately, of  short  duration,  since  they  ha\e  been 
made  to  descend  from  it  with  still  more  rapidity  in 
the  years  that  have  followed  the  peace. 

Can  such  Fluctuations  be  foreseen  or  prevented  ?  — 
After  this  summary  of  facts  in  regard  to  the  past, 
the  next  and  still  more  important  point  is  to 
ascertain  how  far  such  fluctuations  are  likely  to 
continue.  But  here  the  most  indefatigable  in- 
quirer will  find  the  result  uncertain,  and  be  obliged 
to  admit,  that  in  so  complicated  a  question,  all 
that  we  can  do  with  confidence,  is  to  state  the 
arguments  on  either  side.  Those  in  favour  of  the 
rise  of  prices,  are, 

The  contingency  of  war. 

The  probable  increase  of  the  produce  of  the 
mines,  from  the  application  of  steam-engines  and 
other  improved  machinery. 

The  farther  substitution  of  bank  paper  for  me- 
tallic (Murencv ;    a  substitution,  which,  in  its  ge- 


Fluchiat'nm  in  the  Value  of  Money.        .1^1 

Hcral  (though  not  in  its  local)  effect,  operates  like 
the  increased  productiveness  of  a  mine.* 

On  the  other  hand,  the  arguments  for  the  fall 
of  prices  are  equally  substantial ;  viz. 

The  tendency  of  all  improvements  in  productive 
industry,  whether  in  agriculture,  maiuiiacture, 
mechanics,  or  navigation,  to  produce  cheaj)ness. 

The  increasing  demand  for  the  precious  metals, 
ti'om  the  increasing  population  of  the  civihzcd 
world. 

As  to  England  in  particular,  tlie  tendency  of  a 
country  where  prices  are  higher  than  in  the  neigh- 
bouring states,    to   approximate  (see  p.  32.5),  by 
commercial  intercourse,  to  the  standard  of  other 
countries. 

Supplij  of  Specie  from  the  Mines.  —  The  amount 
of  specie  extracted  annually  from  American  mines, 
was  computed  in  17(^>0,  at  (),000,UUU/.  sterling  :  in 
the  course  of  the  succeeding  twenty  years,  it  hail 
increased  to  fully  7,000,000/.,  and  some  time  after 
(Appendix  to  the  Bullion  Report  of  1810)  to 
8,000,000/.  In  this,  as  in  other  res))ects,  Mexico 
is  by  far  the  foremost  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  the 
yearly  ])roduce  of  lier  mines  being  nearly  hve  mil- 
lions sterling,  while  that  of  the  rest  of  Sj)anish 
America  may  be  estimated  at  three  millions  more. 
Adding  to  these,  somewhat  less  than  a  million 
sterlino-  for  Portucfucse  America,  and  somewhat 
more  than  another  million  for  the  mines  of  our 
own  hemisphere,  we  make  a  total  of  neaily  li-n 
millions  annually  added  to  the  stock  of  the  piccions 

•  Our  niLMition  of  bank  paper  must  always  be  understoocl  as 
o'C  bank  notes  payable  in  cash  :  a  resort  to  non-convertible  paper 
will,  we  take  lor  granted,  be  henceforth  excluded  from  our 
finnncja!  creed. 


322        Fluctuatiun  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

metals  tlirougliout  the  world.  From  this,  however, 
is  to  be  made,  both  at  present  and  for  some  time 
back,  a  deduction  on  account  of  the  political 
troubles  of  Spanish  America:  still  the  importation 
is  on  a  large  scale,  and  would  speedily  produce 
depreciation,  were  not  the  demands  of  the  civilized 
world  on  the  increase. 

Consumption  of  Specie.  —  The  demands  for  the 
produce  of  the  mines,  arise  from  various  causes, 
of  which  the  greatest,  by  far,  is  the  annual  con- 
sumption of  it  for  plate,  watches,  gilding,  and 
ornamental  manufacture,  generally.  The  amount 
of  this  admits  of  no  satisfactory  calculation,  but  is 
probably  (Appendix,  p.  [89])  not  far  short  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  total  produce  of  the  mines.  Next 
comes  the  demand  for  coin :  the  currency  of  al- 
most all  the  Continent  of  Europe  is  metallic,  and 
an  annual  supply  is  requisite,  partly  to  make  good 
accidental  loss  or  the  effect  of  wear,  partly  to  meet 
the  increase  of  population.  This,  though  not 
large,  may,  when  joined  to  the  annual  export  of 
specie  to  India  and  China,  (to  say  little  of  losses 
arising  from  shipwreck  or  hoarding),  account  for 
the  absorption  of  the  remaining  third  of  the  pro- 
duce of  the  mines.  What  then  appears  to  be  the 
general  result  ?  That  in  ordinary  times  these  va- 
rious sources  of  demand  are  equal,  or  nearly  equal, 
to  the  amount  supplied  from  the  mines  ;  but  that 
for  some  years  back  (since  1818),  they  appear  to 
have  been  more  than  equal,  in  consequence  of  the 
extra-demand  for  gold  on  the  part  of  the  banks  of 
this  country,  Russia,  and  Austria,  for  the  purpose 
of  substituting  a  metallic  for  a  paper  currency. 

Dr.  Smith,  in  adverting  to  the  future  supply  of 
specie  from  the  mines,  considered  it  an  equal 
chance  that  old  mines  may  become  exhausted,  as 
that  new  mines  may  be  discovered,  or  the  produce 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.        SQS 

of  the  old  increased.  Without  contesting  the  ac- 
curacy of  this  opinion  in  his  age,  it  mW  hardly  be 
doubted,  that  since  the  discovery  of  the  powers  of 
steam,  the  a])plication  of  improved  machinery  to 
the  existing  mines,  would  be  productive  of  a  very 
considerable  extension  of  produce  ;  but  whether, 
or  in  what  time,  it  will  be  carried  so  far  as  to  lower 
materially  the  value  of  specie,  it  appears  in  xain  to 
conjecturc. 

Circulation  of  Bank  Paper. — -Our  countrymen, 
accustomed  during  more  than  half  a  century  to 
the  use  of  bank  notes,  hav^e  observed,  with  some 
surprise,  that  a  currency  so  cheap,  and  apparently 
so  easy  of  introduction,  should,  as  yet,  be  hardly 
known  on  the  Continent.  The  bank  of  France, 
though  of  undoubted  stability,  has  found  it  prac- 
ticable to  establish  branches  in  very  few  of  the 
provincial  towns  :  several,  containing  a  popula- 
tion of  40,000  and  upwards,  are  still  without  such 
branches  ;  and  there  is  not  a  private  bank  of  circu- 
lation in  the  whole  country.  The  causes  are,  the 
distrust  excited  by  the  recollection  of  the  assignats, 
the  want  of  confidence  in  government,  the  absence 
of  commercial  enterprise,  as  well  as  of  the  habits 
of  care  and  arrangement,  which  are  indispensable 
to  success  in  a  line  of  itself  less  profitable  than  is 
commonly  imagined.  Holland,  with  all  her  com- 
mercial improvements,  has  never  adopted  the  bank- 
note system,  while  in  Austria,  Russia,  and  Sweden, 
the  paper  circulated  is  a  forced  government  cur- 
rency, not  convertible  into  cash. 

The  obstacles  to  the  circulation  of  bank 
paper  on  the  Continent,  might  })crliaps  have 
yielded  to  the  effects  of  peace  and  augmented 
trade,   but  they  have  been   strengthened   of  late 

Y    2 


:^Q4>        Find uati 011  in  the  Value  of  Money, 

years,  by  tlie  increased  facility  of  ibrgery.  It 
would  thus  be  vain  to  calculate  on  the  extended 
use  of  bank  paper,  or  on  any  effect  likely  to  arise 
from  it  in  regard  to  the  value  of  the  precious 
metals. 


Supply  of  Agricultural  Produce. — Though  corn 
is  so  liable  to  fluctuation,  as  well  from  difference 
of  seasons,  as  from  the  occurrence  of  peace  or 
war,  it  is  remarkable  that  a  character  of  rise  or  fall 
when  once  stamped  on  a  period,  is  found  to  pre- 
vail during  a  considerable  time.  Thus,  the  rise  of 
price  begun  in  the  early  part  of  the  reign  of  Eliza- 
beth, continued,  with  only  occasional  intermissions 
to  lG50,  not  far  short  of  a  hundred  years.  At  that 
time  began  an  a^ra  of  stationary,  and,  in  some  de- 
gree, of  decreasing  prices,  which,  with  temporary 
suspensions  during  the  indifferent  seasons  and  ex- 
pensive wars  of  the  reigns  of  William  and  Anne, 
continued  until  1764.  From  that  year  until  1814, 
we  had  no  less  than  fifty  years  of  brisk  demand  and 
high  prices ;  while  at  present,  as  far  as  can  be 
judged  from  appearances,  either  in  England  or  on 
the  Continent,  we  are  entering  on  a  period  similar 
to  that  which  followed  1650  or  1713,  —  a  period 
when  our  growth  being  somewhat  more  than  ade- 
quate to  the  demand,  the  market  long  continued 
heavy,  and  prices,  in  a  great  measure,  stationary. 

In  what  circumstances  are  we  to  look  for  the 
cause  of  a  stagnation  continuing  during  so  long  a 
period  as  half  a  century?  In  the  investment  of 
capital  and  labour  in  agriculture,  to  an  extent  pro- 
ductive of  a  surplus  growth  ;  and  in  the  fact,  that, 
as  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  the  producers 
increase  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  consumers, 
the  disproportion  continues,  year  after  year,  until 


FhictiuU'ton  in  I  he  Value  ojMonei/.        3^5 

the  occurrence  of  some  great  national  change,  such- 
as  a  war,  or  the  direction  of  an  extra  portion  of 
labour  to  nnuuii'acturcs. 

To  return  to  the  more  immediate  object  oi"  our 
enquiry  —  the  effect  of  the  cost  of  corn  on  prices 
generally.  This  effect  is  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance, botii  as  corn  is  the  chief  object  of  family 
consinnption,  and  as  it  regulates,  in  a  great  mea- 
sure, that  other  main  constituent  of  prices,  the  rate 
of  labour.  Since  18M<,  and  more  particularly  since 
18iy,  the  operation  of  the  corn  market  has  tended 
to  reduce  prices,  by  gradually  extending  to  other 
articles  the  reduction  that  has  taken  place  in  agri- 
cultural produce.  Nor  does  this  tendency  seem 
likely  to  alter  :  part  of  our  taxes  on  agriculture  are 
reduced  ;  the  effect  of  the  remainder  is,  as  we  have 
shewn  in  a  preceding  chapter,  considerably  over- 
rated;  and  the  charges  of  tillage  bid  fair  to  return 
to  a  standard  little  higher  than  that  of  179'2.  Such 
is  also  the  prospect  in  France  and  the  Continent 
at  large ;  a  state  of  peace  reducing  the  cost  of 
labour,  and  preventing,  in  consecpience,  any  per- 
manent rise  of  prices  in  the  corn  market. 

Effect  of  Conthwnlal  Prices  on  those  of  England, 
—  In  the  case  of  two  countries  enjoying  peace  and 
the  benefit  of  commercial  intercourse,  there  is  a 
perpetual  tendency  to  equality  of  price.  The  rea- 
sons are  obvious ;  there  exists  a  direct  motive  for 
emigrating  from  the  dearer  country,  ami  for  making 
in  the  cheaper,  articles  for  importation,  whether 
open  or  clandestine,  into  the  dearer.  In  the  latter, 
the  rate  of  interest  is  generally  lower,  and  allbrds  a 
temptation  to  send  out  of  it  funded  and  other  mo- 
nied  property.      The  operation   oi"  these   causes,. 


3'l(j        Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Monctj. 

steady,  though  almost  unseen,   has  been   a  main 
reason  of  the  fall  in  our  prices  since  ISII-. 

War;  Mode  of  its  Operation, — Of  the  effect 
of  war  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  it  enhances  com- 
modities in  various  ways  :  —  First,  by  the  addition 
of  a  tax  to  the  price  of  an  article ;  next  by  a  gene- 
ral rise  in  labour  from  the  demand  for  men  for 
government  service,  whether  in  the  field  or  in  the 
preparation  of  clothing,  arms,  and  other  M^arlike 
stores ;  and,  lastly,  by  the  interruption  of  interna- 
tional intercourse,  and  the  increased  charge  of 
transport.  If  in  the  l6th  and  lyth  centuries  these 
causes  had  a  serious  operation  on  prices,  their 
effect  was  greatly  increased  by  the  adoption  of  the 
funding  system,  since  which,  the  scale  of  military 
expenditure  has  been  enlarged  in  every  country  of 
Europe. 

What,  in  this  respect,  was  the  situation  of  France 
during  the  reign  of  Bonaparte  ?      His  unsettled 
government    and   personal   want    of    credit,    dis- 
couraged loans,  and  diminished  one  great  source 
of  expenditure ;  nor  was  his  power  displayed  with 
much  effect  in  the  imposition  of  additional  taxes. 
But  the  demand  of  men  for  his  service,  was  on  a 
large  scale,  and,  without  the  operation  of  either 
paper-currency  or  war  taxes,  prices  in  France  rose 
between  1792  and  1814,  about  30  per  cent.     From 
this  important  fact  we  may  form  some  idea  of  the 
effect  of  a  new  war  on  the  price  of  commodities  in 
England,  without  supposing  a  repetition  of  extreme 
measures,  such  as  an  exemption  from  cash  pay- 
ments,   or   the   stoppage   of   neutral   navigation. 
Even  in  a  mitigated  form,  the  effect  of  war  on 
prices  would  be  so  decisive  as  to  counteract,  in 
the  coiurse  of  a  few  years,  the  operation  of  almost 

20 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money,        STf 

all  the  causes  of  reduction.  On  this,  however,  we 
forbear  to  dwell,  because  the  advantages  of  peace 
are  now  better  understood,  and  a  recurrence  to  a 
state  of  hostihty,  to  that  state  which  subverts  tlie 
calcidations  of  the  governor,  as  it  destroys  the  hap- 
piness of  the  governed,  will  be  less  and  less  fre- 
quent, as  sovereigns  become  aware  that  the  field 
of  combat  presents  only  barren  glories. 

The  arguments  for  the  rise,  as  for  the  fall  of 
prices,  are  thus  of  great  weiglit,  antl  no  question, 
it  is  evident,  can  be  more  complicated,  or  present 
a  longer  catalogue  of  opposing  causes.  On  the  one 
hand,  what  a  prospect  of  fall  is  held  out  by  the 
application  of  improved  machinery  to  the  American 
mines,  and  the  introduction  of  bank  paper  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe !  On  the  other,  what  a 
counterpoise  from  the  prospect  of  increased  popu- 
lation or  the  recurrence  of  a  state  of  war  1  To 
attempt  to  strike  a  balance  between  these  contend- 
ing causes,  to  advance  an  opinion  in  regard  to 
future  probability,  would  be  vain  :  all  wc  can  pro- 
nounce, is,  \\\2i\.  jluctuation  in  the  value  of  money 
cannot  he  'prevented ;  that  it  can  hardly  fail  to  re- 
cur on  any  great  political  transition ;  and  that  a 
measure  which  should  put  an  end  to  uncertainty 
in  time  contracts,  woidd  relieve  us  from  a  great 
national  evil. 

Injurious  Effect  of  Fluctuatio7i  in  the  Value  of 
Money. — Money,  as  Dr.  Smith  remarks,  (Book  I. 
Chap.  V.)  is,  in  buying  and  selhng,  an  unexception- 
able measure  of  value  j  and  in  a  contract  from  year 
to  year,  it  is,  in  general,  a  safe  measure  ;  but  in  a 
contract  of  long  duration  it  is  far  otherwise.  How 
great  was  the  depreciation  of  money  during  the  late 


.'^-28         FIkcI  nation  in  (he  Value  of  M  one  if. 

wars;  and  notvvitiistandiiig  the  various  disadvan- 
ta£i;c.s  attendant  on  landed  property,  liow  <reneral 
was  the  preference  given  to  it  in  tlie  case  ot"  a  })ro- 
vision  for  a  young  family,  for  grand-children,  or  for 
any  remote  object.  Is  it  not  in  the  unfortunate 
tendency  of  money  property  to  fluctuate,  rather 
than  in  any  distrust  of  the  stability  of  the  public 
i'unds,  that  we  are  to  look  for  the  cause  of  stock 
selling  for  f),  7*  oi*  8  years'  purcliase  less  than  land? 
Then,  as  to  land  itselfj  and  the  mode  of  letting  it, 
can  we  trace  among  the  various  objection^  to  long 
leases  any  so  powerful  as  the  inicertainty  of  the 
value  of  money  ?  Lastly,  amidst  all  the  difficulties 
in  the  question  of  a  commutation  for  tithe,  what 
operates  so  greatly  as  this  uncertainty  to  prevent 
the  church  from  acceding  to  a  fixed  income,  fi'om 
reducing  to  a  determinate  form  those  collections 
which,  in  their  present  unsettled  state,  leave  open 
so  wide  a  field  for  contention  ? 

Situation  of  Annuitants. — We  have  already  ex- 
plained in  our  second  chapter,  that  as  to  land  and 
houses  the  fluctuations  in  price  during  the  war, 
were,  in  a  great  measure,  nominal ;  that  it  was,  in 
general,  money  that  changed,  and  commodities 
that  maintained  their  Vidue.  This  maintenance  of 
value  was  exemplified  in  many  other  respects ;  in 
income  derived  from  personal  exertion,  whether  in 
the  shape  of  wages,  salaries,  or  professional  fees  ; 
in  each,  the  money  received  was  increased  in  pro- 
portion, or  nearly  in  proportion,  to  the  decrease  of 
its,  value,  the  whole  exhibiting  a  tendency  in  the 
transactions  of  life,  to  And  their  level,  and  to  coun-- 
terbalance  all  artificial  changes,  whether  arising 
from  additional  taxes,  the  non-convertibility  of 
paper-currency,  or  the  restriction  of  )iationai  inter- 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.        3^29 

course.  But  "  from  tlie  benefit  of  this  tendency  to 
equality,  of  this  antidote  to  enliancement,  the  fixed 
annuitants  are  exciutled  ;"  they  are  luiable  to  guartl 
against  a  progressive  decHne  of  income  during  a 
war ;  and  the  recovery  of  income  which  may  indi- 
rectly take  place  at  a  peace,  will  hardly  j)rove  an 
indenniity  to  tliem  if  it  arise,  as  at  present,  from 
circumstances  which  bear  hard  on  the  solvency  of 
other  classes.  Are  we  not,  therefore,  justified  in 
inferring,  that  the  case  of  the  aniuiitant,  as  it 
stands  at  j)resent,  is  luniatural,  and  at  variance 
with  the  rules  of  equity ;  and  may  we  not  con- 
clude that,  by  conferring  on  money  income  the 
stability  attendant  on  income  derived  from  laboiu' 
or  real  property,  we  shall  correct  an  essential  de- 
fect in  our  institutions  ? 

Money -'pro'pertij  in  the  Kingdom  —  Magnitude  of 
its  Amount.  —  We  proceed  to  calculate  the  amount 
of  money-property  in  the  kingdom,  —  the  property 
that  would  be  beneficially  aliected,  or  relieved 
from  uncertainty  ol"\ahie,  by  the  adoption  of  such 
a  measure.  In  former  ages,  when  the  funding 
system  was  unknown,  and  loans  of  money  from 
one  individual  to  another  were  of  very  limited  ex- 
tent, land,  houses,  furniture,  implements  and  cloth- 
ing, comprised  almost  every  description  of  pro- 
perty:  they  constituted  "  the  moveables  and 
immoveables"  of  our  ancient  statutes.  But  uithin 
the  last  century,  there  has  arisen  in  the  public 
funds,  in  canals,  docks,  and  otiier  undertakings, 
held  in  shares,  as  well  as  in  private  loans,  (on 
mortgages  and  otherwise),  a  j)roj)erty  represented 
solely  in  money ,  of  which  the  aggregate  approaches 
10  two-fifths  of  the  total  wealth  of  th.-  kingdom. 

Thus,  were  we  lo  cojuputc  ihe  land,  the  houses, 


330        Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money, 

the  farming,  the  manufacturing,  the  mercantile 
stock  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  at  2,000,000,000/. 
(see  Appendix,  p.  [82]),  we  should  not  be  disposed 
to  rate  our  public  funds,  the  amount  of  loans  ex- 
isting between  individuals,  the  value  of  shares  in 
public  w^orks,  in  short,  all  property  of  which  the  va- 
lue is  directly  affected  by  the  rise  or  fall  of  money, 
at  less  than  1,200,000,000/.  Though  of  this  sum 
the  greater  part  can  hardly  be  called  an  addition 
to  the  national  property,  the  whole  is  evidently 
individual  property;  and  its  amount  is  demon- 
strative of  the  magnitude  of  that  income,  which 
is  most  exposed  to  suffer  by  fluctuation  of  prices. 


331 


SECTION  II. 

Plan  for  lessening  the  Injury  arising  from  the  Flucttuition 
of  Prices. 

If  we  proceed  to  analyze  the  use  of  money,  whe- 
ther for  national  or  individual  purposes,  we  shall 
find  it  resolve  itself  into  "  the  power  of  purchase," 
or,  in  other  words,  into  the  power  of  procuring  arti- 
cles for  consumption.  It  is  consequently  of  much 
more  importance  in  all  contracts  of  duration  to 
look  to  the  value  than  to  the  numerical  amount  of 
a  given  sum.  The  expecHency  of  this  has  long 
been  felt,  and  the  price  of  corn  has  been  recom- 
mended as  a  standard  of  regulation  in  regard  to 
leases  and  other  time  contracts.  Such  it,  in  some 
measure,  may  be  in  a  country  like  France,  where 
the  majority  of  the  lower  orders  are  strangers  to 
the  use  of  foreign  articles,  such  as  groceries,  and 
expend  literally  three-fourths  of  their  wages  on 
bread.  The  price  of  corn  is  farther  of  importance 
in  that  country  in  an  indirect  sense,  from  its  influ- 
ence on  the  price  of  labour,  as  manual  labour  is 
there  made  to  perform  much  more  in  agriculture, 
and  even  in  manufactures,  than  with  us :  the  whole 
exemplifying  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Smith,  who  as- 
sumed labour  as  the  measure  of  value,  and  corn  as 
the  measure  of  labour. 

The  case  of  France  is  that  of  the  Continent  at 


:V3'2       PIdnJhr  i^irin^-  a  permamnf  Value  In 

large,  Hiul  was  that  of  our  ancestors  a  cciiliiiy 
aijjo;  our  situation,  however,  is  now  materially 
altered,  our  consumption  of  corn  havinf^  under- 
gone a  comparative  reduction,  while  manual  labour 
enters  in  a  proportion  far  smaller  than  formerly 
into  the  cost  of  our  manufactures. 

That  corn  occupies  a  very  different  proportion 
in  the  expenditure  of  different  classes,  will  be  ap- 
parent from  a  short  comparative  table. 


Family  of  the  mid- 

Family of  a  Cotta- 

dle Class,  residing 

Heads  of  Expenditure. 

ger;   Expence 

in  a  Provincial 

(Sec  Appendix,  p.  [11].) 

about  .£'57  a  Year. 

Town,  Expentc 

Proportions  in  100. 

£6~iO  a  Year. 
Proportions  in  lOO. 

Provisions          -         -         . 

60 

33 

Clothing  and  Washing 

20 

18 

House-rent 

^-k 

10 

Fuel  and  Liglit 

10 

(i 

Other    charges,    namely, 

Wages,  Assessed  Taxes, 

Education,  Medical  At- 

tendance, &c. 

3^ 
100 

33 

100 

This  sketch,  brief  as  it  is,  puts  in  a  very  clear 
light  the  difference  between  the  wants  of  the  lower 
and  those  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes.    To  the 
latter,  corn  is  evidently  ineligible  as  a  standard  of 
value.     In  a  direct  sense,  it  forms  hardly  a  third 
of  their  expenditure,  and  though,   on  making  al- 
lowance tor  its  indirect  operation,    in  particular 
for  its  effect  on  wages,  we  become  more  aware  of 
its  importance,  it  will  hardly  be  denied,  that  in 
an  age  of  such  varied  and   refined    expenditure, 
a  standard  of  a  more    comprehensive   character, 
ought  if  possible  to  be  adopted.     Now,  the  pro- 


Money  Contracts.  .3,3,5 

gress  of  statistics,  and  the  multiplication  of  official 
returns  within  the  last  half-century,  have  supj)lie(l 
data  which,  in  the  time  of  Dr.  Smith,  were  not  ac- 
counted reducible  to  a  definite  form.  Of  this, 
some  idea  may  be  formed  from  a  table  in  the  Ap- 
pendix (p.  [95])  comprising-  a  list  of  articles  of 
general  consumption,  corn,  butcher-meat,  'manu- 
factures, tropical  products,  &c.  and  containing  the 
probable  amount  of  money  expended  on  each  by 
the  public.  This  table  is  followed  by  ex})lanatorv 
remarks,  of  which  the  object  is  to  show  that  con- 
tracts for  a  series  of  years  ought  to  be  made  with 
a  reference  to  the  power  of  money  in  purchasing 
the  necessaries  and  comforts  of  life ;  that  after 
fixing  a  given  sum,  say  100/.  as  the  amount  of  an 
annual  salary,  the  payment  in  subsequent  years 
should  be  not  necessarily  100/.,  but  either  <J.'5/., 
100/.,  or  105/.,  according  to  the  varying  power  ol 
money  in  making  purchases. 

Being  aware  of  the  uncertainty  of  calculations, 
when  unsupported  by  official  returns;  as  well  as 
that  to  give  to  a  table  the  autiiority  re([uisite  to 
constitute  it  a  regulator  of  the  value  of  money, 
must  be  a  work  of  nuich  time  and  labour,  we 
decline  inserting  our  list  in  the  text,  and  confine 
ourselves  to  an  enquiry  in  regard  to  the  means  ol 
obtaining  the 

Documents  for  tJtc  Formation  of  a  Tabic  of  Refer- 
ence. —  As  yet  our  official  returns  are  scanty,  or 
rather  the  use  made  of  them  has  been  on  a  con- 
fined scale :  enough,  however,  has  been  done 
to  show  the  practicability  of  obtaining  the  in- 
formation we  desire.  Thus,  in  regard  to  corn, 
the  registers,  both  as  to  price  and  quantity, 
are  now  on    a  more   satisfactory  tooting  than  in 


.334      Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

former  years :  of  sugar,  a  similar  record  has 
loni^  been  kept,  and  there  are  also  registers, 
whicli  might  easily  be  rendered  more  complete,  of 
our  woollen  and  linen  manufactures.  Of  the  con- 
sumption of  all  excised  articles,  estimates  approach- 
ing to  correctness  may  be  formed  from  documents 
in  possession  of  that  Board ;  while  in  regard  to 
foreign  commodities,  the  custom-house  would  sup- 
ply similar  results.  Then,  as  to  average  prices, 
there  are  the  Books  of  the  Victualling  Office,  of 
the  Commissariat  department,  and  of  public  hos- 
pitals, such  as  Greenwich.  The  Board  of  Agricul- 
ture has  at  various  times  obtained  information,  not 
strictly  official,  but  substantially  correct,  by  sending 
circular  letters  to  their  correspondents  throughout 
the  kingdom  ;  a  plan  acted  on  to  a  great  extent  by 
the  late  Arthur  Young,  in  1811. 

Returns  of  this  nature,  when  obtained,  might 
easily  be  reduced  into  the  tabular  form  on  the  plan 
of  the  late  Mr.  Colquhoun,  but  wdth  more  selection 
and  discrimination.  Since  the  date  of  his  calcu- 
lations (1812),  great  changes  have  occurred  in 
respect  both  to  price  and  quantity,  and  to  complete 
the  collections  with  the  accuracy  requisite  to  form 
a  document  of  authority  would  require  an  extent 
of  labour  beyond  the  means  of  an  individual.  A 
task  of  such  length,  and  of  such  general  utility, 
should  be  defrayed  from  a  common  fund,  and 
government,  if  unwilling  to  give  so  direct  a  sanc- 
tion to  a  new  project,  as  would  be  implied  by  the 
appointment  of  persons  for  collecting  and  com- 
paring materials,  would,  doubtless,  on  the  demand 
of  any  respectable  association,  communicate  from 
the  public  offices  all  returns  applicable  to  the 
subject. 


Money  Contracts,  335 

For  the  details  of  the  table,  and  the  calculations 
connected  with  it,  we  refer  to  tlie  Appendix  :  at 
present  we  shall,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  suppose 
it  in  operation,  and  bestow  a  few  paragraphs  on  the 
effects  that  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure  would 
have  on  the  "Teat  interests  of  the  country. 

In  what,  it  may  be  asked,  would  the  benefits  of 
it  consist  ?  In  ascertaining  on  grounds  that  would 
admit  of  no  doubt  or  dispute,  the  power  in  pur- 
chase of  any  given  sum  in  one  year,  compared  to 
its  power  of  purchase  in  another.  And  wliat 
would  be  the  practical  application  of  this  know- 
ledge ?  The  correction  of  a  long  list  of  anomalies 
in  regard  to  rents,  salaries,  wages,  &c.,  arising  out 
of  unforeseen  fluctuations  in  our  currency.  In 
the  present  undefined  form  of  leases,  annuities, 
and  other  time  contracts,  the  100/.  of  this  year  may, 
three  years  hence,  be  equivalent  in  power  of  pur- 
chase, either  to  110/.  or  to  90/.,  the  former  being- 
probable,  if  peace  continue,  while  the  latter  is  a 
moderate  estimate  of  the  change  that  would  follow 
the  first  year  of  a  war.  So  much  are  the  chances 
on  the  side  of  fluctuation,  in  the  value  of  money, 
that  it  may  almost  be  said,  that,  "  in  a  contract  of 
duration,  an  adherence  to  a  fixed  sum  of  money 
implies  an  acquiescence  under  a  change  of  value.** 
But  a  table  exhibiting  from  year  to  year  the  power 
of  money  in  purchase,  would  give  to  annuitants 
and  other  contracting  parties,  the  means  of  main- 
taining an  agreement,  not  in  its  letter  only,  but  in 
its  spirit ;  of  conferring  on  a  sj)ecified  sum  a  uni- 
formity and  permanency  of  value,  by  chajigin<x  the 
numerical  ajiiount  in  j^roporlion  to  the  chuitgc  in  its 
porcer  ofpwxhase. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this,  that  a  change  of 


:^fi()     Plan  for  giving  a  permaneiU   I'alue  to 

numerical  amount  oiif^lit  to  he  unnnal  :  it  would, 
in  o-eneral,  be  sufficient  that  it  took  ))lace  at  periods 
of  three,  four,  or  five  years,  takinir  as  the  ciite- 
rion  the  average  value  of  money  in  purchases 
throughout  the  whole  period. 

Elfcct  071  the  labouring  Classes  of  the  adoption  of 
such  a  Standard.  —  The  use  of  money  to  the  country 
labourer  is  very  simple,  extending  to  little  beyond 
the  purchase  of  the  articles  mentioned  in  the  pre- 
ceding skctcli  of  his  annual  expenditure.      In  the  ' 
case  of  tlie  inhabitants  of  towns,   tlie  proportion 
required  for  house-rent,  fuel  and  clothing  is  some- 
what larger,  while  that  for  provisions  is  somewhat 
smaller  than  in  tlie  family  of  the   cottager.     To 
both,    the    chief  object  of  expence  is    corn,   the 
average  price  of  which  is  already  ascertained  pe- 
riodically ;  but  to  render  the  table  complete,  our  • 
wish  would  be  that  the  average  of  the  other  articles 
consumed  by  the  labouring  classes,  such  as  beer, 
coarse  clothing,   fuel,  were  in  like  manner  put  on 
record.     If  to  such  returns  were  added  a  few  plain 
tables  of  the  average  consumption  of  the  lower  class 
in  various  situations,  one  for  an  unmarried  labourer, 
others  for  a   labourer  married,    and  having  two, 
three,  or  four  children,  it  would  be  an  easy  process 
to  calculate  how  far  a  given  sum  of  wages  (for  ex-  ■ 
ample  45/.  annually)  was  more  or  less  adequate  than 
in  former  years  to  the  supply  of  such  wants.     We  ' 
should  then  possess  completely  the  means  of  judging 
of  the  comparative  comfort  of  the  working  classes ; 
of  making,  in  a  manner  satisfactory  and  conclusive, 
the  calculations   hitherto  prepared  with  nuich   la-  - 
hour,  and  an  unavoidable  share  ot'  error,  by  iSir  F. 
Eden,  Mr.  Barton,  and  others. 

How  important  would  such  a  standard  of  refei- 


Moiwy  Contracts.  337 

ence  have  been  throughout  the  last  thirty  years,  a 
period  of  such  frequent  contention  between  the 
employer  and  the  employed  !  During  the  war, 
workmen  in  towns  were  repeatedly  obliged  to  com- 
bine for  tlie  pui-pose  of  raising  their  wages  to  the 
level  of  ])rovisions,  and  in  rural  districts,  where 
combination  was  im])racticable,  the  poor-rate  was 
called  in  to  supply  the  deficiency.  At  present  the 
case  is  reversed  ;  the  employer,  particularly  wlien 
resident  in  a  town,  has  found,  and  will  long  find  it  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty  to  reduce  wages  to  the 
standard  justified  by  the  fall  of  provisions. 

What  a  scene  of  inequality  is  exhibited  at  pre- 
sent by  tlie  current  payments  of  the  metropolis  ! 
Wages,  salaries,  professional  fees,  are  almost  all  on 
as  high  a  scale  as  during  the  war,  notwithstanding 
the  diminution  of  the  two  great  causes  of  rise,— the 
expence  of  living  and  the  extra  demand  for  labour. 
The  persons,  whether  of  high  or  low  station,  who 
are  in  receipt  of  the  established  allowances,  if  called 
on  for  an  abatement,  would  naturally  plead  the 
uncertainty  of  j)rovisions  continuing  at  a  reduced 
rate :  and  nothing,  it  is  evident,  will  induce  them 
willingly  to  assent  to  a  reduction,  excej)t  a  guarantee 
against  a  recurrence  of  the  grand  evil  —  a  rise  of 
prices  without  a  correspondent  rise  in  wages. 
Such  a  guarantee  we  should  hope  to  afford,  not  by 
an  interference  between  the  payer  and  reci'i\er, 
but  by  an  alternative  offered  to  their  \oluntary 
adoption  ;  by  putting  it  in  their  power,  when  mak- 
ing a  time  contract,  to  affix  a  permanent  value  to  a 
money  stipulation  ;  or  to  have  access,  when  no  such 
precaution  was  taken,  to  an  ecpiitable  standanl  of 
reference. 

What  would  be  the  probable  effect  of  liaving 
this  authenticated  record  of  the  price  of  commo- 

z 


S3H       Plan  Jbr  giving  a  pcmiancnl  I'alue  to 

(dities,  this  monitor  to  declare  the  rise  or  fall  in  the 
value  of  money  ?  It  could  hardly  fail  to  operate 
greatly  in  abridging  altercations.  At  a  time  when  a 
reduction  of  wages  became  expedient,  it  would 
relieve  the  inferior  from  the  humiliation  attendant 
on  such  a  step  ;  and,  in  tlie  case  of  a  rise  of  prices, 
it  would  guide  the  employer  to  a  fair  advance  of 
wages,  the  distributor  of  charitable  aid  to  a  fair 
apportionment  of  relief. 

Effect  of  such  a  Measure  on  Agriculture.  —  In  no 
department  of  our  productive  industry  has  our 
progress  as  a  nation  been  less  conspicuous  than  in 
tillage  ;  our  superiority  over  olu-  continental  neigh- 
bours being  in  a  great  degree  limited  to  our  live- 
stock and  our  machinery.  On  computing  the 
annual  amount  of  property  created  in  the  kingtlom, 
we  find,  after  making  a  great  deduction  from  the 
prices  (moderate  as  they  were,  considering  the  state 
of  markets  at  the  time)  assumed  by  Mr.  Colquhoun, 
that  the  annual  produce  of  the  agriculture  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  still  amounts  to  1 20,000,000/. 
What  a  field  is  there  here  for  the  application  of 
skill  and  judgment,  and  how  great  the  call  for  both 
in  the  present  situation  of  oiu'  agriculturists  ! 

Leases.  —  It  is  not  a  little  remarkable,  that  several 
of  the  counties,  such  as  Norfolk  and  Northumber- 
land, in  which  our  husbandry  is  most  improved, 
are  by  no  means  our  most  fertile  districts  naturally. 
To  what,  then,  are  they  indebted  for  their  supe- 
riority ?  To  a  cause  wliicli  Mr.  Coke  has  repeatedly 
pressed  on  his  brother  land-holders,  both  in  and 
out  of  parliament,  — that  there  is  no  good  agricul- 
ture xvithout  leases.  In  what  other  way  can  we  ex- 
plain the  high  rents  paid  in  a  comitrv  in  general  so 
little  favoured  in  soil  and  chmate  as  Scotland  ?  The 


Money  Contracts.  339 

objections  of  our  landlords  to  long  leases,  are  va- 
rious, arising  partly  from  the  habits  of  their  pre- 
decessors ;  partly  from  a  reluctance  to  ])art  with 
the  command  of  their  pro])crty  for  a  mnnber  of 
years ;  but,  more  than  all,  from  the  uncertainty  of 
the  value  of  money.  During  the  war  this  uncer- 
tainty was  of  very  serious  import :  at  present  it  is 
removed,  as  far  as  regards  landlords,  by  the  return 
to  cash  payments,  and  the  difficulty  now  is  to  in- 
duce a  solvent  tenant  to  take  a  lease.  To  both 
parties,  therefore,  the  fluctuation  of  our  currency, 
even  when  metallic,  is  replete  with  anxiety. 

Corn-rents.  —  Of  late,  the  great  fall  of  price  has 
induced  several  of  our  principal  land-holders  to 
regulate  their  rents  by  the  price  of  corn  ;  a  plan 
open  to  many  objections,  when  varied  from  year  to 
year,  because,  a  season  of  high  price  may  be,  and 
generally  is,  a  season  of  deficient  produce.  When 
calculated  on  the  price  of  a  series  of  years,  this 
course  is  less  exceptionable  :  in  any  form,  how- 
ever, it  seems  less  eligible  than  the  plan  which 
(Appendix, }).  [98])  we  are  desirous  to  propose,  of 
combining  the  price  of  corn  with  that  of  other  arti- 
cles of  consumption. 

Tithe.  —  Referring  to  the  remarks  under  this 
head  in  the  Appendix,  we  shall  at  ])resent  merely 
observe,  how  great  would  be  the  benefit  accruing 
from  a  regulating  standard,  applied  to  clerical  in- 
come, and  cnlculated,  as  far  as  regards  j)erniaiu'ney 
of  value,  to  justify  the  church  in  eonnntiting  tithe 
for  a  money  stipend.  A  change  of  that  nature 
would,  on  the  one  hand,  put  an  end  to  altercations 
unfortunately  too  freciuent  ;  while,  on  the  other,  it 
would  ])revent  tithe  liom  oj)erating  as  an  impedi- 
ment to  agricultural  improvement.  The  great,  and, 
at  present,  well-founded  objection  of  the  clergy  to 

z  '2 


f^lO       Plan  ftn-  giving  a  permanent  J'dhic  to 

a  permanent  commutation  of  tithe,  is  a  dread,  not 
of  the  faitli  of  ])arliament,  but  of  the  uncertain 
vahie  of  money  :  removx'  that  a])prehension,  and  you 
give  them  substantial  motiv^es  to  prefer  a  fixed  sum, 
whether  they  look  to  the  interest  of  themsehes  oi' 
their  successors.  In  the  Protestant  church  of  Hol- 
land, they  have  an  example  of  stipends  paid  during 
more  than  two  centuries,  by  local  magistrates  or  by 
government,  without  any  derogation  from  the 
respectability  of  those  who  received  them  :  and  if  in 
France  the  amount  of  clerical  income  be  too  small 
to  be  dwelt  on  when  we  are  treating  of  a  Protes- 
tant establishment,  the  regularity  of  its  payment 
during  twenty  years,  under  circumstances  of  great 
financial  embarrassment,  is  calculated  to  lessen  one 
material  ground  of  apprehension. 

The  commutation  to  which  we  allude  does  not, 
of  course,  imply  any  reduction  of  the  existing  in- 
come of  the  clerical  body,  nor  a  relinquishment  of 
any  security  arising  from  the  tenure  by  which  they 
are  at  present  invested  with  tithe.  A  change  from 
an  unfixed  to  a  fixed  money  income,  may  evidently 
take  place  without  interfering  either  with  such 
security,  or  with  the  patronage  of  the  church  as  at 
present  established.  It  might  be  proposed  as  a 
temporary  arrangement,  to  last  only  during  the 
interval  required  to  carry  into  effect  a  plan  that  has 
been  more  than  once  proposed,  and  which  has 
lately  received  a  kind  of  legislative  recommenda- 
tion— the  purchase  of  land  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  the  church  a  revenue  from  rent  instead  of 
tithe.  But  on  this  we  will  not  enlarge,  our  subject 
naturally  confining  us  to  the  operation  of  the  mea- 
sure with  a  view  to  the  relief  of  the  agriculturists  ; 
a  view  in  which  it  would  soon  disclose  satisfactory 
results. 


Money  Contracts.  341 

Under  our  present  system,  the  church  is  entitled 
to  an  increase  of  revenue  in  proportion  to  the  in- 
crease of  produce  ;  such,  we  may  safely  take  for 
granted,  would  form  no  part  of  its  demand  under 
a  different  arrangement.  All  tiiat  its  representa- 
tives would  be  likely  to  desire,  would  be  an 
assurance  that  the  contract  should  be  maintained 
bojidjide,  that  the  sum  once  fixed  sliould  be  maiie 
good,  whatever  be  the  fluctuations  of  our  currency. 
And  what  would  be  the  result  to  the  agriculturists 
of  tithe  being  thus  limited  ?  That  all,  whether  laiul- 
lords  or  farmers,  might  extend  their  tillage  as  they 
chose,  without  being  annually  taxed  in  a  portion 
of  the  produce.  Our  numbers  are  on  the  increase  ; 
our  production  increases  with  them,  and  it  is, 
above  all,  in  a  case  of  such  increase,  that  the  j)res- 
sure  of  tithe  is  felt.  An  exemj)tion  from  such 
pressure  is  most  strongly  called  for  by  our  situ- 
ation, present  and  prosj)ective  ;  and  may  we  not 
add,  that  when  viewed  in  connexion  with  the 
various  circumstances  stated  in  our  chapter  on 
Agriculture,  it  would  render  probable  a  result, 
on  which,  at  present,  it  seems  somewhat  bokl  to 
sj)eculate?  we  mean  Mr.  Tooke's  idea  of  the  prac- 
ticability of  our  competing  with  foreigners  in  the 
export  of  corn,  as  was  done  by  our  countrymen 
previous  to  I'^Crl. 

Application  of  the  pro}H)sed  Plan  lo  the  Puhlic 
Funds. — To  offer  any  suggestion  connected  with 
the  public  funds  is,  we  are  aware,  to  tread  on  dvW- 
cate  ground,  men  in  office  being  \erv  j)r()j)cijy 
backward  to  interfere,  in  even  a  slight  degree,  witli 
the  existing  contract  with  the  fund-iioUler.  W'v 
shall,  however,  satisfy  the  most  cautions,  by  pre- 
mising that  the  acceptance  of  the   |)lan   i.iiould  be 

z  3 


342      Planjbr  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

optional  on  the  pari  (}/'  each  stock-holder ,  although 
we  can  have  little  doubt  of  the  beneficial  tendency 
of  :i  measure,  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to  en- 
sure to  the  stock-holder  and  his  posterity,  the  same 
income,  whether  the  country  was  at  peace  or  war ; 
whether  its  currency  were  sound  or  depreciated  ; 
M'hether  the  mines  of  gold  and  silver  throughout 
the  world,  became  more  or  less  productive.  The 
100/.  of  1792,  which  in  I8O6  was  equivalent  to 
80/.,  and  seven  years  after,  to  less  than  70/.,  would 
thus  remain  100/.  throughout.  The  apprehensions 
which  at  present  not  unfrequently  lead  to  sales  of 
stock  against  the  wish  of  the  holders,  would  cease 
or  be  materially  diminished,  and  funded,  like  land- 
ed property,  would  be  seldom  disposed  oi\  except 
on  particular  occasions,  such  as  when  a  division  of 
property  became  expedient  on  the  demise  of  a  tes- 
tator, on  legatees  attaining  majority,  or  on  their 
entering  on  mercantile  business.  In  fact,  after  the 
adoption  of  such  a  measure,  the  chief  features  of 
distinction  between  land  and  stock,  would  be,  that 
while  the  one  possessed  the  attraction  of  local  in- 
fluence, the  other  would  have  the  more  direct  ad- 
vantage of  dispatch  and  certainty  in  regard  to  re- 
ceipt of  income. 

The  present  is,  we  believe,  the  flrst  proposition 
of  a  measure  for  giving  a  permanent  value  to  our 
funded  property.  Our  public  men,  or  rather  the 
few  anions:  them  who  are  accustomed  to  take  com- 
prehensive  views  of  finance,  have  hitherto  contem- 
plated a  very  different  course.  Money,  they  saw, 
was  declining  in  value  during  half  a  century,  and 
funded  property  declined  with  it ;  a  fall  carefully 
kept  by  them  in  the  back  ground,  and  consequently 
in  a  great  measure  unknown  to  the  public.  Our 
successive    chancellors   of    the    exchequer    antici- 


Money  Contracts.  34^ 

pated  (see  p.  300.)  a  continuance  of  this  decline,  and 
silently  calculated  on  its  producing  a  diminution 
in  the  pressure  of  our  debt.  But  the  re-action  of 
the  last  eight  years  has  greatly  shaken  this  calcu- 
lation :  money  has  recovered,  and  along  with  that 
recovery,  the  pressiu'e  of  our  debt  has  greatly  in- 
creased. It  is  time,  therefore,  to  seek  relief  in  a 
measure  of  a  difterent  character. 

Its  Effect  on  the  Price  of  Stocks. — Nothing  can 
be  more  different  than  a  rise  of  stock  caused  by 
the  adoption  of  a  plan  such  as  we  propose,  and  a 
rise  that  might  be  consequent  on  the  operation  of  a 
large  sinking  timd.  The  latter  would  be  liable,  as 
we  shall  show  in  our  cha])ter  on  Finance,  (]).  .'3()0.)  to 
various  objections  :  in  particular,  it  would  afford 
a  strong  inducement  to  sell  out  and  to  vest  capitiil 
in  other  securities,  probably  in  foreign  stock.  But 
a  rise  proceeding  from  a  course  such  as  we  are 
anxious  to  reconmnend,  would  prove  an  induce- 
ment to  keep  capitiil  in  our  funds,  the  \alue 
conferred  by  the  measure  being,  in  its  nature,  })er- 
manent  and  hkely  to  increase. 

Cojisequcnl  /Idrantatie  to  the  Piihlic. — This  brings 
us  to  a  question,  which,  untlei-  present  circum- 
><tances,  may  very  naturally  be  asked  by  our 
readers, — why  confer  addition^  value  on  the  funds, 
at  a  time  when  they  ha\e  risen  so  considerably  in 
the  scale  of  comparison  with  land,  houses,  and 
merchandize  ?  Oiu'  answer  is,  that  we  contemplate 
no  undue  favour  to  the  stock-holder  ;  we  merely 
point  out  a  measure,  which,  by  benefiting  him  in 
the  first  instance,  may  gi\  e  go\'ermnent  a  fair  plea 
to  demand  lioni  him  a  return  calculated  to  afford 
relief  to  other  classes  of  the  coiuuuuiify.     'I'o  re- 

z  4 


S44       Pl((n  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

quire  such  from  the  fund-holder  witliout  a  con- 
sideration, wouki,  of  course,  imply  a  sacrifice  on 
his  ])art,  but  the  results  which  we  antici})ate  froi7i 
the  proposed  measure,  will,  if  they  be  well  founded, 
confer  on  him  in  one  way  as  much  as  he  may  be 
called  on  to  relinquish  in  the  other.  Thus,  if  it 
continue  a  favourite  object  with  ministers  to  reduce 
the  interest  on  the  old  four  per  cents.,  nothing  is 
so  likely  to  promote  that  measure,  as  conferring 
an  additional  value  on  funded  property.  Atid  if 
it  be  said  that  such  would  be  a  return  partial  and 
inadequate  to  the  advantage  conferred,  the  dis- 
cussion may  be  cut  short  by  the  general  argimient, 
that  if  the  legislature  improve  materially  the  cir- 
•cumstances  of  the  fund-holder,  or  of  any  great 
class  in  the  community,  there  can  be  no  great  dif- 
rficulty  in  rendering  that  prosperity  conducive  ta 
the  relief  of  the  public  at  large. 

All  this  may  be  admitted,  but  the  plan,  it  will 
be  said,  can  be  adopted  by  the  governments  of 
iother  countries,  and  our  stocks  soon  deprived  of 
any  relative  superiority  which  it  might  confer. 
Our  answer  is,  that  the  success  of  such  a  plan, 
and  the  extent  of  rise  attendant  on  its  adoption, 
will  depend  chiefly  on  the  degree  of  confidence 
that  each  nation  has  in  its  government ;  a  point  in 
which  we  possess  a  great  and  undoubted  supe- 
riority over  the  rest  of  Europe. 

General  Remarks. — We  conclude  this  chapter 
by  a  few  remarks  on  the  general  characteristics  of 
the  proposed  plan.  Does  it,  it  may  be  asked, 
contain  any  thing  compulsory  or  unfair,  and  in 
particular,  does  it  imply  the  imposition  of  any 
burden  on  posterity?  Our  posterity  will,  in  all 
probability,  be  in  a  far  easier  condition  than  our- 


Money  Contracts.  345, 


selves,  and  would  incur  no  loss  from  our  conferrino- 
the  character  of  })ernianent  value  on  our  dividends : 
on  the  contrary,  they  will  (see  ]).  401.)  be  benefited 
by  whatever  shall  be  found  conducive  to  the  rehef 
of  the  ])resent  generation.  Our  proposition  may 
])e  considered  an  attempt  to  fill  up  a  bhuik  in  the 
mode  of  regulating  our  pi{)ducti\e  industry,  and 
to  do  it  in  a  way  not  fancifid  or  artificial,  but  on 
the  principles  of  unreserved  freedom  so  strongly 
recommended  by  Dr.  Smith  and  other  eminent 
authorities.  But  the  use  to  be  made  of  it  would 
be  perfectly  optional.  It  would  be  in  itself  merely 
a  table  of  reference,  and  all  contracts,  whether 
relative  to  loans,  leases,  or  bequests,  might,  at  the 
will  of  the  parties,  be  made  payable,  either  accord- 
ing to  the  proposed  standard,  or,  as  at  present,  in 
money  of  undefined  value. 

Our  preceding  pages  ex])lain  the  operation  of 
the  proposed  plan  in  respect  to  individuals.  In 
regard  to  its  result  in  a  national  sense,  we  may  be 
allowed  to  anticipate  that  the  removal  of  uncer- 
tainty from  time  contracts  woidd  contribute  very 
effectually  to  the  extension  of  our  national  industry. 
That  industry  and  its  results  ha\e  been  carried 
farther  by  us  than  by  almost  any  of  our  neighbours, 
but  they  are  still  far  from  having  reached  a  limit. 
Circumstances  have  of  late  become  more  favoiuable 
and  the  pressure  of  taxation  less  heavy  ;  but  great 
exertions  will  still  be  requisite  to  carry  our  national 
income  to  an  amount  corresponding  with  our  bur- 
dens ;  that  is,  to  increase  it  so  that  the  jiroportion 
of  our  taxation  to  our  resources  shall  not  bo  greater 
than  in  other  countries. 

How  far,  it  may  be  asked,  has  the  proposition 
brought  forward  in  this  chapter  the  sanction  of 
precedent.-^     That  sanction,  though    it    cannot   he 


.34<6      Plan  for  giving  a  jyermanent  VaJne^  8^c. 

cited  as  of  frequent  occurrence,  is  not  altoi^ether 
wanting.  The  course  now  suggested,  is  analogous 
to  the  plan  of  corn  rents  lately  adopted  by  several 
of  our  great  proprietors,  and  wliich,  for  many  years 
has  been  exemplified  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
CourtofTeinds,  or  tithe,  inScotland.  Thedecisions 
of  that  court  j)ui'port  that  clerical  income  shall  be 
regulated  by  the  price  of  corn  in  the  public  markets 
during  a  series  of  years.  But  were  precedent 
wholly  wanting,  the  rule,  "  that  prospective  en- 
sraafements  should  be  framed  so  as  to  maintain 
their  bond  Jide  value,  whatever  be  the  value  of 
money,'*  is  so  equitable,  and  apparently  so  easy  of 
execution,  that  there  seems  no  little  difficulty  in 
accounting  for  its  not  yet  having  found  its  way 
into  practice.  This  has,  we  believe,  been  owing 
to  two  causes ;  the  unfortunate  neglect  of  political 
economy  in  the  education  of  our  public  men  ;  and 
the  interest  of  government,  the  greatest  of  all 
debtors,  to  prevent  the  public  from  fixing  its  atten- 
tion on  the  gradual  depreciation  of  money  that 
went  on  during  the  half  century  previous  to  the 
late  peace. 


847 


CHAP.  XL 

Our  Finances. 

We  now  approacli  the  end  of  our  volume,  and  have 
arrived  at  the  dejKirtmcnt  which  forms  at  present 
the  cliief  object  ofpubHc  attention.  In  tliis,  as  in 
the  former  chapters,  we  shall  begin  by  a  statement 
of  facts,  a  retrospect  to  past  events,  and  after  remov- 
ing, or  endeavouring  to  remove,  several  popular 
errors,  we  shall  proceed  to  develope  the  measures 
apparently  best  ada})ted  to  our  present  situation, 
greatly  altered,  as  it  has  been,  by  the  events  con- 
sequent on  peace. 

We  propose  dividing  our  discussion  into  the 
following  heads :  — 

A  historical  sketcii  of  finance  operations ; 

Our  prospects  in  regard  to  trade  and  national 
income ; 

The  views  of  finance  suggested  by  such  prospects. 


SECTION  I. 

Our  National  Debt. 

A  public  debt  in  one  form  or  other,  has  been,  in 
almost  every  country,  an  appendage  of  estabhshed 
government.  Its  amount,  however,  seklom  ex- 
ceeded an  anticipation  of  one  or  two  years' 
revenue,  until  the  ado))ti()n  <»f  tlir  funding  system, 


348  ^^'^^'  Finances ; 

or  plan  of  rendering  public  obligations  transferable 
from  band  to  band,  gave  governments  a  surprising 
facility  in  borrowing.  Tins,  like  many  otiier  inge- 
nious schemes,  both  in  civil  and  military  affairs, 
originated  with  the  Italians,  and  was  adopted  early 
in  Venice,  Genoa,  and  Holland.  In  England,  it 
Avas  not  introduced  until  our  participation  in  the 
great  struggle  made  by  King  William  against  the 
aggrandizement  of  Louis  XIV.;  but  if  we  were 
somew^hat  late  in  following  the  example,  in  our 
ultimate  progress  we  have  far  surpassed  our  neigh- 
bours.    Our  debt  amounted, 

At  the  peace  of  Ryswick       -       in  1697    to     -£'21,500,000 

of  Utrecht       -          -  1713           -      54,000,000 

of  Aix  la  Chapelle   -  1748           -      78,000,000 

of  Paris             -         -  1763           -    134,000,000 

of  Versailles       -       -  1783           -    238,000,000 

of  Amiens         -         -  1802           -    452,000,000 

of  Paris           -           -  1815  nearly  700,000,000 

To  which,  adding  the  debt  of  Ireland,  somewhat 

more  than            ...  -          100,000,000 


Total  present  debt  about       -         800,000,000 


These  sums  represent  the  total  of  our  debt  at 
each  period,  without  the  perplexing  distinctions  of 
funded  and  unfunded,  redeemed  and  unredeemed. 
Though  the  figures  express  an  amount,  not  of 
money  but  of  stock,  the  difference  at  peace  prices 
is  not  much  more  than  nominal :  thus,  our  pre- 
sent debt,  w^ere  it  practicable  to  pay  it  off"  at  the 
market  price,  would  require  an  amount  in  money, 
not  greatly  below  the  800,000,000/.  of  stock.  But 
as  there  is  no  more  reason  to  anticipate  the  liqui- 
dation of  the  debt  of  this  than  of  other  countries, 
the  more  correct  course,  and  that  which  conveys 


Fluctuations  of  Stock.  349 

the  more  distinct  idea  of  the  extent  of  tlie  burden, 
is  to  follow  the  French  nietliod  of  computing,  not 
by  the  principal,  but  by  the  sum  re([uired  to  pay 
the  interest ;  a  sum  which,  since  the  reduction  of 
the  Five  per  cents.,  may  be  calh'd,  in  round 
numbers,  .^30,000,000/. 

Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Stock.  —  By  fluctu- 
ations in  stock,  we  must  be  understood  to  mean 
changes  proceeding,  not  fiom  the  rumours  per- 
petually in  circulation  on  the  Stock  Exchange, 
which  are  too  absurd  for  notice,  and  operate  only 
for  a  few  days,  but  from  causes  of  a  more  com- 
prehensive and  permanent  character  ;  —  the  credit 
or  discredit  of  government ;  scarcity  or  abund- 
ance of  capital ;  the  adecjuacy  or  inadequacy  of  our 
resources  to  our  burdens.  The  extent  of  fluctu- 
ation, has,  of  course,  been  very  great  at  diflferent 
])eriods  of  our  history.  During  the  long  peace 
that  followed  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  under  the 
prudent  administration  of  Wal})ole,  stocks  rose 
greatly,  the  three  ])er  cents,  having  attained  par 
in  173^,  and  being,  in  17.'3{),  the  time  when  that 
minister  was  forced  by  j)()pular  clamour  to  declare 
war  against  Spain,  at  the  very  high  rate  of  I07/.  in 
cash  for  100/.  in  stock.  They  continued  high 
during  several  years  of  the  war  ;  and  it  was  not 
until  the  range  of  hostilities  widened,  and  assumed 
a  serious  as})ect,  that  their  fall  became  great. 
The  same  may  be  said  to  have  applied  to  the  more 
successful  contest  begun  in  17'^^N  the  three  per 
cents  continuing  between  70/.  and  SO/.,  until  IJdO, 
when  our  loans,  in  consequence  of  the  national  ar- 
dour and  the  confldent  character  of  Lord  Chat- 
ham, were  carried  to  an  amount  at  that  time  un- 
precedented.    In  the  American  war  the  fall  was 


350  Our  Finances; 

more  serious  :  it  was  great  from  the  time  that  France 
took  part  against  us,  and  tlie  pubhc  became  aware 
of"  the  inabiUty  of  our  ministers  to  conduct  the 
contest  with  success. 

Mr.  Pitt's  Administration.  —  It  was  in  1784  that 
Mr.  Pitt  succeeded  to  his   financial   charge,  and 
found  it  during  several  years  productive  of  great 
contention    and    embarrassment.      Our   prospects, 
however,  gradually  brightened,  and  ere  the  expir- 
ation of  the  ten  years  of  peace  that  preceded  the 
war  of  1793,  the  nation  had  risen  superior  to  its 
difficulties.     This  w^as  the  aera  of  the  so-mucli  ap- 
plauded revival   of  the   sinking  fund.     Partly  by 
the  effect  of  that  measure,  more  by  the  general 
prosperity  of  the   country,  our  3  per   cents   were 
carried  in  1792  to  tiie   high  price   of  97;  a  price 
from  wliich  they  fell  as  soon  as  the  public  became 
aware  that  our  government  had  determined  to  take 
part  in  the  coalition  against  France.     But  as  during 
the  first  two  years  of  the  war  our  expences   were 
comparatively  limited,  the  great  decline  did  not 
take  place  until   1796,  or  rather  1797>  ^vhen  the 
3  per  cents,  sunk  to  the  unexampled  low  rate  of 
47.     It  was  then  that  our  minister  felt  the  neces- 
sity of  altering  his  financial  plan,  of  lessening  loans 
and  augmenting  taxes  :  he  came  forward  accord- 
ingly witli  the  bold  proposition  of  raising  a  large 
proportion  of  the  supplies  within  the  year  ;  a  course 
which,  alarmed  as  the   nation  was  at  the  aggran- 
dizement of  France,  obtained  general  concurrence, 
and  soon  received  a  consolidated  form  by  the  im- 
position of  the  income  or  property-tax. 

In  consequence  of  this  decided  measure,  and  of 
the  splendid  success  of  our  continental  allies  in 
1799,  our  stocks  revived,  hut  they  fell  towai'ds  the 
close  of  the  year,  when  the  fickle  Paul  forsook  the 


Measures  since  1815.  351 

coalition,  and  Bonaparte,  arriving  from  Egypt,  gave 
new  vigour  to  the  resources  of  France.  Large 
loans  became  again  indispensable,  and  our  funds 
continued  comparatively  low,  until  the  signature 
of  the  preliminaries  in  October  1801.  That  event 
had  a  tendency  to  reinstate  them,  but  the  peace 
was  too  short  and  too  doubtful  to  admit  of  any 
great  rise. 

JVarqf  1803. — On  the  renewal  of  war  in  1803, 
the  3  per  cents,  fell  from  "JO  to  57,  and  during 
some  time,  the  general  dread  of  invasion  kept 
them  at  a  very  low  rate.  War  taxes,  however, 
were  cheerfully  submitted  to,  and  in  the  succeed- 
ing years  (1805,  (i,  70'  these  potent  auxiliaries 
enabled  government  to  lessen  the  loans,  and  to 
raise  the  three  per  cents,  to  ()0  and  upwards.  The 
same  cause  explains  their  continued  higli  price  in 
1808,  a  year  of  commercial  distress,  anil  in  1809, 
a  season  of  general  over-trading.  Nor  was  it  till 
the  multi])lied  bankruptcies  of  1810,  and  the  heavy 
drain  of  monoy  ibr  the  peninsular  war,  that  the 
fall  became  considerable.  Large  loans  were  now 
unavoidable,  and  stocks  were  lowered  not  only  in 
181'2,  a  year  of  chequered  i(:)rtune  to  our  arms, 
but  during  part  of  1813,  when  our  prospects  were 
equally  cheering  in  Spain  and  (iermany.  At  last 
the  balance  inclined  to  the  lavourable  side :  the 
victory  of  Leipsic,  and  the  evident  superiority  of 
the  allies,  outweighed  the  demands  of  our  Treasiny, 
enormous  as  they  had  become. 

From  1815  to  18^^2.  — In  the  early  part  of  1815 
the  3  per  cents  were  fluctuating  Irom  &1  to  (»."), 
when  the  retiu'ii  of  Bonaparte  from  Klba,  \no- 
duced  a  very  sudden  reduction.  In  llii-  contest 
that  ensued,  government  were  unluckily  obliged 
to  contract  for  a  loan  early  in  June,  and  were  thus 


352  Our  Finances ; 

(U'j)rivo(l  of"  tho  benefit  of  tlie  rise  which  imme- 
diately ioUowcd  the  success  of"  our  arms,  lii  1816, 
peace  was  consolidated,  but  the  price  of  commodi- 
ties experienced  a  great  fall,  and  mucli  distress 
prevailing  in  both  trade  and  agriculture,  tlie  funds 
recovered  very  slowly.  In  I8I7,  appearances  im- 
proved, and  in  the  early  part  of  1818  the  3  per 
cents,  having  risen  above  80,  our  prospect  became 
very  encouraging.  Unfortunately  the  rise  was  not 
of  long  duration :  the  mismanagement  of  the 
French  loan,  the  over-trading  in  this  country,  the 
distress  of  the  United  States  of  America,  all  con- 
curred to  depress  the  funds.  They  continued  low 
during  the  two  years  from  the  summer  of  1819  to 
that  of  1821,  after  wliich,  they  gradually  im- 
proved so  as  to  enable  ministers  to  carry  into 
effect  an  important  and  long  contemplated  oper- 
ation. * 

Reduction  of  the  Five  per  Cents.  —  The  five  per 
cents,  comprised  a  sum,  which  in  round  numbers 
we  shall  call  140,000,000/.,  and  which  government 
were  at  any  time  at  liberty  to  pay  off,  by  giving 
100/.  in  cash  for  100/.  in  stock.  How  then,  it  may 
be  asked,  did  it  happen  that  the  discharge  was 
delayed  so   long  after  the  peace  ?      Because  the 

*  Average  Prices  of  the  3  per  Cent.  Consols  during  the  fol- 
lowing years ;  — 

1803  70,57,53.  1813  58,  57,  GO,  61. 

1804-  55,56,5S.  1814  64-,  66,  64. 

1805  56,58,60.  1815  65,  after  Mar.  58,  60. 

1806  60,62,6+.  1  1816  60,62,63. 

1807  61,62,64-.  j  1817  63,70,75,83. 

1808  62,  64,  66,  68.  1818  80,  82,  79. 

1809  67,  6S,  70.  '  1819  77,  74,  65,  70,  68. 

1810  70,  71,  69,  66.  \     1820  68,  69,  70. 

1811  65,64,63.  1821  69,72,75,77. 

1812  62,  61,  59,  5S.  1822(toAug.)76.  77,  78,  80. 


Measures  since  181.5.  553 

discliargc  of  so  large  a  sum  could  take  place  only 
by  the  substitution  of  one  security  for  another ; 
and  as  the  new  fund  to  be  created,  would,  in  most 
of  the  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  peace, 
have  fetched  an  indiffercni,  price,  ministers  were 
from  time  to  time  obliged  to  ))ostpone  the  measure. 
In  the  early  part  of  IS  18,  circumstances  becom- 
ing favourable,  a  new  stock  bearing  3^  per  cent, 
interest,  and  not  reducible  below  that  rate  during 
ten  years,  was  created  e\idently  for  the  purpose 
of  supplying  the  desired  substitute.  The  i)roject, 
however,  failed,  in  consequence  of  the  general  fall 
of  funded  property,  and  there  afterwards  occurred 
no  favourable  opportunity  until  the  beginning  of 
the  present  year,  when,  as  is  well  known,  the  re- 
duction was  very  successfully  accomplished. 

There  remains  open  to  leduction  a  farther  por- 
tion of  our  stock,  viz.  the  old  four  per  cents, 
which  distinguished  from  the  four  per  cents 
created  in  the  present  year,  amount  to  about 
70,000,000/.  This  sum  *^is  considerable,  but  in 
other  respects  the  question  of  reduction  stands  on 
very  doubtful  grounds.  The  saving  of  a  half  per 
cent,  in  the  interest  would  give  only  about  300,000/. 
clear,  and  it  seems  very  doul)tful  at  what  period 
tlie  course  of  circumstances  will  admit  of  even  that 
diminution. 

Our  otJicr  Financial  Measures.  —  The  course 
contemplated  by  government  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  was  to  kee})  up  an  eHicient  sinking  fund,  and 
to  continue  during  several  years  the  |)r()j)iMty-ta>L 
on  the  reduced  scale  of  5  \)cv  cent.  This  plan 
fell  to  the  ground  on  the  rejection  of  that  tax  by 
the  House  of  Commons  on  the  ISth  March,  1810; 
a  rejection   altogether   unexpected    by    ministers, 

A  A 


.J^^  Our  Fhumccs : 

and  wliicli  was  afterwards  declared  hy  theiii  to  have 
been  })rodiictive  of"  great  puljlic  injury.  To  this 
opinion  though  expressed  dehijerately,  and  h)ng 
after  the  first  impression  of  disappointment,  we  can 
by  no  means  subscribe.  Had  the  burden  been 
inevitable,  and  had  the  question  been  merely  a 
commutation  of  one  payment  for  another,  a  pro- 
perty-tax might  have  been  somewhat  less  oppressive 
than  several  of  the  existing  imposts ;  but,  under 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  rejection  of 
the  bill  was,  we  are  satisfied,  productive  of  public 
good.  Men  in  office,  immersed  in  a  routine  of 
business,  are  often  very  imperfectly  apprized  of  the 
circumstances  of  particular  portions  of  the  commu- 
nity. In  the  session  immediately  preceding,  they 
had,  by  the  magnitude  of  their  grants,  shown  them- 
selves unconscious  of  the  extent  of  the  loss  atten- 
dant on  the  transition  from  war  to  peace ;  of  the 
approaching  fall  of  prices,  the  increasing  pressure 
of  taxation.  To  all  this  they  were  awakened  by 
the  loss  of  the  bill,  and  taught,  for  the  first  time  in 
twenty  years,  the  necessity  of  negativing  the  im- 
portunate demands  to  which  the  holders  of  office 
are  perpetually  exposed.  Besides,  a  property-tax, 
had  it  been  imposed  in  1816,  would  have  been  pro- 
ductive, distressing  as  was  the  time  that  followed, 
of  loud  complaint,  perhaps  of  serious  and  general 
injiuy. 

The  next  financid  measure  of  importance  took 
place  in  1819,  when  ministers  having  called  on 
parliament  to  give  efficiency  to  the  sinking  fund, 
proposed  and  carried  a  measure  little  expected  in 
the  midst  of  peace, — the  imposition  of  new  tiixes  to 
the  amount  of  3,000,000/.  These  were  imposed 
chiefly  on  malt,  spirits,  and  tobacco,  and  paid  with 
great  reluctance  during  the  interval  of  doubt  and 


tJie  Sinking  Fund.  355 

embarrassment  which  ensued.  Ol'  late,  liowever, 
brighter  prospects  liave  opened,  and  a  diminution 
of  ex])enditure  has  been  promoted  by  a  concuiTcnce 
of  causes,  —  tranquiihty  among  our  lower  orders  ; 
the  reduction  of  the  5  per  cents ;  and  the  transfer 
of  a  portion  of  our  half-pay  and  pension  list  to  the 
next  generation.  The  consequence  has  been  im- 
])ortant  and  gratifying  —  a  reduction  of  taxes  in 
tlie  last  two  years  to  the  amount  of  G,000,000/. 

The  Sinking  Fund, 
The  idea  of  a  Sinking  Fund  is  of  old  date, 
having  been  conceived  more  than  a  century  ago, 
by  Sir  R.  Walpole,  the  only  public  man  of  his  age 
wiio  appears  to  have  been  conversant  with  finance. 
Its  plan  was  simple,  the  fund  being  formed  in  the 
first  instance  of  a  small  sum  of  surplus  revenue,  and 
augmented  progressively  by  the  interest  of  such 
part  of  the  debt  as  w^as  paid  off  by  its  operation. 
Here  was  no  dis})lay  of  the  wojiders  of"  compound 
interest,  but  the  long  peace  that  ensued  favoured 
the  reduction  of  debt,  and  the  fund,  though  small, 
was  progressively  increasing.  Such  continued  the 
course  of  circumstances  until  1733,  when  the 
troubled  aspect  of  the  Continent,  and  the  difficulty 
of  imposing  new  taxes,  necessitated  an  interference 
with  some  disjiosable  resource,  and  the  sinking 
fund  was  encroached  on.  A  precedent  once  given, 
trespasses  became  fi'cquent,  and  this  fund,  thongii 
never  abolished,  ])roved  of  so  slender  oj)erati()n, 
that  in  the  course  of  ludja  century  it  had  not  dis- 
charged above  15,000,000/.  of  our  debt.  At  lasl, 
in  178(),  the  scheme  was  revivetl  with  augmented 
energy,  aided  on  the  one  hand  l)y  Dr.  Price's 
flattering  calculations  of  the  effect  of  compound 
interest,  on  the  other  by  Mr.  I'itt's  decl:iri'd  dctir- 

A  A    L> 


il'iG  Our  Fhumccs ; 

mination  to  consider  its  funds  inviolable.  'J'he  new 
plan  was  in  substance  the  same  as  that  of  Sir  K. 
Walpole,  but  the  reserve  was  invested  with  many 
additional  safeguards,  being  committed  to  a  special 
board  of  commissioners  who  were  independent,  not 
merely  of  the  Treasury,  but  in  some  respects  of 
Parliament. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  public  first  became 
familiar  with  the  term  «*  Consolidated  Fund,"  which 
meant,  however,  nothing  more  than  our  taxes 
formed  into  an  aggregate,  out  of  which  govern- 
ment pledged  itself,  whatever  might  be  the  pro- 
portion of  our  revenue  to  our  expenditure,  to  pay 
a  million  annually  to  the  new  commissioners. 

The  sinking  fund  consisted  consequently  of 

1.  An  annual  million,  to  which  were  added : 

2.  The  amount  of  government  annuities  as  they 
successively  expired ;  and 

3.  The  interest  of  such  stock  as  w^as  annually 
redeemed. 

The  measure  now  brought  into  operation,  paid 
off  the  following  sums  : 


In  1787     £  662,750  Stock. 

1788  1,456,900 

1789  1,506,350 


In  1790  .^1,558,850  Stock. 

1791  1,587,500 

1792  1,507,110 


These  sums,  small  as  they  were,  could  hardly  be 
considered  bondjide  reductions  of  the  public  debt, 
since  the  Spanish  armament  in  I79O  necessitated 
an  addition  to  our  burdens  of  nearly  half  their 
amount.  In  an  arithmetical  sense,  accordinq-ly, 
the  effect  w^as  inconsiderable  ;  in  a  political  sense  it 
was  otherwise,  as  it  excited  the  expectation  of  great 
subsequent  deductions.^  To  strengthen  this  ex- 
pectation, and  to  remove  an  apprehension  that  a 
renewal  of  war,  by  necessitating  new  loans,  might 
cast  these  annual  liquidations  into  the  shade,  Mr. 


Uic  Sinking  Fund.  S5J 

Pitt  obtained,  in  Vi^M,  an  act  of  "parliament  declar- 
ing that  all  future  loans  should  carry  in  themselves 
the  means  of  tiieir  progressive  extinction,  ministers, 
on  contracting  a  loan,  being  pledgeil  to  "  ])rovide 
taxes,  not  only  for  the  interest  but  lor  an  adtlition 
to  the  sinking  fund."  This  provision,  whether  in 
reality  judicious  or  not,  was  very  favourably  re- 
ceived by  the  public,  and  had,  in  concurrence  with 
the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  year,  the  effect  of 
producing  a  very  considerable  rise  in  the  funds. 

But  this  flattering  prospect  was  forthwith  over- 
cast by  our  participation  in  the  war  against  France, 
and  the  unparalleled  magnitude  of  our  expence. 
The  sinking  fund  was  maintained,  and  operated  a 
large  ajjparent  reduction,  but  the  result,  in  a  defi- 
nitive sense,  was  null,  our  debt  being  augmented 
by  our  annual  loans  in  a  far  greater  ratio.  After 
all  that  we  have  been  told  of  the  operation  of  the 
sinking  fund ;  after  the  pompous  statements  of 
hundreds  of  millions  redeemed  by  it;  after  all  the 
eloquent  effusions  in  its  praise  by  both  sides  of  the 
House,  the  public  will  learn  with  some  surprise, 
that  since  I786,  this  fund  has  had  a  real  o])eration 
during  twelve  years  only,  and  that  the  actual  re- 
duction effected  by  it,  has  not  averaged  a  single 
million  a  year!  In  this  we  are  to  be  understood,  as 
leaving  the  twenty-three  years  of  war  wholly  out  of 
the  question,  and  coniining  our  calculation  to  the 
six  yeai's  })receding  171)3,  and  tlie  six  years  subse- 
quent to  181.5. 

Compound  Interest.  —  The  surj)rising  results 
ascribed  in  our  time  to  compound  interesi  will  be 
cited  by  the  future  historian,  :us  alfbrding  a  striking 
example  of  tiie  ))ower  of  enthusiasm  in  the  original 
calculator,  and  of  the  exteni  of  credulity  on  the 
])art   of  tlie  jniblic,      in  Nvar,   llir   ^inking  linid  i5 

A  A    J 


,'^58  Our  Finances  ; 

supported  by  loans,  and  is  it  not  apparent,  tfiat 
whatever  may  be  the  beneficial  result  of  accinnu- 
lation  in  the  hands  of  the  commissioners  of  the 
sinking  fund,  tlie  loss  to  the  public  from  the  addi- 
tional loans  required  by  it  must  be  in  the  same 
compound  ratio  ?  We  might  even  add,  that  in  all 
cases  of  taxation,  where  the  impost  has  not  (and  it 
very  rarely  has)  the  effect  of  inducing  economy  in 
the  individual,  the  loss  is  to  be  reckoned  by  com- 
pound interest,  since,  had  the  money  been  lefl  in 
the  hands  of  the  subject,  tlie  increase  would  have 
been  in  the  compound  form. 

Without  entering  into  any  arithmetical  statement, 
or  even  pressing  the  argument  in  an  abstract  form, 
we  may  safely  make  the  general  assertion,  tliat  the 
power  of  the  sinking  fund,  whatever  it  may  have 
been,  has  arisen  "  not  from  actual  payments,  but 
from  its  influence  on  the  public  mind;**  — from  its 
presenting  ^possibility  of  an  ultimate  repayment  of 
the  debt; — a  possibility  transformed  into  confident 
expectation  by  the  ardour  of  the  public  and  our 
natural  inclination  to  belie^'e  what  we  wish. 

Present  State  of  the  Sinking  Fund.  —  Such  was 
the  state  of  our  financial  concerns  until  the  begin- 
ning of  1322,  when,  by  the  double  effect  of  reduc- 
tion of  expenditure  and  increase  of  revenue,  an 
actual  surplus  was  produced,  and  the  sinking  fund 
was  likely  to  become  efficient  to  the  extent  of  4  or 
5,000,000/.  a  year.  We  seemed  now  on  the  eve  of 
attaining  the  result  so  long  represented  as  desirable 
by  ministers  ;  the  possession  of  an  engine  for  raising 
the  price  of  stocks,  or,  in  other  words,  for  reducing 
the  rate  of  interest  on  private  securities.  In  wliat 
manner,  it  may  be  asked,  would  the  latter  prove  a 
consequence  of  the  former  ?  In  France,  where  the 
14. 


the  Smhin<>:  Fund.  3.59 

interest  of  the  public  debt  does  not  Ibrni  10  per 
cent,  of  the  income  arising  from  ])ro])erly,  and 
government  securities  do  not  connnand  general 
confidence,  the  interest  of  money  vested  in  land, 
iiouses,  and  trade,  is  not  materially  affected  by  the 
j)rice  of  the  public  fimds.  Land  continues  to  be 
bought  with  eagerness,  though  yiekling  only  .'3, 
3^7,  or  i  per  cent,  on  the  })urchase  money,  at  a 
time  when  the  same  capital  would  yield  between 
5  and  (')  per  cent,  in  the  funds.  In  this  country 
the  case  is  otherwise.  Our  })ublic  divitlends  iorm 
a  considerable  propoition  of  the  income  arising 
fi'om  property ;  they  are  held  by  individuals  in  all 
[)arts  of  the  country  ;  and  their  value  naturally 
uifluences  that  of  other  investments  of  capital.  It 
follows  that  a  rise  in  the  price  of  stock,  in  other 
words,  our  obtaining  less  interest  from  purchasing 
in  the  funds,  has  a  chrect  tendency  to  lower  the 
interest  on  private  securities,  as  has  been  exempli- 
fied by  the  general  diminution  of  the  interest  on 
mortgages  diu'ing  the  last  and  })resent  year. 

What,  in  a  statistical  sense,  are  the  ciuuacteristics 
or  accompaniments  of  a  low  rate  of  interest  ?  It  is 
indicative  of  abundant  ca})ital,  and  of  a  very  ad- 
vanced state  of  productive  industry.  It  was  this 
which  formed  the  great  featiue  in  the  situation  of 
Holland  during  the  chief  part  of  the  17th  and  18th 
centuries,  and  enabled  her  government  to  lower 
her  dividends  at  a  time  (l651)  when  Fnuice  and 
other  states  borrowed  at  very  high  interest.  It  was 
this  which,  under  Sir  R.  Walpole,  afforded  the 
strongest  proof  of  the  revival  of  our  financial  credit, 
and  which  in  I7ID  enableil  Mr.  IVlham  to  ctlect 
a  well-known  and  highly  beneficial  reductii)n.  But, 
neither  hi  these  cases,  or  in  any  otiier  of  whicli 
history  has  preserved  the    recoril,    did   the    I'all   of 

A   A     1' 


;3(J0  O/cr  FiiKuire.s ; 

interest  proceed  from  tlie  operation  of  a  sinking 
fund.  It  rested  on  a  much  broader  ])asis  :  it  was 
the  natural  consequence  of  confirmed  peace  ;  of 
the  diminished  demand  for  capital ;  of  a  fall,  or 
tendency  to  fall,  in  the  rate  of  interest  on  all  secu- 
rities whether  public  or  private ;  it  was  to  a  con- 
currence of  these  circumstances,  much  more  than 
to  any  surplus  in  the  revenue,  tliat  we  attributed 
the  fortunate  accomplishment  of  that  great  oper- 
ation, the  reduction  of  the  five  per  cents. 

If  our  readers  see  with  some  surprise  these  de- 
ductions from  the  efficiency  of  a  measure  so  much 
vaunted,  they  will  be  no  less  struck  with  the  farther 
part  of  our  argument ;  viz.,  tliat  a  large  sinking 
fund,  or,  to  describe  it  in  the  most  simple  terms,  a 
large  surplus  revenue  applied  to  the  redemption  of 
stock,  would  be  productive  of  public  injury.  By 
lowering  unnaturally  the  rate  of  interest,  it  would 
send  capital  abroad,  and  operate  as  a  fund  to  raise 
the  stocks  of  France  or  America.  This  result  is 
too  obvious  to  have  escaped  the  observation  of 
either  the  Bank  directors  or  ministers  :  in  fact,  the 
readiness  wdth  which  ministers  consented  both  in 
the  last  and  present  year  to  relinquish  their  surplus 
revenue  by  remitting  taxes,  seems  to  indicate  a 
conviction,  that  a  rise  in  the  value  of  stock,  pro- 
duced artificially,  would  be  replete  with  injury  to 
the  public.  They  cannot  fail  to  be  aware,  that 
since  the  reduction  of  the  5  per  cents.,  there 
remains  no  adequate  motive  for  interfering  with  the 
current  rate  of  interest,  or  for  discovering  a  soli- 
citude on  the  part  of  government,  to  raise  the  value 
of  the  funds  more  than  of  land,  or  au}^  other  de- 
scription of  property.  If,  in  commercial  affairs, 
ministers  have,  during  the  last  ten  years,  evinced  a 
prudent  forbearance,  and  abstained  from  the  inter- 
17 


the  Sinking  Fund.  36l 

vention  so  unfortunately  exercised  by  tlieir  prede- 
cessors, is  it  likely  that  in  finance  tliey  ^vill  follow 
a  different  course  ?  Our  debt  will  hardly  admit 
of  direct  reduction :  our  hope  of  relief  is  in  that 
diminution  of  pressure  which  will  follow  the  in- 
crease of  our  means;  —  the  augmentation  of  na- 
tional income; — a  result  most  likely  to  be  ])romoted, 
by  strict  impartiality  as  to  property,  whether  vested 
in  land  or  the  public  funds. 

But,  if  such  be  the  conviction  of  our  rulers, 
why,  it  may  be  asked,  do  tliey  still  cling  to  a  name, 
and  hold  forth  the  sinking  fund  to  parliament  and 
the  country,  as  an  institution  entitled  to  such 
zealous  support  ?  Partly,  we  believe,  from  a  wish 
to  retain  a  surplus  of  revenue  at  their  disposal, 
for  the  relief  of  suffering  interests,  or  to  facilitate 
measures  of  evident  utility,  such  as  the  commu- 
tation of  tithe  in  Ireland  :  partly  perhajis,  from 
a  deficient  acquaintance  with  the  backwardness  of 
other  countries,  and  a  consequent  difh'dence  in  cal- 
culating the  relative  progress  of  our  own.  Our 
true  sinking  fund  is  to  be  sought  in  the  more  rapid 
increase  of  our  national  i?iconie,  an  increase  that 
rests  on  no  visionary  basis,  but  on  our  mines,  our 
navigation,  our  capital.  Yet  no  speaker  in  parlia- 
ment, whether  ministerialist  or  oppositionist,  ap- 
pears to  have  as  yet  studied  the  comparati\e 
prospects  of  England  and  her  neighbours,  oi-  lo  be 
sufficiently  aware  of  the  inferences  whicii  they 
justify. 

The  admissions  successively  nv.xdv  by  the  siip- 
])orters  of  the  sinking  fund  (Aj)j)endi\,  j).  [1().'3].) 
liave  removed  part  of  the  mystery  which,  by  the  aid 
of  such  phrases  as  "  inviolability  of  de])osit"  and 
*'  operation  of  compound  interest,"  luul  so  long 
encircled  it.    Our  present  Chancellor  of  the  Exclie- 


;if)2  Our  l^'uianccs  ; 

(iiicr  lias  liad  tlie  good  sense  to  reliiHiuisli  the 
nominal  part  of"  tlie  sinking  fund,  and  to  describe 
the  remainder  merely  as  a  surplus  revenue  ap[)ro- 
priated  to  tlie  redemption  of  stock.  As  such  we 
request  our  readers  to  consider  it,  and  to  enable 
them  to  compute  its  amount  without  unravelling 
a  long  list  of  finance  papers,  we  subjoin  an 

Estimate  of  our  Annual  Expenditure  for  1823  and  1824'. 

Half  pay  and  pensions  for  tlic  Army, 

Navy,  and  Ordnance,  about        -         £  4,800,000 
Ofwhich  advanced  by  the  Bank,  nearly  -  2,0(X),000 

Remainder   to   be    paid    out    of    the     ■■  

current  revenue  -  -         -  2,800,000 

Army,    exclusive    of    half    pay   and 

pensions  -  -  -  7,000,000 

Navy  -  -  -  -  .5,5(X),0(K) 

Ordnance  -  .  »  .  1,200,000 

Miscellaneous         -  ...  1,500,000 

C-'ivil  list ;  pensions  for  Civil  Services  ;  Courts  of 
Justice  ;  civil  Government  of  Scotland,  and 
some  lesser  heads,  all  charged  on  the  Consoli- 
dated Fund.  ...  .         2,000,000 


Amount  of  expenditure  distinct  from  the  interest 

of  the  debt 20,000,000 

Interest  of  the  public  debt         -           ...  30,000,000 

Total      -  €  50,000,000 


Such  is  our  present  expenditure ;  and  our  bo7id 
fide  sinking  fund  can,  of  course,  be  nothing  else 
than  the  siu'plus  of  our  income  above  it :  it  will 
be  found  to  amount  to  three,  four  or  more  mil- 
lions, according  to  the  productiveness  of  tlie 
revenue. 

The  next  and  equally  important  question  is, 
whether  a  surplus  when  found  to  exist,  '*  ought  to 
be  applied  to  the  redemption  of  stock,  or  made  a 
ground  lor  the  further  remission  oi'  taxes."     We 


the  Sinking  Fund.  363 

subscribe,  without  hesitation,  to  the  hitter,  not 
merely  for  tJie  sake  of"  rehefto  tlie  j)ubhc,  but  on 
the  less-understood  ground  ol"  the  injurious  con- 
sequences of  interfering  with  the  price  of  stocks. 
Against  this,  liowever,  it  may  be  urged,  that  men 
of  the  most  opposite  views  in  politics  have  con- 
curred in  eulogising  the  sinking  limd — that  Mr. 
Fox,  was,  in  this  respect,  no  less  zealous  than  his 
great  antagonist.  Mr.  Fox,  it  is  well  known, 
never  made  a  study  of  finance,  still  less  of  political 
economy ;  his  conclusions  in  these,  as  in  many 
other  respects,  when  well  founded,  owed  their 
justness  less  to  continued  research  or  careful  com- 
parison, than  to  rectitude  of  feeling,  to  a  manliness 
of  character,  which,  in  a  question  like  the  present, 
woidd  prompt  him  to  adopt  without  much  inves- 
tigation that  course,  which  should  place  the  burden 
on  the  shoulders  of  ourselves,  instead  of  our  pos- 
terity. Again,  Mr.  Pitt,  when  he  introduced  the 
sinking  fund,  was  only  in  his  twenty-seventh  year, 
and  could  not,  from  the  pressure  of  other  a\  oca- 
tions,  have  been  able  to  study  very  closely  the 
operation  of  a  surplus  revenue,  ap])lied  to  the  pur- 
chase of  stock.  He  was  necessarily  unacquainted 
with  the  statistical  returns  which  we  ])ossess, 
and  which  shall  be  more  fiilly  noticed  in  the 
tbllowdng  pages.  He  had  before  him  no  example 
of  a  measure  tending,  by  mniatural  interference 
with  the  rate  of  interest,  to  send  capital  out  of  the 
country:  still  less  could  he  foresee  the  raj)id  increase 
of  our  numbers,  the  sur})rising  extension  of  our 
productive  industry,  and  the  consequent  motives 
for  pursuing  a  system,  the  reverse  of  that  wliich 
maintains  a  sinking  fund  —  we  mean,  heaiing  light 
on  the  present  generation,  and  transferring  a  por- 
tion of  taxation  to  then'  les^  burdeneil  successors. 


,'30  J<  (hir  Finances  ;  Dis/'nir/ion  iif 

If  these  remarks  are  at  all  useful  in  correcting 
])()])ular  niisa|)i)re]iension,  we  shall  hope  somewhat 
of  a  similar  result  from  the  following  paragra})hs, 
ralating  to  the  situation  of  difterent  classes  of 
stockholders. 

StockJioldcrs :  Disli/iclioti  helxveen  Permanent  and 
Temporari/  Depositors.  —  Those  of  our  country- 
men who  have  travelled  and  paid  attention  to  topics 
of  this  nature,  must  have  remarked  that  in  France, 
Germany,  Spain,  in  short,  in  every  country  on  the 
Continent,  except  Holland,  the  public  funds  are 
comparatively  little  resorted  to  as  a  deposit  for 
private  property.  The  governments  of  these  coun- 
tries have  not  as  yet  acquired  the  confidence  at- 
tached to  a  representative  assembly,  and  the  inha- 
bitants are  little  acquainted  with  the  security  con- 
ferred on  property  by  public  register,  the  power  of 
transfer,  the  steady  observance  of  good  faith  to- 
wards the  public  creditor.  Continental  lenders 
require  the  visible,  and,  as  they  account  it,  solitl 
security  of  land  and  houses.  Such,  a  century  and 
a  half  ago,  was  the  case  throughout  England 
generally,  and  such,  in  no  small  degree,  was  the 
case  in  the  provincial  part  of  the  kingdom  at  the 
beginning  of  the  late  war.  The  general  ardour  of 
our  countrymen  in  the  contest,  their  confidence  in 
government,  and  the  comparatively  high  interest 
then  given  by  the  Treasury,  led  to  the  deposit  in 
that  ready  absorbent,  of  sums  of  which  the  magni- 
tude would  have  startled  the  caution  of  our  fore- 
fathers. The  result  of  the  whole  is,  that  funded 
property  so  insignificant  in  a  former  age,  when 
compared  to  the  general  wealth  of  the  kingdom,  is 
now  of  an  amount  approaching  to  the  value  of  our 
land,  ])articularly  if  we  estimate  it  not  by  capital, 
but  (seo  p.  '258.)  by  income. 


Permanent  and  Tempnrarif  SloclJiolders.     80.5 

Annuitants  on  our  public  funds,  instead  of 
being  confined,  as  in  the  last  age,  to  London, 
Bristol,  and  a  few  of  our  principal  towns,  are  now 
found  in  every  district,  and  in  every  variety  of 
occupation.  The  great  majority  of  them  are  })er- 
manent  depositors,  strangers  to  tlie  manani\)-c's  of 
the  stock  exchange,  speculating  neither  on  buy- 
ing or  selling,  and  attentive  merely  to  the  lialfl 
yearly  receipt  of  their  dividends.  These  persons 
consider  the  stocks  as  a  fund  ])ermanently  eligible 
for  themselves  and  their  families,  confiding,  on 
the  one  hand,  in  the  good  faith  of  Parliament,  and 
aware,  on  the  other,  of  the  serious  drawbacks  at- 
tendant on  property  in  land  and  houses,  —  the  dif- 
ficidty  of  collecting  rents,  the  heavy  charge  at- 
tendant on  transfers.  The  funds,  they  are  aware, 
involve  neither  delays  nor  lawsuits,  while,  with  a 
view  to  bequest,  they  admit  of  an  easy  and  direct 
repartition.  It  is  in  results  such  as  these,  that 
we  recognize  all  the  advantage  of  established  in- 
stitutions, of  the  steady  observance  of  good  faith 
on  the  part  of  government.  Viewed  in  a  national 
sense,  they  render  a  people  capable  of  efforts  such 
as  those  which  maintained  the  independence,  of 
Holland  against  the  successive  attacks  of  Spain, 
England,  and  France: — Viewed  in  regard  to  the 
individual,  they  ofler  a  mode  of  investment  almost 
as  much  superior  to  that  of  the  circle  of  pri\ate 
connexion,  as  is  afforded  by  Saving  Banks,  when 
compared  with  the  precarious  deposits  to  which 
the  lower  orders  were  formerly  accustomed  to  trust 
their  petty  savings. 

What  proportion  do  these  persons,  the  perma- 
nent depositors  in  our  funds,   bear  to  the  body  of 
stockholders  at  large  ?    Not  less,  we  believe,  than 
fonr-Jifths  of  the  xv/iok%  whether  we  look  to  number 


3(]G  Our  Finmiccs ;  JYis  tine  lion  of 

or  piopcrty.  The  temporary  depositors,  liowcvor, 
few  IIS  tliey  are,  fill  a  more  conspicuous  ])iact!  in 
the  public  eye  :  it  is  they  who  bustle  on  the  Slock 
Exchange,  who  confer  with  tlie  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer,  and  who  come  conspicuously  forward 
to  bear  a  part  in  loan  contracts.  But  these  persons 
consider  the  funds  merely  as  a  transient  property, 
a  security  in  which,  as  in  Exchequer  bills  or  mer- 
cantile acceptances,  they  may  vest  a  floating  sum 
until  the  occurrence  of  a  more  eligible  mode  of 
appropriation.  Their  calculations  as  to  the  price 
of  stocks  go  no  farther  than  the  month  or  the 
quarter  which  may  elapse  ere  it  suit  them  to  with- 
draw their  money,  for  the  purpose,  perhaps,  of 
transferring  it  to  the  funds  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  France,  or  the  lesser  Continental  powers. 
Merchants,  it  has  long  been  said,  are  citizens  of  the 
world,  but  of  all  mercantile  men,  that  is  particu- 
larly the  case  with  temporary  stockholders,  to  whom 
London,  Amsterdam,  and  Paris,  present  but  one 
vast  exchange.  How  different  this  from  the  jier- 
manent  depositor  who  exhibits  so  many  character- 
istics of  the  retired  capitalist,  of  the  inheritor  of 
real  property,  preferring  British  security,  even  at  a 
reduced  interest,  and  not  seeking  to  escape  his 
portion  of  sacrifice,  when  satisfied  that  it  is  con- 
ducive to  the  general  relief !  These  persons  are 
much  more  interested  in  preserving  than  in  ac- 
quiring ;  their  object  is  not  a  rise  of  price  for  the 
purpose  of  sale,  but  secuiity  in  regard  to  their 
capital  and  strict  punctuality  in  the  payment  of 
the  interest. 

This  disposition  has  been  strikingly  exemplified 
in  the  late  reduction  of  the  five  per  cents.,  of  which 
not  a  jifticth  part  was  sent  out  of  the  country y  not- 
withstanding the  great  temptation  offered  by  foreign 


Permanent  and  Tcmporarii  Stockholders.    307 

funds.  And  if  in  the  three  per  cents,  the  perma- 
nent depositors  do  not  sur})ass  the  teni})orary  in  so 
great  a  proportion,  they  form,  even  in  these,  beyond 
all  comparison,  the  majority. 

With  what  view,  it  may  be  asked,  do  we  enter 
into  this  discrimination  of  tem])orary  antl  peinia- 
nent  depositors  ?  Partly  because  it  is  little  under- 
stood, but  more  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
unimportance  in  a  national  sense,  of  the  class  who 
come  forward  as  the  representatives  of  the  fund- 
holders  at  large.  It  follows,  that  any  measures 
that  may  be  taken  in  regard  to  the  funds,  should 
be  adapted  to  the  unobtrusive,  we  may  almost  say, 
the  silent  majority  of  stockholders.  Persons  cir- 
cumstanced as  they  are,  can  desire  no  aid  at  the 
expence  of  the  community  ;  no  addition  to  the 
market  price  of  stock,  except  such  as  shall  natu- 
rally arise  from  the  continuance  of  peace,  the 
growing  abundance  of  capital. — An  artificial  proj), 
such  as  the  sinking  fund,  they  will  not  hesitate  to 
forego,  when  a])prized,  that  in  peace  it  is  of  inju- 
rious tendency,  and  should  be  considered  only  as 
an  ingenious  scheme  by  which  the  financier,  in  a 
season  of  difficulty,  seeks  to  stimulate  the  avidity  of 
capitalists,  and  to  })rovide  lor  the  calls  of  the 
Treasury,  without  an  extravagant  sacrifice. 

After  these  preliminary  explanations  and  (he 
removal  from  the  mind  of  the  reader  of  certain  po- 
pular impressions,  we  shall  proceed  with  ad\  autage 
to  our  farther  illustrations. 


3()S  Coinpdralivc  Taocufum  of 

Comparative  Taxation  of  Hits  Cnuntrij  and  France. 

GREAT    BlllTAIN    AND    IRELAND. 

Computed  fur  182;i,  after  dcdnclin^  llie  taxes  on  salt,  leather.,  and 
vialt  lately  reduced  :  also  a  portion  of  the  Assessed  Taxes. 

Gross  amount,  inclusive  of  the  expence  of  collection. 

Assessed  taxes             -              -                  -  £5,000,000 

Customs         ....  11,000,000 

Excise          ....  27,00O,fXK) 

Stamps             ....  6,800,000 

Land-tax         ....  1,200,000 

Post-office  (nett  amount)             -                 -  1;400,000 

Crown  lands                  -                 -                  -  200,000 

All  other  government  receipts         -             -  1,400.000 

i54-,0(X),(XK) 
Tithe  (including  Ireland)         -  .  5,000,000 

Poor-rate,  after  deducting  the  portion 

paid  (see  page  199.)  in  lieu  of  wages  -  5,000,000 


Total  -     ^G4-,000,0()0 


being  25  per  cent,  on  our  national  income 
as  computed  in  page  257. 

FRANCE. 

Gross  amount,  inclusive  of  expence  of  collection. 
Fancier,  or  land  and  house  tax         -  -  9,000,000 

Mobilier  a  farther  house  tax;  also  the  window 

tax  ?Lwi\.patentes,  or  tax  on  professions         -  3,000,000 

Customs         ....  2,300,000 

Excise,  viz.  duties  on  salt,  tobacco,  snuff,  wine, 
spirits,  beer,  and  some  lesser  articles,  the 
whole  comprised  under  the  name  of  droits 
remiis  ...  .  9,000,000 

Stamps,  viz.  enregistremcnt,  doinaine  ct  timbre     -     6,000,000 
Post-office  (nett  receipt)  -  -  -        600,000 

Sale  of  wood  from  the  public  forests         -  -         800,000 

All  other  receipts  and  contingencies,  including 
a  large  municipal  revenue  collected  from 
octrois  and  other  charges  borne  by  the  inha- 
bitants of  towns         -^  -        "      -       .-  6,300,000 

37,000,000 


Enf>;Jan(l  and  France.  369 

Kqual,  alter  adding  a  Htth  for  the  greater  value 

of  money,  in  France  than  in  England,  to       -      45,000,000 


This  forms  nearly  18  per  cent,  on  the  national 
income  of  France,  as  computed  in  page  270. 

In  this  table  of  comparative  taxation,  the  chief 
distinctive  feature  is  tiie  magnitude  of  our  excise, 
customs,  and  assessed  taxes,  tlie  proportion  of 
which  to  the  same  taxes  in  France,  is  as  forty  to 
twenty  milhons.  This  puts  in  a  striking'  Hght  the 
greater  ability  to  pay  on  tlie  part  of  a  connnercial 
community,  of  whicli  so  large  a  proportion  are  re- 
sident in  towns,  a  circumstance  conducive  equally 
to  ease  of  collection  on  the  part  of  government, 
and  to  free  consumption  on  that  of  the  public. 
Hence,  the  magnitude  of  our  receipts  on  spirits, 
beer,  tea,  sugar,  wine,  fruit ;  on  certain  articles  of 
dress,  as  silk  ;  or  on  that  which  more  immediately 
marks  a  mercantile  society,  postage.  It  lessens,  at 
the  same  time,  the  weight  of  an  argument,  fre- 
quently brought  against  our  taxation,  but  which 
we  are  far  from  adopting  in  a  literal  sense,  viz.  that 
when  computed  at  so  much  a  head,  it  amounts  to 
more  than  twice  the  average  capitation  of  our 
neighbours. 

Com  Larvs.  —  These  laws  may  be  termed  an  in- 
direct impost  on  the  public,  payable  to  landholders 
as  an  indemnity  for  the  huul-tax,  tithe,  and  j)oor- 
rate.  They  have  in  particidar  years  foinied  an 
addition  to  our  j)ayments  greatly  beyond  the 
amount  expended  by  the  landed  interest  for  these 
burdens ;  l)ut  at  })resent  the  case  is  so  different, 
that  our  corn  laws  may,  in  some  measure,  be  con- 
sidered a  dead  letter.  In  oiu-  table  accordingly  we 
have  avoided  noticing  their  operation,  and  have 
preferred  introducing  the  amount   of  the  charges 

R    B 


370  Comparative  Taxation. 

which  they  are  intended  to  counterbalance.  In 
France  also  there  exist  restrictions  on  the  import 
of  foreign  corn,  but  they  are  of  little  consequence 
in  a  country  where  the  growth  is,  in  general,  fully 
equal  to  the  consumption,  particularly  as  import 
becomes  free  whenever  the  average  of  wheat  of 
home  growth  approaches  to  50^.  the  Winchester 
quarter. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  object  of  the  pre- 
ceding tables?  To  draw  with  distinctness  and 
precision,  that  which  is  so  often  attempted  in  a 
loose  and  exaggerating  manner,  —  a  comparison 
between  the  burdens  of  this  and  other  countries, 
our  competitors  in  the  sale  of  manufactures.  The 
Agricultural  Committee  of  1821  advanced  an  opi- 
nion (Report,  p.  22.),  that  the  taxation  of  other 
countries  compared  to  their  resources  is  as  high  as 
our  own.  This  conclusion  our  statement  does  not 
confirm,  but  it  will  probably  be  instrumental  in 
modifying  a  very  general  impression  of  an  opposite 
nature ;  viz.  that  oui'  burdens  exceed  those  of  our 
neighbours,  to  a  degree  which,  in  a  manner,  baffles 
all  hope  of  approaching  to  an  equality.  Far  from 
joining  in  this  discouraging  view  of  our  situation, 
we  are  inclined  to  augur  very  favourable  results 
from  a  perseverance  in  the  course  of  reduction 
lately  adopted  by  ministers. 


371 


SECTION  II. 

Our  Prospects  in  Commerce  and  Finance, 

Jtrobability  of  continued  Peace.  —  The  events 
that  liave  recently  occurred  on  the  Continent, 
unsatisfactory  as  they  are  to  the  friends  of  con- 
stitutional freedom,  have  had  at  least  one  i^ood 
effect,  that  of  putting  beyond  doubt  the  determin- 
ation of  our  ministers  to  maintain  peace.  The 
debates  of  29th  and  30th  April  last,  will  be  me- 
morable for  the  declarations  to  that  eflf'ect,  made 
by  Mr.  Canning  and  Mr.  Robinson,  and  confirmed 
by  the  votes  of  an  overpowering  majority.  But 
this,  we  may  be  assured,  was  no  new  determination 
on  the  part  of  our  rulers,  the  course  of  circum- 
stances having  long  since  shown  to  the  reflecting 
part  of  our  public  men,  tiiat  the  only  eflectual 
remedy  for  the  national  embarrassment  was  to  be 
sought  in  a  steady  adherence  to  a  pacific  system. 
It  will  be  in  the  recollection  of  many  of  our 
readers,  that  the  late  Lord  Lonilonderry,  in  his 
speech  of  29th  April  (1822),  dwelt  strongly  on  the 
improbability  of  our  being  again  called  on  to  bear 
a  part  in  war,  on  a  scale  at  all  similar  to  that  ot"  our 
late  contest.  Had  the  reserve  of  office  permitted 
his  lordship  to  express  himself  at  large,  he  might, 
we  believe,  have  gi/ven  the  most  conc/usit'c  argu- 
ments for  this  opinion,  avowing  that  the  magnitude 
of  our  loss,  by  the  war,  was  unperceived  at  the 
time  it  was  incurred  ;  that  ministers,  had  they  com- 
prehended its  extent,  would  have  followed  a  much 

B  B    2 


872  Pruhahilih/  if/' 

more  cautious  course,  aiul  that  no  consideration 
should  again  prompt  tlieni  to  the  once  popuhu"  sys- 
tem of  vigour.  Never,  we  may  add,  chd  a  contest 
close  with  more  success  in  its  main  objects — the 
change  of  government  in  France,  and  the  restoration 
of  independence  to  Europe;  while,  as  to  territorial 
acquisitions,  it  rested  with  us  to  retain  or  give  back 
whatever  suited  our  policy.  Would  it  be  easy  to 
imagine  circumstances  more  calculated  to  heal  the 
wounds  of  protracted  warfare,  or  to  prevent  that 
distress  in  which  we  have,  notwithstanding,  been 
so  deeply  involved?  After  such  dear-bought 
experience,  is  it  probable  that  our  government 
will  be  easily  led  to  act  an  aggressive  part ;  or  is 
it  not  more  likely,  that  its  conduct  will,  in  future, 
be  stamped  with  a  prudence  similar  to  that  of  a 
Cecil  or  a  Walpole,  —  to  that  which  the  unambi- 
tious government  of  Holland  has  for  ages  studied  to 
exemplify  ? 

How  far  is  this  pacific  prospect  confirmed  by 
the  situation  of  foreign  powers  ?  The  United 
States  of  America  passed,  in  February  1821,  an 
Act  for  reducing  to  one  half,  an  army  which 
already  was  far  from  munerous  j  and  the  building 
of  ships  of  war,  prosecuted  only  in  compliance 
with  a  temporary  enthusiasm,  is  now  also  relaxed. 
Next,  as  to  our  great  European  rival,  France  is  no 
longer  to  us  the  France  of  Louis  XIV.  or  of  Bona- 
parte :  not  only  is  her  national  power  comparati^•ely 
very  different,  but  the  s})rings  of  court  intrigue, 
the  hazard  of  secret  influence  on  the  executive 
branch,  are  checked,  as  in  this  country,  by  the 
freedom  of  parliamentary  discussion.  If  it  be 
urged,  however,  that  though  the  nation  be  inclined 
to  peace,  the  cabinet  may  be  misled  by  foreign 
influence  or  ministerial  prejudices,  and  that  in  the 


conti7uie(l  Peace.  373 

varying  scene  of  European  politics,  there  may 
arise  contingencies  calculated  to  draw  France  into 
war,  let  it  be  remembered,  that  her  internal  situ- 
ation affords  the  strongest  motives  for  a  return  to 
peace.  Her  ministers  cannot  long  be  blind  to  her 
real  situation,  —  to  the  fact,  that  her  })0])ulation  is 
in  a  more  divided  state,  the  ])reservation  of  her  }n-e- 
sent  government  less  assured  than  was  the  case  in 
England  a  century  ago,  when,  the  Hanoverian 
family  being  recently  settled  on  tiie  throne,  it 
rcxjuired  a  steady  adherence  to  pacific  ])olicy  to 
prevent  a  ru})ture,  of  which  the  result  might  have 
been,  that  the  regal  prize  Mould  have  been  fought 
for  on  British  c^round. 

Causes  qJ'JVar  that  no  longer  eiist.  —  On  taking 
a  retrospect  of  our  history,  we  shall  Hnd  that 
several  of  the  most  populai",  as  well  as  most  sub- 
stantial grounds  of  continental  war,  have  ceasetl  to 
exist.  This  country  began  to  take  an  active  part 
in  foreign  politics  nearly  a  century  and  a  half  ago, 
a  time  when  France  was  so  prejwnderant,  that 
during  the  reigns  of  William  and  Anne,  continued 
exertion  was  necessary  to  preserve  the  independ- 
ence of  Europe.  The  wars  of  171-0  and  I756 
owed  their  origin  chiefly  to  peculiarities  in  the 
situation  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  li'  these  no  longer 
iurnish  a  probable  ground  of  war,  it  is  still  less 
likely  that  we  shall  be  involved  in  any  contest  for 
colonies  such  as  that  of  177''^>  o^'  i"  'i"  attempt  to 
regulate  the  government  of  our  neiglihours,  such 
as  that  which  called  Europe  to  arms  in  179^3. 
Those  liberal  views  in  jjolitics,  tliat  conviction 
of  tlie  barren  nature  of  military  troj)hies,  anil  of 
the  substantial  fruits  of  })eace,  which  were  so  long 
confined  to  the  philosophic  reader  of  history,  have 
at  last  reached  our  cabinet,   and   have  influenced 

B  B  S 


37  4>  Pro  ba  hilt t  if  of 

it  since  1812,  to  a  degree  greater  than  is  generally 
known.  Neither  the  troubles  of  (rrecce  or  of 
Spain  have,  for  a  moment,  shaken  the  pacific 
determination  of  our  ministers.  Add  to  this,  that 
the  restrictive  laws,  so  long  connected  with  our 
colonial  system,  have  now  ceased  to  fascinate  our 
rulers,  and  will  soon  cease  to  fascinate  our  mer- 
chants. Our  Board  of  Trade  has  expunged  from 
our  commercial  code,  the  acts  most  offensive  to 
foreigners :  it  no  longer  listens  to  scliemes  of  mo- 
nopoly, or  seeks  to  found  our  connnercial  pros- 
perity otherwise  than  in  concurrence  with  that  of 
our  neighbours.  The  discovery  of  the  real  sources 
of  national  wealth,  has  show^n  the  folly  of  wasting 
lives  and  treasure  for  those  colonial  possessions, 
which,  during  the  last  century,  in  the  reign  of  the 
mercantile  theory,  were  accounted  the  chief  basis 
of  commercial  prosperity.  It  is  now  above  forty 
years  since  the  United  States  of  America  were 
definitively  separated  from  us,  and  since  their  situ- 
ation has  afforded  a  proof,  that  the  benefit  of  mer- 
cantile intercourse  may  be  retained  in  all  its 
extent,  without  the  care  of  governing,  or  the  ex- 
pence  of  defending  these  once-regretted  provinces. 
Mexico,  Peru,  Chili,  Brazil,  tiie  regions  so  much 
coveted  by  our  forefathers,  are  now  open  to  every 
flag,  and  never  likely  to  become,  on  commercial 
grounds  at  least,  a  cause  of  wan 

Is  it  necessary  to  add  arguments  to  show  the 
fallacy  of  expecting  any  national  advantage  from 
war  ?  If  we  cast  our  eyes  on  France,  we  find  her, 
after  considering  herself,  during  many  years,  the 
mistress  of  the  Continent,  brought  back,  in  1814, 
to  her  ancient  limits  :  if  we  look  at  home,  we  find 
our  countrymen,  after  believing  that  our  naval 
superiority,  our  coiiquests  in  the  east  and  west,  had 


continued  Peace.  S'JS 

brought  us  unparalleled  wealtli,  have  made  the 
mortifying  discovery  that  our  l)urdens  far  exceed 
our  acquisitions,  and  that  the  only  substantial  ad- 
dition to  our  resources,  arises  from  domestic  im- 
provement and  augmentation  of  numbers  ;  cir- 
cumstances that  had  little  or  no  connexion  with 
a  state  of  hostility.  Frederic  II.  of  Prussia  af- 
forded, perhaps,  the  most  striking  example  of  suc- 
cess arising  from  keeping  up  a  large  standing  army, 
having  acquired  by  it,  in  the  first  instance,  »Silesia, 
and  eventually  part  of  Poland  :  yet,  whoever  will 
calculate,  on  the  one  hand,  the  amount  of  his 
sacrifices,  on  the  other,  the  natural  progress  of 
population  and  wealth  during  so  long  a  period  as 
his  reign  (Ibrty-five  years),  will  find  that  the  in- 
crease of  his  power  would  have  been  fully  equal, 
had  he  confined  himself  to  the  plain  and  direct 
course  of  remaining  in  peace  and  improving  his 
hereditary  dominions. 

To  follow  up  such  a  course,  to  surmount  our 
financial  difficulties,  and  to  lieal  the  woinuls  of 
Ireland,  are,  doubtless,  the  chief  objects  of  govern- 
ment. When  these  grand  points  shall  be  attained, 
the  magnitude  of  our  resources  will  be  so  evident 
as  to  dispel  all  apprehension  of  attack,  not  only  on 
this  country,  but  on  the  independeiice  of  the  Ne- 
therlands, the  maintenance  of  which  seems  now  to 
form  the  only  sufficient  ground  for  our  interfering 
in  a  continental  contest. 

Our  Prospect  of  ina^ased  Resources.  —  We  have 
already  expressed  (p.  2,54.)  a  belief  that  if  we  can 
so  conduct  our  affairs  as  to  get  over  a  few  years 
of  difficulty,  our  financial  prospects  would  brighten 
beyond  those  of  any  other  country.  The  more 
we  examine  our  situation,  the  more  we  .shall  find 
B  B   4 


S7(')  Our  Prospect  of 

ourselves  enal)le(l  to  trace  its  evils  to  transition, 
derangement,  and  other  causes  of"  a  temporary  cha- 
racter. Our  recent  experience  has  shown,  that  a 
season  of  peace  will  not  always  be  a  season  of 
stagnation,  and  that  an  increase  of  ])opulation,  pro- 
ducing consumers  as  well  as  producers,  has  no 
tendency  to  over-stock.  The  order  of  Providence 
evidently  is,  that  the  industrious  should  be  at  no 
loss  for  employment.  And  the  old  adage,  that 
"  England  is  England's  best  customer,"  will  be 
exemplified  with  ample  effect  whenever  the  course 
of  circumstances  shall  restore  things  to  their  level, 
and  whenever  the  unnatural  effect  of  war  and 
taxation  shall  be  removed. 

In  the  belief  of  several  of  our  countrymen,  we 
have  arrived  at  that  point  beyond  w^hich  we  can 
hardly  expect  to  carry  either  our  numbers  or  our 
wealth.      Their   apprehension,    however,    will   be 
found  to  require  no  lengthened  refutation,  and  is 
noticed  here  chiefly  to  satisfy  those  persons,  neces- 
sarily numerous   in   a  commercial    country,   w^ho, 
immersed  in    their    respective   occupations,    have 
little  means  of  generalizing  or  of  reasoning  from 
the  past  to  the  future.     The  fact  is,  that  our  im- 
provements, whether  in  agriculture,  manufacture, 
or  navigation,  are  at  present  no  more  arrive  1  at  a 
limit,  no  more  threatened  with  obstacles  to  their 
farther  progress,   than  they  were   a  century  ago. 
A  negative  impression  of  this  nature  w^as  general 
thirty  years  since,  yet  no  age  has  been  so  fertile  in 
discovery,  in  invention,  in  increase  of  productive 
powder  j    and  happily  no  country  possesses,  in  its 
resources,   whether  physical    or   political,   greater 
means  of  continuing  the  career  of  advancement. 
Our  capital  and  labour,  of  which  so  large  a  portion 
was  long  directed  to  military  purposes,  are  nov/ 


increased  Resources.  .377 

applied  to  objects  of  permanent  utility.  The  two 
great  anomalies  of  our  inland  situation,  ])oor-rate 
andtitlic,  can  hardly  fail  to  yield  to  the  intelli*^ence 
of  the  age ;  and  their  removal  Mould  go  far  to- 
wards healing  the  wounds  of  the  suffering  portion 
of  the  connn unity. 

To  bring  our  calculation  to  a  point,  —  what  an- 
nual sum  may  we  consider  as  likely  to  be  added  to 
our  national  revenue,  in  a  season  of  peace  ?  This  it 
is  no  easy  matter  to  reduce  to  a  s})ecific  form,  but 
after  establishing  (p.  262.),  the  intimate  connection 
between  population  and  wealth,  we  may,  we  trust,  on 
very  safe  grounds,  as  far  as  regards  England  and  Scot- 
land (leaving  Ireland,  at  least  the  cottagers  of  Ire- 
land, out  of  the  question),  assume  the  increase  of 
numbers  as  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  our  taxable 
income.  Such  certainly  may  be  taken  for  graiited, 
when  the  reduction  of  our  taxation  shall  have 
been  carried  somewhat  farther,  removing  the  chief 
})art  of  the  extra  pressure  on  our  national  industrv, 
and  placing  it,  in  regard  to  pul)lic  burdens,  more 
nearly  on  a  level  with  that  of  our  continental  com- 
petitors. 

We  proceed  to  exhibit  the  result  in  the  form  of 
arithmetical  computation.  First,  as  to  our  num- 
bers:—  instead  of  requiring  our  readers  to  assent 
to  the  probability  of  an  addition  ainiualh  angincMit- 
ing,  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  that  wliieh  is 
past  and  ascertained  ;  viz.  the  individuals  boni  in 
the  early  part  of  the  century  (1S02,  S,  1.),  who 
are  now  entering,  year  after  year,  on  flie  age  of 
productive  labour.  Next,  as  to  the  fiiiits  of  iheii" 
labour,  represented  in  the  Ibrm  of  money,  we  ha\  e 
already  (Ap])endix,  j).  77-)  calculated  the  animal 
addition  to  our  national  income  from  that  source 
at  .S,01X),()00/.,    and   as  our   taxation,   even    on    a 


S7S 


Oin^  Pros-peel  of 


reduced  scale,  will  be  iiilly  ^0  per  cent,  on  our 
income,  the  consequent  addition  to  our  revenue  is 
aboNC  000,000/.  Hut  here  also  we  shall  make  a 
large  abatement,  and  shall  call  the  addition  in 
question  only  400,000/. 

Computated  Increase  of  National  Incomefrovi  the  Progress  of 
prodnctivi'  Industiij  and  Population^  assuming  such  Increase 
at  400,000/.  a-ycar. 


Annual  Increase 

Annual  Increase 

Years. 

of  the  I'roduce 

Years. 

of  the  Produce 

of  Taxes. 

of  Taxes. 

1823 

£  400,000 

1837 

£  6,000,000 

1824 

800,000 

1838 

6,400,000 

1825 

1,200,000 

1839 

6,800,000 

1826 

1,600,000 

1840 

7,200,000 

1827 

2,000,000 

1841 

7,600,000 

1828 

2,400,000 

1842 

8,000,000 

1829 

2,800,000 

1S43 

8,400,000 

1830 

3,200,000 

1844 

8,800,000 

1831 

3,600,000 

1845 

9,200,000 

1832 

4,000,000 

1846 

9,600,000 

1833 

4,400,000 

1847 

10,000,000 

1834 

4,800,000 

1848 

10,400,000 

1835 

5,200,000 

1849 

10,800,000 

1836 

5,600,000 

1850 

11,200,000 

This  increase  supposes  neither  new  taxes  or  im- 
pro'sed  circumstances  on  the  part  of  those  who 
pay  them  :  if  the  latter  merely  escape  deterior- 
ation, the  increase  of  numbers,  the  acquisition  of 
the  additional  labourers  in  the  productive  field,  will, 
by  the  augmented  consum])tion  of  taxed  articles, 
make  the  computed  addition  to  the  revenue. 

Diminution  of  public  Eapenditiu^e.  —  If  it  be 
accounted  somewhat  confident  to  anticipate  so 
regular  an  increase  of  national  income  from  the 
mere  augmentation  of  our  numbers,  we  shall  call 


increased  Resources.  879 

in  an  auxiliary  of  another  kind,  —  the  effect  of 
diminishing  expenditure.  Economy  is  evidently 
tlie  wish  of  ministers,  and  the  rising  value  of 
money  bids  fair  to  enable  them  to  carry  reduction 
considerably  farther,  witliout  injury  to  the  indi- 
viduals reduced.  Wliat  is,  in  this  respect,  the 
effect  of  the  repeal  ot«  6,000,000/.  of  taxes  in  the 
last  two  years  ?  To  lower  prices  ;  to  bring  money 
more  nearly  to  the  value  it  bore  in  179'2;  to  render 
<Jo/.  in  the  present  year  equivalent  to  100/.  two 
years  ago.  Much,  it  nuist  be  allowed,  remains  to 
be  done  ere  the  long  list  of  charges,  rent,  wages, 
i)rofessional  attendance,  kc,  which  constitute 
domestic  expenditure,  can  be  brought  to  their  due 
level ;  but  the  course  of  circumstances  cannot  be 
resisted ;  a  continuance  of  peace  must  be  followed 
by  a  reduction  of  these  charges  in  correspondence 
with  that  which  has  already  taken  ])lace  in  regartl  to 
provisions  ;  and  when  that  is  accomplished,  a  tlimi- 
nution  of  payment  to  the  servants  of  the  public 
may  be  effected  without  injury  to  the  individuals 
reduced. 

Comparison  of  our  Nafional  Income  at  prescjify 
with  its  Amount  a  Centurtj  a^o.  —  How  far  do  these 
encouraging  anticipations  receive  support  from  the 
evidence  of  the  ])ast,  from  a  parallel  between  the 
England  of  the  ])resent  age,  and  the  Englatid 
of  the  early  part  of  last  century,  of  the  reign  of 
George  I.?  Since  that  aara,  the  produce  of  our 
revenue  has  increased  in  the  ])roportion  of  more 
than  five  to  one;  but  we  disclaim  ///  tofo  this  mode 
of  computhig  our  national  wealth,  and  shall  build 
our  inferences  on  a  surer  Ibundatioii.  Our  ])()])u- 
lation  in  the  reign  of  George  1.  ajjpears  (see  Pre- 
liminary  0])servation5  to  t!ie    Population    Return 


380  Comparadre  Resources  o/' 

of  18^il)  to  have  been,  inchidiiig  Ireland,  about 
9,()()(),()()() ;  at  ])resent  it  is  ^Z%()()(), ()(){),  or  more  than 
cloiibJe.  But  tliat  is  not  all :  ^hen  treating  ( A})pen- 
dix,  p.  [75])  of  the  increase  of  national  revenue, 
we  enumerated  among  the  indications  of  an  im- 
proving society  — 

An  increase  in  the  propor{ion  of  persons  deriving 
their  income  from  property  distinct  from  labour. 

An  increase  in  the  comparative  amount  of  town 
population. 

A  decrease  in  that  of  agriculturists,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  improvements  in  husbandry,  supply- 
ing the  requisite  produce  with  less  manual  labour, 
and  enabling  the  country  to  send  a  portion  of  its 
youth  to  follow  manufacturing  and  mechanical 
pursuits  in  towns. 

Without  professing  to  define  the  amount  of  our 
national  income  a  century  ago,  no  one  will  doubt 
that  the  proportion  of  *'  persons  living  on  income 
derived  from  property,"  has,  in  that  period,  greatlv 
increased.  Still  less  will  they  question  the  effect 
of  improvement  in  agriculture,  and  the  probability 
that  in  the  reign  of  George  I.  above  40  persons  in 
100  were  required  to  raise  the  national  subsistence, 
which  we  now  find  to  be  produced  (see  Appendix, 
p.  [72])  by  33  persons  in  100.  In  estimating 
the  whole  of  our  national  income,  we  should  pro- 
bably not  exceed  the  mark  by  assuming  it  to  be 
at  present  three  times  its  amount  in  the  time  of 
George!.,  but  as  it  is  quite  unnecessary  to  press  our 
calculation  to  its  extent,  we  shall  consider  it  only 
to  have  doubled.  The  next  question  is,  what 
prospect  is  before  us  for  the  ensuing  age  or  cen- 
tury ?  How  far  useful  discovery  and  invention 
may  or  may  not  be  carried,  we  cannot  venture  to 
calculate,  but  in  other  points,  there  is.  fortunately, 


England  and  France,  381 

less  uncertainty.  Can  it  be  doul)ted  tiiat  our  public 
men  are  more  enliglitened  than  their  })redecessors 
a  century  ago ;  that  our  ])ro(hictive  labourers, 
whether  merchants,  manufacturers,  or  farmers, 
are  better  provided  with  capital ;  that  the  ])ubhc 
in  general  are  more  experienced  ;  and  the  liope 
of  long  periods  of  peace  established  on  a  better 
foundation  ?  —  This  reasoning  will  be  put  in  a 
clearer  light  by  a  parallel  of  the  resources  of  our 
country  and  those  of  her  hereditary  rival. 

Comparison  of  the  Resources  of  England  and 
France.  —  The  reader,  on  referring  to  a  statistical 
return  of  very  remote  date,  (Appendix,  p.  [T-^]) 
will  find,  that  five  centuries  ago,  the  town-po})u- 
lation  of  England  was  so  insigni6cant  that  the 
number  of  places  containing  above  J,000  inhabi- 
tants, did  not  exceed  eighteen.  In  these  days, 
France  took  a  decided  lead  in  population,  as  in 
})olitical  power  :  and  the  subsc(iuent  accessions  to 
her  territory,  by  the  incor])oration  of  extensi\e 
provinces  (Brittany,  Dau})hiiie,  Burgundy),  ren- 
dered her  for  a  long  period  an  over-match  for 
England.  In  an  age  of  timid  navigation,  our  an- 
cestors could  derive  little  advantage  from  their 
extent  of  coast,  or  from  the  richness  of  their  coal 
mines,  which  are  valuable  only  in  as  far  as  their 
bulky  products,  or  the  almost  equally  bulky  manu- 
factiu-es  promoted  by  them,  can  be  conveyed  by 
water.  A  better  prospect  was  opened  by  tlu-  im- 
provements that  followed  the  a'ra  of  the  relorma- 
tion,  and  the  wise  government  of  Elizabeth  —  the 
period  from  which  we  date,  the  eflectual  cultiva- 
tion of  our  national  resources.  Still  our  continental 
rival  continued  preponderant,  and  the  revenue  of 
Louis  XIV.  was  computed  at  nearly   three  times 


S8^2  Comparative  Resources  of 

thai  of  Charles  II.  The  alliance  against  France, 
cemented  by  the  perseverance  of  William,  and 
rendered  victorious  by  the  talents  of  Marlborough, 
relieved  us  from  the  dreaded  overthrow  of  the 
political  equilibrium  ;  but  even  afler  our  splendid 
successes,  it  continued  a  common  opinion  amon^ 
foreigners  as  among  ourselves,  that  the  resources 
of  the  French  were  more  solid,  and  that  they 
would  soon  equal  or  surpass  us  in  those  arts  which 
form  the  constituents  of  national  wealth.  But  so 
different  has  been  the  result,  that  in  no  ])eriod  of 
our  history  have  we  out-run  so  decidedly  the 
competition  of  other  countries.  In  the  reign  of 
George  I.,  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  bore 
to  France,  in  point  of  population,  the  proportion 
of  only  45  to  100  (See  Napier's  Supplement,  heads 
of  "  England  and  France  ")  ;  nor  was  that  of  tax- 
able income  much  more  considerable  :  at  present, 
in  point  of  numbers,  we  hold  the  proportion  of 
70  to  100,  and  in  taxable  income  of  100  to  100. 

Such  has  been  our  comparative  progress  during 
the  last  hundred  years;  but  what,  it  may  be  asked, 
is  our  prospect  for  the  future  ?  This  may  be  in 
part  answered  by  observing  the  principal  discove- 
ries of  late  date,  and  marking  the  connection  that 
happily  prevails  between  them  and  the  physical 
advantages  which  belong  to  our  country.  Steam 
navigation,  for  instance,  is  evidently  of  greatest 
avail  to  the  country  which  possesses  coals,  iron, 
and  extent  of  coast.  But  even  in  branches  totally 
different,  such  as  the  manufacture  of  silk,  a  branch 
in  which  we  long  despaired  of  success,  we  have  of 
late  years  gained  ground  on  our  continental  rivals: 
nor  need  we,  since  with  the  aid  of  Ireland  we  are 
assured  of  an  adequate  supply  of  agricultural  pro^ 
duce,  apprehend  the  recurrence  of  a  high  price  of 


England  and  France.  3^3 

labour,  or  the  emigration  of  our  master  manufac- 
turers. 

We  proceed  to  bring  our  statement  to  the  test 
of  arithmetical  calculation,  talking  as  our  basis, 
the  comparative  increase  of  nunil)ers  in  France 
and  tliis  country.  To  those  who  do  not  clearly 
understand  in  what  maimer  increase  of  niunbers 
conduces  so  directly  to  increase  of  national  re- 
sources, we  would  recommend  to  leave  out  of  the 
question  the  infantine  part  of  society,  and  to  con- 
tine  their  attention  to  those  approaching  to  tlie  age 
of  twenty,  the  age  of  producti\e  labour.  Om- 
population  returns  have,  ever  since  1801,  exhi- 
bited an  increase  of  1^  percent,  a  year;  these 
persons  are  now  attaining  maturity,  and  entering 
the  field  as  new  contribiitois  to  our  national  in- 
come, while  in  France  the  proportion  of  such  new 
contributors  is,  and  has  been  ever  since  1801,  not 
quite  one  per  cent,  annually.  Assuming  a  similar 
proportion  for  the  future,  the  inference  is,  that 
in  France  the  augmentation  of  national  income, 
reckoned  at  10  })er  cent,  in  ten  years,  will  be 
hardly  -  ...     ^21,000,000 

But  in  this  country,  the  increase, 
computed  by  the  same  rule,  viz.  the 
ralio  of  the  addition  to  ])Opulation 
(1.5  per  cent,  in  ten  years)  will  pio- 
duce  nearly  -  -  -        30,(K)0,()00 

The  increase  of  numbers  in  this  country  takes 
place  chieHy  among  mechanics,  manufiicturers, 
merchants,  and  others,  whose  exertion  is  directly 
conducive  to  increase  of  \Neaith;  bul  in  France,  tiie 
increase  of  numbers  is  as  slow  in  toxvns  as  in  ninil 
districts  ;  m  consequence  of  which,  the  augmenta- 
tion of  property  seems  mciely  to  kee})  pace  with 
that  of  popidatiou.     Hence,  the  tardy  increase  of 


UHl  ( 'omparative  Resourcci  oj 

the  ))iil)lic  revenue,  and  the  stationary  condition 
of  the  inhabitants,  many  of  whom  foHow  no  other 
occupation,  and  liold  no  liiglier  rank  in  society 
than  tlieir  forefathers  two  centuries  ago. 

Were  we  inclined  to  continue  the  })arallel,  we 
should  find  that  even  as  to  population,  we  shall  pro- 
bably overtake  our  ancient  rival,  ere  another  ge- 
neration  pass  away.  Meantime,  those  who  know 
that  the  issue  of  a  military  struggle  de})ends  not  so 
much  on  population  as  on  disposable  revenue,  will 
be  satisfied  that  at  present  we  should  ha\e  no 
cause  to  dread  a  contest,  single-handed,  with  that 
power  against  which  our  forefathers  were  obliged 
to  seek  safety  in  continental  alliances.  Or,  sup- 
posing that  from  any  unforeseen  cause,  our  mari- 
time force  should  become  less  predominant,  and 
that  a  war  betw^een  the  two  countries  were  to  be 
decided  on  shore,  we  should  have  no  great  reason 
to  dread  the  result,  or  to  regard  invasion  with  the 
alarm  which  it  excited  during  the  last  century. 

This  course  of  reasoning  applies  in  a  consider- 
able degree  to  Russia,  Austria,  and  other  conti- 
nental powers  :  in  none  is  the  degree  of  increase 
in  population,  and  certainly  not  in  national  wealth, 
on  a  par  with  this  country.  We  have,  therefore, 
little  to  dread  from  attack  ;  and  as  we  shall  as- 
suredly not  make  our  superiority  a  source  of  aggres- 
sion, the  conclusion  is,  that  our  situation  presents 
a  solid  hope  of  continued  peace,  and  of  all  the 
advantages  arising  from  the  undisturbed  extension 
of  our  productive  industry.* 

*  Those  among  our  readers  who  imagine  that  there  is  still 
somewhat  of  over-confidence  in  the  preceding  reasoning,  will 
do  well  to  consult  the  following  sketch  of  '•  the  public  re- 
venue" of  the  two  countries,  which  is,  we  believe,  sufficiently 


England  and  France. 


385 


accurate,  and  puts  in  a  striking  light  the  progress  of  this  country 
during  the  last  two  centuries. 


Public  Revenue. 

Englan'i,  after  de- 

Ypar<: 

ducting  for  differ- 

France. 

England. 

ence  ill  the  value  ol 
money. 

1550 

a£l,500,000 

^600,000 

^600,000 

1600 

2,500,000 

900,(X)0 

900,000 

'1660 

4,000,000 

1,2(X),000 

1,200„000 

1700 

8,000,000 

4,000,000 

4,000,000 

1750 

12,000,000 

7,000,000 

7,0(X),000 

1790 

22,000,000 

16,000,000 

13,000,000 

1823 

33,000,000 

52,000,000 

42,000,000 

c  c 


38G 


SECTION  III. 

Views  of  Finance  suggested  by  our  Situation  and  Prospects, 

Difference  in  the  Nature  of  our  Resources  since 
the  Peace, — The  radical  difference  in  the  sources  of* 
our  financial  supplies,  in  peace  and  in  war,  is,  as  yet, 
very  imperfectly  understood  by  the  public  :  it  may, 
however,  receive  some  illustration,  from  a  reference 
to  the  measures  adopted  during  our  great  contest. 
It  was  in  1797>  in  the  fourth  year  of  the  war,  that 
circumstances  pointed  out  to  Mr.  Pitt,  the  neces- 
sity of  a  radical  change  in  his  financial  plans — the 
substitution  of  war  taxes  for  loans.  The  length  to 
which  the  latter  had  been  carried,  exceeded  the 
disposable  funds  of  the  monied  interest ;  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  increase  of  productive  industry, 
the  rise  of  wages,  salaries,  rents,  all  concurred  to 
strengthen  the  hope  of  a  liberal  supply  from  tax- 
ation. Mr.  Pitt  seized  the  distinction  with  his 
usual  promptitude,  and  erected  on  it  a  structure, 
the  eventual  magnitude  of  which,  proved  one  of  the 
wonders  of  the  age.  What  concurrence  of  circum- 
stances enabled  him  and  his  successors  to  carry 
taxation  so  far  ?  During  the  war,  our  capital  and 
labour  had  ample  employment :  competition  from 
abroad  on  the  part  of  foreigners,  or  what  might 
have  proved  far  more  formidable,  our  emigrating 
countrymen,  w^as  wholly  out  of  the  question.  The 
transfer  of  English  capital  to  the  continent  was 
prevented,  as  well  by  a  dread  of  lawless  conduct  on 


Taxation,  a  Cause  ofEmharrassment .      387 

the  part  of  the  French  government,  as  by  a  more 
gratifying  consideration,  the  profits  reaUzed  at 
home.  .Since  the  peace,  circumstances  are  entirely 
altered ;  the  competition  of  foreigners  is  to  be 
dreaded  ;  capital  has  been  placed  in  foreign  funds, 
and  emigration,  had  not  the  price  of  provisions 
fallen  among  us,  might  have  been  carried  to  a  ruin- 
ous length.  The  profit  of  stock,  the  wages  of  part 
of  the  lower  classes,  the  emoluments  of  the  higher, 
most  incomes,  in  short,  except  those  of  the  annuitant 
on  the  public  funds,  have  undergone  diminution, 
the  wiiole  pointing  as  much  to  the  necessity  of  re- 
ducing taxation  in  peace,  as  our  situation  during 
war  indicated  the  practicability  of  its  increase. 

How  far  is  Taxation  a  Cause  of  Embay^rassment  ? 
—  What,  it  may  be  asked,  have  been  the  most  pro- 
minent characteristics  of  our  national  embarrass- 
ment since  1814?  A  deficiency  of  employment, 
among  part  of  the  lower  orders,  and  distress,  from 
insufficiency  of  wages,  at  those  intervals  when  pro- 
visions were  high  priced.  In  the  middle  classes, 
whether  merchants,  manufacturers,  or  agriculturists, 
the  general  ground  of  complaint  has  been  an  inade- 
quacy of  profit ;  a  disproportion  of  prices  to  the 
cost  of  production.  The  principal  cause  of  these 
and  other  difficulties  was,  doubtless,  as  explained 
in  the  preceding  chapters,  the  magnitude  of^  the 
transition,  the  suspension  of  government  expendi- 
ture, and  the  consequent  over-stock  of  hands.  That 
such  would  have  been  severely  felt  under  a  taxation 
as  light  as  that  of  Switzerland  or  the  United  States 
of  America,  admits  of  no  doubt ;  but  it  never  would 
have  reaJicd  such  an  extent,  or  coiitinuetl  until  the 
ninth  year  of  peace,  had  not  our  public  burdens, 
and  consequently  the  expence  of  Uving,  been  higher 

c  c  2 


.'■tSS  Injvrii  arising 

than  among  our  neighbours.  Emigration  and  the 
export  of  capital  would,  in  a  different  case,  have 
been  comparatively  inconsiderable  ;  and  additional 
means  of  promoting  j/roductive  industry  would 
have  been  possessed  at  home. 

Having  no  wish  to  press  our  arguments  to  an 
extreme,  we  disclaim,  without  hesitation,  the  aid  of 
certain  popular  notions,  such  as  that  "  a  taxed 
commodity  after  passing  through  three  or  four  dif- 
ferent hands,  is  enhanced  by  20  or  30  per  cent, 
charged  by  the  dealers  for  their  advance  on  the 
tax.'*  We  know  too  well  the  slender  profit  of  either 
wholesale  or  retail  business,  to  give  credit  to  such 
loose  assertions  ;  a  dealer  is  in  general  satisfied 
with  a  charge  of  2  or  3  per  cent,  on  his  ad\ance, 
so  that  this  argument,  though  not  undeserving  of 
attention,  has  no  claim  to  a  prominent  rank  in  the 
objections  to  taxation.  These  will  be  found  suffi- 
ciently serious  without  the  aid  of  exaggeration  :  it 
can  hardly  be  disputed  that  our  high  duties  tend, 
to  raise  our  prices  above  the  currency  of  our  neigh- 
bours, and  we  have  the  sanction  of  Dr.  Smith 
for  saying  that  "  a  rise  in  the  money  price  of  com- 
modities, "when  peculiar  to  a  country,  tends  to  dis- 
courage more  or  less  every  department  of  industry 
carried  on  within  it,  enabling  other  nations  to 
undersell  it,  not  only  in  the  foreign  but  in  the  home 
market;" — an  opinion  to  which  we  subscribe  in  the 
words  of  its  illustrious  author,  notwithstanding  all 
tbe  qualifications  of  it  which  we  have  read  in  the 
publications  of  the  political  economists  of  the  day. 
To  bring  this  question  into  a  more  definite  form, 
we  subjoin  a  table  of  the 


from  Taxation. 


.389 


Taxes  uihich  bear,  more  or  less  directly,  on  the  comjorit  qflifCy 
<or  interfere,  more  or  less  directly,  ivil/i  the  extension  of  productive 
industry. 

Assessed     Taxes 

since    the   1 

reduction 
Malt     and     Beer"! 

since    the     re-  > 

ductionin  1822  J 
Stamps 

Sugar   -  -         - 

Tea  .  .  - 
Foreign  Timber  - 
Coals        carried  7 

coastways         J 
Soap     -         -         - 


xesl 

ate  S-  €4,500,000 


6,500,000 

6,500,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
1,000,000 

900,000 

900,000 


Leather  since  the! 

reduction     in   > 

€300,000 

1  .SL^'J                       J 

roreign  Wool 

3(X),000 

Cotton 

5(X),(KK) 

Paper  - 

•100,000 

Glass 

400,tKK) 

Candles  and  Tallow- 

40(),(XK) 

Bricks  and  Tiles 

3(X),0{K) 

Auction  Duties 

240,000 

Hemp 

200,(K)0 

Starch 

50,000 

The  whole  forming  a  sum  of  nearly  30,000,000/,* 

To  draw  the  line  of  distinction  between  the  ne- 
cessaries and  superfluities  of  life,  between  the 
greater  or  less  injury  arising  from  taxation  to  pro- 
ductive labour,  is  a  task  of  great  nicety.  There 
can,  it  is  true,  be  little  doubt  that  such  imposts  as 
those  on  leather,  candles,  green  ghiss,  bricks,  tiles, 
soap,  starch,  coal,  are  direct  burdens  on  industry  ; 
charges  which  must  have  many  bad  effects,  such  as 

*  To  give  the  reader  a  complete  view  of  our  fiscal  burdens, 
we  subjoin  the  following,  which  are  left  out  of  the  text,  as 

Taxes  ■which  appear  to  interfere  less  tvith  our  productive  in- 
dustry. 


Post-office  -  £1,400,000 

Foreign    spirits,  ) 

chielly  brandy/ 
British  spirits 
Licences  for  pub-  ) 

licans,  &c.        J 
Wine 
Tobacco  andsnuff) 

(Excise)  f 

Tobacco  (Customs) 
Coffee  and  cocoa 
Rum 

Silk,  raw  and  thrown 
East  India  piece) 

goods  i 


2,300,000 
3,000,000 
700,000 
1,600,000 
2,400,000 


500,000 
100,000 


)ds'l 

'"■{ 

s       - 
2ign     butter ) 
id  cheese       J 


Printed      goods 

(home   niant 

iacture) 
Foreign  linens 
Foreij 

and 
Tallow 
Raisins  and  other  |^ 

Iruits  I 

600.000  Barilla  and  other  | 

300.0001  tlrugs  / 
200,000!  I'cpper 

Skins  and  furs 
Mahogany 
Varion- other  diiticf> 

c  c  3 


€570,000 

80,000 
100,000 
100.000 
100,000 

150,000 

150,(X)0 

50.000 

50,000 

1. 000.000 


impairing  personal  comfort,  raising  the  nominal  rate 
of  wages,  or  lessening  our  exports.  On  the  other 
liand,  it  may  happen  that  imposts,  the  least  excep- 
tionable in  the  view  of  individuals,  may,  on  the 
ground  of  fiscal  calculation,  have  the  earliest  claim 
to  diminution.  Thus,  wine,  spirituous  liquors,  and 
lace,  appear  fair  objects  of  high  taxation,  but  if  the 
duty  be  so  great  as  to  hold  forth  to  smugglers  a 
premium  such  as  enables  them  to  prosecute  their 
business  in  spite  of  all  the  vigilance  of  our  cruisers, 
an  abatement  of  duty  may  be  found  an  indis- 
pensable alternative.  In  the  case  of  sugar,  the 
question  of  abatement  stands  on  different  groimds. 
In  an  article  so  acceptable  to  general  taste,  and  so 
innocent  in  its  effects,  we  are  justified  in  expecting 
a  regular  extension  of  sale,  in  proportio?i  to  the 
diminution  of  price.  This  has  been  in  a  consider- 
able degree  exemplified  at  different  intervals  of  de- 
pression in  the  market,  and  seems  to  authorize  the 
inference,  (and  a  very  important  one  it  is,)  that  a 
reduction  of  the  duty  Avould  have  the  effect  of  ex- 
tending the  consumption,  and  of  gratifying  the 
lower  orders  without  much  injury  to  the  revenue. 

On  these  different  claims  to  priority  in  the  re- 
duction of  taxes  we  acknowledge  our  inability  to 
decide.  The  records  of  the  Treasury,  doubtless, 
contain  materials  calculated  to  throw  light  on  these 
intricate  enquiries,  although  even  with  such  an  aid 
the  result  of  reduction  will,  at  times,  be  found  to 
differ  considerably  from  previous  expectation.  "We 
decline  accordingly  to  enter  on  this  uncertain  field, 
and  confine  ourselves  to  the  general  question  of  the 
pressure  of  taxation. 

Examples  of  Injury  from  Taxation. — The  un- 
seen injury  arising  from  taxation,  its  interference 


from  Taxation.  391 

with  the  free  course  of  manufacture,  is  much 
greater  than  is  suspected  by  the  pubHc.  To  form 
a  correct  idea  of  this,  would  require  an  investiga- 
tion into  all  the  branches  in  which  the  activity  and 
invention  of  individuals  are  repressed  by  the  regu- 
lations of  the  excise.  Of  their  effect  in  the  case  of 
distillers,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the  evi- 
dence given  before  the  Sugar  Distillery  Connnittee 
in  1808.  To  advert  to  a  very  different  case,  we  shall 
take  an  illustration  familiar  to  those  who  transact 
business  as  underwriters,  and  who  know  the  extent 
of  the  reduction  produced  by  peace  in  the  terms  of 
insurance.  To  a  war  premium  of  6,  8,  or  10  per 
cent.,  a  policy  duty  of  one-fourth  per  cent,  on  the 
sum  insured  formed  an  addition  of  little  conse- 
quence, but  when  premiums  were  lowered  to  .2  or 
3  per  cent.,  it  was  found  a  heavy  proportional 
chariie,  and  afforded  an  inducement  to  fbrcifrn 
merchants  to  effect  their  insurances  at  llamburuii 
and  other  ports,  where  the  duty  is  comparatively 
light.  The  consequence  is,  that  the  recent  reduc- 
tion of  our  policy  duty  has,  in  some  degree,  come 
too  late. 

Ship-owning,  often  a  losing  investment  of  capital 
during  the  war,  has  been  doubly  so  since  the  j)eace, 
and  can  hardly  prove  otherwise,  until  by  reducing 
the  attendant  charges,  we  shall  enable  our  buiklers, 
our  rope-makers,  and  others,  to  meet  foreign  com- 
petitors on  equal  terms.  Navigation  does  not,  like 
iiome  trade,  admit  of  controul  by  interior  regula- 
tion :  its  scene  of  competition  is  the  ocean,  and 
success  in  it  can  be  attained  only  by  a  clear  supe- 
riority over  foreigners.  Countries  j)ossessing  forests 
of  timber  in  the  vicinity  of  a  navigable  river,  enjoy 
already  one  great  advantage  over  our  shij)-builders: 
to  increase  that  by  an  impost  on  the  foreign  timber 

c  c  4- 


392  Reduction  of 

used  by  our  countrymen,  is  to  place  them  on  a  foot- 
ing of  inferiority  inadequately  balanced  by  our 
extra  duties  on  goods  im])orted  in  foreign  vessels. 
A  reduction  of  the  duty  on  foreign  timber  and 
hemp,  seems  an  indispensable  preliminary  to  our 
successful  competition  with  foreign  ship-builders, 
—  a  competition  which  would  not  then  be  hopeless, 
when  we  consider  the  superiority  of  our  workmen, 
and  the  recent  fall  in  the  cost  both  of  their  mainte- 
nance, and  of  the  conveyance  of  foreign  materials 
to  our  shores. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  examples  of  pres- 
sure from  taxation,  but  there  can,  we  believe,  be 
little  doubt  on  several  essential  points,  as 

That  it  forms  a  main  obstacle,  to  the  general  free- 
dom of  trade  which  government  seem  so  desirous 
to  introduce ; 

That  on  a  considerable  part  of  the  public  it  bears 
harder  now  than  during  the  war ;  and 

That  in  general  its  pressure  is  greater  in  Eng^ 
land  than  on  the  Continent. 

After  all  the  additional  means  conferred  by  our 
navigation,  our  extent  of  town-population,  and  our 
superior  agriculture,  the  payment  of  64,000,000/.  a 
year,  must  bear  harder  on  the  national  income  of 
this  country  than  that  of  45,000,000/.  (see  p.  369. 
of  this  chapter)  on  that  of  France.  On  the  Conti- 
nent, the  evils  of  transition  from  war  to  peace  have 
not  been  altogether  so  serious ;  the  failures  among 
merchants  and  manufacturers  have  been  less  numer- 
ous ;  while  among  their  agriculturists  the  decline 
of  price,  much  as  it  is  complained  of,  has  been  less 
ruinous  than  in  this  country. 

How  far  'would  a  Reduction  of  Taxation  be  pro- 
ductive of  Relief  ?  —  We  shall  suppose,  for  the  sake 


Taxation.  393 

of  giving  our  argument  a  definite  form,  that  it  is 
proposed  to  discuss  the  expediency  of  making  a 
farther  reduction  of  our  taxes  to  the  extent  in  all 
of  6,000,000/.  Were  that  abatement  directed  in 
ioto  to  some  specific  branches  of  industry,  for  ex- 
ample, those  connectetl  with  the  use  of  such  articles 
as  leather,  coals,  timber,  there  seems  little  doubt 
that,  though  like  all  other  changes,  it  would  for 
some  time  be  productive  of  a  derangement  of  work, 
the  stock  of  em])loymcnt  eventually  created  would 
supply  that  which  in  }'ears  of  distress  was  our 
principal  desideratum^  —  a  sufiicient  demand  for 
labour.  We  shall  take,  however,  the  least  favour- 
able supposition,  assuming  that  our  public  men  are 
not  agreed  in  regard  to  the  farther  taxes  to  be  re- 
pealed, and  that  the  6,000,000/.  of  which  we  con- 
template the  reduction,  must  be  abated  in  the  form 
of  a  per  centage  on  the  revenue  at  large.  What, 
it  may  be  asked  in  the  next  place,  would  be  the 
result  of  such  abatement  to  the  individual?  A 
diminution  of  charge  to  the  extent  of  two  or  three 
per  cent,  on  his  expenditure, — an  object  of  no 
great  consequence,  it  is  true,  to  the  land-holder, 
the  retired  capitalist,  or  any  person  out  of  business  j 
but  one  which  in  the  hands  of  the  merchant,  the 
manufacturer,  or  the  farmer,  woukl  form  an  engine 
of  great  efficiency.  In  the  case  of  an  individual 
out  of  business,  the  amount  of  annual  disburse  re- 
presents only  the  expenditure  of  himself  "and  family; 
in  business,  on  the  other  hand,  it  comprizes  wages, 
salaries,  and  other  outlay  to  an  amount  frequently 
of  three,  four,  or  five  times  the  house-keeping  ex- 
pence.  That  which  in  the  one  case  would  j)rove  a 
saving  of  only  20/.  a  year  might,  and  generally 
would  amount  in  the  other  to  100/.  Now  j)ersons 
m  business  form  evidently  the  stay  of  a  commer- 


39'if  Reduction  of 

cial  country,   the  class  whose  prosperity  is  decisive 
oftliiit  of"  the  community  at  large. 

Tiiis  will  be  apparent  on  our  pursuing  our  rea- 
soning a  step  farther,  and  examining  the  effect  of 
a  reduction  on  our  means  of  maintaining  a  compe- 
tition with  foreigners.  The  consequence  would  be 
that  our  w'oollens,  our  cottons,  our  hardware,  might 
be  sent  to  foreign  markets  two  or  three  per  cent. 
chea})er  than  at  present.  To  those  who  have  a  due 
sense  of  the  smallness  of  mercantile  profit,  (Speech 
of  Mr.  Baring,  loth  July  1822,)  even  this  limited 
reduction  will  appear  of  great  importance,  enabling 
us  to  compete  with  our  foreign  rivals,  the  manu- 
facturers of  France,  Germany,  and  the  Nether- 
lands. To  these,  since  the  inauspicious  aera  of  our 
Orders  in  Council,  we  must  add  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Northern  States  of  the  American  Union,  the 
return  of  the  State  of  New  York  for  1821,  exhibit- 
ing a  value  of  8  or  10,000,000/.  sterling,  (chiefly 
woollens  and  cottons,)  manufactured  among  a  po- 
pulation of  little  more  than  a  million. 

But  our  national  industry  is,  it  may  be  said, 
already  amply  productive,  whether  in  agriculture 
or  manufacture  ;  —  the  evil  lies  in  a  want,  not  of 
produce,  but  of  vent,  and  our  neighbours,  whether 
Germans  or  Belgians,  have  long  complained  of  the 
free  admission  of  our  fabrics.  This,  however, 
proves  little  more  than  that  in  certain  branches 
foreigners  kre  unable  to  compete  with  us,  and  that 
our  rivalship,  if  continued,  may  induce  them  to 
give  a  different  direction  to  a  part  of  their  labour 
and  capital,  manufacturing  commodities  of  which 
we  should  probably  become  the  purchasers,  in  con- 
sequence of  changes  that  would  follow  the  increased 
freedom  of  trade.  A  state  of  continued  peace  im- 
plies a  reduced  scale  of  profits,  a  limited  return  for 

li 


Ta^vaUoii.  395 

capital,  but  not  necessarily  an  overstock  of  mer- 
chandize or  deficiency  of  employment.  In  harvest 
we  generally  have  an  opportunity  of  observing, 
that  the  su])])ly  of  labourers  is  not  superabiuidant, 
and  since  the  beginning  of  last  year,  :here  has 
existed  no  over-stock  but  in  agriculture.  Even  in 
a  dull  season  the  surcharge  of  hands  is  less  great 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  To  add  a  twentieth  or 
even  a  thirtieth  to  the  existing  demand  for  labour, 
in  other  words  to  find  employment  for  100,000  in- 
dividuals of  the  lower  order,  would,  on  most  occa- 
sions, prove  a  change  completely  satisfactory. 

If  we  proceed  to  make  an  analysis  of  the  causes 
which  determine  the  quantity  of  produce  prepared 
among  us,  either  by  the  loom  or  the  plough,  we 
shall  find  it  to  depend  mainly  on  the  "  amount  of 
capital  and  number  of  workmen  in  the  coimtry,'* 
points  in  which,  of  course,  no  legislative  j)rovision 
can  effect  any  speedy  change.  It  is  a  fact,  that 
for  a  series  of  years  the  quantity  jirepared  for  a 
losing  market  is  nearly  as  large  as  for  a  profitable 
one  ;  so  great  is  the  power  of  habit,  the  necessity 
of  following  up  an  ^stablislied  trade  or  profession. 
This  result,  so  difierent  fiom  the  inferences  of 
some  political  economists,  is,  doubtless,  promoted 
by  our  poor-law  system  :  it  was  exemplified  on  the 
part  of  our  manuflicturers  amid  the  continued  dis- 
tresses of  1819  and  1820  ;  and  experiences  at  pre- 
sent a  confirmation  in  the  case  of  our  farmers. 

From  all  these  facts  what  inference  do  we  make, 
and  what  are  we  to  consider  the  probable  result  of 
a  reduction  of  taxation?  Not  overstock  in  atii/  branch 
of  manufacture,  butsecur'iti/fromforcii^n  competition  ? 

Oljections  ansxverccL  —  Various  arguineiUs  may, 
we  are  aware,  be  advanced  as  well  by  men  in  office 
as  others,  against  any  considerable  change  ni  our 


.^96  Taa^ation ; 

fiscal  arrangements.  Taxes  repealed  or  modified, 
cannot,  they  will  say,  be  re-imposed.  Charges 
that  have  interwoven  themselves  with  our  habits 
ought  not  to  be  abruptly  removed.  To  this  we 
answer,  that  several  of  our  taxes  are  such  as  ought 
never  to  have  been  im})osed,  indicating,  as  they  do, 
the  rudest  state  of  financial  science,  and  betraying 
an  almost  total  unconsciousness  of  the  check  given 
by  these  burdens  to  productive  industry.  As  to 
the  question  of  re-imposition,  we  have,  happily, 
good  ground  for  dismissing  the  apprehension  of 
retracing  our  steps ;  but,  supposing,  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  tliat  such  were  to  become  in  some  de- 
gree necessary,  the  new  taxes  would  be  of  an  alto- 
gether different  nature.  A  property-tax  to  the 
extent  of  2^,  perhaps  5  per  cent.,  would,  doubtless, 
receive  the  sanction  of  parliament,  in  preference  to 
a  revival  of  such  duties  as  those  on  malt,  salt, 
leather,  coals,  or  the  house  and  window-tax. 

Next,  as  to  the  evils  apprehended  from  transi- 
tion,— from  that  state  of  change,  which,  to  a  nation 
as  to  an  individual,  is  always  unprofitable  and  fi:e- 
quently  pernicious.  Evils  of  that  nature,  would, 
even  on  a  diminution  of  our  burdens,  occur  in  a 
variety  of  modes  not  anticipated  by  the  public,  but 
their  duration  would  necessarily  be  temporary,  and 
their  amount  might  be  lessened  by  various  arrange- 
ments, such,  perhaps,  as  making  our  future  reduc- 
tions consist  less  in  an  absolute  repeal  of  a  few 
particular  taxes  than  in  a  modification,  a  partial 
diminution  of  a  number  ;  —  a  course  which  might, 
besides,  have  the  effect  oi  relieving  government 
from  much  importunate  solicitation. 

Such  are  the  arguments  for  a  reduction  of  taxa- 
tion.    Inconsiderable  as  the  proposed  abatement 


Plan  o/M.  Xecker.  Sgj 

may  appear,  no  one  can  say  liow  materially  our  pro- 
ductive industry  may  be  promoted  by  it :  but  were 
immediate  relief  not  to  prove  the  consequence,  we 
should  have  at  least  the  satisfaction  of  entering  on 
that  path,  which  must  eventually  lead  to  a  favour- 
able issue.  The  modifications  made  last  session  in 
our  navigation  and  corn  laws  have  a  title  to  general 
approbation,  yet  no  one  expects  from  them  imme- 
diate relief,  or  regards  '!iem  in  other  li^lit  than  as 
an  approximation  to  a  better  system.  In  like  man- 
ner a  diminution  of  taxes  would  bring  us  more 
nearly  to  a  level  with  the  rest  of  the  civilized 
world,  giving  our  manufacturers  a  fair  chance  in 
the  field  of  competition,  relieving  our  aniuiitants 
from  the  necessity  of  emigrating,  and  placing  us 
nearer  to  that  equality  of  prices  which  would  admit 
of  unrestricted  trade,  and  estabhsh  our  prosperity 
on  a  solid  basis. 

Pla?i  of  Finance  pursued  by  M.  Necker. — The 
financial  concerns  of  France  have  been,  in  gene- 
ral, badly  conducted,  and  taxation  has,  time  im- 
memorial, been  a  subject  of  complaint  among  a 
people  whose  national  character  is  far  from  que- 
rulous. This  was  more  particularly  the  case  in 
the  latter  years  of  Louis  XV.,  after  winding  up  the 
arrears  of  the  expensive  and  inglorious  war  con- 
cluded in  1763.  The  18,000,000/.  constituting,  at 
that  time,  the  clear  produce  of  the  taxes  of"  France, 
were  levied  in  so  aukward  and  circuitous  a  mode 
as  to  cost  4  or  5,000,000/.  in  the  collection,  and  a 
sum  perhaps  equally  large  in  the  injury  arising 
from  the  obstructions  which  it  caused  to  the  free 
course  of  industry.  Different  provinces  in  France 
were  subject,  in  these  days,  to  different  imposts ; 
the  frontier  lines  were  discriminated  from    each 


39^  Taxation  ; 

other  by  custom-houses  Hke  the  boundaries  of 
distinct  kingdoms;  the  transit  of  merchandize  was 
taxed  ;  the  douaniers  or  custom-house  officers 
multiplied  beyond  all  due  proportion.  At  that 
time,  as  at  present,  the  imposts  on  consumption 
were  comparatively  small,  and  a  great  part  of  the 
revenue  arose  from  a  land  tax  similar  in  its  nature, 
but  more  unequal  in  its  collection  than  the  present 
Fonder. 

M.  Necker,  the  first  real  financier  whom  France 
had  seen  for  a  century,  received  his  official  ap- 
pointment in  I77G,  and  had  hardly  begun  to  intro- 
duce order  into  this  chaotic  mass,  when,  in  1778, 
the  course  of  circumstances  caused  the  French 
court  to  depart  from  its  pacific  policy.  The  humane 
character  of  Louis  XVI.,  and  the  necessity  of  con- 
tinued economy,  were  strong  arguments  for  the 
preservation  of  peace,  but  the  cause  of  the  Ameri- 
can colonists,  when  opposed  to  England,  could 
not  be  otherwise  than  popular  while  the  French 
had  fresh  in  recollection,  a  war  in  which  we  had 
struck  such  fatal  blows  at  their  nav}%  and  deprived 
them  of  so  many  Trans- Atlantic  possessions.  Louis 
and  his  ministers  were  thus  obliged  to  yield  to  the 
public  voice  ;  fleets  were  to  be  equipped,  and  con- 
siderable expence  to  be  incurred.  M.  Necker,  on 
whom  the  task  of  providing  the  pecuniary  supplies 
devolved,  was  aware  of  two  things  ;  first,  that  at 
that  time  the  imposition  of  fresh  taxes  would  be 
wholly  unadvisable ;  and  next,  that  eventually  the 
resources  of  France  would  be  more  tlian  equal  to 
her  burdens.  He  conceived  accordingly  the  plan 
of  meeting  the  new  demands  by  annual  loans,  for 
the  interest  of  which,  he  made  provision,  not  by 
taxes,  but  by  the  abolition  or  reduction  of  pen- 
sions, and  of  many  unnecessary  appendages  of  the 


Plan  ofM.  Necker.  399 

court.  At  that  time,  as  at  present,  France  cxlii- 
bited  few  sinecures  of  the  first  magnitude,  but  an 
endless  list  of  unmerited  grants,  of  supernumerary 
offices,  of  unauthorized  appropriations  of  the  public 
money.  The  confidence  inspired  by  the  i)ersonal 
respectability  of  the  minister,  and  the  prospect  of 
great  improvements  in  the  fiscal  administration  of 
France,  induced  the  monied  interest  on  the  con- 
tinent to  subscribe  to  the  loans  of  M.  Necker, 
without  the  guarantee  of  a  parliament,  or  the  al- 
lotment of  specific  funds  for  the  payment  of  the 
interest.  In  this  manner,  he  succeeded  (Flennet 
on  French  Finance)  in  borrowing  15,UUU,0UU/. 
sterling,  in  three  years,  at  moderate  interest,  and 
would,  doubtless,  have  conducted  the  war  to  its 
close,  without  a  single  impost,  had  not  circum- 
stances led  to  his  abrupt  retirement  from  ofHce  in 
1781. 

Does  this  example  supply  any  inference  ap})li- 
cable  to  our  present  situation  ?  If  the  amount 
borrowed  by  M.  Necker,  appear  small,  it  was  far 
from  small  when  we  consider  the  limited  resources 
of  France.  Then,  as  at  present,  her  towns  were 
neither  numerous  nor  large  :  the  majority  of  her 
inhabitants  were  scattered  over  rural  districts  ;  her 
manufacturers  were  adequate  only  to  home  con- 
sumption ;  the  increase  of  her  population  was  slow. 
How  different  the  present  state  and  prospect  of 
productive  industry  in  this  country,  possessed  as  it 
is,  of  rich  mines,  extensive  water  communication, 
abundant  capital,  —  the  whole  with  a  j)o])ulation 
rapid  in  its  increase,  and  formed  to  habits  of  busi- 
ness. With  such  auxiliaries,  is  it  going  too  far,  to 
ask,  whether  we  are  not  justified  in  looking  to  the 
future  with  the  favourable  expectation  entertained 
by  M.  Neckei",  especially  as  in  one  material  point 


400  The  Question  uj 

wc  may  reason  witli  a  confidence  greater  than  lie 
could  feel,  —  we  mean  the  hope  of  continued  peace  ? 
Nothing  indeed  can  be  more  flattering  than  our 
prospects,  provided  we  are  enabled  to  give  relief  to 
the  suffering  part  of  the  public.  This,  it  is  evident, 
could  be  best  accomplished  by  cancelling  or  reduc- 
ing the  more  injurious  of  our  fiscal  burdens;  and 
we  now  proceed  to  enquire  whether  circumstances 
justify  our  imitating  the  example  of  the  French 
minister,  and  substituting  a  small  annual  loan  for 
a  portion  of  the  taxes  repealed.  We  say  a  portion, 
because  there  seems  little  doubt,  that  the  produc- 
tiveness of  the  remaining  imposts  would  be  so  much 
increased,  as  to  enable  government,  if  they  deter- 
mined on  borrowing  i;f  4,000,000  annually,  to  repeal 
taxes  to  the  extent  of  5  or  ^6,000,000. 

The  Question  of  a  small  Annual  Loan  in  lieu  of 
Taj^es. 

State  of  the  Monied  Interest.  —  Amidst  all  the 
losses  and  complaints  of  late  years,  the  monied  in- 
terest, that  mixed  body  of  bankers,  retired  mer- 
chants and  capitalists,  have,  in  a  great  measure, 
escaped  the  general  distress.  Their  situation  has 
exempted  them  from  the  fluctuations  experienced 
by  many  other  classes  ;  by  our  agricultuiists,  our 
manufacturers,  our  exporters  of  merchandize  to 
the  West  Indies  and  America.  The  monied  in- 
terest comprises  a  number  of  old  estabUshments, 
who  conduct  their  business  more  conformably  to 
rule  and  calculation  than  several  other  portions  of 
the  mercantile  community  :  they  are  strangers  to 
the  hazard  of  credit,  and  the  still  greater  hazard 
of  distant  markets.  The  cloud,  which,  from  the 
depreciation  of  our  currency,  overhung  them  in 


a  .swr///  Annual  Loan.  \0\ 

tlie  latter  years  of  the  war,  has  disappeared,  and 
the  late  reduction  of"  the  rate  of  interest,  consider- 
able as  it  is,  may  be  considered  as  innoxious  to 
them,  their  incomes  having  gained,  or  being  likely 
to  gain,  in  value  what  they  have  lost  in  amount. 
The  fact  is,  that  they  have  periodically  at  their 
disposal,  particularly  after  receipt  of  the  public 
■dividends,  a  fund  of  ready  money,  which  has 
caused  the  rise  in  our  stocks,  so  idly  ascribed  to  a 
sinking  fund,  and  M'hich  has  also  afforded  large 
supplies  to  the  exchequers  of  our  neighbours. 

Transmission  of  Capital  to  Foreign  Countries.  — 
The  interest  of  money  is  always  highest  in  the  least 
advanced  communities,  and  capital  has  conse- 
quently a  tendency  to  move  thither,  not  rapidly, 
we  allow,  but  progressively.  It  is  thus  that  at  pie- 
sent  it  begins  to  be  withdrawn  from  England,  ex- 
actly as  in  the  17th  and  18th  centuries  it  was  with- 
drawn from  Holland.  Last  year  was  remarkable 
for  the  extent  of  such  transfers,  and  by  writers  who 
do  not  scruple  to  take  an  extra  latitude  in  a  popu- 
lar argument,  the  imprudence  with  which  these 
advances  were  made,  and  the  losses  of  which  they 
were  productive,  might  be  made  the  ground  of 
a  vehement  ap})eal  in  siip})ort  oi"  oiu-  })lan  of  ex- 
changing a  ])art  of  our  taxation  for  an  annual  loan. 
We  are  desirous,  however,  to  avoid  all  such  ap- 
peals, and  to  state  deliberately  and  impartially,  the 
arguments  on  either  side.  ii\  on  the  one  hand,  it 
be  asked  **  Why  should  we  not  render  subser\  ic-nt 
to  a  reduction  of  taxes  that  periodical  surplus  of 
capital  which  has  for  some  years  been  transtcrreti 
to  foreigners  ?  "  the  advocate  of  conunercial  free- 
ilom  may  say  on  the  other,  *'  You  are  not  at 
liberty  to  exercise  any  interference,  or  to  divert 

D  D 


1'0'J  'J'hti  Question  o/' 

ca))itnl  from  tlio  direction  wliicli  it  naturally  takes: 
its  transfer  to  foreign  countries  may  be,  for  au<^ht 
yon  know,  tlic  most  profitable  means  of  employing 
it  in  a  national  as  in  an  individual  sense.  The 
capitalist  who,  living  in  England,  draws  a  large  in- 
come fi'oin  the  Freiich  or  American  funds,  is  en- 
abled to  make  a  larger  expenditure,  to  be  a  more 
liberal  contributor  to  the  productive  industry  of  his 
own  Country." 

Between  these  contending  opinions  what  course 
ought  we  to  hold  ?  The  last  mentioned  argument 
would  be  excellent  against  any  legal  restraint  which 
might  exist,  in  the  shape  of  a  tax  or  otherwise,  on 
the  transmission  of  capital  abroad ;  a  restraint 
which  would  be  quite  as  absurd  as  the  lately  re- 
pealed prohibition  to  export  specie.  Farther,  were 
our  burdens  no  greater  than  those  of  our  neighbours, 
or  were  the  doctrine  of  freedom  of  trade  generally 
adopted,  we  should  be  inclined  to  look  with  a  fa- 
vourable eye  on  the  most  unreserved  transmission 
of  capital.  But  at  present  we  are  obliged  to  reason 
in  a  more  narrow  circle,  and  to  calculate  what 
peculiar  aid  we  can  oppose  to  peculiar  pressure. 
Our  situation  is  unfortunately  anomalous;  our 
taxation  higher  than  that  of  any  other  country  ; 
and  if,  as  we  have  reason  to  apprehend,  its  magni- 
tude be  such  as  to  reduce  the  profit  of  stock,  and 
in  that  manner  to  cause,  or  to  be  likely  to  cause, 
capital  to  leave  us,  the  objection  of  the  political 
economist,  however  true  in  the  abstract,  ceases  to 
apply,  or  becomes  in  a  manner,  lost  in  the  urgency 
of  circumstances. 

Though  we  are  thus  hardly  called  on  to  combat 
objections,  it  may  be  useful,  in  this  day  of  theoriz- 
ing, to  remark  that  the  application  of  general  prin- 
ciples in  regard  to  money  transactions  is  found  to 


u  small  Annudl  Loan.  403 

require  no  sliglit  share  of  the  caution  that  lias 
proved  necessary  in  otiier  de))artnients  —  our  corn 
trade,  our  navigation,  our  custom  duties.  To 
explain  our  meaning  by  example.  In  1815, 
Mr.  llobinson,  at  that  time  President  of  the  Board 
of  Trade,  was  as  fully  convinced  as  Mr.  Horner, 
or  any  member  of  the  House,  of  the  radical  im- 
})olicy  of  our  corn  laws  ;  but  while  he  regretted 
that  they  should  ever  have  been  enacted,  or  that 
agriculturists  should  ever  have  relied  on  so  un- 
natural a  support,  he  felt  that  any  change  nuist  be 
gradual,  that  the  advantage  from  a  return  to  sound 
principle  would  be  remote,  and  the  evils  of  transi- 
tion immediate.  The  Agricultural  Conunittee  of 
18^1  acknowledged,  in  like  manner,  the  benefit  of 
iiee  trade,  but  felt  the  inexpediency  of  its  early 
ado})tion  :  while  in  regard  to  our  navigation,  the 
bills  brought  forward  during  the  session  of  18*;^^, 
for  repealing  the  obnoxious  part  of  our  statutes, 
experienced,  as  is  well  known,  nuich  opposition 
and  curtailment  from  the  same  cause. 

A\  e  must  not,  howe\  er,  be  understood  as  ])ro- 
posing  any  obstacles  to  the  transmission  of  capiUil 
abroad,  except  that  of  giving  an  additional  open- 
ing for  its  investment  at  home. 

We  are  perfectly  aware,  that  the  ])rinciples  of 
])roductive  industry  prescribe,  in  the  words  of 
V^auban,  (jtie  raf^gtiil  Ic  viieiw  nnplotje  est  ccliii  que 
le  roi  laissc  tnitrc  ks  mains  dc  ses  sujcts  —  that 
government  should,  if  j)ossible,  avoid  draining  it 
from  the  pocket  of  the  individual  in  the  shape  of 
either  a  loan  or  tax.  Were  it  practicable  to  avoid 
both,  we  should  be  reluctant  to  urge,  or  even  to 
listen  to  the  project  of  an  annual  loau,  however 
justified  by  our  prospect  of  increasing  wealth. 
The  question,   however,    has  no  such  scope,  being 

u  u  'J 


404  The  Qffes/ion  of 

unluckily  confined  to  the  alternative  of  taxins^  or 
borrowing ;  and  we  a])peal  to  those  wiio  have 
studied  the  nature  of  our  resources,  wliether  we 
cannot  at  present  raise  a  given  sum,  for  example 
.^4,000,000,  with  less  injury  as  a  loan  than  as  a 
tax. 

Probabililj/  of  Financial  Relief  —  We  should  on 
on  account  suggest  a  transfer  of  a  portion  of  our 
burdens  to  the  next  generation,  were  it  probable 
that  their  situation  would  partake  of  that  embarrass- 
ment which,  since  1814,  has  borne  so  heavily  on  us. 
But  whether  we  look  to  the  increasing  caution  of 
our  rulers,  the  resources  arising  from  improvements 
in  our  national  industry,  or  the  diminution  of  oiu' 
burden  by  its  repartition  among  augmenting  num- 
bers, we  find  reason  to  consider  the  prospects  of  our 
successors  far  superior  to  our  own.  And  though 
the  assertion  may  excite  a  smile,  it  is,  notwith- 
standing, true,  that  to  relieve  ourselves  from  a  por- 
tion of  our  taxes,  is  an  effectual  method  of  prevent- 
ing loss  to  our  posterity,  inasmuch  as  the  present 
pressure,  if  continued,  would,  by  sending  abroad 
the  family  of  the  annuitant,  and,  as  we  fear,  the 
money  of  the  capitalist,  operate  to  curtail  the  fund 
destined  to  become  in  the  hands  of  the  next  gene- 
ration the  basis  of  national  wealth. 

Would  the  proposed  Loan  affect  the  Rate  of 
Interest  ?  —  One  of  the  chief  features  in  the  great 
transition  from  war  to  peace,  was  an  increase  of  dis- 
posable capital,  and  considering  the  magnitude  of 
this  increase,  we  may  well  question,  whether  govern- 
ment ought  not,  several  years  ago,  to  ha\e  made  a 
demand  on  the  monied  interest  for  a  loan,  rather 
than  on  the  public  for  taxes.      If  such  would  have 

15 


a  amall  Annual  l.onn.  405 

been  at  that  time  a  Ht  application  to  the  national 
wound,  there  seems  still  less  doubt  of  its  being  so  at 
present.  To  take  a  few  millions  aniuially  out  of  the 
money  market  would,  doubtless,  o])erate  in  some 
measure  to  retard  the  fall  of  interest,  and  the  ad- 
vantage slow,  but  sure,  which  follows  that  fall ;  but 
that  it  would  do  so  in  a  slight  degree  seems  proba- 
ble, whether  we  consider  our  present  abundance, 
or  our  satisfactory  prospects  in  regard  to  disposa- 
ble capital.  The  dread  of  scarcity  of  currency  from 
the  resumption  of  casii  payments  has  j)roved  ground- 
less; and  there  seems,  assuredly,  no  reason  to  appre- 
hend an  early  demand  for  money  for  the  payment 
of  corn  imports,  still  less  for  subsidies  or  military 
charges  on  the  continent. 

The  power  of  habit  is  in  nothing  more  strongly 
exemplified  than  in  the  ap})ropriatiou  of  the  disposa- 
ble funds  of  our  monied  men.  Accustomed  to  a 
few  simple  securities,  they  have  no  idea  of  changing 
their  investments,  even  under  an  alteration  of  cir- 
cumstances. Our  bankers  and  city  capitalists  con- 
fine themselves  to  stocks,  excliequer  bills,  or  mer- 
cantile acceptances,  (all  convertible  into  money  at 
short  notice,)  and  have  no  idea  of  investing  money 
on  mortgage,  still  less  of  adventuring  in  trade,  or 
making  a  permanent  loan  to  a  mercantile  house. 
They  look  more  naturally  to  foreign  stocks,  parti- 
cularly since  business  of  that  kind  is  transacted  so 
largely  on  our  own  exchange.  In  what  manner  does 
this  reasoning  apply  to  the  present  question?  It 
implies  that  government  by  giving  a  new  opening  to 
our  capitalists  in  the  form  of  a  small  annual  loan, 
would  withdraw  comparatively  little  from  the  ac- 
commodation of  our  merchants  and  landed  interest : 
the  diminution,  we  believe,  would  hardly  be  felt, 
except  in  the  demand  for  i'oreign  stock. 

1)  D    3 


1()()  The  Question  of 

IVouId  it  affect  the  Price  of  Stocks  ?  —  Tliis  (lues- 
tion  we  shall  answer  first  as  it  regards  the  public, 
and  next  in  respect  to  the  stockholders.  Since  the 
reduction  of  the  five  per  cents,  government  aj)pcars 
to  have  hardly  any  greater  interest  in  keeping  u}) 
the  funds  than  in  maintaining  the  price  of  land, 
merchandize,  or  any  other  description  of  national 
property.  The  only  direct  advantage  from  a  rise 
in  the  funds,  would  be  the  power  of  reducing  the 
old  four  per  cents,  and  the  farther  power  of  reduc- 
ing the  new  four  j)er  cents,  five  or  six  years  hence. 
Any  diminution  of  interest  in  the  great  mass  of  our 
debt,  the  three  per  cents,  is  a  very  doubtful  and 
remote  object :  a  result  not  likely  to  ensue,  until 
after  a  long  continuance  of  peace,  and  a  conciu'rence 
of  circumstances,  which  of  themselves  would  mate- 
rially improve  our  financial  condition.  But,  what- 
ever may  be  the  probable  time  of  the  occurrence  of 
such  a  power,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  to  endea- 
vour to  accelerate  its  arrival,  in  regard  to  either  the 
three  or  the  four  per  cents,  by  artificial  means,  w^ould 
be  highly  impolitic.  The  reasons  against  such  a 
course  are,  even  when  briefly  stated,  (p.  360.)  so 
direct  and  substantial,  as  to  render  it  incumbent  on 
every  well-wisher  to  his  country  to  dissuade  it ;  and 
nothing  prevents  our  enlarging  on  the  evils  that 
would  attend  it,  except  a  conviction  that  it  can  form 
no  part  of  the  plans  of  the  present  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer. 

Next,  as  to  the  effect  of  a  loan  on  the  interest  of 
stockholders.  Dividing  these  into  the  two  classes 
of  temporary  and  permanent  depositors,  and  consi- 
dering the  former  as  loan  contractors,  we  shall  soon 
find  that  they  may  safely  venture  on  such  a  loan 
without  the  pledge  of  taxes.  Four  millions,  bor- 
rowed at  an  interest  of  four  per  cent.,  would  involve 

17 


a  small  Annual  Loan.  407 

an  annual  burden  of  1G0,{XK)/.  wliicli,  if  the  plan  of 
a  sinking  fund  provision  for  eacii  loan  were  retained, 
might  be  carried  to  'iOO,000/.,  a  sum  not  insignifi- 
cant certainly,  but  not  equal  to  /la/f  the  addition 
that  is  annually  making  to  our  revenue  by  the  in- 
creasing consumption  of  taxed  articles.  Mas  such 
security,  we  may  be  allowed  to  ask,  e\  er  oficred  on 
a  war  loan  in  the  most  brilliant  days  of  our  finance  ? 

Lastly,  as  to  permanent  depositors  and  the  j)ro- 
bable  price  of  stocks  for  a  scries  of  years.  What 
have  been  the  causes  of  the  slow  rise  of  stocks  since 
the  peace?  The  years  1811<  and  1815  required 
heavy  loans;  1815  was  a  season  of  general  distress, 
but  no  sooner  did  our  prosperity  return  in  I8I7, 
than  stocks  rose  and  continued  high  during  1818, 
when  the  mismanagement  of  the  French  loan,  and, 
soon  after,  the  effect  of  overtrading  in  this  country, 
produced  a  fall.  These  causes,  joined  to  the  general 
disquietude  dining  a  trial  (in  18'20)  of  unfortunate 
notoriety,  delayed  the  rise  of  stocks ;  and  a  farther 
delay  took  place  from  an  ap})rehcnsion  in  that  and 
the  succeeding  year  that  tiie  magnitude  of  the  agri- 
cultural distress  would  necessitate  a  reduction  of 
the  public  dividends.  Since  then,  however,  the 
circumstances  of  the  })ul)hc,  and  the  amount  of  the 
revenue  have  both  materially  impro\ed. 

Two  points  will  be  readily  admitted  by  the  pei- 
manent  de})Ositor  in  our  fimds  ;  first,  that  wliatever 
conduces  to  the  relief  of  the  suffering  classes  has  a 
tendency  to  raise  stocks;  and  next,  that  a  loan  for 
the  purpose  of  reducing  taxes  is  altogether  ihflerent 
in  its  operation  on  his  pro})erty  from  a  loan  for  the 
purpose  of  expenditure.  I3y  augmenting  the  value 
of  money  it  augments  /lis  incomcy  and  aflbrds  him  a 
substantial  return  for  any  delay  of  rise  in  the  mar- 

u  D    1' 


'U)8  The  Question  of 

ket  price  of  stock,  which  may  be  attributable  to  the 
act  of  borrowing. 

Liviitation  to  borroxvhig.  —  Were  tlie  j)lan  of  an 
annual  loan  to  be  adopted,  and  found  to  answer, 
what  limit,  it  may  be  asked,  ought  there  to  be  to 
our  borrowing  ;  at  what  time  ought  we  to  suspend 
our  demand  on  our  future  resources  ?  Our  answer 
is  —  "  at  the  time  when  our  taxation  shall  havebeen 
brought  to  a  level  with  that  of  France  and  other 
countries,  our  rivals  in  manufacture."  If  in  these 
countries  the  public  biu'dens  form  18  or  20  per  cent, 
of  the  national  revenue,  let  the  same  be  considered 
the  limit  of  taxation  in  England  ;  the  point  below 
which  we  make  no  attempt  to  reduce  it,  satisfied 
with  the  superiority  given  to  our  })roductive  labour 
by  our  physical  advantages, — our  mines,  and  our 
command  of  water  communication. 

RetreiicJiment.  —  Nor  ought  the  adoption  of  the 
loan  system,  though  productive  of  financial  relief, 
by  any  means  to  lessen  the  demand  on  the  part  of 
the  public  for  retrenchment :  on  the  contrary,  it 
would  bring  with  it  a  direct  motive  for  reduction, 
the  effect  of  all  abatement  of  taxation  being  to  in- 
crease the  value  of  money  ;  to  add  to  the  emolu- 
ments of  the  servants  of  the  public.  The  allowance 
to  Prince  Leopold,  for  example,  has  been  impercep- 
tibly, but  substantially  increased  fi'om  50,000/.  to 
60,000/.  by  the  fall  in  prices  since  passing  the 
grant ;  and  if  taxes  are  further  reduced,  it  will, 
ere  long,  attain  the  value  of  65,000/.  It  follows, 
that  a  reduction  to  a  sum  representing  the  value  of 
50,000/.  at  the  date  of  the  grant,  niiglit  take  place 
without  injury  to  the  Prince,  and  without  deviating 
from  the  spuit  of  the  act  of  parliament. 

Have  LoanSy  in  time  of  PeacCj  been  sanctioned 
by  example  ?  —  As  yet,  only  by  that  of  the  United 


a  small  Annual  Loan.  U)[) 

States  and  some  continental  powers  who,  seekin<; 
their  supplies  fioni  ahen  capitalists,  have  no  title 
to  be  held  forth  as  an  example  to  England.  But, 
had  Holland  in  former  ages  possessed  that  evi- 
dence of  progressive  increase  of  population  and 
income,  which  at  present  ha})pily  belongs  to  our 
country,  her  course  would  probably  have  been  that 
which  we  recommend,  and  without  any  departure 
irom  her  habitual  caution  ;  for  it"  in  peace,  wages, 
salaries,  and  profits  are  lower,  and  tlie  poMer  of 
present  payment  less,  the  labourers  in  tlie  produc- 
tive field  iu*e  more  numerous,  the  results  of  their 
exertion  far  more  conducive  to  eventual  pros- 
perity. During  the  late  war,  our  national  income 
was  large  but  of  uncertain  duration  :  at  present, 
it  is  reduced  in  amount,  but  much  improved  in 
prospect.  If,  in  the  former  case,  it  was  politic  in 
govermnent  to  defray  a  large  share  of  tlie  current 
expence  out  of  our  passing  gains,  a  different  course 
is  obviously  suited  to  a  state  of  ])eace. 

The  Annu'Uij  Bill.  —  These  truths  luue  at  last 
been  felt,  and  the  proceedings  of  Parliament  in 
the  last  and  preceding  session,  have  evinced  a 
considerable  change  in  the  measures  of  ministers. 
Till  then,  whatever  might  be  their  merits  in  regard 
to  foreign  "politics  or  commercial  regulations,  their 
financial  arrangements  were  unsatisfactory  to  the 
attentive  enquirer,  discovering,  apparently,  little 
discrimination  between  a.  state  of  war  and  ])eace, 
in  regard  to  the  power  of  bearing  tiixes,  and  a  very 
inadequate  impression  of  the  superiority  of  our 
progress  to  that  of  our  neighbours.  The  mea- 
sures adopted  previously  to  last  year,  seemed  to 
proceed  from  the  suggestions  of  merely  practical 
inen  —  of  men  accustomed  to  estimate  a  finaneial 
j)roceeiling  by  its  effect  on  the  Stock  KxcJiange, 


MO  The  Qucslion  uf 

oil  the  mere  monied  interest,  rather  tliaii  on  the 
pnxhictive  in(histry  of  the  country  at  large.  At 
las^  was  brought  forward,  unexpectedly,  the  ])lan 
for  exchanging  life-interests  in  half  pay  and  pen- 
sions for  long  annuities ;  a  jilan,  which,  since  the 
moment  of  its  announcement,  we  liave  considered 
indicative  of  consequences  considerably  beyond  the 
anticipation  of  the  public.  Its  temporary  failure, 
or,  as  we  may  now  say,  the  delay  of  its  success, 
was  owing  to  the  engagement  being  brought 
before  the  public  on  too  extended  a  scale  :  the 
duration  of  the  contract  being  such  as  naturally 
to  startle  men  not  then  apprised  of  all  the  reasons 
which  determine  our  rulers  to  adhere  to  a  pacific 
course.  But  our  confidence  in  it  was  unshaken, 
connected  as  it  is  with  considerations  on  which  we 
build  the  hope  of  farther  and  extensive  relief. 
The  adoption  of  such  a  measure  confers  a  kind  of 
official  saiiction  on  views  such  as  those  we  have 
endeavoured  to  take,  and  shows  that  in  the  highest 
quarter  there  prevails  a  conviction  of  the  pro- 
mising nature  of  our  prospects  ;  an  assurance  that 
our  only  desideratum  is  present  relief. 

Of  our  suggestions  in  this,  as  in  a  previous 
chapter  (p.  3il<.)  it  may,  we  trust,  be  said,  that 
we  propose  to  do  nothing  by  surprise,  by  contri- 
vance, or  by  plausible  calculation ;  all  may  be 
gradual,  voluntary,  and  open,  where  necessary,  to 
recall.  From  cii'cumstances  beyond  the  power 
of  foresight,  a  great  pressure  has  fallen  on  the 
present  generation  :  it  is  proposed  to  transfer  a 
part  of  it  to  future  years,  but  on  a  plan  that  will 
leave  those  on  whom  it  may  devolve,  whether  of 
the  present  or  of  the  next  age,  far  less  burdened 
than  we  now  find  ourselves.    How  singular,   that 


a  small  Annual  Loan.  411 

ill  all  our  distress  since  the  peace,  amid  all  the 
schemes  for  our  relief^  none  of  this  natiue  should 
have  been  brought  forward  until  the  recent  trans- 
fer of  life  interests  into  long  annuities.  Had  our 
finances  been  administered  by  a  statesman  of  the 
bold,  inventive  mind  of  Pitt,  the  increase  of  our 
population  and  the  connection  l)et\veen  it  and  the  in- 
crease of  taxable  income,  would,  ere  this,  have  been 
made  the  ground-work  of  some  decisive  measure. 
Let  it  not  be  objected  tiiat  such  was  not  his  course 
during  the  period  of  his  administration  that  passed 
in  peace,  and  that  the  plan  pursued  for  the  supj)()rt 
of  our  credit  after  the  American  war,  was  the  im- 
position of  additional  taxes.  At  that  time  the 
increase  of  our  lumibers  was  less  rapid,  and  for 
want  of  regular  returns,  was  unperceived.  The 
recent  loss  of  our  colonies  forbade  the  expectation 
of  a  progressive  extension  of  trade,  and  there  were 
few  examples  in  our  history,  of  taxes  repealed 
in  the  hope  of  stimulating  })roductive  industry. 
Mr.  Pitt  ])ursued,  therefore,  the  only  expedient 
within  his  knowledge,  but  had  })eace  been  ])re- 
served  after  1792,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  result  of  the  favourable  state  to  which  cir- 
cumstances had  brought  our  finances,  would  have 
borne  the  stamp  of  his  discriminating  mind,  and  of 
the  example  given,  under  circumstances  somewhat 
similar,  by  Sir  R.  Walpole  :  it  would  have  been, 
not  the  support  of  the  sinking  fund,  to  an  extent 
that  would  have  afforded  an  inducement  to  send 
capital  out  of  the  country,  but  the  repeal  or  reduc- 
tion of  the  taxes  which  interlered  most  directly 
with  productive  industry,  in  coufoiinity  to  the 
course  recommended  many  years  before  by  Dr. 
Smith.* 

*  Wealth  of  Nations,  vol.  iii. 


41 '2  I'lic  Qucsliun  <(J'  an  Aninidl  Loan. 

The  Period  from  lySt  to  1798.  —  To  niontion 
llie  name  of  Pitt,  is  to  recall  the  attention  of 
tlie  financial  inquirer  to  the  time,  unluckily  too 
short,  when  the  plans  of  that  minister  were 
undisturbed  by  the  expenditure  of  war ;  we 
mean  the  interval  from  1781<  to  1793.  No  period 
of  our  history  is,  as  far  as  regards  our  productive 
industry,  entitled  to  an  equal  share  of  our  atten- 
tion. The  circumstances  of  that  interval  of  peace 
were  in  many  respects  similar  to  those  of  the 
present  time.  Beginning  in  financial  embarrass- 
ment, our  prospects  gradually  brightened,  and  our 
trade  flourished  without  the  aid,  as  in  a  period  of 
war,  of  artificial  causes :  all  was  the  legitimate 
result  of  the  application  of  capital  and  industry 
to  the  improvement  of  our  national  advantages. 
Agriculture  prospered  w^ithout  a  rise  of  prices  : 
the  revenue  increased  without  new  taxes  :  labour 
was  paid  not  largely  but  satisfactorily,  and  the 
addition  to  the  poor-rate  was  very  gradual.  Let 
us  not  imagine  that  the  period  in  question  pos- 
sessed peculiar  advantages ;  or  that  the  progress 
of  our  cotton  manufacture,  and  the  troubles  of 
France,  placed  our  countrymen  in  those  days  on 
commanding  ground :  they  felt  severely  the  pres- 
sure of  taxation,  and  were  not  altogether  exempt 
from  the  pernicious  operation  of  corn-laws.  With 
confidence,  therefore,  may  we  conclude,  that  could 
but  a  part  of  our  present  burdens  be  removed,  we 
should  follow  the  career  of  productive  industry 
with  equal  or  superior  advantage. 


CONCLUSION. 


We  have  now  broui^ht  our  labour  to  a  close,  after 
endeavourinji;  to  exhibit  a  j)icture  of  our  national 
situation,  and  enunieratini>'  its  various  advantages 
and  drawbacks,  in  a  manner  wliieli,  wliatever  may 
be  thought  of  the  degree  of  ability,  will  hardlv  be 
arraigned  on  the  score  of  partiality.  Political 
allusions  have  been  avoided  as  much  as  was  at  all 
practicable,  in  an  inquiry  in  which  statistical  results 
were  frequently  aflfected  by  the  decisions  of  the 
cabinet.  If  we  have  ventured  on  questions  of  great 
difficulty,  and  occasionally  expressed  opinions  with 
a  degree  of  confidence,  it  has  proceeded  from  no 
other  feeling  than  a  consciousness  of  the  advan- 
tage arising  from  command  of  time,  and  the 
opportunity  of  giving  long-continued  attention  to 
a  few  select  subjects. 

Summarij.  —  Our  first  chapter  was  appropriated 
to  a  much  dis})uted  question,  the  causes  of  the 
unexpected  abundance  of  our  h'nancial  resources 
during  the  war,  and  their  still  more  unexpected  ilefi- 
ciency  since  the  peace.  This  was  followed  by  an  in- 
quiry  into  the  subject  of  "  currency  and  exchange,*' 
which,  uninviting  and  intricate  as  it  is,  could  not 
with  propriety  be  omitted  in  a  work  recjui ring- 
such  frequent  reference  to  changes  in  the  value  of 
money.  The  state  of  agriculture  claimed  a  longer 
chapter  and  more  ample  details,  as  well  from  sym- 


Ml,  Conclusion. 

patliy  for  a  very  numerous  aiul  respecta])lL'  class, 
as  iiom  the  importance  of  the  sul)ject  to  the  nation 
at  large.  The  price  of  produce  influencing  so  di- 
lectly  the  price  of  labour,  it  became  an  object 
of  great  solicitude  to  arrive  at  an  opinion  as  little 
doubtful  as  possible  in  regard  to  our  })ros})ect  of 
the  su])ply  of  corn  both  as  to  quantity  and  price. 
On  that  must,  in  all  probal)ility,  depend  a  variety 
of  future  measures  :  the  regulation  of  wages,  sala- 
ries, and  money  incomes,  generally  ;  the  degree  of 
equality  in  the  means  of  competition  between  our 
manufacturers  and  those  of  the  continent ;  and  the 
latitude  which  may  consequently  be  taken  by 
government  in  removing  the  restrictions  on  our 
commercial  intercourse. 

From  these  doubtful  and  anxious  points  we  turned 
with  satisfaction  to  the  evidence  of  our  progressive 
advance  in  agriculture,  manufacture, .  and  the  use- 
ful arts  generally,  accompanied,  as  it  is,  by  a  large 
increase  in  our  population.  Augmentation  of  na- 
tional power  ;  the  prospect  of  continued  peace  ; 
the  means  of  reducing  taxes  —  are  all  consequences 
of  our  decided  superiority  to  other  nations  in  the 
progress  of  national  improvement. 

The  examination,  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  of 
the  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  gold  and  silver, 
was  prompted  by  a  double  cause  —  the  revolutions 
in  the  value  of  money  during  the  last  thirty  years  ; 
and  the  evident  disproportion  existing  at  present, 
particularly  in  the  metropolis,  between  the  rate  of 
wages  and  the  cost  of  the  maintenance  of  the  in- 
dividual. A  hope  of  being  instrumental  in  cor- 
rectins  these  anomalies  led  to  researches  of  which 
the  object  is  to  give  a  permanent  and  uniform  value 
to  money  contracts  ;  to  lessen  the  prevailing  objec- 
tion to  leases ;    to  give  facilities  to  the  commut- 


Conclusion.  415 

ation  of  tithe  ;  and  finally,  to  show  annuitants  that 
it  is  possible  for  them  to  make  an  abatement  in  the 
numeiical  amount  of  money  income  without  in- 
curring a  sacrifice. 

In  our  concluding  chapter  we  liave  conveyed 
our  ideas  in  regard  to  the  operation  of  a  sinking 
fund;  the  comparative  weight  of  English  and 
French  taxation  ;  the  growing  nature  ol'  our  re- 
sources ;  and  the  prospect  of  a  farther  and  con- 
siderable reduction  of  our  burdens. 

It  may  appear  somewhat  singular  to  our  readers 
that  subjects  of  such  general  interest  should  not 
long  ere  this  have  been  fully  discussed  ;  that  ques- 
tions of  such  importance  to  our  welfare  should  not 
have  been  decisively  answered.  But  in  such  re- 
searches the  magnitude  of  the  labour  is  found  to 
exceed  all  previous  calculation  :  the  number  of 
persons  fitted  for  it  by  situation  or  habits  is  not 
great ;  and,  immersed  as  they  generally  are  in 
official  or  professional  pursuits,  a  long  period 
elapses  in  this,  as  in  the  province  of  general  his- 
tory, before  an  individual  is  enabled  to  bestow  on 
such  topics  the  time  and  attention  they  require. 


Comprehensive  as  the  preceding  investigations 
may  appear,  there  still  remain  for  discussion  se\e- 
ral  subjects  of  great  interest. 

Our  Trade.  —  Of  our  commercial  history  during 
the  last  thirty  years,  we  propose  a  sketch  as  cir- 
cumstantial, and  as  carefully  grounded  on  official 
documents  as  that  which  has  been  given  of  our 
Finances  and  our  Aj^riculture.  The  fluctuations 
in  our  trade,  the  over-rating  of  our  protits  during 


M(')  Cunrln.sion. 

the  war,  tlie  tlistinctioii  hetwcoi  real  aiitl  nominal 
acltlitions  to  projjerty,  are  all  suhjects  which  re(}iiire 
examination  and  perspicuous  statement. 

Emigration,  —  Though  the  recent  improvement 
in  the  state  of"  our  productive  industry  has  lessened 
the  necessity  of  emigration,  a  disquisition  into 
that  subject  would  open  views  connected  with 
the  diffusion  of  civilization,  not  only  in  our  colo- 
nies, but  in  many  districts  in  Europe.  The  state 
of  these  is  more  backward  than  can  well  be  con- 
ceived by  the  untravelled  part  of  our  countrymen. 
Though  to  send  settlers  to  these  neglected  tracts 
would  form  no  part  of  our  policy,  their  improve- 
ment would  be  of  interest  to  us,  both  as  opening 
markets  for  our  manufactures,  and  as  proving  to 
continental  powers  how  much  it  is  their  policy  to 
maintain  peace,  and  to  seek  in  the  diffusion  of  civi- 
lization that  increase  of  population  and  revenue 
which  they  have  hitherto  so  fruitlessly  attempted 
from  conquest. 

Public  Retrenchment.  —  This  question,  much  as 
it  has  been  discussed,  still  stands  in  need  of  an  ex- 
position unconnected  with  party  views,  and  found- 
ed on  considerations  strictly  statistical,  in  parti- 
cidar  the  power  of  money  in  the  purchase  of 
commodities,  and  the  extent  of  the  change  attend- 
ant on  the  transition  from  war  to  peace. 

Finance.  —  On  this  head  we  have  communicated 
in  the  present  Aolume  only  a  part  of  our  materials  : 
to  arrange  and  condense  the  remainder  might 
tend  to  give  clearness  to  official  statements,  and 
to  support  the  arguments  for  a  farther  reduction  of 
our  burdens. 


Concluaiufu  117 

Parallel  between  England  and  France.  —  We 
liave  exhibited  a  comparison  of  the  charges  on 
agriculture,  and  of  the  general  taxation  of  the  two 
countries :  but  there  remains  much  to  com})are  in 
regard  to  the  sUite  of  trade  and  manufactujes ;  of 
military  and  other  public  establishments  j  of  educa- 
tion, science,  and  national  usages. 

Tithe  and  Poor-rate. — These  subjects  acquire 
an  increased  interest  from  tiie  course  of  recent  cir- 
cumstances : —  the  im])robabihty  of  any  great  or 
permanent  rise  in  agricultural  produce  :  tlie  higlily 
beneficial  measure  about  to  be  carried  into  effect  in 
Ireland  ;  and  the  evident  ability  of  our  monied  in- 
terest to  afford  relief  to  their  landed  brethren, 
whenever  an  eligible  plan  shall  be  biought  forward 
by  government.  Of  this  plan  the  main  features 
would,  })erhaps,  be  as  to  tithe,  redemption  at  a 
moderate  \aluation;  and  as  to  poor-rate,  the  ecjua- 
hzation  of  the  burden  throughout  a  parish  or  dis- 
trict, by  assessing  (see  page  18.5,)  the  income  of  all 
instead  of  that  of  the  farmer  or  householder  only. 

What  is  the  present  ])rosj)ect  in  regard  to  the 
price  of  conmiodities  generally?  That  a  rise  is 
very  unlikely,  and  that  in  all  ])robability  no  injury 
would  accrue  to  the  clergy  from  their  accejMing  a 
money  income  in  lieu  of  tithe  for  a  few  years, 
until,  by  the  purchase  of  land  or  otherwise, 
arrangements  should  be  made  for  a  permanent 
commutation. 

Our  West  India  Colonies. — The  attention  of  the 
])ublic  has  lately  been  directetl  to  two  (juestions, — 
a  reduction  of  the  duly  on  East  Iiulia  sugar,  and 
the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery  in  our  West  India 
colonies.     The  discussions  in   both   lia\e   liitlierlo 


418  Ciynclu.sioii. 

been  coiiclucted  in  ii  manner  of  wliicli,  to  l)oir()W 
the  expression  of  a  foreign  historian,  la  moderation 
7i\'st  nullcment  h  caractcre.  Neither  party  has 
shown  much  sohcitude  to  observe  a  medium,  or  to 
ascertain  decisively  a  few  fundamental  points ; 
such  as,  whether  the  purchase  of  sugar  in  India  at 
a  low  price  is  or  is  not  practicable  to  a  large 
extent;  or,  whether,  in  regard  to  the  West 
Indies,  it  is  not  the  interest  of  the  planter  to  co- 
operate cordially  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  pro- 
posed change,  afiter  the  principle  of  compensation 
shall  be  distinctly  admitted. 

These  several  topics  it  is  our  intention  to  discuss, 
in  an  additional  volume,  whenever  circumstances 
shall  afford  the  time  requisite  for  such  laborious  re- 
g,earches. 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  11. 


(Page  20.)  Expence  of  the  late  WarSy  rccJconing  from  the 
begin7ii72g  of  1793  to  the  beginnmg  of\8l6. 


MONEY    RAISED. 


War  of  1793. 


Years. 

j    By  Taxes. 

By  Loans. 

Total. 

£ 

£ 

,£ 

1793 

17,170,4-00 

4,500,000 

21,670,400 

1794. 

17,308,811 

11,000,000 

28,308,811 

1795 

1    17,858,454 

18,000,000 

35,858,454 

1796 

18,737,760 

25,500,000 

44,237,760 

1797 

20,654,650 

32,500,000 

53,154,650 

1798 

30,202,915 

1 7,000,000 

47,202,915 

1799 

35,229,968 

18,500,000 

53,729,968 

1800 

33,896,464 

20,500,000 

54,396,464 

1801 

35,415,096 

28,000,000 

63,415,096 

1802 

37,240,213 

25,000,000 

62,240,213 

*263,714,731 

200,500,000 

464,214,731 

Deduct 

sums  for  the  ser- 

vice  c 

)f  Ireland  -  - 

13,000,000 

13,000,000 

187,500,000 

451,214,731 

Dr.  Hamilton  on  the  National  Debt,  pp.  157.  289. 
[A] 


[2] 


The  late  Wars  ,■ 
War  of  1803. 


[App. 


Years. 

By  Taxes. 

By  Loans. 

Total. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1803 

37,677,063 

15,202,931 

52,879,994 

1804. 

45,359,4-42 

20,104,221 

65,463,663 

1805 

49,659,281 

27,931,482 

77,590,763 

1806 

53,304,254 

20,486,155 

73,790,409 

1807 

58,390,225 

23,889,257 

82,279,482 

1808 

61,538,207 

20,476,765 

82,014,972 

1809 

63,405,294 

23,304,691 

86,709,985 

1810 

66,681,366 

22,428,788 

89,110,154 

1811 

64,763,870 

27,416,829 

92,180,699 

1812 

63,169,854 

40,251,684 

103,421,538 

1813 

66,925,835 

54,026,822 

120,952,657 

1814 

69,684,192 

47,159,697 

116,843,889 

1815 

70,403,448 

46,087,603 

116,491,051 

770,962,331 

388,766,925 

1,159,729,256 

Deduc 

t  the  proportio 

n  of  the  above 

rais 

ed  for  the  servi 

ce  of  Ireland  - 

-     46,612,106 

1,113,117,150 

Note.  —  See  a  very  short  but  clear  summary,  entitled,  "  Statement 
of  the  Revenue  and  Expenditure  of  Great  Britain,  in  each  year,  from 
1803  to  1814,  by  C.  Stokes." 

Summary.  —  Instead  of  dwelling  on  these  complicated 
statements,  we  invite  the  reader  to  fix  his  attention  on  the 
following  abstract  in  round  numbers : 


War  of  1793. 

Total  money  raised  by  loans  and  taxes,  ex- 
clusive of  the  loans  for  the  service  of 
Ireland,  about  -  -  jf  450,000,000 

Deduct  the  probable  charge  in  Great  Bri- 
tain and  Ireland,  had  peace  been  pre- 
served, 18,000,000/.  a-year.  -  180,000,000 

Balance  constituting  the  war  expenditure     -     270,000,000 


A  pp.]  Amount  of  our  Expenditure.  [3] 


War  of  1803. 

Total  money  raised,  exclusive  of  the  sums 

for  the  service  of  Ireland,  about      -      .^1,113,000,000 
The  deduction  for  the  probable  expence 

of    a   peace    establishment,  may,  after 

1803,  be   called  22,000,000/.  *a-year, 

;is  well  on   account  of  our  augmented 

population,  as   because  in   the  table  of 

the  war  of  1803,  the  charge  of  collect- 

mg  the   revenue   is  not  deducted ;  say 

22,000,000/.  for  1 3  years  -  -         286,000,000 

Balance  constituting  the  war  expenditure         827,000,000 

Average  war  expenditure  from    1793   to 

1802,  both  inclusive         .  _  _  27,000,000 

Average   war  expenditure  from  1803  to 

1815,  both  inclusive  -  -  ..  63,500,000 

Total  charge  of  the  two  wars,  exclusive 

of  an  ample  allowance  for  a  supposed 

peace  estabhshment,  nearly  -         -     1,100,000,000 


Explanatory  Remark.  —  This  amount,  adopted  in  the 
text,  as  representing  the  total  of  our  war  expenditure,  may 
require  some  explanation.  It  is  exclusive  of  the  sums 
raised  for  the  service  of  Ireland  during  the  twenty-three 
years  in  question,  whether  by  taxes  in  that  country,  or  by 
loans  in  England  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  comprizes  a  large 
sum  appro|)riated  in  England  not  to  the  war,  but  to  the  re- 
duction of  the  national  debt.  Still,  as  the  amount  of 
money  thus  applied  did  not  materially  exceed  the  sums 
raised  for  the  service  of  Ireland,  and  as  it  forms  no  part  of 
our  object  to  aim  at  fractional  accuracy,  we  may  safely  con- 
sider the  sums  thus  left  out  as  balancing  each  other,  and 
assume  the  1,100,000,000/.  as  a  representation  of  our  total 
war  expenditure. 

Addition  to  the  Public  Debt. — Though  the  expenditure  of 
the  war  of  1803  exceeded  that  of  the  war  of  1793,  in  the 
ratio  of  more  than  three  to  one,  the  addition  made  to 
our  public  debt  was  not  at  all  in  that  proportion ;  the  war 
of  1793  having  added    to  it  fully    200,000,000/.,  that  of 

r,A]  2    ' 


[4]     Compnris(m  of  Exports  in  fVar  unci  in  Peace.       [App 

1803  about  260,000,000/.  In  the  war  of  180S,  tlie  far 
rrieattr  part  of  the  expence  was  defrayeil  by  the  property- 
tax  and  other  supplies  raised  within  the  year. 

Such  were  the  total  sums  raised  for  our  war  expenditure: 
but  it  is  fit  to  recollect  that  they  do  not  indicate  with  ac- 
curacy the  extent  of  sacrifice  connected  with  the  war. 
There  remain,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  considerations  of 
great  importance  on  either  side  of  the  account ;  such,  on 
the  one  hand,  as  the  loss  arising  from  the  transition  to 
peace ;  on  the  other,  the  amount  of  supply  derived  from 
the  extra  profits  attendant  on  a  state  of  war. 


(Page  25.)  —  Explanation  of  the  ^^  official  Falue  of 
Goods."  —  The  "  official  value  of  goods"  means  a  comput- 
ation of  value  formed  with  reference,  not  to  the  prices  of 
the  current  year,  but  to  a  standard  fixed  so  long  ago  as 
1696,  the  time  when  *  the  office  of  Inspector-general  of  the 
Imports  and  Exports  was  established,  and  a  Custom-house 
Ledger  opened  to  record  the  weight,  dimensions,  and  value 
of  the  merchandize  that  passed  through  the  hands  of  the 
officers.  One  uniform  rule  is  followed  year  after  year  in 
the  valuation,  some  goods  being  estimated  by  weight,  others 
by  their  dimensions ;  the  whole  without  reference  to  the 
current  or  market  price.  This  course  has  the  advantage 
of  exhibiting  with  strict  accuracy  any  increase  or  decrease 
in  the  quantity  of  our  exports. 

Next,  as  to  the  value  of  these  exports  in  the  market. 
In  1798,  there  was  imposed  a  duty  of  two  per  cent,  on  our 
exports,  the  value  of  which  was  taken,  not  by  the  official 
standard,  but  by  the  declaration  of  the  exporting  mer- 
chants. Such  a  declaration  may  be  assumed  as  a  repre- 
sentation of,  or  at  least  an  approximation  to,  the  current 
or  market  price  of  merchandize  ;  there  being,  on  the  one 
hand,  no  reason  to  apprehend  that  merchants  would  pay  a 
per  centage  on  an  amount  beyond  the  market  value;  while, 
on  the  other,  the  liability  to  seizure  affiarded  a  security 
against  under-valuation. 

These  two  scales  of  valuation,  we  mean  the  official  regis- 
ter and  the  current  price,  affiDrd  the  means  of  solving  a 
question  of  no  slight  importance,  viz.  the  comparative 
value  of  merchandize  in  the  present  age  and  at  the  re- 
mote  date  of  1696.     Some  articles,  in  particular   coffee, 

•  Chalmers'  Historical  View  of  the  Domestic  Economy  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland.  1812. 


Ai'P.J       Comparison  of  E.iporls  in  War  and  in  Peace.     [5] 

cottons,  hardware,  are  cheaper  than  in  the  rei^n  of  King 
Wilham  ;  but  the  great  majority  were,  during  the  late  war, 
so  much  dearer,  that  it  was  usual  to  calculate  the  real  or 
market  value  at  50  per  cent,  above  the  oflicial  value.  Since 
the  peace  the  case  is  greatly  altered,  the  market  price  of 
goods  having,  as  we  shall  perceive  from  the  following  state- 
ment, been  greatly  reduced. 


1814. 

-  -  J^.>6,59 1,000 

1815. 

-  -   60,984,000 

1816. 

-  -   51,260,000 

1817. 

-  -   53,125,000 

Comparison  of  Exports  in  Jl'ar  mid  in  Peace. 

1.  Total  Exports  from  Great  Britain,  conjjnisinghome  pro- 
duce and  manufacture,  as  well  as  foreign  and  colonial 
goods,  the  whole  according  to  the  official  value. 

1818.  -  -  .€56,851,000 

1819.  -  -  46,912,000 

1820.  -  -  51,731,000 

1821.  -  -  56,445,000 

Annual  average  of  the  eight  years  of  peace, 

above  ._-_--  .€'54,200,000 

This  is  the  average  referred  to  in  the  text,  p.  27. 

We  subjoin,  in  the  nex^place,  the  declared  value  of  our 
exports  since  the  peace ;  in  other  words,  their  value  ac- 
cordins:  to  the  state  of  the  markets  in  each  year. 

Exports  from  Great  Britain,  taking  home  produce  and 
manufactures  at  the  value  declared  by  the  merchants, 
and  adding  in  the  case  of  foreign  or  colonial  goods  25 
per  cent,  to  the  official  value,  an  addition  considerably 
less  than  that  which  was  made  in  war. 


1814. 
1815. 
1816. 
1817. 


.€73,489,000 
74,372,000 
61,138,000 
58,032,000 


1818.  -  -  €'64,263,000 

1819.  -  -   52,031.000 

1820.  -  -   52,982,000 

1821.  about  54,000,000 


Annual  average  of  the  eight  years  of  peace 
from  1814  to  1821,  both  inclusive,  men- 
tioned in  the  text,  p.  28.        -         -  -  j^63,787,500 

In  either  way,  the  value  of  our  exports  is  greater  since 
the  peace  than  during  the  war. 

II.  For  those  who  may  wish  to  carry  farther  these  calcu- 
lations of  our  exports,  and  of  their  effect  on  our  productive 
indusUy,  we  add  a  return  of  that  part  of  our  exports  which 
is  illustrative  of  the  extent  of  our  home  trade. 

[A]  :J 


[6]        Comparison  of  Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace,     [^rr. 


War.     Exports  of  Home  Produce  and  Manufacture  from 
Great  Britain,  previous  to  and  during  the  late  wars. 


Average  of  six  years  ending  with  1792 

Ditto 1798 

Ditto 1804 

Ditto 1810 


In  Money  of 

the  particular 

year. 


£22,131,000 
25,658,000 
36,817,000 
43,575,000 


Supposed  to  be 

equivalent  at 

the  prices  of 

1792  to 


£22,131,000 
23,325,000 
30,681,000 
33,519,000 


These  sums  are  calculated  by  adding  50  per  cent,  to  the 
official  value,  so  that  ample  prices  are  allowed  for  the  period 
of  war. 


Exports  of  Home  Produce  and  Manufacture  from  Great 
Britain  sijicc  the  2)eace,  according  to  the  value  declared 
by  the  exporting  merchants. 


Years. 

Money  of  the  parti- 
cular year. 

Supposed  to  be  equiva- 
lent at  the  prices  of 
1792  to 

1814 

1815  -      - 

1816  -     - 

1817  -     - 

1818  -     - 

1819  -     - 

1820  -     - 
1821.  about 

^€47,851,453 
53,217,445 
42,955,256 
43,626,253 
48,903,760 
37,940,000 
38,620,000 
40,000,000 

^f'37,000,000 
42,000,000 
34,000,000 
35,000,000 
39,000,000 
35,000,000 
38,000,000 
40,000,000 

The  returns  for  these  years  of  peace,  when  compared 
with  years  of  war,  sufficiently  establish  the  g)-eater  value  of 
our  exports  since  the  peace.  They  may  appear  at  variance 
with  a  statement  published  in  a  work  of  very  wide  circu- 
lation, (Quarterly  Review,  No.  LII.,  p.  534.)  in  which  the 
exports  of  three  years  of  war,  1811,  1812,  1813,  are  con- 
trasted with  three  years  of  peace,  1819,  1820,  1821,  and 
the  amount  of  the  former  found  to  be  considerably  greater. 
This,  however,  is  to  be  understood  of  foreign  merchandize, 
and  was  owing  to  the  extent  of  our  transit  trade  during  the 

9 


App.]     Comparison  of  Exports  m  War  and  in  Peace.      [7] 

years  when  neutrals  had  very  little  direct  navigation,  and 
were  obliged  to  carry  almost  every  article  through  the  me- 
dium of  this  country.  But  a  transit  trade  may  be  very 
large,  without  making  any  great  addition  to  the  productive 
powers  of  a  country,  and  our  object  being  to  show  the  con- 
nexion between  the  amount  of  our  exports  and  the  degree 
of  activity  existing  among  our  population,  our  tables  are 
confined  to  returns  of  our  home  produce  and  manufac- 
tures. 

The  reduction  to  money  of  a  uniform  value  (that  of  1 792) 
is  expedient  for  a  period  in  which  money  lias  varied  so 
greatly :  it  removes  a  part  of  the  exaggeration  to  which  we 
habituated  ourselves  during  the  war,  and  simplifies  the  com- 
parison with  years  of  peace. 

Decline  in  the  Price  of  Goods. — We  subjoin  a  farther 
extract  illustrative  of  the  general  fall  in  the  price  of  mer- 
chandize since  1818. 

Exports  from  Great  Britain,  of  Home  Produce  and 
Manufactures. 


Years. 

Official  value. 

The  declared  or  mar- 
ket value. 

1818  - 

1819  - 

1820  - 

1821,  exclusive  of 
our  export  to  Ireland 

^44,564,000 

35,634,000 
40,240,000 

1      40,195,000 

^48,904,000 
37,940,000 
38,620,000 

35,826,000 

Prices,  as  our  readers  may  remember,  began  to  fall 
very  soon  after  the  peace:  yet  in  1818  they  were  still 
from  10  to  12  per  cent,  above  the  official  value.  In 
1819,  a  year  of  stagnant  trade,  the  market  value  fell  to 
within  7  per  cent,  of  the  olTicial  value,  and  since  1820 
it  has  been  below  it.  By  this  we  are  to  understand,  not 
that  all  merchandize  is  cheaper  than  in  the  reign  of  King 
William,  when  the  standard  of  official  value  was  formed ; 
but  that  cottons  and  hardware,  (in  particular  cottons)  form 
so  very  large  a  proportion  of  our  exports  as  to  counter- 
balance the  rise  in  woollens,  leather,  and  other  articles, 
which  are  still  somewhat  dearer  tiian  they  were  a  century 
ago. —  Returns  such  as  these  are  of  the  highest  interest  to 
the  political  arithmetician. 

r.Ai  + 


[8]       C'uiiufxioii  between  Expenditure  inul  Jtcvtiiue.     [ArF. 

Effect  of  Taxation. — Taxation  is  injurious  chiefly  in  two 
ways:  in  an  individual  sense,  when  the  parties  assessed 
have  not  the  means  of  indemnifying  themselves ;  and  in  a 
national  sense,  when  the  magnitude  of  the  burden  is  such 
as  to  reduce  the  profits  of  labour  and  capital  materially 
below  those  of  other  countries.  The  former  receives  at  pre- 
sent a  distressing  exemplification  in  the  case  of  our  agricul- 
turists ;  the  latter  has  long  prevailed  in  the  Dutch  pro- 
vinces, at  least  in  the  maritime  provinces  of  Holland  and 
Zealand,  in  which  the  charge  of  defence  against  the  sea  is 
superadded  to  heavy  demands  of  a  political  nature.  Such 
also  has  been,  in  a  considerable  degree,  our  own  situation 
since  the  peace ;  that  it  was  by  no  means  so  during  the 
war,  has,  we  trust,  been  satisfactorily  shown  in  the  text. 

We  consider,  therefore,  our  taxes  during  the  war  in  the 
light  of  circulation,  without  ascribing  to  them  all  the  de- 
trimental effects  alleged  by  the  majority  of  political  econo- 
mists, and  still  less  the  beneficial  operation  attributed  to 
them  by  others.  The  latter  opinion,  singular  as  it  may 
seem,  is  nearly  a  century  old,  and  was  supported  by  re- 
peated references  to  the  case  of  Holland  before  her  decline. 
In  this  country  it  seemed  to  receive  a  striking  confirmation 
from  the  stagnation  that  followed  the  peace,  as  the  public 
did  not  take  sufficiently  into  account  how  much  the  circu- 
lation of  ^onotcer/ money  had  been  the  cause  of  the  general 
activity  during  the  war. 


[9] 

APPENDIX 

TO 

CHAPTER  III. 


Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

Ccnmtry  Labourer.  —  Computation  of  tlie  annual  expence 
of  the  family  of  an  agricultural  labourer,  supposed  to  con- 
sist of  5-  persons ;  calculated  chiefly  from  a  table  of  the 
expence  of  66  families  of  labourers,  in  different  parts  of 
England,  collected  by  Sir  F.  Eden. 

In  the  year  1792.    In  1813.   In  182S. 

Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  1  £  s.  ^'     s.  ^'  s. 

other    provisions    of    home  >  16  0  32     0  17  0 

growth  ~  "       "  J 

Tea,  sugar,  and  foreign  articles       2  0  3     0  3  0 

Rent              -                  -            -        1  13  2     0  2  0 

Fuel  and  candles           -           -       2  10  3   10  3  0 

Clothes  and  washing        -        -4-7  6   10  6  0 

Contingencies             -             -       0  10  10  10 

•i^T  b  J^     b  .£S2  b 

To'wn  Mechanic,  —  Computed  cxjiencc  at  diflferent  dates, 
of  the  family  of  a  mechanic  living  in  a  provincial  town,  and 
supposed  to  consist,  as  in  the  case  of  the  agriculturist,  of 
5*  persons. 

In  the  year  I79'i.        In  18i;{.       In  1823. 
Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  S  ,ii'     s.       st'     s.       .=€'     s. 

other    provisions    of    home  V20     0       3S     0       21      0 

growth         -  -  -J 

(Iroceries  and  other  provisions )     ,    ,^          -     /,         *.■     ,. 
*  ^    !•   10  I      (i         o     0 


-} 


imported 
Rent  of  cottage  or  rooms 
Fuel  and  light 
Clothes  and  washing 
Scliool  fees,  apothecary's  bill,  } 

and  other  contingencies      -  S 


2 

10 

\ 

0 

'1- 

0 

3 

0 

f) 

0 

4 

0 

7 

0 

11 

0 

10 

0 

i-' 

0 

s 

0 

ji 

1 

0 

.J.\'l 

0 

L 

t:? 

0 

r>'2 

0 

[10]  liise  uj  Prices  during  the  War.  [Apr. 

The  Middle  Classes.  —  Comparative  estimate  of  tlie  ex- 
pellee ill  (liflercnt  years  of  house-keeping  in  a  family  of  the 
middle  class,  supposed  to  reside  in  London. 


In  the  year  1792.  In  1813.  In  1823. 

^  S.  £  S.  £  s. 

House  rent             -                 -     60  0  100  0  90  0 

Assessed  taxes  and  poor  rate     18  0  4-7  0  4-0  0 

Wages;  two  women  servants     18  0  22  0  22  0 

Clothes         -              -               -     60  0  85  0  70  0 

Boots  and  shoes             -         -       9  0  18  0  16  0 

Wine,  spirits  and  strong  beer     16  0  35  0  30  0 

Table  beer        -             -         -       7  0  11  0  9  0 

Tea,  sugar,  and  other  groceries     22  0  38  0  35  0 

Fuel             -             -               -     24  0  35  0  30  0 

Light,  viz.  candles  and  oil-       60  100  80 

Washing         -              -           -      16  0  25  0  22  0 

Bread              -             -              -     25  0  50  0  25  0 

Butcher  meat        -         -         -     25  0  4-5  0  30  0 

Milk,  butter,  fish,  cheese        -     SO  0  85  0  70  0 

Education            -            -         -14-0  22  0  20  0 

Medical  attendance         -       -14-0  20  0  20  0 

Furniture;  annual  repairs,  and)  j^  ^  24  0  20  0 

purchases         ~         "  "/ 

Incidents,  such  as  postage,  sta-  k 

tionery,  charity,  pocket  dis-  >35  0  55  0  50  0 

bursements  -  -  J 

Expences  of  a  less  necessary-N 

character,  such  as  excursion  I  __  _  rr.  r»  ^<^  « 

.                 -J               ^,     >30  0  50  0  40  0 
to    the    sea    side,    or    the  ( 

country  -  -  -J 

Expence  of  company       -        -     35  0  60  0  50  0 
Furniture ;  interest  on  the  mo- 1 

ney  invested  in  its  purchase;  >  42  0  63  0  53  0 

also  its  insurance  against  fire  \ 


^^540     0^900     0£750     0 


We  are  next  to  exhibit  these  charges  in  a  more  concise 
form,  classing  them  under  specific  heads,  and  showing  the 
per-centage,  or  proportion  borne  by  each  head  ;   thus : — 


Ari'O 


Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 


[H] 


Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  "^ 
and  other  provisions  of  home  > 
growth  or  manufacture    -     -j 

Provisions,  such  as  groceries,  1 
of  foreign  produce  -J 

Clothes  and  washing 

Rent  _  _  _ 

Fuel  and  light 

Contingencies 


Expence  of  the 
familyof  acoun- 
try  labourer. 
Parts  in  100. 


55 


20 
10 

_H 

100 


Expence      of 
tilt"  town  me- 
chanic. 
I'arts  ia  100. 

42 


10 

19 
8 
8 

13 


100 


A  family  of  the 
middle  class  ex- 
pending between 
500  and  800/. 
a-year  in  Lon- 
don, or  nearly 
500  in  a  pro- 
vincial town. 
Parts  in    100. 


Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  "1 
other  provisions  of  home  > 
growth         -  ~         'J 

Provisions,  such  as  groceries  of 
foreign  growth 

Clothes  and  washing 

House  rent 

Assessed  taxes  and  poor  rate     - 

Fuel  and  light 

Education,  medical  attendance, 
repairs,  and  occasional  pur 
chases  of  furniture 

Travelling,  entertaining  compa-^ 
ny,  and  other  less  necessary  > 
expences  -  -         -J 

Servants'  wages         -       -         - 

Incidents         _  -  - 


1 


*} 


25 


A   family    of 
larger  income, 
expending 
1000/.  and  up- 
wards. 


Parts  in  100, 
20 


18 

14^ 

10 

10 

7 

4i 

6 

3 

100 


13 

14 

5i 
lOi 

100 


In  calculating  these  proportions,  we  have  taken  the  re- 
sults, not  of  any  particular  year,  but  of  a  number  of 
years. 


[12]  Hisr  (>/  rriccs  i/uri/i^  the  War.  [A PP. 

Com  para  live  Comfort  o/'  the  labour  iu<^  (.'lasses  in  War  and 
Peace.  —  'J'hc  expcnce  of  the  lahouriiip^  classes  is,  of  course, 
confined  to  the  necessaries  ot  life,  and  the  above  sunnnary 
shows  clearly  the  greater  proportion  of  their  income  that  is 
appropriated  to  the  purchase  of  food.  Now  as  food  rose 
(luring  the  war  more  than  any  other  head  of  exjience,  it 
follows  that  the  ratio  of  enhancement  was  greater  in  the 
case  of  the  working  classes,  than  in  that  of  their  superiors. 
On  the  part  of  the  middle  and  iipj)er  ranks,  IGO/.  or  170/. 
were  recjuired  to  make  those  purchases  for  which  100/. 
sufficed  in  1792;  but  on  the  part  of  tlie  lower  orders  180/. 
were  probably  not  more  than  adequate.  It  thus  becomes 
a  question  whether,  after  all  the  rise  that  took  place  in 
wages,  the  condition  of  the  labouring  classes  during  the 
war  was  more  comfortable  than  in  1792.  That  at  j)resent 
it  is  much  better,  will  at  once  a})pear  from  an  inspection 
of  the  preceding  tables,  for  while  wages  have  been  but  little 
lowered,  provisions  have  fallen  greatly,  and  the  reduction 
of  housekeeping  since  1814,  which  to  the  middle  classes 
has  been  only  about  20  per  cent.,  is  nearly  twice  as  much 
to  their  inferiors. 

Rise  iji  the  Price  of  Corn.  —  Towards  the  close  of  the 
war  the  price  of  corn,  butclier  meat,  and  most  articles  of 
country  produce,  became  double  that  of  the  year  1792, 
which,  considering  the  proportion  borne  by  provisions  to 
our  total  consumption,  might  have  justified  our  computing 
at  33  per  cent.,  the  addition  thus  made  to  our  national  ex- 
penditure. But  as  this  extreme  rise  lasted  only  a  few  years, 
we  have  called  it  in  the  text  30  per  cent. 

Causes  of  this  Rise  in  Corn.  —  These  shall  be  fully  ex- 
plained in  our  chapter  on  agriculture:  at  present  we  state 
them  very  briefly ;  viz. 

1.  The  rise  in  labour  and  other  farming  charges  attend- 
ant on  the  war. 

2.  The  occurrence  of  a  series  of  bad  or  indiffei-ent  sea- 
sons, 179I-,  1795,  1799,  1800,  1811. 

These  two  causes  raised  the  quarter  of  wheat  from  50s. 
to  80a'.,  where,  in  all  probability,  it  would  have  stopped, 
had  not, 

3.  The  depreciation  of  our  currency  after  1809  sub- 
jected our  import  of  corn  to  an  enhancement  so  great,  as 
to  cany  our  average,  fiom  SO^'.  to  lOOy. 


App.]  Rise  of  Prices  durmg  the  War.  [13] 

Are  such  Causes  likely  to  he  operative  in  future  ?  —  Inter- 
ference with  our  currency  is,  in  all  probability,  excluded 
from  the  creed  of  our  rulers,  and  a  rise  in  the  price  of 
labour  seems  out  of  the  question  in  a  season  of  peace. 
Of  the  remaining  cause  of  enhancement,  the  occurrence  of 
bad  or  indifferent  seasons,  nothing  can  be  said,  except  that 
so  long  as  peace  shall  continue,  the  degree  of  rise  j)roceeding 
from  it,  will  be  greatly  checked  by  the  facility  of  import. 

Enhancement  of  Labour.  —  The  proportion  of  rise  at- 
tributed in  the  text  to  "  Labour,"  may  apjiear  somewhat 
below  the  mark,  since  the  rate  of  wages  and  salaries  was 
doubled,  or  nearly  doubled,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  while 
our  table  of  housekeeping  expenditure  is  found,  on  com- 
paring the  years  1792  and  1813,  to  exhibit  a  large  addi- 
tion under  the  different  heads,  (clothes,  furniture,  house- 
rent,  &c.)  affected  by  rise  of  labour.  These  considerations, 
however,  are  subject  to  material  qualifications.  They  apply 
only  to  the  upper  classes,  since  our  humbler  countrymen  per- 
form service  for  themselves,  and  exclude  wages  from  the  list 
of  their  charges.  Next,  in  regard  to  one  very  extensive  de- 
partment, agriculture, the  rise  proceeding  from  "Labour"  is 
comprized  in  the  30  per  cent,  attributed,  in  our  sununary,  to 
the  enhancement  arising  from  "  Provisions."  Add  to  this,  in 
the  third  place,  that  in  various  manufactures,  such  as  cot- 
ton and  hardware,  the  additional  cost  proceeding  from  rise 
of  wages,  was  balanced  by  improved  methods  of  working, 
and  by  the  application  of  machinery.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  it  seems  that  we  may  account  an  addition  of  20 
per  cent,  to  our  general  expenditure,  a  fair  representation 
of  the  rise  of  prices  during  the  war,  as  far  as  such  rise  is 
attributable  to  enhancement  of  labour. 

Paper  Curreyicy  —  its  Depreciation. —  It  may  occur  to 
our  readers,  that  in  the  summary  of  the  causes  of  enhance- 
ment in  the  text,  paper  currency  ought  to  have  found  a 
place  along  with  taxation,  rise  of  labour,  &.c.  Allowance, 
however,  is  made  for  its  operation  in  our  estimate  of  the 
enhancement  of  corn,  and  of  the  other  imported  articles, 
cotton,  wool,  tobacco,  the  cost  of  which  was  so  greatly 
increased  towards  the  close  of  the  war  by  the  decline  of 
our  paper. 

Annuitajits  on  Mortgage. —  After  explaining  in  the  text 
the  loss  sustained  by  sucli  annuitants  in  one  point  of  view, 


[l-t]  Rise  oj  Prict'a  f/nrt'?i^  ike  War.  [Api». 

il  is  fit  to  add  tliiit  in  anotlier,  vi/.  keeping  up  the  nitc  of 
interest,  the  eliect  of  the  war  proved  fa vou ruble  to  them. 
Had  i)eace  continned  after  1792  their  debtors,  instead  of 
contimiiiig  to  ])ay  them  5  per  cent,  interest,  would  have 
obtained  loans  at  -l-j  or  4  per  cent.,  and  would,  doubtless, 
liave  availed  themselves  of  the  power  of  paying  off  or  re- 
ducing the  interest  on  their  mortgages,  in  the  manner  so 
generally  practised  during  the  last  and  present  year. 


D5J 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Oil)'  Currency  mid  Exchanges. 

On  the  Amount  of  Dank  of  England  Notes  in  Circidation. 
— The  circulation  of  money  is  generally  considered  under 
two  heads ;  that  of  the  larger  sums,  which  takes  place  between 
wholesale  dealers ;  and  that  of  tiie  smaller,  which  ap})lies  to 
retail,  the  payment  of  wages,  and  otlier  petty  transactions. 
Between  wholesale  dealers  money  circulates  with  rapidity : 
bank  notes,  lUce  coin,  being  wholly  unproductive,  any  su- 
pei'fluous  stock  of  them  is  exchanged  as  quickly  as  possible 
for  mercantile  acceptances,  the  purchase  of  government 
stock,  or  other  securities  readily  convertible  into  cash.  In 
London,  the  vicinity  of  bankers  to  each  other,  and  the 
power  of  receiving  an  immediate  supj)ly  on  a  deposit  of 
securities,  enable  banking-houses  (Bullion  Report,  p.  26. 
and  Evidence,  p.  123.)  to  lessen  greatly  the  amount  kept  by 
them  as  a  reserve  or  unproductive  fund.  Add  to  this,  that 
whatever  renders  money  abundant  in  the  metropolis  has  a 
speedy  effect  on  the  kingdom  at  large ;  so  intimate  is  the 
connexion  between  town  and  country,  so  extensive  the  cor- 
respondence (Evidence  Bullion  Report,  pp.  123,  124-,  125.) 
of  bill  and  money  agents.  If  we  assume  six  weeks  as  the 
medium  term  of  bills  discounted  at  tlie  bank,  and  suppose 
the  money  to  change  hands  once  in  two  tlays,  the  result  is 
that  100,000/.  thus  obtained  will,  in  the  course  of  tlie  six 
weeks  that  the  bill  remains  uncalled  for,  circulate  about 
2,000,000/.  of  merchandize.  How  great,  then,  must  have 
been  the  distress  of  trade  in  the  latter  months  of  1796,  and 
the  early  part  of  1797,  when  our  circulating  medium  was 
contracted  by  two  or  three  millions  :   how  seasonable  the 


f  I G]  Our  Currenn)  and  Errhan{res. 

lelicraflbrJcil  in  the  course  of  1797,  by  the  resumption  of 
discounts  on  their  former  scale  ! 

An  hirrraxe  of  Batik  of  England  notes  is  not  condush^ 
•proof  of  an  increase  of  our  circulating  medium  at  large.  —  If 
our  readers  are  reluctant  to  admit  this,  we  must  remind 
them  of  a  point  in  which  the  public  opinion  was  long 
equally  positive,  viz.  that  we  received  an  annual  sum  of 
money  from  foreign  countries,  in  payment  of  our  profits  or 
balance  of  trade.  This  was  a  favourite  notion  with  our 
ancestors,  and  is  still  a  prevalent  impression  among  our 
practical  men.  The  balance  was  even  reduced  to  specific 
computation,  the  received  mode  of  calculating  it  having 
been  to  deduct  the  amount  of  our  imports  from  tliat  of  our 
exports,  and  assume  that  the  difference  must  be  profit,  pay- 
able to  us  in  hard  cash  :  a  comfortable  doctrine  certainly, 
and  one  which,  had  it  been  well  founded,  would  have 
brought  among  us,  in  the  course  of  the  last  century,  a  sum 
httle  short  of  400,000,000/.  sterling.  This  is  mentioned 
merely  as  an  example  of  the  hazard  of  deducing  an  infer- 
ence from  appearances :  in  regard  to  the  present  question, 
the  increase  of  Bank  of  England  paper,  the  doubt  arises 
from  our  having  no  power  to  discriminate  how  far  such 
increase  forms  an  addition  to  our  circulation,  or  is  merely 
a  substitution  of  paper  for  coin  sent  abroad.  Or,  if  the 
state  of  exchange  be  considered  as  affording,  in  some  mea- 
sure, an  index  in  that  respect,  what  means  have  we  of 
ascertaining  another  material  point ;  viz.  how  far  an  extra 
issue  of  Bank  of  England  notes  may  not  be  a  substitution 
for  a  corresponding  amount  of  country  bank  paper  with- 
drawn from  circulation  ?  This  was,  doubtless,  the  case  in 
1810  and  1811,  a  time  when  a  number  of  country  banks 
became  either  insolvent  or  discredited  by  the  insolvency  of 
their  neighbours.  Again,  on  the  fall  of  prices  in  1815  and 
1816,  there  took  place  in  our  paper  currency  a  reduction  of 
several  millions  ;  but  as  the  Bank  of  England  experienced 
no  variation  of  consequence,  the  inference  is,  that  its  paper 
must  have  been  substituted  in  various  districts  for  the 
diminished  circulation  of  the  country  banks.  Finally,  we 
have  the  authority  of  both  the  Bullion  Report,  (p.  26.)  and 
of  that  of  the  Bank  Committee  of  1819,  that  no  satisfactory 
conclusions  are  to  be  drawn  from  the  amount  of  Bank  of 
England  paper  in  circulation  :  a  declaration  of  great  im- 
portance, since  the  increase  of  that  circulation  formed,  all 
along,  to  the  antagonists  of  the  bank,  the  fundamental 
argument  for  the  charge  of  over  issue. 

21 


App.]  Our  Cmrenn/ and  Exchanges,  [17] 

Fluctuations  in  the  Circulation  of  Bank  of  England  Notes. 
— Were  we  to  attempt  calculation  on  u  subject  necessarily 
conjectural,  we  mean  how  far  additions  to  the  circulation  of 
the  Bank  of  England  formed  an  increase  of  our  currency, 
or  were  merely  a  substitution  for  coin  sent  abroad,  we 
should  begin  by  considering  in  tlie  latter  sense  all  notes  of 
1^.  and  2/.,  and  confine  our  attention  to  the  fluctuations  in 
notes  of  51.  and  upwards.  The  addition  made  to  the  latter, 
in  the  years  1797  and  1798,  appears  to  have  done  little 
more  than  replace  the  contraction  caused  by  the  general 
embarrassment  and  distrust  of  the  early  years  of  tlie  war. 
In  1799,  1800,  and  1801,  there  took  place  an  increase  of 
nearly  two  millions,  proceeding  from  several  causes,  par- 
ticularly the  export  of  coin,  and  the  general  rise  in  the  price 
of  commodities.  From  the  end  of  1802  to  that  of  1808 
there  was  hardly  any  increase;  a  circumstiuice  in  a  high 
degi-ee  remarkable,  when  we  consider  the  extension  of  our 
productive  industry,  the  farther  rise  of  prices,  and  the  con- 
tinued exemption  of  the  Bank  from  cash  payments.  From 
1809  to  1814  the  case  was  altogether  different,  the  circu- 
lation increasing  four,  five,  six,  and  even  seven  millions 
above  its  amount  in  the  preceding  period.  Of  this  the 
causes  were  various ;  first,  the  almost  complete  expori;  of 
our  metallic  currency ;  next,  the  discredit  of  country  banks 
after  the  insolvencies  of  1810;  but,  above  all,  the  rise  of 
prices  which,  at  this  period  of  the  war,  was  owing  chiefly 
to  the  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper. 

The  next  asra  of  fluctuation  (1815  and  1816)  was  of  a 
very  different  character :  it  alFected  chiefly  the  country 
banks,  and  was  evidently  a  consequence  of  the  general  fall 
of  prices,  multiplied  failures,  and  stagnation  of  business. 
The  amount  of  this  contraction  has  not  been  ascertained 
with  any  accuracy ;  but  from  the  returns  inserted  towards 
the  close  of  the  Report  of  the  Bank  Committee  of  1819, 
it  seems  to  have  exceeded  8,000,000/.;  a  sum  which,  large 
as  it  was,  appears  to  have  been  nearly  counterpoised  by  the 
re-extension  of  country-bank  circulation  on  the  rise  of  prices 
in  1817  and  1818. 

Since  the  peace,  what  have  been  the  causes  affecting  the 
circulation  of  the  Bank  of  England?  The  substitution,  on 
a  greater  or  less  scale,  of  coin  for  paper  ;  the  rise  or  lull  ot 
prices;  and,  what  is  closely  connected  with  that  rise  or  fall, 
the  credit  or  discredit  of  our  provincial  banks. 

Circulation  of  Pramiicial  Banks.  —  To  nscbrUiin  the 
amount  of  country-bank  paper  in  circulation,  would  be  aii 


[*18]  O'lr  Cinrrnry  and  Escchfnu/^f<i.  [Apt. 

object   of  <,'rcai    interest  and  importiincc;  at   present  onr 
means   ofealculatinf^  it   are  very  ina{le(|uate,  and  must  coii- 
liruie  so  while  private  banks  are  so  mnnerous   anci   on   so 
small  a  scale.     The   Bank  of  England,  placed   al)ove  the 
hazard  of  discredit,  declares  openly  its  circulation  :  private 
bankers  require,  or  conceive  that  they  require,  the  aid  of 
secrecy.      This  will,    in    all    probability,    continue    until 
the  arrival  of  the   much-desired  period,  when  the  coun- 
try at  large  shall  be  admitted  to  the  advantage  at  present 
enjoyed  by  Scotland  alone,  we  mean  that  of  having  an  un- 
limited number  of  partners  in  country  banks.     The  con- 
sequence would  be,  a  stability  beyond  all  doubt ;  and  the 
accumulation  in  a  limited  number  of  great  establishments 
(chartered   banks)    of  that  business  which   is  at  present 
broken  into  small,  and  frequendy  insecure  fragments.   (See 
the  evidence  of  E.  Gilchrist  before  the  Bullion  Commit- 
tee, 1810. ;  also  Mr.  Joplin's  pamphlet  on  Country  Banks. 

The  Exemptionfrom  Cash  Payments.  —  To  exempt  banks 
from  cash  payments  was  a  measure  altogether  new  in  the 
history  of  finance,  and  the  necessity  for  it  is  to  be  sought 
in  difficulties  that  were  peculiar  to  ourselves.  France, 
Austria,  and  most  other  countries,  know  no  mode  of  carry- 
ing on  war  but  by  furnishing  men  and  military  stores ;  but 
after  1795,  England,  in  a  great  measure,  exchanged  this 
plan  for  the  payment  of  subsidies.  Then  as  to  an  occasional 
demand  for  a  very  different  purpose,  the  supply  of  corn, 
the  lower  classes  in  most  countries  of  the  Continent,  on  the 
occurrence  of  scarcity,  have  recourse  to  coarse  substitutes, 
or,  being  immersed  in  a  poverty  of  which  we  have  no 
idea,  often  fall  victims  to  unhealthy  food,  sometimes  to  ab- 
solute want ;  while,  in  a  wealthy  community  like  England, 
an  export  of  the  circulating  medium  is  made  the  means  of 
obtaining  relief.  Now,  though  the  sums  sent  abroad  are 
in  either  case  less  great  than  they  appear,  our  subsidies 
being  furnished,  in  a  great  degree,  in  stores,  and  our  com 
paid,  in  some  measure,  by  manufactures,  the  drain  takes 
place  from  a  stream  already  sufficiently  small  for  its  channel ; 
for  in  no  country  is  there  more  of  circulating  medium  than 
is  indispensable  for  the  transaction  of  business.  This  is  ap- 
parent from  various  circumstances;  from  the  rapidity  with 
which  money  is  made  to  circulate  from  dealer  to  dealer ; 
also,  from  a  recent  and  striking  fact,  the  distress  that  oc- 
curred in  France  in  the  autumn  of  1818,  when,  notwith- 
standing the  enjoyment  of  peace  and  free  trade,  the  abstrac- 
tion  of  a  part  of  the  metallic  currency  led  to  the  most 


A  pp.]  Oitr  Currennj  avd  Exchanges.  [19] 

distressinpf  results;  an  imiiietliate  reduction  of  discounts,  a 
general  fall  of  j)rices,  and  a  long  list  of  bankruptcies. 

From  dilFiculties  of  this  nature  we  were  relieved  by  that 
decisive  measure,  the  exemption  of  our  banks  from  cash  pay- 
ments :  after  its  adoption  no  scarcity  of  money  was  expe- 
rienced in  the  years  of  our  heaviest  continental  demands  :  its 
effect,  in  fact,  was  to  remove  present  pressure  by  incurring 
the  hazard  of  depreciation,  and  of  a  great  ultimate  addition 
to  our  debt. 

The  Time  of  its  Operation. — A  considerable  time  elapsed 
before  the  operation  of  the  act  was  fairly  tried.  In  1797 
and  1798,  our  financial  affliirs  were  prosperous;  our  con- 
tinental exchanges  were  favourable ;  and  the  susi)ension  of 
subsidies  and  corn  imports  would,  without  the  exemption, 
have  restored  confidence  in  our  money  market :  when 
concurrent  with  it  and  with  a  vigorous  increase  of  tiix- 
ation,  they  raised  the  funds  and  added  largely  to  the 
command  of  money  on  the  part  of  our  merchants,  our 
manufacturers,  our  agriculturists.  It  was  not  till  the 
autumn  of  1799,  that  the  aid  expected  from  the  act  was 
put  fairly  to  the  test:  our  allies  re(|uired  large  payments; 
our  deficient  harvest  necessitated  a  great  import;  and  both 
were  supplied  without  the  pecuniary  embarrassment  expe- 
rienced before  the  exemption.  The  means  now  adopted 
were,  the  export  of  our  coin  to  the  Continent,  and  the 
substitution  of  bank  paper:  the  result  a  {lartial  depreci- 
ation (between  3  and  5  per  cent.)  of  bank  notes  relatively 
to  coin. 

In  1800,  notwithstanding  the  continuance  of  continental 
demands  both  for  subsidies  and  the  purchase  of  corn, 
both  government  and  the  mercantile  world  still  escaped 
pressure  from  scarcity  of  money,  and  thus  got  over  an 
interval  of  greater  })ressure  than  any  in  the  early  years  of 
the  war.  The  experiment  had  not,  indeed,  been  made 
with  impunity:  we  had  exhausted  our  coin,  and  could  not 
have  undergone  such  another  trial  without  a  great  depre- 
ciation of  our  paper.  This  was,  doubtless,  felt  by  Mr  Pitt, 
and  may  be  ranked  among  his  principal  motives  for 
resigning  and  advising  peace ;  but  the  shock  was  not  per- 
ceived by  the  public,  and  was  evidently  of  a  nature  to  be 
repaired  in  a  season  of  tranquillity. 

Increase  of  Discoiwts  explained. — The  Bullion  Committee 
in  their  Report  (p.  2G.)  animadverted  emphatically  on  the 
great  increase  that  had  taken  ])lace   in   the  aniount  of  dis- 

[15]    'J 


j'JUJ  (iiir  ('Kirninj  mnl  Krchav^ea.  [A PP. 

counts  hy  llir  l>:iMk  ol"  Kiiirlnnd,  hdwocii  17J>7  and  Islo. 
'I'liis  llicy  ascribed  lo  over  issue,  but  tlicy  omitted  to  niakt* 
allowance  for  tlie  operation  of  several  causes  of  a  wholly  dil- 
fneiit  nature.  Thus,  after  the  Exemjition  Act,  the  notes 
of  the  Bank  of  England  were  made  to  replace  the  cash 
reserve  of  every  banker  in  the  kingdom,  and  supplies  of 
these  notes  could  be  obtained  only  by  discount.  Hence, 
the  adoption  of  a  practice,  which,  in  the  last  age,  would 
have  been  deemed  not  a  little  extraordinary  by  the  cautious 
veterans  of  Lombard  Street, —  that  of  London  bankers 
opening,  like  merchants,  accounts  with  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land ;  and,  when  in  want  of  money,  sending  thither  bills 
for  discount,  in  preference  to  a  sale  of  Exchequer  bills  or 
stock.  If  the  reserve  fund  of  all  the  country  banks  of  the 
kingdom,  previous  to  the  Exemption  Act,  be  calculated 
at  4,000,000/.,  we  need  be  at  no  loss  to  account  for  a  very 
large  addition  to  the  demands  for  discount  on  the  Bank  of 
England. 

The  Rate  of  Interest.  —  Our  last  reference  to  facts,  or, 
as  the  French  express  it,  to  le&  choses  positives^  regards  the 
rate  of  intei'est  which,  notwithstanding  the  magnitude  of 
our  war  expense,  rose  only  one  per  cent,  above  its  average 
rate  in  peace.  This  was  certainly  a  very  moderate  differ- 
ence, and  owing,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  substitution  of 
war  taxes  for  loans ;  to  our  raising  so  large  a  portion  of 
our  supplies  within  the  year.  It  was  owing,  also,  in  a  very 
considerable  degree,  to  the  advantage  arising  to  bankers, 
from  the  Exemption  Act ;  an  advantage  founded,  in  the 
case  of  provincial  banks,  on  the  saving  of  their  reserve 
or  dead  fund,  and  wholly  distinct  from  a  power  to  in- 
crease their  issues  ad  libitum.  Had  the  latter  been  prac- 
ticable, would  not  so  gainful  a  business  have  been  followed 
more  extensively,  and  would  not  interest  soon  have  been 
reduced  by  an  eager  competition,  from  five  to  four  per 
cent?  * 

The  Exemption  Act  considered  as  an  ccotiomising  Expe- 
pedient.  —  The  use  of  bank  paper  is  a  refinement  enabling 
a  community  to  turn  to  account  a  large  proportion,  sup- 
pose the  half,  of  a  currency  which  would  otherwise  be 
wholly  unproductive.     The  exemption  from  cash  payments 

*  For  further  arguments  on  the  limited  power  of  banks,  see  a  pam- 
phlet entitled  "  Observations  on  the  Depreciation  of  Money;  "  also  a 
second  pamphlet,  entitled  "  Farther  Obsenations ; "  both  published  in 
1811,  by  Robert  Wilson,  Esq.  Accountant,  and  one  of  the  Directors  of 
the  Bank  of  Scotland. 

14 


Apr.]  Our  Cunenaj  and  Exchanges.  [21} 

is  a  farther  refinement,   enabling  bankers  to  hold,  at  the 
disposal  of  their  customers,  the  chief  part  of  their  reserve 
tiind ;  which,  for  the  sake  of  precision,  we  shall  consider  a 
fourth  of  the  paper  currency  in  the  country.     Now,  to  keep 
the  reserve  fund  as  low  as  is  compatible  with  security,  has 
long  been  the  wish  of  our  bankers,  and  the  oi>ject  of  a 
variety  of  arrangements  :  of  these,  by  lar  the  most  ellectual 
is  that  by  which  they  settle  their  daily  balances  against 
each  other,  amounting  (Evidence  to   the  Bullion  Ueporl, 
p.  151.)  to  the  very  large  sum  of  5,000,000/.  daily,  by  an 
exchange  of  cheques,  without  having  occasion  to  use  more 
than  a  tenth  of  the  sum  in  bank  notes.       Of  the  same 
nature,  are  certain  facilities  given  at  the  Bank  of  Erigland, 
in  regard  to  the  hour  at  which  a  banking  house  makes  its 
payment  for  tiie  day;  as  well  as  the  employment  of  money 
agents  or  middle-men  (Evidence,  Bullion  Report,  p.  12 1.) 
in  obtaining  sums  from  one  banker  for  another,  at  very 
short  notice.     These  various  modes  of  lessening  the  amount 
of  a  dead  stock  are  both  ingenious  and  legitLn:ntc,  aflbrdhig 
a  striking  proof  of  the  advantages  attendant  on  a  great  com- 
mercial connnunity,   on  mutual  confidence,  and  vicinity  of 
position.       A  farther    saving   of  this   nature  would    luive 
tbrmed  one  of  the  leading  features  of  Mr.  Ricardo's  "  plan 
for  an  economical  and  secure  currency."     Now,  the  result, 
which,  on  a  comparative  snudl  scale,  was  attained  by  these 
arrangements,  was  accomplished,  en  strand,  by  the  Exemp- 
tion Act;  which,  by  one  decisive  provision,  cnableil  bankers 
to  dispense  with  the  most  expensive  and  anxious  part  of 
their  business.     So  flir  as  regarded  circulation  at  home,  its 
effect  partook  of  the  beneficial  character  of  the  economising 
expedients ;  its  weak  side  was  towards  the  Continent,  and 
there  accordingly  was  received   the  wound  which  proved 
the  source  of  so  much  pain  and  disquietude  after  1809. 

Report  of  the  Bullion  Committee.  —  This  document,  the 
merits  of  which  liave  been  so  diftlsrently  estimated,  may  be 
read  with  interest  even  at  present,  when  the  subject  has  re- 
ceived so  much  additional  elucidation,  both  from  research 
and  from  events  that  have  intervened.  The  passages  in  the 
Report  which  treat  of  the  regulation  of  money  and  ex- 
change, whatever,  in  short,  can  be  termed  an  exposition  of 
general  principles,  are  remarkable  for  accuiacy  and  clear- 
ness :  those  of  a  different  character  are  to  be  Ibund  in  the 
latter  part  (pp.  23,  24-.),  and  are  open  to  censure,  chiefly 
as  implying  a  beUef  that  the  Bank  had  the  means  of  in- 

[H]    S 


[22']  Oiiidntroinj  (1)1(1  Exchanges.  [Al'P. 

crrasiii'^  its  issfws  at  (liscrelion,  as  ii'  the  pul)lic  were  wholly 
without  the  power  of  chcckiiip^  the  circulation,  u  power  so 
clearly  illustrated  by  Mr.  Bosanquet,  in  liis  "  Practical 
Observations  on  the  Report." 

Of  the  extent  ol"  misconception  conveyed  by  disseminat- 
ing the  opinion  that  "  the  rise  of  prices  was  owinjr  chiefly  to 
our  bank  pajier,"  some  idea  nmy  be  formed  from  one  simple 
fact.  The  total  rise  of  prices  between  1797  and  1810  was 
above  30  per  cent. ;  and  of  that  not  more  than  5  or 
6  per  cent,  was  at  that  time  attributable  to  the  non-con- 
vertibility of  our  paper.  (See  the  Essay  on  M(jn(y  in  Na- 
pier's Supplement,  p.  526.)  In  this,  Ave  refer  to  the  declar- 
ation of  an  eminent  buUionist,  (Mr.  M'Culloch,)  and  cite 
his  authority  in  contradiction  to  that  of  the  Bullion  Com- 
mittee itself. 

Another  serious  error,  or  rather  omission  in  the  Report, 
is  an  inattention  to  the  "  effect  on  the  exchange  of  our  sul>- 
sidies  and  corn  purchases."  An  admission  is,  indeed,  made 
(p.  16.)  in  general  terms,  of  the  effect  of  political  and  mer- 
cantile transactions ;  but  the  impression  conveyed  by  it  is 
lessened  by  other  passages  (p.  21,  &c.)  in  which  the  effects 
in  question  are  treated  as  slight,  and  the  result  of  the  stop- 
page of  American  intercourse  with  the  Continent  is  wholly 
passed  over. 

That  the  authors  of  the  Report  had  deferred  for  a  season 
the  formation  of  their  conclusions  on  a  subject  so  new  and 
^complex,  had  certainly  been  desirable;  but  there  seems  no 
ground  for  the  suspicion  of  their  being  actuated  by  party 
leeling.  Their  labours  give  evidence  of  great  research  and 
solicitude  for  truth  ;  while  the  imperfections  in  their  rea- 
soning admit  of  explanation  from  circumstances  similar  to 
those  to  which  we  have  alluded  in  the  text ;  in  particular, 
the  fact,  that  so  much  of  the  information  now  before  the 
public  was  either  unknown  or  very  imperfectly  disclosed  to 
them.  Thus,  a  witness  of  evident  ability,  and  in  the  habit 
of  very  extensive  discount  transactions,  gave  (p.  124'.)  the 
following  evidence : 

"  Do  you  know,  in  point  of  fact,  whether  such  transac- 
tions as  you  have  now  described,  were  in  practice  previous 
to  the  suspension  of  the  cash  payments  of  the  Bank  ?  — 
Yes ;  they  were. 

"  Do  you  know  whether  they  were  practised  to  a  similar 
extent  ?  —  No ;  they  were  not. 

"  In  what  proportion,  compared  with  the  present  time  ? 
-»—  1  cannot  form  any  exact  criterion. 


A  pp.]  Our  Cmrencjj  and  Exchanges.  [25} 

"  Can  you  stale  to  the  Committee,  the  cause  of  such  thf- 
ference?  —  I  beheve  it  to  be  on  account  of  the  increase  of 
country  paper,  and  also  Bank  of  Enghmd  paper." 

Wlien  a  witness  of  such  inteHifjence,  in  accouiittu';  for 
the  augmentation  of  discounts,  leaves  out  of  consicleratiou 
the  effects  of  the  increase  of  our  population  anil  productive 
industry  from  1797  to  1810,  we  need  hardly  wonder  that 
they  should  have  escaped  the  attention  of  the  Committee. 
Jn  fact,  the  errors  of  the  latter  may  be  easily  accounted  for. 
The  chief  writer  of  the  Report,  however  temperate,  impar- 
tial, and  likely  to  rise  in  reputation,  had  his  life  been  pro- 
longed, was  a  stranger  to  the  practice  of  business  ;  antl 
could  not,  from  his  youth,  have  had  nmch  acquaintance 
with  the  state  of  our  money  transactions  previous  to  1797. 
Of  his  coadjutors,  one  was  a  banker,  never  remarkable  for 
clearness  or  accuracy;  another,  a  man  of  undoubted  ability^ 
l)ut  at  that  time  new,  as  he  has  himself  admitted  *,  to  ques- 
tions of  this  nature.  Accordingly,  in  historical  and  com- 
mercial matter  the  Report  is  very  defective ;  no  notice  is 
taken  in  it  of  the  pecuniary  embarrassments  of  1795  and 
1 79G,  arising  from  the  double  drain  of  specie  for  subsidies 
and  corn;  nor  is  the  recurrence  of  these  causes  in  1799  or 
1809  adverted  to,  although  it  was  to  them  that  we  owed  the 
chief  increase  of  our  bank  notes.  Nothing  would  have  con- 
tributed so  much  to  obtain  the  conviction  of  the  mercantile 
body,  we  may  say  of  the  public  at  large,  as  a  course  of  rea- 
soning supported  by  facts.  Such  an  inquiry,  conducted 
with  the  candour  that  marks  the  Rej)ort,  and  was  so  con- 
spicuous in  the  general  parliamentary  conduct  of  Mr.  Hor- 
ner, would  have  led  to  several  very  important  conclusions; 
—  to  an  estimate  of  the  share  in  depreciation  to  be  ascribed 
in  the  first  place  to  the  expenditure  then  making  in  Spain; 
next,  to  the  corn  imports  then  in  progress  from  the  Conti- 
nent; and,  lastly,  to  the  interruption  of  the  trade  of  the 
United  States.  Ilad  the  effect  of  the  last  been  proved  to 
be  considerable,  the  iucjuiry  might  perhaps  have  led  to  a 
most  desirable  measure  —  the  repeal  of  our  Orders  in 
Council  before  the  United  States  resorted  to  the  alter- 
native of  war. 

Qiiestions  at  issue  beiMoeen  the  Opponents  <intl  Supporters  oj 
the  Bullion  lieport. — The  points  most  strongly  contested 
between  the  opposite  parties  in  the  bullion  (juestion  were 

*  llubkisson  on  the  Depreciation  ol  oiu"  Currency,  1810. 
[Bj  4. 


[_2i']  Our  Currcncij  and  Exchanges.  [Ai'P. 

two;  —  first,  the  cause  ot"  the  fall  of  our  exchanges;  and, 
next,  the  cause  of  the  progressive  enhancement  of  commo- 
dities. As  to  the  former,  the  events  of  1815  showed,  be- 
yond doubt,  that  the  7;rmrt?;y  cause  of  fluctuations  in  the 
exchange  was  to  be  sought  in  continental  transactions,  how- 
ever much  the  non-convertibility  of  our  paper  miglit  affect 
the  degree  and  duration  of  the  full.  Tlie  second  cjuestion 
is  more  complicated,  and  tliere  is  still  no  small  difficulty  in 
convincing  the  buUionists  that  the  operation  of  our  non- 
convertible  paper  was  passive,  and  necessarily  posterior  to 
the  rise  of  prices.  They  will  not,  however,  refuse  their 
attention  to  facts,  or  deny  that  a  very  general  rise  of  prices 
took  place  prior  to  1797;  nor  will  they  object  to  admit  in- 
ferences from  the  case  of  the  agriculturists,  the  class  whose 
circumstances  operate  most  directly  on  the  circulation  of 
country  banks. 

Connexum  between  the  Circumstances  of  our  Agriculturists 
and  the  Circidation  of  Country  Banks. —  The  continued 
inadequacy  of  our  growth  of  corn  rendered  the  war  a 
period  of  activity  in  regard  to  inclosures,  drainages,  and 
other  agricultural  improvements :  prices  were  carried  to  30, 
50,  and  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war  to  100  j^r  cent,  be- 
yond those  of  peace,  requiring  thus  twice  the  sura  to  pur- 
chase the  same  commodities.  Wages  rose  progressively  ; 
the  style  of  living  of  the  farmers,  and  even  of  their  labourers, 
was  visibly  improved.  Observe  the  reverse  of  the  picture 
as  exhibited  in  1815  and  1816:  prices  and  wages  had  fallen 
surprisingly ;  inclosures,  drainages,  and  other  improve- 
ments, were  discouraged ;  the  style  of  house-keeping  on  the 
part  of  the  farmers  was  lowered,  and  a  far  smaller  sum  of 
currency  was  found  sufficient  for  their  transactions.  In 
1817  the  high  prices  of  corn  brought  back  activity  in  agi'i- 
cultural  improvements,  and  (see  the  Report  of  the  Bank 
Committee  of  1 8 1 9)  a  renewed  increase  of  paper  currency. 
During  the  last  four  years  the  picture  has  been  for  the 
fourth  time  reversed ;  prices  have  fallen  greatly,  and  with 
them  the  circulation  of  bank  paper. 

Prices  of  Merchandize.  —  In  regard  to  these  also,  a  similar 
course  of  reasoning  will  be  found  to  hold  :  the  adoption  of 
a  paper  currency  tended,  doubtless,  to  promote  enhance- 
ment ;  but  the  primary  causes  of  it  are  to  be  sought  in  the 
war  demand,  or  (see  Tooke  and  High  and  Low  Prices)  in 
unfavourable  seasons  and  obstructions  to  mercantile  inter- 
course. It  is  a  foct  that  almost  all  articles  experienced  a 
fall  at  the  peace  before  the  reduction  of  bank  paitcr. 


Ai'i'.]  Our  Ciirroirij  (uui  Exchanges.  [25] 

The  Poxver  of  BanLs  vver-rafal. — We  thus  consltler  our 
banks  as  following  the  course  of  circumstances,  and  as 
iakin<^  no  A'ac/,  either  in  extending  or  contracting  their  issues. 
Those  who  think  otherwise,  and  who  regard  our  banks  as 
both  possessing  and  exercising  the  power  of  over-issue,  are 
pledged  to  show  how  it  happened  that  these  potent  associ- 
ations did  not  thus  act  at  a  much  earlier  period.  Why  did 
our  banks  defer  until  1S09,  that  which  they  might  have  done 
in  1797,  at  all  events  in  1803?  On  referring  to  the  Bullion 
Report  we  shall  find  (p.  25.)  that  this  difficulty  is  noticed, 
but  not  explained  ;  and  that  the  Committee,  in  pointing 
out  two  periods  of  extended  issue,  at  the  distance  of  more 
than  seven  years  from  each  other  (1801  and  1809),  were 
wholly  unable  to  give  reasons  for  the  circulation  remaining 
stationary  during  that  long  interval.  Farther,  if  our  banks 
possessed  this  lucrative  power,  why  suspend  its  exercise  at 
the  peace  of  1814,  so  long  before  the  act  for  the  resump- 
tion of  cash  payments  ? 

Jnefficacx)  of  an  Exemption  from  Cash  Payments  in  Peace. 
— We  proceed  to  address  a  few  sentences  in  the  same  style 
to  a  very  different  class  of  persons ;  to  those  who,  snficring 
under  the  depressed  price  of  merchandize  or  agricultural 
produce,  regret  that  the  exemption  from  cash  jiaynients 
siiould  not  have  been  made  a  permanent  part  of  our  policy. 
These  persons  cannot  be  aware  that  in  peace  this  exemp- 
tion would  be  of  very  rare  and  limited  operation:  it  was  in 
existence  during  1819  and  1820,  yet  our  prices  contiimed 
progressively  falling;  in  other  words,  the  value  of  money 
progressively  rose.  The  exemjnion  from  cash  payments 
was,  then,  in  one  point  of  view,  unnecessary;  in  another,  it 
was  inoperative.  That  it  was  unnecessary,  was  shown  by  the 
case  with  which  discounts  were  obtained  ;  that  it  was  inoper- 
ative, ajipeared  from  our  exchanges  keeping  at  or  above 
par.  Yet  so  little  is  this  understood,  that  in  the  various  de- 
bates on  the  subject  in  the  House  of  Conunons  {e.  g.  9tli 
April,  1821,)  the  majority  of  our  jiarliamentary  guides 
attribute  the  great  fall  in  prices  to  the  return  to  a  metallic 
standard;  as  if  a  state  of  peace  and  a  favourable  harvest 
were  of  little  account,  and  the  power  of  keeping  up  prices 
were  actually  vested  in  our  banks. 

Is  it  not  apparent  that  in  peace,  wlien  our  exchanges 
are  brought  down  by  ojily  one  great  cause,  an  occasional 
necessity  lor  imi)orting  corn,  the  e\em|)tion  from  ca.sli  pay- 
nienls  would  be  available   only  in  a  year  like  IbiT,  when 


[26]  Our  ('.iiyrciicij  cmd  Kahunges.  [Al»P. 

tlic  (Ic'fiiit'Mcy  ol'tlic  prcccdin;^  ciop  h.'cl  to  ji  sudden  dc- 
luaml  oil  our  nci<^lil)<)iirs,  and  when  the  exemption  from 
cash  payments  won  Id  enable  us  to  send  abroad  several  mil- 
lions of  our  metallic  currency  ? 

Mr.  PccVs  Bill. —  Those  who  ascribe  our  present  embar- 
rassments to  Mr.  Peel's  Bill,  and  the  resumption  of  casli- 
paymcnts,  would  do  well  to  consider  that  no  legislative 
arrangement  has  the  power  of  converting  a  banker  into  a 
capitalist.  The  object  of  the  latter  is  to  obtain  interest  for 
liis  money,  without  the  trouble  or  hazard  of  active  business  ; 
while  a  banker  is  necessarily  a  man  of  business,  and  sel- 
dom a  man  of  large  capital.  His  funds,  arising  chiefly 
from  deposit,  and  being  subject  to  sudden  demands,  nmst 
be  vested  in  securities  easily  vendible,  such  as  mercantile 
acceptances,  exchequer  bills,  or  government  stock.  Any 
deviation  from  this  course,  any  advance  of  money  made  on 
land,  houses,  or  property  of  doubtful  sale,  is  at  variance 
with  the  rules  of  his  business,  and  never  fails  to  be  attended 
with  embarrassment  or  loss. 

Publications  on  the  Subject  ()f  Exchange. —  The  present 
age  has  been  fertile  in  essays  on  the  principles  of  exchange, 
umonij  which  the  most  entitled  to  attention  are ;  the  remarks 
in  the  Bullion  Report,  (pp.  10,  11.);  Mr.W.  Blake's  pam- 
phlet, entitled  "  Observations  on  Exchange,"  jniblished 
in  1810 ;  and  an  essay  by  Mr.  J.  R.  M'Culloch,  under  the 
head  of  "  Exchange,"  in  the  Supplement  to  the  Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica.  The  last  claims  our  attention,  not  only 
as  an  able  and  comprehensive  treatise,  but  as  differing  in  its 
general  tone  from  the  arguments  advanced  in  the  text ;  a 
diflference,  however,  which,  on  an  attentive  examination, 
will  be  found  less  considerable  than  it  appears. 

Correspondence  bctivce7i  our  reasoning  and  that  of  Mr. 
M'Culloch. —  Mr.  M.,  in  maintaining  (Essay  on  Exchange, 
p.  220.)  that  corn  purchases  or  expenditure  abroad  have 
no  permanent  effect  on  the  exchange,  does  not  deny  that 
their  temporary  effect  is  great.  Such  is  also  our  doctrine, 
as  exemplified  in  the  tabular  statement  in  the  text :  the  fall 
in  our  exchange  was  not  permanent  at  all  till  1800,  nor 
permanent,  in  a  high  degree,  till  1809;  and  in  both  cases 
it  became,  after  a  certain  time,  nominal. 

Farther,  a  tall  in  the  computed  exchange,  wlien  there  is 
no  exemption  from  cash  payments,  is  recovered  during  the 
continuance  of  the  pressure,  but  when  such  exemption  sub- 


Arp.]  Our  Cinrcticij  and  Exc/iarigcs.  [27] 

sists,  the  currency  loses  its  reinstating  puv:er,  antl  becoming 
depreciated,  the  exchange  continues  depressed  until  the  re- 
action of  causes,  mercantile  or  poHtical,  restore  the  vahie 
ot"  the  currency.  Of  both  we  have  had  striking  examples 
ill  the  present  age:  the   fall   of  our  exchange  in  1795  and 

1796,  was  redressed  in  the  end  of  179G,   and  beginning  of 

1797,  before  the  termination  of  our  subsidy  to  Austria; 
whereas  the  fall  in  1800,  and  still  more  that  in  1809,  and 
continued,  until  the  conclusion  of  peace  entirely  altered  the 
nature  of  our  connexion  with  the  Continent. 

Fluctuatio7is  in  the  Exchange  in  1815. —  We  have  dwelt 
in  the  text  on  the  fluctuations  of  the  exchange  in  1815, 
viz.  on  its  sudden  fall  on  the  renewal  of  continental  hos- 
tilities, and  its  no  less  sudden  rise  on  the  prospect  of  their 
termination.  Both  are  evidently  accordant  with  the  gene- 
ral admission  in  the  Essay  in  question  (p.  220.),  of  the 
great  temporary  effects  of  foreign  demand.  They  require, 
therefore,  no  farther  notice,  except  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
fall  in  April  and  May,  1815,  which  (nearly  20  per 
cent.)  was  very  great,  open  as  the  Continent  then  was  to 
our  exports. 

But  does  not  this  extent  of  fall  furnish  a  strong  presmnp- 
tion  in  favour  of  another  part  of  our  reasoning  on  this  in- 
tricate subject,  viz.  our  mode  of  accounting  for  the  great 
and  continued  depression  of  the  exchange  during  the  years 
1811,  1812,  and  1313?  The  demands  on  us  from  the 
Continent,  say  the  buUionists,  were  not  great  in  these  years; 
but  admitting  the  correctness  of  ISIr.  M'Culloch's  statement 
(Essiiy  on  Exchange,  p.  222.),  that  our  remittances  to  the 
Continent  for  corn  and  subsidies  did  not  much  exceed 
2,000,000/.  sterling,  in  each  of  these  years,  we  consider 
even  that  sum  sullicient  to  continue  the  depression,  England 
being  then  wholly  exhausted  of  the  precious  metals,  the 
counterpoising  effect  of  the  American  trade  removed,  and 
our  exports  to  the  Continent  greatly  cramped. 

Reduction  ofCountnj-BankPajyer. —  In  regaril  to  the  ili- 
minution  of  country-bank,  paper,  which  took  place  in  IS  15 
and  1816,  we  agree  with  Mr.  M'Culloch  as  to  the  I'act,  and 
are  not  disposed  to  dissent  from  his  estimate  of  the  extent 
of  the  reduction  :  the  diflereuce  lies  in  our  considering  this 
reduction  as  posterior  to  a  lall  of  prices,  exactly  as  we  con- 
sider the  augmented  issue  iluring  the  war  anil  in  1817  as 
posterior  to  their  rise. 


[28]  Our  C.nncnai  (ind  Hvchan<its.  [Al'P. 

Depict idl toil. —  Lastly,  as  to  the  extent  ol"  dcprcc  iatiori 
urisiiig  Iroiii  tlie  Exemption  Act.  Tliat  the  unliivoiiral)!*.- 
balance  of  excliange  from  1809  to  181 4-  was  chiefly  nomi- 
nal, and  that  in  regard  to  continental  payments  our  hank 
paper  was  depreciated  to  the  extent  denoted  by  the  course 
t)f  exchange,  we  readily  admit.  But  as  the  use  of  our 
bank  paper  was  to  circulate  commodities  at  home,  and  as 
the  rise  of  prices  consecjuent  on  its  continental  deprecia- 
tion was  by  no  means  immediate,  we  have,  we  conceive, 
made  a  fair  allowance  in  takinij  the  averajje  of  home  de- 
preciation  at  somewhat  more  than  the  half  of  the  foreign  ; 
meaning,  that  if  in  Spain  or  Germany  125/.  in  notes  were 
re(|uired  in  1812,  to  pay  for  that  which  might  have  been 
purchased  for  100/.  in  metallic  currency,  the  proportion  at 
home  was  probably  10  per  cent. less;  115/.  in  notes  pur- 
chasing what,  without  the  exemption  from  cash  payments, 
jnight  have  been  had  for  100/. 


r-M] 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER  V. 


J^FFECT  of  increasing  Population  on  the  Price  of  Corn. — 
The  reasoning  in  the  text  enables  us  to  con-ect  a  veiy  ma- 
terial part  of  the  Report  of  the  Agricultural  Connnittee. 
The  writers  of  that  Report,  in  adverting  (p.  11.)  to  the 
chance  of  a  future  deficiency  of  harvest,  advance  an  opinion 
that  the  magnitude  of  our  consumption,  as  compared  with 
that  of  former  periods,  must  render  the  pressure  of  defi- 
ciency more  severe,  and  the  means  of  jiroviding  against  it 
more  diilicult. 

"  A  liarvest,"  they  add,  "  which  should  be  one-third 
below  an  average  in  wheat,  would  bring  on  this  country  a 
very  different  degree  of  suffering,  and  would  require  a  very 
dif!erent  degree  of  exertion  and  sacrifice,  to  supi)lv  llie 
deficiency,  from  what  would  have  been  recjuireil  uiulur  a 
similar  failure  fifty  years  ago."  But  to  this  opinion  olllu- 
Committee  we  must  oppose  a  recent  and  highly  important 
fact;  viz.  that  though  the  harvest  of  1816  was  (Evidence  of 
Mr.  Hodgson,  p.  2(it.)  a  full  third  below  the  average  of  our 
wheat-crop,  yet  the  degree  of  public  suffering  was  less  in/oisc 
than  would  have  been  experienced  under  a  similar  failure 
fifty  years  before.     For  this  tiiere  are  several  reasons  : — 

1st.  If  the  agricultural  part  of  our  countrymen  incrujuse 
their  numbers  in  proportion  to  the  consumers ;  if  the 
amoimt  of  produce  depend  on  the  extent  of  labour  and 
cai)ital  applied  to  cultivation  ;  and  if  a  recourse  to  the  in- 
ferior soils  mentioned  repeatedly  in  the  lleport  (and  in 
Mr.  Ricardo's  well-known  work  on  Political  Kconoiny  and 
Taxation)  be  far  less  neeessary  than  an  improved  cultivation 
of  the  better  soils;  we  stand  nearly  in  the  situation  of  our 
forefathers,  and  find  the  prospect  of  adequacy  of  supply 
very  little  affected  by  the  increase  of  our  numbers  ;  because 


[301  On  AgnaiUuye.  '\'\PT'» 

that  increase  hrini^s  with  it  llic  power  of  auirmcmiiiL^  our 
labour,  and,  coiisecjuently,  oxiv  produce. 

*2(llv.  li  !iucli  be  the  case  at  home,  tlie  cliance  of  relief 
from  abroad  is  decidedly  inijiroved,  since  the  extension  oi 
tillage  in  the  course  of  the  last  and  present  age.  The  sur- 
face of  corn  country  in  Europe,  we  mean  of  country  j)ro- 
ducing  corn  in  sufliciency  for  export,  was  formerly  far 
from  large;  comprising  only  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  the 
North  of  France,  and  North  of  Germany,  with  part  oi" 
Denmark  and  Poland.  We  have  explained  in  the  text 
(p.  119.)  the  similarity  of  temperature  prevalent  throughout 
this  tract,  which  is  almost  all  maritime,  and  presents  no 
very  material  difference  of  latitude.  Hence  a  deficiency  of 
crop,  whether  arising  from  blight  as  in  1811,  or  from  ex- 
cess of  rain  as  in  1809  and  1816,  was  more  or  less  ccnn- 
mon  to  the  whole.  But  in  the  last  and  present  age,  tillage 
has  been  extended  in  the  interior  of  Poland,  and  on  the 
shores  of  the  Euxine ;  countries  differing  considerably  from 
ours  in  climate,  and  not  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  causes 
which  create  disappointment  in  the  north-west  of  Europe. 
As  vet,  the  produce  in  these  countries  is  far  from  large,  but 
the  improvements  now  taking  place  in  river  navigation  bid 
fair  to  facilitate  the  access  to  several  fertile  tracts  hithertc 
in  a  manner  excluded  from  communication  with  the  sea. 
Add  to  this,  that  a  similar  prospect  is  presented  by  the 
increased  cultivation  of  the  United  States  of  America.  To 
expect  a  very  extensive  supply  from  either  would,  on  account 
of  the  distance,  be  absui'd;  but  in  a  year  of  scarcity,  an  im- 
port to  the  extent  of  only  a  week  or  a  fortnight's  consump- 
tion has  a  very  sensible  effect  on  our  corn  market. 

It  follows  that  the  result,  in  the  present  age  at  least,  is 
very  different  from  the  anticipation  of  the  Committee.  The 
progress  of  improvement,  and  the  extension  of  communi- 
cation between  different  countries,  which  are  the  accom- 
jianimcnts  of  augmented  population,  have  a  very  beneficial 
effect  on  the  supply  of  corn  :  they  widen  the  range  of  pur- 
chase, enable  one  nation  to  come  to  the  relief  of  another, 
and  convert  into  the  mitigated  form  of  scarcity  those  failures 
of  harvest,  which,  in  remote  ages,  were  followed  by  all  the 
liorrors  of  famine. 

ISational  Disadvantage  of  a  high  Price  of  Corn.  —  After 
all  that  we  have  urged  on  the  vital  importance  to  the 
country  of  the  prosperity  of  agriculture,  we  may,  without 
suspicion  of  under-rating  that  importance,  sulyoin  a  few- 
remarks  on  a  subject  at  present  very  seldom  mentioned; — 


App.]  Qucsh'oii  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn.  [31] 

the  evils  tliat  would  attend  a  j)rice  of  corn  materially  hitrlier 
than  that  ot"  our  neighbours;  we  mean  a  price  between 
10s.  and  8()5.  a  quarter,  while  that  of  France,  the  Nether- 
lands, or  Germany,  was  at  45.?.  or  50.?.  The  war  closed,  in 
.1  political  sense,  with  so  much  success,  with  so  great  an 
appearance  of  national  triumph,  as  to  blind  us  ibr  a  season 
to  the  evils  of  transition,  aiul  to  the  emb.-irrassment  conse- 
(juent  on  hiirh  prices.  The  injurious  effect  of  the  latter 
was,  indeed,  sliown  in  part  by  the  emigration  of  half-pay 
officers,  annuitants,  and  persons  with  large  families,  who 
drew  their  income  from  this  country  and  expended  it  abroad, 
giving  to  our  neighbours  the  stimulus  arising  from  rej)ro- 
duction,  and  subjecting  England  to  an  injury  of  the  kind  so 
long  inflicted  on  Ireland  by  her  absentee  proprietors.  'I'he 
amount  thus  drawn  by  emigrants  and  travellers  has  been, 
we  believe,  moderately  computed,  for  some  time,  at 
5,000,000/.,  at  present  at  4,000,000/.  a  year;  but  how 
much  greater  would  have  been  the  evil  had  a  continuance 
of  high  prices  induced  master  manufacturers,  or  their  work- 
men, to  seek  an  establishment  on  the  Continent?  Those 
of  our  countrymen,  who  have  travelled  since  the  peace, 
remark,  and  apparently  with  justice,  that  continental  ma- 
nufacturers are  as  yet  far  from  formitlable;  but  they  fail  to 
take  into  account  the  surprising  change  that  might  have 
been  effected  by  a  transfer  of  British  capital  anil  master 
workmen.  W'ith  these  potent  aids  the  inhabitants  of  Nor- 
mandy, the  Netherlands,  or  the  banks  of  the  Rhine,  would 
soon  become  dangerous  rivals,  for  we  ought  steadily  to  keep 
in  mind  that  our  superiority,  as  a  nation,  lies  not  in  the 
individual,  bid  in  our  establishments ;  in  the  operation  of  eol- 
lective  bodies:  as  workmen,  our  neighbours  would  sooi; 
attain  an  equality,  were  they  placed  on  a  par  with  us  in 
regard  to  machinery,  and  the  division  of  emj)loyment. 
Their  merchants  have  not,  it  is  true,  the  capital  necessary 
to  give  long  credit  to  customers,  such  as  the  Americans ; 
but  that  want  would  have  been  supplied  by  our  exporters, 
who,  whether  they  emigrated  personally  or  not,  would  have 
made  a  point  of  purchasing  goods  in  those  towns  or  ilistricts 
of  the  Continent,  where  they  could  have  been  most  cheaply 
manufactured. 

Would  our  government  have  possessed  any  means  of 
counteracting  the  tide  of  emigration  ?  None  ;  if  our  corn- 
market  had  been  kept  at  an  exorbitant  lieigiit,  the  tide 
would  have  flowed  in  various  directions,  according  to  the 
respective  advantages  of  particular  situations.  One  part  of 
the  Continent  possesses  mines  of  iron,  another  mines  of 


[32]  On  A<^rirullinr.  [Apt*. 

coal,  alliini  abounds  in  timber,  while  several  tracts  olcoa.st 
approndi  to  ours  in  the  nuniber  and  ca))acity  ol'tht-ir  sen- 
ports.  Happily  no  part  of  the  Continent  could  oiler  these 
advantages  collectively,  so  that  although  incjuiries  were  made 
and  calculations  Ibnned  by  many  of  our  sj)eculative  men, 
no  emigration  of  consequence  took  place  among  our  labotn- 
ing  classes,  and  the  i)resent  prices  of  the  necessaries  of  lid; 
among  us  seem  to  remove  such  unwelcome  enterprizes  to 
an  indefinite  date. 

Subsistaice  of  i he  lower  Orders. —  In  reasoning  on  the 
means  of  supporting  the  lower  orders,  we  have  not  laid 
stress  on  the  effects  of  spade  husbandry,  of  deep  ploughing, 
or  other  agricultural  experiments  described  in  late  publica- 
tions. Nor  do  we  dwell  on  the  practicability  of  subsisting 
an  increased  po])ulation  by  the  more  general  use  of  pota- 
toes, although,  in  1817,  a  case  in  point  was  established  by 
the  French  government,  wlio  recommended  in  public  orders 
the  more  general  cultivation  of  that  I'oot ;  and,  in  regard  to 
Ireland,  it  is  a  curious  fact,  that  the  export  of  corn  has  be- 
come large  since  the  great  increase  of  the  population.  Our 
object,  however,  is  not  to  dwell  on  the  means  of  reducing 
the  expense  of  subsistence ;  it  is  merely  to  show  that  in- 
crease of  population  has  no  necessary  tendency  to  raise  it. 

Uncertainty  of  speculative  Opinions.  —  In  treating  of  the 
prospects  of  our  agriculturists,  our  wish  is  less  to  press  a 
particular  opinion,  than  to  show  the  uncertainty  of  many 
of  the  allegations  advanced  of  late  years  with  so  much  con- 
fidence. After  the  revolutions  we  have  witnessed  in  statis- 
tics as  in  politics,  it  would  be  idle  to  attempt  predictions  as 
to  what  is  likely  to  be  either  the  amount  or  the  price  of  our 
produce.  In  this  season  of  profoinid  peace,  agriculture 
occupies  a  very  large  share  of  the  national  capital  and  in- 
genuit}' ;  discoveries  and  inventions  are  successively  occur- 
ring to  modify  established  methods  and  alter  received  opi- 
nions. Take,  for  example,  the  subject  on  which  so  much 
was  in'ged  in  parliament  lately, — a  high  protecting  duty. 
If  during  peace  our  growth  continue  adequate  to  our 
consumption,  what  will  have  been  the  use  of  these  pro- 
tracted discussions,  and  where  would  be  the  advantage  so 
confidently  promised  to  our  farmers  from  the  protection  in 
question  ?  .  From  these  various  considerations,  ought  we 
not  to  conclude,  tliat  the  only  safe  course  is  to  be  guided, 
as  far  as  circumstances  at  all  permit,  by  general  principles, 
expecting  little  from  any  deviation,  however  plausible,  and 
calculating  that  in  the  price  of  our  produce,   as  in  other 


A  pp.]  Question  of  a  free  Trade  in  Com.  [33] 

results,  this  country  cannot  long  differ  from  the  civilized 
world  at  large?  This  naturally  leads  to  a  brief  notice  of 
the 

Arguments  in  favour  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn. —  Without 
any  wish  to  discuss  this  question  at  length,  we  lay  before 
our  readers  the  opinion  of  several  well-inibrmed  writers. 

Extract  from  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  Observations  on  the 
Commerce  of  Grain,  by  Dugald  Bannatyne,  Esq.,  Secretary 
to  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Glasgow,"   18  J  6. 

"  All  great  authorities"  (says  Mr.  B.,  p.  10.)  "  were  in 
favour  of  a  free  trade  in  corn,  initil  Mr.  Malthus  demanded 
the  same  protection  lor  the  iiome  grower  of  corn,  as  for 
the  home  manufacturer  of  particular  commodities :  but 
these  manufactures  (such  as  lace  and  silk)  are  protluctive 
of  no  benefit  to  the  public,  being  all  carried  on  in  contra- 
diction to  natural  and  inherent  obstacles,  while  our  labour 
and  capital  would  find  a  more  beneficial  direction,  if 
transferred  to  the  woollen,  cotton,  hardware,  or  other 
branches ;  in  which,  particularly  in  the  latter,  we  possess 
local  and  permanent  advanUiges  over  our  continental 
neighbours. 

"  It  seems  extraordinary,  that  we  should  be  so  muchi 
alive  to  the  advantages  we  gain  from  the  division  of  employ- 
ment in  the  prosecution  of  our  houie  industry,  and  not  see 
the  benefit  to  be  obtained  from  the  more  extended  ili vision 
of  employment  in  the  case  of  nations  :  a  division  pointed 
out  by  the  separate  facilities  for  carrying  them  on,  which, 
from  climate,  soil,  or  natural  j)roductions,  different  coun- 
tries possess.  By  keeping  up  the  price  of  corn,  we  oblige 
ourselves  to  labour  in  our  manufactures  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage, when  compared  with  other  nations." 

Extract  from  a  |>amphlet,  by  Major  (now  Colonel) 
Torrens,  published  also  in  181G,  and  entitled  "  Letter  tv 
Lord  Liverpool  on  the  Slate  of  Agriculture:"  — 

"  To  any  persons  who  will  either  investigate  first  princi- 
ples, or  recur  to  the  experience  of  countries  which,  like 
Holland,  have  given  freedom  to  tratle,  it  must  be  evitient, 
that  this  natural  stiite  of  things  is  greatly  preferable  to  any 
artificial  system  which  can  be  substituted  in  its  stejid.  As 
we  extend  the  area  from  which  subsistence  is  drawn,  the 
inequality  in  the  productivetiess  of  the  seasons  diminishes. 
Hence  when,  under  a  free  intercourse,  a  deficient  harvest 
required  an    unusual    import,   abuii(l:nii    harvests   in    some 


[34  J  On  /l^riculiure.  [App. 

otlior  country  of  the  world  would  supply  the  deficiency  by 
an  extraordinary  export.  On  the  other  hand,  a  succession 
of  unusually  abundant  years  could  occasion  no  deep  de- 
pression in  our  markets,  because  this  extraordinary  (juantity 
of  corn  of  liome  growth  could  not  (as  when  abundant  har- 
vests occur  in  the  case  of  a  country  forcin*;^  in  averaj^e  years 
an  inde))endent  supply)  much  exceed  the  consumption  of 
the  season." 

To  these  opinions  we  add  that  of  Mr.  M'Culloch,  who 
has  inserted  an  Essay  on  the  Corn  Laws,  in  the  same  work 
as  his  Essay  on  Exchange,  viz.  the  Supplement  to  the  En- 
cyclopaedia Britannica.  After  regretting  that  the  corn  trade 
was  not  definitively  laid  open  in  1815,  a  time  when,  as  at 
present,  our  prices  were  so  low  that  our  agriculture  had,  in 
a  manner,  felt  all  the  evils  of  transition,  and  the  public 
would  have  reaped  the  greatest  advantage  from  a  return  to 
unrestricted  freedom,  Mr.  M.  adds, — 

"  M^hen  this  happy  event"  (a  free  trade  in  corn)  "  shall 
have  taken  place,  it  will  be  no  longer  necessary  to  force 
nature.  The  capital  and  enterprise  of  the  country  will  be 
turned  into  those  departments  of  industry  in  which  our 
physical  situation,  national  character,  or  political  institutions, 
fit  us  to  excel.  The  corn  of  Poland,  and  the  raw  cotton 
of  Carolina,  will  be  exclianged  for  the  wares  of  Birmingham 
and  the  muslins  of  Glasgow'.  The  genuine  commercial 
spirit,  that  which  permanently  secures  the  prosperity  of 
nations,  is  altogether  inconsistent  with  the  dark  and  shallow- 
policy  of  monopoly.  The  nations  of  the  earth  are  like 
provinces  of  the  same  kingdom  —  a  free  and  unfettered 
intercourse  is  alike  productive  of  general  and  of  local 
advantage." 

Political  economists  are  more  accustomed  to  deal  in 
general  reasoning,  than  to  analyse  the  circumstances  of  a 
case,  or  to  go  through  the  details  necessary  to  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  specific  remedy.  This  blank  we  shall  now 
endeavour  to  supply,  and,  by  way  of  supplement  to  the 
preceding  arguments,  add  u  sketch  of  the  preliminaries 
indispensable  to  freedom  in  our  corn  trade.  By  these  we 
mean  the  exemption  of  our  agriculturists  from  such  burdens 
as  press  on  them  either  exclusively,  or  in  a  greater  degree 
than  on  the  rest  of  the  public.     Thus : — 

Computation  of  Poor  Bate  and  Tithe.  —  Of  the  sums 
levied  for  rates  in  England  and  \\'ales,  the  averaije  annual 
amount  will  probably  be,  ere  long,  reduced  to  — 


App.]  Qitestion  of'  a  free  Trade  in  Corn.  [85^ 

Highway  rate,  county  rate,  church  rate    -      j61, 200,000 
Law  suits,  removal  of  paupers,  and  expence 

of  parish  officers 300,000 

Maintenance  and  relief  of  the  poor,  after  as- 
suming a  reduction  from  the  present  charge 
of  somewhat  more  than  1,000,000/.  -       t,500,000 

In  all     -     .t  6,000,000 


Of  this   amount  what  \xirt  bears  exclusively  on  agricul- 
ture ?     To  calculate  that  we  begin  by  excluding 

1.  The  proportion  that  appears  to  be  raised  in 
towns,  includinj;  smaller  towns  than  those 
mentioned  in  the  Poor-rale  Report  of 
1821,  p.  13.,  and  referring  to  the  assessment 
of  181. -5,  in  which  a  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween the  contribution  of  landholders  and 
householders  -----  .::^1, 500,000 

2.  A  large  sum  which  in  fact  is  but  vominalli/ 
paid  by  agriculturists,  the  wages  of  country 
labour  being  lower  than  they  would  be  with- 
out the  rates  :  this  sum  we  estimate  conjec- 

turally,  in  war  at  2,000,000/. ;  in  peace  at         1,000,000 
Remainder,  being  the  actual  burden  on  agricul- 
ture arising  from  rates,  supposing  the  whole 
on  a  reduced  scale  -         -         -         .       3,500,000 


Total  (agreeing  with  the  preceding)     i'6,000,000 

Now,  were  all  classes  equal  contributors  to 
the  rates,  the  quota  of  the  land  would  be 
only  a  third,  or  2,00(),0()()/.  making  a  de- 
duction from  the  3,500,000/.  of         -  -  i£'l,500,«00 

Next,  as  to  Tif/w. — Amount  of  tithe  of  Eng- 
land, Wales,  and  Ireland,  computed  at  the 
reduced  price  of  produce,  l)ut  including  tithe 
paid  to  laymen,  about         -         5,000,000/. 

If  tithe  also  were  rendered  a  national  burthen, 
thelandoughttopayonlyatliird(  1,700,000/.) 
which  would  form  a  deduction  from  its  pre- 
sent burden  of  3,300,000 

Total  deduction  that  would  then  be  made  fr<Mn  

the  burdens  on  agriculture         -  -  .i4-,800,000 


It  is  a  remarkabh-  coincidence  that  this  »Jiun  (4,800,000/.^ 

[c]  2 


[36]  071  Agriculture.  [App. 

is    little  more  than  the  excess   of  the  burdens  on  British 
over  those  on  French  agriculture.     Sec  the  text,  p.  1 72. 

As  our  allowance  of  4,500,000/.  for  the  poor  may  ap- 
pear below  the  mark,  we  shall  compare  it  with  the  rate  as 
it  stood  before  the  late  wars :  — 

In  1792  our  poor-rate,  exclusive  of  law  ex- 
pences,  and  of  highway  or  county  rate, 
amounted  to  about  -         -         .         -  j£ '2,000,000 

Add  an  increase  of  50  per  cent,  proportion- 
ed to  the  increase  of  population  -       1,000,000 

Remains  to  add,  as  a  kind  of  allowance  for  the 
greater  embarrassment  of  the  present  time, 
and  for  abuses  introduced  into  the  system         1,500,000 


Total    -    j£4,500,000 


Tithe:  Mode  of  computing  its  present  Aj)wunt. —  Our 
estimate  in  the  preceding  page  is  founded  on  the  property 
tax  returns  for  the  year  1812,  (Nos.  248.  and  250.  for 
1814-15).  Viewing  the  question  historically,  we  find  a 
very  close  connection  between  the  increase  of  our  popula- 
tion and  the  increase  of  our  tithe.  As  there  are  no  means 
of  ascertaining  the  amount  of  our  agricultural  produce, 
our  reference  must  be  to  the  increase  of  consumers  ;  and 
though  our  population  returns  go  no  farther  back  than 
1801,  we  may  with  tolerable  certainty  compute  the  total 
addition  to  have  been  nearly  50  per  cent,  on  our  numbers 
as  they  stood  in  1792.  In  fact,  were  we  possessed  of  a 
correct  return  of  tithe  for  that  year,  we  should  calculate  its 
present  amount  by  merely  adding  50  per  cent,  to  such  re- 
turn; for  the  prices  of  produce  being  now  similar  to  those 
of  1792,  the  comparative  estimate  becomes  narrowed  to  a 
calculation  of  quantity. 

Rent  of  Land. —  Can  we  with  any  confidence  observe  a 
similar  rule  when  calculating  the  progressive  increase  of 
rent  ?  In  that  the  connection  between  augmented  produce 
and  augmented  payment  is  less  apparent  than  in  the  case 
of  tithe :  yet  it  would  be  obviously  vain  to  attempt  a  mode 
of  computation,  which  may  at  first  claim  attention,  we  mean 
one  founded  on  the  extent  of  additional  surface  brought 
into  tillage.  In  proof  of  this  we  have  merely  to  consi- 
der that  the  50  per  cent,  added  to  our  produce  in  the 
last  thirty  years  has  been  raised  with  an  addition  of  pro- 


App.]  Question  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn.  [37] 

bably  less  than  fifteen  per  cent,  to  the  number  of  acres 
under  corn  culture,  and  has  been  chiefly  the  fruit  of  the 
additional  labour  and  improved  methods  applied  to  the 
surface  previously  under  the  i)louf;h.  The  extension  of 
tillage  over  mferior  soils  is  rather  an  index  of  augmented 
rent,  than  a  basis  for  its  calculation :  the  latter  we  should 
seek  by  preference  in  the  new  methods  that  have  been 
discovered,  the  old  that  are  improvtti,  the  consequent 
abridgment  of  labour,  and  the  additional  quantity  of  corn 
produced  at  the  same  expence;  for  the  eflectof  all  improve- 
ments, whether  they  anieliorate  quality  or  augment  quan- 
tity, is  to  cheapen  jiroduction  :  they  are  otherwise  not 
entitled  to  the  name  of  improvements. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  benefit  to  the  nation  from 
such  improvements  ?  The  power  of  supporting  an  addi- 
tional population  on  the  same  territorial  surface.  —  And 
what  is  tlie  advantage  to  the  proprietors  of  that  surface? 
An  increase  of  rent  which  there  are,  it  seems  to  us,  various 
reasons  for  calculating  in  proportion  to  increase  of  popu- 
lation. Were  the  number  of  consumers  stationary,  the 
result  of  agricultural  improvements  would  be  a  fail  of  mar- 
ket price:  with  an  increase  of  consumers,  the  results  are  the 
maintenance  of  price  and  the  rise  of  rent.  If  the  surface 
which,  a  century  ago,  produced  wheat  for  the  support  of 
two  millions  of  inhabitants,  be  now  sufficient  to  maintain 
twice  the  number,  the  price  of  wheat  being  the  same,  we 
shall  probably  deviate  little  from  the  truth  in  assuming  that, 
in  the  natural  course  of  things,  the  rent  also  oui^/ii  to  be 
doubled ;  and  that  any  excess  or  deficiency  in  this  propor- 
tion of  increase  is  to  be  sought  in  causes  temporary,  pecu- 
liar, or  in  some  cases,  little  more  than  apparent. 

How  far  is  this  confirmed  by  historical  evidence  ?  It 
seems  to  have  long  been  the  case  in  France,  a  country  where 
corn  still  sells  for  the  price  it  bore  a  century  and  a  /i(dfa<io, 
and  the  agricultural  history  of  which  is  more  simple  and 
regular  than  that  of  England,  being  unembarrassed  by 
fluctuations  in  the  value  of  the  currency,  or  by  insufficiency 
in  the  average  growth  for  the  average  consumption.  But 
even  in  England,  the  proportion  between  increase  of  popu- 
lation and  rise  of  rent  will  be  found  to  hold  in  u  consider- 
able degree.  It  might,  j)erhaps,  be  traced,  were  our  docu- 
ments complete,  during  the  long  period  from  1G50  to  1792; 
in  which  the  price  of  corn  bore,  with  casual  and  temporary 
exceptions,  a  character  of  uniformity.  Even  in  the  present 
age,  we  should  not  despair  of  finding  a  confirmation  of  our 
rule,  could  we  succeed  in  clearing  our  calculation  of  the 

[c]  $ 


[38]  On  Agriculture.  [ApP. 

temporary  effect  of  bank  paper  and  of  seasons  unusually  ad- 
verse. Such  an  attempt  mi<fht,  some  years  ago,  have  been 
ridiculed;  but  at  present  the  temporary  part  oftlie  increase 
has  disappeared,  and  left  us  with  the  prices  of  1792,  along 
with  a  discovery  in  regard  to  rent  not  a  little  at  variance 
with  the  high-flown  language  of  those  who  saw  in  the  war 
a  source  of  unparalleled  wealth;  — that  the  present  rental 
of  the  United  Kingdom  is,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  little 
more  than  50  per  cent,  above  that  of  1792,  or  36,000,000/., 
instead  of  24,000,000/.,  its  supposed  amount  before  our 
rupture  with  France. 

This  sober  result,  if  it  fall  below  the  sanguine  expect- 
ation of  those  who  still  cling  to  high  prices,  and  still  put 
faith  in  the  efficacy  of  corn  laws,  leaves,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  rise  fair  and  legitimate.  We  have  no  argument  to  found 
on  the  principle  of  calculating  the  future  rise  of  rent  by  the 
increase  of  our  numbers,  but  it  seems  to  be  just  towards  both 
parties.  Our  landlords  certainly  would  have  no  reason  to 
complain  of  it ;  for  it  presents  to  them  the  cheering  pros- 
pect of  being  not  only  permanent  but  progressive. 

Use  of  Salt  in  Agriculture.  —  We  cannot  forbear  adding 
a  few  words  on  a  topic  closely  connected  with  the  freedom 
of  productive  industry,  we  mean  the  2?icreased  use  of  salt  in 
agriadttirc.  If  there  be  any  accuracy  in  the  arguments  of 
the  late  Sir  Thomas  Bernard,  and  of  several  others  who 
have  written  on  the  subject,  how  sensible  must  be  the  be- 
nefit to  our  farmers  and  graziers,  now  that  government  has 
given  the  means  of  so  decided  an  extension  to  the  use  of 
salt,  either  as  a  manure  or  for  feeding  cattle.  Our  inland 
•navigation  will  enable  almost  every  district  to  profit  by  the 
relaxation  ;  and  the  injury  to  the  revenue  in  one  sense  will, 
we  trust,  soon  be  compensated  by  benefit  in  another,  since 
the  only  solid  basis  of  taxation  is  the  extension  of  the 
national  industry. 

There  is  thus  little  or  no  doubt,  that,  were  our  farmers 
relieved  from  their  extra  burdens,  they  would  be  enabled 
to  raise  produce  on  as  low  terms  as  our  continental  neigh- 
bours, and  might,  ere  long,  allow  the  public  to  reap  all  the 
benefit  arising  from  unrestricted  freedom  in  the  corn  trade. 
For  the  present,  however,  we  consider  "  unrestricted  free- 
dom" as  wholly  out  of  the  question,  and  shall  confine  our 
speculations  to  the  effect  of  relaxation  :  of  a  protecting  duty 
on  a  reduced  scale. 


A  pp.]  On  AgricuUure.  [39  J 

Comparative  Burdens  on  British  and  Foreign  Agriculture. 
— Abstract  of  the  Evidence  before  the  Agricultural  Com- 
mittee (April  and  May,  1821)  of  Mr.  Tooke,  i)artner  in  a 
mercantile  house  extensively  connected  witii  the  Baltic:  — 
Mr.  T.,  aware  how  <rreatly  the  untravelled  part  of  our 
countrymen  overrate  the  cheapness  of  foreign  countries, 
laid  before  the  Agricultural  C'onniiittee  (Evidence,  p.  224(.) 
tables  of  the  prices  of  wheat  from  18  H  to  1820,  at  Peters- 
burgh,  Riga,  and  Archangel;  the  result  of  which  is,  that 
it  coukl  seldom,  in  these  years  of  peace,  have  been  deli- 
vered in  an  English  port  for  loss  than  from  50s.  to  iiOs.  a 
quarter.  At  Odessa  the  price  is  occasionally  very  low,  but 
the  freight  to  England  is  high;  and  the  hazard  of  damage 
on  so  long  a  voyage  is  such  as  to  put  that  port  almost  out 
of  the  question  for  the  Britir>h  market.  And  as  to  another 
point,  the  amount  of  supply  to  be  expected  from  the  Con- 
tinent at  large,  Mr.  T.  concurs  with  I\Ir.  Jacob,  (Evidence, 
pp.  232.  260.)  that  it  is  in  general  overrated. 

la  regard  to  our  own  agriculture,  Mr.  T.  differs  mate- 
rially from  those  who  imagine  that  a  continuance  of  the 
present  low  prices  would  throw  much  land  out  of  cultiva- 
tion. As  a  fall  in  the  price  of  corn  necessarily  reduces  the 
cost  of  production,  he  sees  no  great  reason  (pp.  232.  288.) 
why  we  should  not,  as  half  a  century  ago,  raise  corn  as 
cheaply^  or  almost  as  c/icapli/,  as  on  the  Continent,  particu- 
larly now  that  the  agriculture  of  Ireland  is  relieved  from 
restraint. 

Mr.  T.  is  also  the  oidy  witness  who  brings  forward 
(p.  288.)  an  argument  which  we  have  been  at  |)ains  to 
enforce  in  tlie  text,  viz.  that  an  inijiort  limit,  if  high,  would 
induce  extended  cultivation,  and  prove  injurious  to  our 
fiirmers.  We  have  his  concmrence,  likewise,  in  another 
important  point,  in  accounting  (p.  3 tt.)  for  the  ";reat  fall 
in  the  price  of  commodities  since  the  peace,  less  hy  a  re- 
currence to  cash  payments;,  than  by  the  application  of  a 
great  addition  of  labour  and  capital  to  productive  purposes. 
Lastly,  he  is  favourable  to  a  protecting  duty  on  corn,  pro- 
vided" (Evidence,  p.  297.)  it  be  no  greater  than  the  direct 
taxes  that  operate  on  our  own  production. 

The  opinion,  that  our  corn  is  likely  to  be  raised  at  a  rate 
(between  50s.  and  GOi'.  the  (juarter)  nearly  as  cheap  as  on 
the  Continent,  has  a  claim  to  {)ariicuhir  alleiilion  ;  and  we 
jnoceed  to  enquire  how  far  it  is  conliniieil  by  a  consider- 
ation of  either  our  past  or  present  circumstances. 

[c]  4 


[40]  On  Agriculture.  [App. 

Prices  dnrinp^  last  Centurtj.  —  If  in  the  history  of  our  corn 
trade  we  go  back  sufficiently  far  to  reach  a  period  of  pro- 
found peace,  we  shall  find  little  reason  to  expect  tliat  in  such 
a  season  our  prices  can  be  kept  much  above  those  of  the 
Continent.     Throughout  the  hundred  years   that  elapsed 
between  the  accession  of  Charles  II.  and  of  George  III., 
corn  was  as  low,  or  nearly  as  low,  in  England  as  in  France, 
the  Netherlands,  or  other  adjacent  parts  of  the  Continent. 
After  1764,  the   case  was   different;  but  of  the  85.  or  IO5. 
per  quarter  of  additional  price  obtained  in  this  country,  the 
half  may  safely  be  ascribed  to  temporary  causes ;  we  mean 
the  American  war,  the  extension  of  our  manufactures,  and 
the  general  aversion   to  vest  capital  in  farming,  after  the 
discouraging  experience  of  the   preceding  age.     But  our 
taxation,  it  may  be  said,  is  greater,  compared  to  that  of 
continental  countries,   than  it  was  in  the  last  century,  and 
France  is  now  exempt  from  tithe ;  —  important  consider- 
ations certainly,  but  balanced  by  others  of  great  weight  on 
our  side ;  by  the  fact  that  the  tillage  of  Ireland  is  no  longer 
in  fetters,  that  our  machinery  and  implements  have  received 
much  more  improvement,   our  inland  navigation  a  much 
greater  extension  than  that  of  our  neighbours.     The  ad- 
vantage of  all  these  to  agriculture  can  be  appreciated  by 
those  only  who  have  seen  the  wretched  roads,  the  clumsy 
implements  and  vehicles  of  the  Continent,   or  who  have 
duly  weighed  the  cheapness  of  our  canal  carriage;  by  which 
salt,    manure,    or   bulky  commodities    generally,    can,    in 
many  parts,  be  transported  ten  or  fifteen  miles  at  the  insig- 
nificant charge  of  a  shilling  a  ton. 

Our  jnrsevt  Prospect.  —  The  arguments  in  favour  of 
Mr.  Tooke's  opinion  derived  from  our  present  situation 
are  as  follow  :  — 

1.  During  the  war,  rents  rose  without  care  or  exertion 
on  the  part  of  our  landlords;  at  present  land  affords  a  rent 
of  consequence  only  when  cultivated  with  skill  —  the  most 
substantial  of  all  arguments  for  the  diffusion  of  the  improved 
husbandry. 

2.  The  evils  that  now  bear  so  hard  on  our  agriculture 
are  evils  of  transition ;  the  degree  of  pressure  w  ill  be  ma- 
terially different  when  farming  charges  shall  have  been 
reduced  (as  reduced  they  must  be)  in  proportion  to  the 
market  price  of  corn. 

3.  As  to  the  comparative  burdens  on  our  agriculture  and 
that  of  other  countries,  we  have  in  the  text  taken  France 


App.]  A  Protecting  DiUy.  [4 1  ] 

as  a  fair  specimen  of  the  Continent  generally:  if  in  Poland 
and  Russia  the  burdens  are  less  heavy  than  in  France,  hus- 
bandry, as  an  art,  is  far  more  backward,  and  the  charge 
of  freight  to  England  is  heavier.  A  reference  to  the  pas- 
sage (p.  168.)  containing  the  comparison  with  France,  will 
much  simplify  the  present  statement,  enabling  us  to  leave 
out  of  the  question  the  advantage  of  cheaper  labour  on 
the  part  of  the  French,  and  on  ours  of  better  machinery, 
lower  interest  of  money,  a  more  advantageous  size  of  farms, 
&c.  After  enumerating  the  respective  burdens,  we  found 
the  difference  confined  to  a  portion  of  our  excise  duty  on 
malt,  beer,  and  corn  spirits  ;  a  difference  which,  when,  as 
at  present,  the  corn  laws  are  in  a  manner  inoj)erative,  left 
a  sum  of  4-  or  5,000,000/.  to  the  disadvantage  of  our 
countrymen.  This  difference  forms  a  charge  of  7  or  8  per 
cent,  on  the  rental  of  our  landlortls,  and  the  income  of  our 
farmers  taken  collectively. 

Competition  of  continental  Agriadturists.  —  Supposing 
that  the  effect  of  a  protecting  duty  is  merely  to  keep  our 
market  from  6s.  to  85.  a  quarter  above  that  of  France,  or 
the  Netherlands,  would  there  be  reason  to  a})prehend  that 
English  capital  would  find  its  way  abroad,  and  be  applied 
to  the  extension  of  culture  on  the  Continent,  with  a  view  to 
import  into  this  country  ?  To  such  a  question  our  answer 
three  years  ago  might  have  been  in  the  affirmative  ;  but  our 
charges  are  now  so  much  reduced,  and  the  advantages  of 
Ireland  in  regard  to  chea})  labour,  conunaiul  of  water 
communication,  and  fertility  of  soil,  are  ibund  to  approach 
so  nearly  to  those  of  the  most  favoured  tracts  of  the  Conti- 
nent, that  we  much  d<njbt  whether  any  traubfer  of  capital 
would  take  jilace  to  the  latter,  particularly  as,  on  referring 
to  the  evidence  annexed  to  the  Agricultural  Report,  we 
find  (p.  364-.)  that  the  cost  of  raising  a  (juarter  of  wheat  in 
Prussia  or  Poland,  including  the  conveyance  to  Dantzic, 
but  exclusive  of  rent,  is  about  iiGs.  the  quarter,  an  expence 
little  greater  than  the  cost  of  raising  it  (p.  ^'iS.)  free  of 
rent,  in  East  Lothian. 

Next,  as  to  the  storing  or  warehousing  of  foreign  corn, 
with  a  view  to  import.  —  The  interest  of  the  money  vestetl 
in  the  purchase  of  corn  forms  so  consideral)Ie  a  part  ol  the 
annual  charge  of  keeping  it  in  granary,  thai  were  our  prices 
to  rise  materially,  it  might  entur  into  the  views  of  our  corn 
merchants  to  purchase  in  remote  countries,  like  the  interior 
ol"  Poland  or  the  south-west  of  Russia,  where  the  average 


[42]  Our  Agriculture.  [Apf. 

price  of  wheat  is  not  above  305.,  and  in  some  years  (Evi- 
dence, j).  o(i\.),  lower.  At  present  sucli  a  course  is  out  of 
the  (|ueslion,  the  inland  provinces  in  these  countries  being 
unj)rovi(.Ied  either  witii  proper  warehouses,  or  with  the 
means  of  j^iving  security  to  deposited  jiroperty.  Were 
these  defects  supplied  by  the  erection  of  suitable  build- 
ings in  a  town  adjacent  to  a  navigable  river,  and  by  the 
protection  of  a  military  guard,  a  large  supply  of  corn 
might  be  warehoused  in  cheap  years,  and  on  the  occur- 
rence of  a  rise,  sent  to  a  market  in  this  country  or  else- 
where. The  transport  to  Dantzic  or  Odessa,  added  to  the 
freight  from  Dantzic  to  England,  or  from  Odessa  to  the 
south  of  France,  miglit  be  averaged  at  20s.  the  quarter, 
carrying  the  total  cost,  when  brought  to  market,  to  some- 
what more  than  50s.,  exclusive  of  our  protecting  duty ;  a 
price  which,  if  not  high,  is  greatly  above  that  which  is 
assigned  by  vague  rumour  (see  Mr.  Curwen's  speeches  in 
the  session  of  1821,)  to  the  Polish  market. 

TheUnitcd  States  (>f  America.  The  great  distance  of  that 
country  from  Euro})e  has  long  led  to  the  practice  of  ship- 
ping its  produce  in  the  form  of  flour,  rather  than  of  grain; 
thus  accomplishing  a  saving  in  freight,  and  avoiding  the 
shifting  and  heating  to  be  apprehended  in  a  long  and  tem- 
pestuous passage.  Among  other  recent  discoveries,  we  are 
apprised  (p.  437.  Revue  E?icyclopedique,  for  August,  1821, 
printed  at  Paris,)  of  a  method  of  preserving  flour  during 
several  years  in  perfect  condition,  by  means  of  air-tight 
casks  ;  but  whether  theexpence  of  this  or  oiher  methods  of 
the  kind  be  not  too  great  for  the  chance  of  profit,  remains 
to  be  ascertained. 

Compared  to  these,  what  means  are  possessed  by  our  own 
agriculturists  in  regard  to  keeping  corn  in  the  granary,  and 
making  the  plenty  of  one  season  conducive  to  the  supply 
of  the  next  ?  They  have  the  connnand  of  better  buildings ; 
they  pay  a  lower  interest  on  capital ;  and  are  exempt,  in 
a  great  measure,  from  the  charge  of  conveyance  to  mar- 
ket:  their  chief  disadvantage  lies  in  the  prime  cost  of  their 
produce. 

Iniprovcme?ifs  in  Husbandrij. —  Those  who  are  inclined 
to  subscribe  to  the  efficacy  of  some  lately-promulgated 
methods  of  penetrating  more  deeply  into  the  soil,  whether 
by  the  plough  or  spade,  may  consider  the  Continent 
likely  to  benefit  more  largely  from  them  in  consequence  of 
its  cheaper  labour,  its  greater  agricultural  population.   But 


App.]  Our  Agriculture.  [43] 

in  any  improvement  arising  from  such  a  process,  this  coun- 
try can  hardly  tail  to  share  equally,  superior  as  we  are  in 
horses,  ploughs,  and  iron-work  generally  :  while,  in  regard 
to  labour,  Ireland  is  as  cheaply  and  iihundantlv  supplied 
as  any  part  ot"  the  Continent. 

Probable  Amount  of  hnport. —  A  low  rate  of  duty  on 
foreign  corn  would  doubtless  prevent  any  considerable  rise 
in  our  market;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  our  tillage 
would  be  materially  circumscribed,  or  that  the  amount  of  our 
import  would  be  large.  Of  barley,  our  growth  is  in  general 
equal  to  our  consumption  :  a  considerable  iuij)ort  takes  place 
only  in  particular  years,  and  after  seasons  unfavourable  to 
this  kind  of  grain,  such  as  the  sununers  of  181(j  aiul  1817. 
In  oats  the  case  has  hitherto  been  different,  our  growth  being 
habitually  below  our  consiunjition,  and  large  imports  being 
required  both  from  Irelanil  antl  the  Continent:  the  amount 
has  varied,  of  course,  in  different  years,  Init  has  not  for  a 
long  time  averaged  so  little  as  half  a  million  of  cjuarters 
from  either.  In  future  our  import  of  oats,  at  least  in 
peace,  is  likely  to  be  confined  to  Ireland.  Of  beans,  pease, 
and  rye,  our  growth  is  in  general  adequate,  and  our  im- 
ports insignificant:  in  regard  to  wheat,  our  inijiorts,  for- 
merly on  su  large  a  scale,  are  at  ])resent  suspended ;  nor 
are  they  likely  to  be  renewed  during  peace,  except  on  the 
accidental  occurrence  of  an  indifferent  season. 

What  appears  to  be  the  average  growth  of  corg  of  all 
kinds  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland?  According  to  Mr. 
Colquhoun,  it  seems  in  1812  to  have  been,  inchuling  the 
corn  used  as  seed,  al)out  4(), 000,000  of  (|uarters,  to  which 
may  be  added  for  increase  in  the  perioil  tliat  has  intervened 
about  20  per  cent.,  or  8,000,000  of  (juarters.  In  reasoning 
on  years  to  come,  with  the  prospect  of  a  progressive  in- 
crease, we  shall  not  greatly  err  in  taking  our  growth  at  an 
average  of  nearly  50,000,000  of  (juarters,  of  corn  of  all 
kinds.  Then,  as  to  import  —  now  that  we  are  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  peace,  and  possess  so  ample  a  connnand  of  capital 
and  labour,  we  may  calculate  our  average  liemand  ti)r 
foreign  corn  at  a  very  moderate  amount.  It  nuist  necessa- 
rily vary  greatly,  according  to  the  seasons  ;  but  the  aver- 
age of  a  spries  of  years  of  peace  will  perhaps  not  exceed  a 
million  of  (juarters  of  grain  of  sill  kinds,  or  2  per  cent,  on 
the  total  of  our  antuial  growth. 

"■'  All  undue  protection  to  agriculture,"  says  Mr.Ilicartio 
in   his   pamphlet    on.    Agvicuiture,    (p.  81.'^    "  shoulil    b<; 


[44]  Oiir  Agriculiiirc.  [App. 

gradually  withdrawn.  The  policy  which  we  ought,  at  this 
moment  of  distress  to  adopt,  is  to  give  the  monopoly  of"  the 
home  market  to  the  British  grower  till  corn  reaches  70s. 
per  quarter.  When  it  has  reached  705.,  a  duty  of  205.  per 
quarter  on  the  importation  of  wheat,  and  other  grain  in 
proportion,  might  be  imposed. 

"  I  should  further  propose,  that  the  duty  of  205.  should 
every  year  be  reduced  one  shilling,  until  it  reached  ten 
shillings.  A  duty  of  ten  shillings  per  quarter,  on  im- 
portation, to  which  I  wish  to  approach,  is,  I  am  sure, 
rather  too  liigh  as  a  countervailing  duty  for  the  peculiar 
taxes  which  are  imposed  on  the  corn  grower,  over  and 
above  those  which  are  imposed  on  the  other  classes  of 
production  in  the  country  ;  but  I  would  rather  err  on  the 
side  of  a  liberal  allowance  than  of  a  scanty  one." 

Ought  a  Ptotc'cihig  Duty  to  be  snspe7ided  in  a  dear  Season  ? 
—  However  adverse  in  general  to  high  prices,  we  are  by 
no  means  inclined  to  give  this  question  an  affirmative 
answer.  The  temperature  which  causes  a  partial  failure 
in  England  being  likely  to  prevail  throughout  the  north- 
west of  Europe,  can  hardly  fail  to  raise  the  corn  maiket 
in  the  Netherlands,  the  Danish  dominions,  and  the  north 
of  Germany,  in  the  same  manner,  though  not  in  an  equal 
degree,  as  in  this  country.  Prices  may  thus  be  brought, 
by  a  natural  course,  to  the  limit  at  which  the  protecting 
duty  ceases:  if  not,  a  suspension  of  it  woidd  be  impolitic, 
as  well  from  the  general  inexpediency  of  tampering  with 
an  established  law,  as  for  another  reason,  viz.  that  a  rise  of 
price  does  not  (Evidence,  p.  36.)  in  a  year  of  deficiency  form 
an  equivalent  to  a  farmer  for  short  quantity ;  hvi  can  be 
indemnified  only  by  the  continuance  of  the  advanced  price 
during  the  succeeding  year.  To  that  he  is  fairly  entitled : 
to  deprive  him  of  it  by  a  suspension  of  the  protecting  duty, 

would  be  to  cast  on  tilla<re  a  discouragement  similar  to  what 

... 
it  has  experienced  from   unlimited  import  under  the  corn 

law  of  1815. 

But  in  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  should  we  then 

lessen  to  the  poor  the  pressure  of  a  dear  season  ?     By 

charitable  contributions ;  which,  when  limited  to  an  interval 

of  real  want,  have  few  or  none  of  the  bad  consequences  of 

an  established  poor-rate.     And  in  what  way  are  the  public 

indemnified  for  taking  this  burden  on  themselves  instead  of 

suspending  the  protecting  duty?     By  the  moderate  rate  at 

which  that  duty  is  fixed. 


App.]  Our  Agriculture.  [45] 

To  these  observations  we  subjoin  the  opinion  of  a  writer 
who  differs  in  many  points  from  the  political  economists  of 
the  school  of  Smith  :  — 

Observations  of  Mr.  S.  Gray  on  the  Corri  Trade.  —  Mr.  G. 
has  given,  in  the  papers  added  in  1819  to  his  work  en- 
titled "  The  Happiness  of  States,"  an  ojiinion  (})p.  34, 
35.)  on  the  corn  trade,  similar  in  most  points  to  that  of  the 
Agricultural  Committee  of  1821.  He  always  considered 
our  late  corn  law  as  likely  to  make  importation  affect  the 
home  price  suddenly  or  violently  ;  while  a  protecting  duty 
would  make  it  flow  in  a  gentle  stream,  tending  to  keep 
prices  fair,  and  inducing  the  foreign  cultivator  to  look  to 
England  as  a  market,  on  certain  conditions  ;  according  to 
which  he  would  regulate  his  purchase  of  our  colonial  goods 
and  manufactures.  This  opinion  p!-oceeds  from  a  writer 
by  no  means  inclined  to  regard  low  prices  as  a  public  ad- 
vantage, but  who  considers  (Happiness  of  States,  p.  6()5.) 
fluctuating  gains  as  highly  pernicious,  tending  to  raise 
rents  and  labour  extravagantly,  and  to  produce  a  pren)a- 
ture  change  in  the  style  of  living.  Tiie  true  interest  of  the 
farmer  is  in  a  steady  price,  tending  to  rise  gradually,  with 
the  national  improvement,  and  })roportioned  consequently 
to  the  prices  of  other  connnodities. 

Tenants  on  Lease,  and  Debtors  oti  Mortgage. — The  case 
of  a  tenant  on  lease,  on  the  occurrence  of  a  rapid  fall  of 
prices,  is  peculiarly  hard ;  the  evil  overtakes  him  in  all  its 
extent,  while  the  relief  is  but  partial,  the  grand  charge  of 
rent  remaining  unadapted  to  the  altered  state  of  things. 
He  must  in  the  first  instance  lay  his  account  with  a  sacn- 
fice  of  part  of  his  capital,  with  refunding  the  gains  arising 
from  the  previous  depreciation  of  money.  I'his,  it  must 
be  confessed,  is  but  fair,  since  the  profit  arising  during 
tlie  war  from  depreciation  was  reaped  chiefly  by  the  tenant. 
But  after  a  certain  period  of  suffering,  a  liberal  landlord 
will  consider  what  is  due  to  ecjuity,  and  what  in  many 
cases,  where  the  covenants  of  the  lease  are  not  drawn  in 
the  anticipation  of  such  a  change,  is  necessary  to  prevent 
injury  to  his  land. 

Debtors  on  mortgage  are,  in  like  n)antier,  heavy  suf- 
ferers, their  means  of  payment  generally  diminishing  as  the 
value  of  their  money  debt  increases,  'riiey  have,  however, 
in  one  respect  a  substantial  ground  of  iiope  ;  the  prospect 


[^•G]  Our  Agriculture.  [App. 

of  reducin*^'  their  interest  to  4A,  ami  some  time  lieiice  to  4 
pcv  cent. 

Interference  by  Courls  of  Justice.  —  During  tlie  half  cen- 
tury from  1764'  to  IH14,  the  chiin^e  in  the  value  of  money 
was  all  on  the  opjiosite  side,  eomniodities  tendinis  to  a  rise: 
gradual,  and  almost  imperceptible  during  tliirty  years,  it 
was  after  1 794  so  regularly  progressive,  that  in  the  course 
of  twenty  years  160/.  became  e(]uivalent  to  only  100/.  of 
1794.  During  the  latter  years  of  the  war,  annuitants,  and 
the  landlords  who  had  granted  long  leases,  received  hardly 
two-thirds  of  the  original  value;  yet  no  appeal  on  the 
ground  of  depreciated  currency  was  brought  before  parlia- 
ment or  our  courts  of  justice.  Any  attempt  of  that  kind 
in  parliament  would  have  been  resisted  by  government, 
partly  from  an  aversion  to  interfere  with  private  contracts; 
more  from  a  solicitude  to  prevent  the  })ublic  attention 
being  fixed  on  the  depreciation  then  going  on  in  the 
greatest  of  all  debts,  that  of  the  nation. 

Since  1811  we  have  had  a  reaction,  and  of  so  rapid  a 
nature,  that  in  trade  100/.  are  equal  to  130/.  at  the  close 
of  the  war  ;  in  farming  to  much  more.  How,  it  may  be 
asked,  does  this  sudden  change  affect  the  question  of  judi- 
cial interference  ?  In  equity,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
all  engagements  ought  to  continue  payable  in  money  (jf  the 
value  at  which  they  were  contracted :  the  objections  to  inter- 
ference arise,  therefore,  from  considerations  of  expediency ; 
from  a  dread  of  excitinir  litijjation  aaiono-  individuals,  and 
a  still  greater  dread  of  shakinii  indirectlv  the  credit  of  our 
funds,  open  as  are  the  exchequers  of  other  countries  to  our 
capitalists.  Some  time  hence  it  may,  perhaps,  be  found 
practicable  to  combine  two  very  nice  points  —  rf  farther  re- 
duction of  our  burdens  with  the  preservation  of  the  divi- 
dends at  their  present  value.  But  on  this  we  cannot  now 
enter;  and  any  intervention  on  the  part  of  our  courts  of 
justice  seems  at  present  out  of  the  question.  It  could  be 
seriously  expected  only  in  the  case  of  our  corn  trade  being 
thrown  open,  and  the  continuance  of  low  prices  being  thus 
put  beyond  all  doubt.  In  any  event,  it  would  probably  not 
go  beyond  the  suspension  ot  legal  process  for  a  given  period 
of  years,  against  a  debtor  who  should  have  paid  or  tendered 
in  money  the  chief  part  (perhaps  three-fourths^  of  his  pre- 
viousU-  contracted  debt :  a  sacrifice  apparently  large  on 
the  part  of  creditors,  but  which,  in  very  many  cases,  may 
be  unavoidable  without  such  intervention,  since  a  continu- 


App.]  Our  Agriailture.  [47] 

ance  of  low  prices  would  involve  the  majority  of  agricultu- 
ral debtors  in  insolvency. 

Dr.  Smith  on  Aariculfural  I»ip7rnH'rs.  —  In  tlie  Wealth  of 
Nations  (Book  V.  ('hai)t(:r  II.)  Dr.  Smith  discusses  the  ex- 
pediency of  inducinij  hnuliords  to  cultivate  for  their  own 
account  a  portitni  of  their  lands,  with  a  view  to  the  disco- 
very and  diffusion  of  improvements  in  husbandry.  He 
remarks,  in  another  part,  that  men  of  mercantile  habits 
frecjucntly  become  successful  ai>;riculturists,  beinfj  more  ac- 
customed than  the  hereditary  ihrnu'r  to  calculate  eventual 
advantages,  and  to  hazard  an  outlay  for  a  remote  return. 
Had  his  life  been  prolt)n<^cd,  he  would  have  seen,  during 
the  war,  an  am|)le  addition  to  the  list  of  gentlemen  farmers, 
and  have  had  occasion,  since  the  peiice,  to  qualify  very 
materially  his  favourable  opinion  of  agricultural  under- 
takings when  in  tlie  hands  of  men  of  otlier  })rofcssions. 
In  his  time  the  practical  farmers  were  compai'atively  poor 
and  uneducated  ;  the  hope  of  improvement  in  husbanchy 
seemed  to  rest  in  the  occasional  adoption  of  a  country  life 
by  men  of  diffljrent  habits.  Had  the  case  been  otherwise, 
and  had  our  northern  and  eastern  counties  possessed,  half 
a  century  ago  a  tenantry  ccjual  to  the  present.  Dr.  .Smith 
would  probably  have  taken  a  different  \'w\y  of  the  subject, 
recommending  that  agriculture,  liki:  otiier  pursuits,  should 
be  confined  to  those  who  had  made  it  their  business  for 
life,  and  accounting  for  the  success  of  gentlemen  farmers 
during  the  twelve  or  thirteen  years  previous  to  the  pub- 
lication of  his  book  (1776)  by  a  cause  unforeseen,  and,  in 
sonic  measure,  accidental,  —  we  mean  the  progi-essive  rise 
of  the  {)rice  of  corn. 

Value  uf  Lund  during  last  Centurij. —  In  Heating  histori- 
cally of  the  value  of  land,  Mr.  Arthur  Young,  in  his  "  In- 
(juiry  into  the  Progressive  Value  of  Money,"  ISl'i,  ex- 
presses an  opinion,  that  about  the  year  1770,  estates  sold 
at  thirty-two  years'  purchase  ;  a  rate  higher,  compared  to 
the  rent,  than  they  bore  during  the  preceding  forty  years. 
The  reason,  iloiibtless,  was,  that  during  that  long  period 
we  had  not  an  interval  of  peace  of  sullicient  length  to  re- 
duce the  interest  of  money.  Next,  as  to  rents,  it  is  a  re- 
markable fact,  that  from  the  beginning  of  last  centiu'y  until 
towards  1770,  they  had  experienced  hardly  any  rise.  *'  A 
neighbour  ol'  mine  in  Suffolk,"  says  Mr.  Young,  (Inquiry, 
p.  \0'2,.)  "  who  inherited  a  considerable  laniled  propi-rty, 
informed   me,   that  in  various  conversations  which  he  hud, 


[48]  Oitr  Agriadlure.  [App. 

between  thirty  and  forty  years  ago,  (between  1770  and  1780) 
with  a  relation  fi\r  advanced  in  years,  and  from  whom  much 
of  that  property  was  derived,  tliat  much  surprise  was  ex- 
pressed at  the  rise  of  rents,  wfiich  then  began  to  t^ike  place. 
Through  the  long  period  of  his  relation's  experience,  no 
rise  was  ever  thought  of;  and  lease  after  lease,  in  long 
succession,  was  signed,  without  a  word  passing  on  the 
question  of  rent :  that  was  an  object  considered  as  fixed  ; 
and  grandfather,  father,  and  son,  succeeded  without  a 
thought  of  any  rise:  in  many  cases  landlords  were  much 
more  apprehensive  of  losing  a  tenant  at  the  old  rent, 
than  having  the  smallest  conception  of  raising  it  to  a  new 
one. 

Comparative  Price  of  Wheat  on  the  Continent^  and  in  Eng" 
landf  previous  to  the  French  Revolution. 

Official   Return  of  the  price  of  Wheat    at  the  Rosoy,  or 
Paris  Market,  by  the  Septier  of  24-Olbs.  French. 

Average  of  the  10  yeai's  preceding  1776 
Average  of  the  10  years  preceding  1786 
The  year  1786 

1787 

1788 

Average  per  septier,    during  the  23  years  pre- 
ceding 1789  -  -  -     24   18     2 


vres 

s. 

d. 

28 

7 

9 

22 

4 

7 

20 

12 

6 

22 

2 

6 

24 

0 

0 

Reducing  this  to  English  measure  aiid  money,  the  ex- 
change being  then  twenty-four  livres  for  the  pound  sterling, 
the  result  is  an  average  for  these  twenty-three  years,  per 
Winchester  quarter,  of  38s.  Qd.  sterling. 

At  Dantzic  the  average  price  of  wheat  in  the  twenty 
years  from  1770  to  1789,  both  inclusive,  after  adding  Is. 
per  quarter  for  freight  and  charge  to  England,  was  (Evi- 
dence, Agricultural  Report,  p.  366.)  about  4 Is. 

But  in  England,  the  annual  returns  of  purchase  at  Eton 
market,  during  the  same  period,  give  an  average  of  49s.  : 
the  whole  computed  by  the  \\'inchester  quarter. 

This  difference  was  not  a  little  remarkable  at  a  time 
when  our  taxation  was  hardly  greater  than  that  of  our 
neighbours.  Arising,  in  the  first  instance,  from  bad  sea- 
sons, it  owed  its  continuance  partly  to  our  corn  law  ;  more 
to  the  extension  of  our  manufactures,  and  to  our  war  with 
our  American  colonies  while  the  continent  of  Europe  re- 
mained in  peace. 


App.]  Ow-  Agriadturc.  [4-9] 

Average  Prices  of  Grain  in  Eni^ia?id  in  the  year  1822,  takeJi 
from  the  Official  Jirlnrn. 


Wheat 

43s. 

3(i. 

Rye 

205. 

3d. 

Barley 

2l5. 

3r/. 

Beans 

23s. 

9d. 

Oats 

17^. 

7d. 

Pease 

25s. 

Id. 

Export   and  Import  of  Corn. 
(From  the  Agricultural  Report  of  June,  1821.) 

Quarters. 

Exporting  period.  —  In  the  seventy-six  years 
between  1697  and  1773,  the  amount  of  our 
export  of  corn  of  all  kinds  above  our  im- 
port was  -  _  _  .  30,968,000 

Importing  period.  —  During  the  forty-two  years 
from  1 773  to  1815,  the  amount  of  our  import 
above  our  export  was  about  -  -  24,630,000 

Ireland.  —  The  import  of  corn  of  all  kinds 
from  Ireland  to  Great  Britain,  in  the  thirty- 
two  years  prior  to  1806,  was  only       -         -     7,531,000 

But  after  the  act  of  1806  had  rendered  sucli 
import  free,  it  amounted  in  fifteen  years  (to 
1821)  to  -  -  -  -   12,304,000 


REMARKS 


ON 


The  Agrirullitnd  Rrpoy/  of\HQ\. 

INo  public  document  was  ever  more  eagerly  expected,  or 
more  generally  perused,  than  the  Agricultmal  Iteport  of 
1821,  How  far,  it  may  be  asked,  did  it  fid/il  the  public 
expectation  ?  On  the  ground  of  impartiality  and  liberality 
of  view,  no  reasonable  disappointment  ct)uld  have  been 
experienced,  but  the  comi^osition  of  the  Report  was  by  no 
means  of  equal  merit  with  its  substance,  ^^'e  do  not 
allude  to  a  deficiency  of  those  graces  of  style  which  custom 
does  not  reijuire  in  a  parliamentary  paper,  and  wliicli 
wcTuld  i)robably  be  mis})luciil  there,  but  to  a  want  of  that 

[i>J 


[50]  AgticuUural   lUport   oj   \H'l\.  [App. 

Ijrevity  ntul  arrangement  which  in  any  composition  ar<;  In- 
(lis})ensable  to  a  (Ustinct  conception  of  the  hiti<rii;iM;c  ol 
business.  The  Report  hef^ins  without  any  sketch  or  out- 
line of  its  objects,  and  terminates  with  a  very  hmited 
summary  of  its  conclusions.  The  consecjuence  has  been 
that  many  have  read,  while  few  have  understood  it ;  for 
he  who  aims  at  understanding  it  thoroughly,  or  at  viewing 
it  in  its  ensemble,  must  go  over  the  whole,  not  as  a  reader, 
but  as  an  analyzer;  forming  an  arrangement  for  himself, 
frequently  altering  the  succession  of  the  arguments,  and 
collecting  them  under  general  heads. 

The  object  of  the  Committee  was,  to  express  ourselves 
in  official  language,  "  to  consider  the  various  petitions 
complaining  of  the  depressed  state  of  our  agriculture, 
to  inquire  into  the  allegations  of  the  petitioners,  and  to 
report  their  observations  thereupon."  In  pursuance  of 
this  authority,  they  examined  a  number  of  witnesses, 
and  composed  the  Report  partly  from  the  evidence, 
but,  in  a  far  greater  proportion,  from  their  own  views  and 
conclusions  on  the  corn-trade,  considered  as  a  general 
question.  The  whole  may  be  said  to  embrace  the  follow- 
ing topics. 

Admission  of  the  distress  of  the  Agricidturists ,-  Attempt 
to  ascertain  its  course,  and  to  define  its  extent ;  Reference  to 
formei' periods  of  distress. 

Principiles  of  our  corn-trade :  Historical  retrospect :  its 
prosperous  state  from  1773  to  1814,  a  period  comparatively 
exempt  from  legislative  interference.  Various  disadvajitages 
of  our  present  corn-law ;  Modifications  suggested,  particularly 
a  moderate  fixed  duty  on  foreign  corn. 

Examination  of  the  petitions  of  the  Agriadturists  with 
regard  to  taxes  ;  of  the  high  duty  (405.  per  quarter')  "which 
they  propose  on  foi'eign  wheat ;  and,  lastly,  their  objections 
to  the  unlimited  warehousing  of  foreign  corn. 

Such  are  the  topics  discussed  in  this  long  and  interesting 
Report :  the  principal  inferences  from  the  reasoning  are. 

That  the  bounty-system,  whatever  might  be  its  early 
operation,  was  accompanied  by  a  torpid  state  of  agriculture 
for  the  half  century  previous  to  1 773  : 

That  one  cause  of  the  prosperity  of  our  agriculture  from 
1773  to  1814,  was  its  comparative  exemption  from  legisla- 
tive interference. 

That  the  high  import-limit  established  in  1815  tended  in 
some  degree  to  excess  of  home-growth. 

The  aiivice  of  the  Committee  was  to   return,  by  cautious 


A  pp.]  A(frimltural  Rqwrf  of  1821.  [51] 

steps,  to  an  unrestricted  state  oi' intercourse ;  reducing  our 
import  limit;  and  substituting  a  duty  of  sucli  an  amount  as 
should  aiFord  jirotcction  to  the  present  cultivators  oi"  our 
inferior  soils,  but  holding  out  no  encouragement  for  the 
farther  appropriation  of  these  ungrateful  occupancies. 
After  this  return  to  sound  princijile,  the  Committee  hope 
that  our  increasing  population,  and  the  general  improve- 
ment of  circumstances  attendant  on  confirmed  peace,  will 
relieve  the  distress  of  our  agricultuiists  :  but  they  anticipate 
no  relief  from  such  measures  as  the  proposed  high  duty 
(40s.  per  quarter)  on  foreign  wheat,  or  from  a  restriction  on 
the  warehousing  of  foreign  corn  in  our  sea-ports.  The 
former  would  lead  to  an  excess  of  home-growth ;  and  the 
latter  would  merely  transfer  the  deposits  of  the  corn-ujcr- 
chants  from  our  warehouses  to  those  of  Holland,  rianders, 
and  other  parts  of  the  Continent  which  are  convenient  for 
shipping  it  to  London. 

To  the  general  spirit  of  the  Report  we  subscribe,  in 
common  with  all  who  acknowledge  the  principles  of  free 
trade,  and  who  lament  that  our  legislature  deviated  from 
them  so  materially  in  the  case  of  our  corn-laws.  Next  as 
to  the  L'uiguage,  the  manner  of  expressing  an  opinion  is 
a  consideration  of  great  nicety  in  an  oilicial  rc})ort;  ni 
which,  far  dilierent  from  the  unauthorized  publication  of 
an  individual,  confidence  of  tone  may  lead  to  serious 
results.  In  the  present  case,  it  was  of  great  importance  to 
avoid  all  assertions  which  migiit  be  construeil  into  inter- 
ference between  landlord  and  tenant;  into  a  discourage- 
ment of  the  continuance  of  tillage  at  its  present  extent ;  or, 
finally,  into  a  protection  of  the  consumer  at  the  expence  of 
the  agriculturist.  Against  all  this  the  Committee  carefully 
guarded;  enjoining  nothing  with  respect  to  a  j)oint  so  tleli- 
cate  as  the  adjustinent  of  wages  or  rent  to  the  retluced  price 
of  corn,  but  leaving  the  change  to  the  natural  operation  of 
circumstances.  In  like  nuumer,  with  regard  to  our  import- 
limit  for  foreifjn  corn,  while  a  modification  of  its  amount 
and  the  introduction  of  a  fixed  duty  were  suggested,  no 
confident  calculation  or  authoritative  prescription  wt-re 
given  as  to  the  rate  of  either.  In  short,  tlu-  lle|K)rt  was 
calculated  to  awaken  tlie  landed  interest  to  the  i'olly  of  llu- 
late  system  ;  and  to  the  injiuious  tendency  of  those  inter- 
ferences, to  which,  formerly  in  the  shape  of  bounty,  and 
lately  in  duit  of  discouragement  to  import,  they  have 
clung. 

If,  on  the  whole,  however,  wc  think  thus  favourably  of 
die  Report  of  die  Agricultural  Committee,   we  are  bv  no 

[D]  2 


[52]  Agrinil/iDol  Tirpor/  of  IS2\.  [App. 

means  blind  to  its  defects; — to  the  omission  of  several 
topics,  and  to  the  imperfect  illustration  of  others. 
We  have  already  noticed  in  the  text  (j).  158.) 
The  omission  by  the  Conmiittee  of  the  grand  argument, 
that  the  cost  of  raising  corn  has  a  tendency  to  fall  with  the 
fidl  of  the  market ;  and  we  have  mentioned  (App.  p.  [29]). 
Our  dissent  from  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  that  in- 
crease of  population  augmented  the  difTiculty  of  providing 
subsistence.  In  fact,  the  chief  defect  of  tlie  Report  arises 
from  the  belief  that  the  cultivation  of  an  additional  surface 
becomes  necessary  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  our 
numbers.  So  much  do  the  Committee  appear  to  have 
taken  this  for  granted,  that  they  addressed  very  few  ques- 
tions to  the  witnesses  on  the  practicability  of  augmenting 
crops  by  bestowing  additional  labour  on  the  same  soil.  We, 
on  the  other  hand,  account  the  effect  of  labour  in  augment- 
ing jiroduce  so  great,  the  connection  between  the  hands 
vs^hich  raise  and  the  mouths  which  consume,  so  direct,  that 
in  an  attempt  to  calculate  the  relative  productiveness  of 
diflerent  countries,  we  should  be  guided  chiefly  by  the  re- 
turns of  population.  Almost  every  part  of  Europe  raises 
subsistence  enough  for  its  inhabitants,  with  the  exception 
of  the  maritime  tracts  of  the  Dutch  provinces,  or  rather  of 
the  single  province  of  Holland,  which  happens  to  have  both 
an  unusually  large  population,  and  a  soil  less  adapted  to 
tillage  than  pasture. 

The  Committee  have  allowed  this  theory  to  influence 
their  reasoning  in  several  points,  such  as  (Report,  p.  10.) 
the  (}uestion  of  a  remunerating  price;  the  extent  (p.  11.)  of 
our  probable  suffering  after  a  deficient  harvest ;  the  argu- 
ment (p.  24.)  against  a  high  protecting  duty.  It  may,  in 
short,  be  said,  that  the  effect  of  this  impression  is  almost  as 
perceptible  in  their  labours,  as  was  in  those  of  the  Bullion 
Committee  the  notion  that  the  bank  possessed  the  power  of 
keeping  an  undue  quantity  of  paper  in  circulation. — These 
drawbacks  on  the  merit  of  the  Report  are  neither  few  nor 
inconsiderable :  they  do  not,  however,  prevent  us  from  rank- 
ing it  among  the  most  important  and  instructive  documents 
of  the  kind  that  have  appeai'ed  for  many  years. 

Coni-LWii)  of  IS  1 5.  —  The  Committee  very  properly 
stigmatised  the  corn-law  of  1815  as  adverse  to  the  con- 
nection which  it  is  our  interest  to  keep  up  with  the  Continent, 
for  the  purpose  of  meeting  our  occasional  deficiencies.  Far 
from  inducing  our  capitalists  to  purchase  foreign  corn,  when 
it  was  cheap  and  abundant,  that  law  discouraged  all  inter- 
17 


A  pp.] 


A<^r'uullural  Rrpvrl  r)/'1821. 


[53] 


course  willi  ourneij:;lil)ouis,  exccjH  in  years  wliitli,  in  con- 
sequence of  tlie  similarity  of  latitude  and  climate,  wme  likely 
to  be  seasons  of  dearth  with  them  as  witii  us.  'i'he  foreigner 
was  thus  prevented  from  buying  our  mamifactures,  at  least 
from  reckoning  with  any  confidence  on  his  means  of  pay- 
ment. Hence  the  advantage  of  the  Act  of  the  present  year, 
which,  imperfect  as  it  is,  opens  a  jirospect  of  eventual  iiitei- 
course  witii  our  neighbours,  and  of  lessening  the  extremes 
of  rise  and  lall  in  our  market. 


CornLa-v:  ry  1S22,  untcted  to  be  printed  lOth  Jane. 

Abstract.  —  The  Corn-Law  of  1815  permitted  import 
free  of  duty,  whenever  our  own  corn,  as  returned  by  the 
averages,  was  at  or  above 

I'cr  Quarter.  IVr  (iuaitiT. 

Wheat     -  -         -     sOi-.      Barley        -       -       -        405. 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans  535.     Oats  -       _       _       oQs. 

When  our  currency  was  below  these  prices,  the  import 
was  prohibited. 

The  present  Act  repeals  that  of  1815,  and  permits-  the 
import  for  home  consmni)tiou  of  foreign  ct)rn,  wiiencver 
our  own  corn  shall  be  at  or  above 


35s. 
9^ 


Wheat     -         -         -     70.t.  I  Barley     - 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans  465.  |  Oats         _         _         _      v^^. 

subject  to  certain  duties,   the  amount  of  which  is  regulated 
not  by  these  prices,  but  by  the  following  table : 


SCHEDULE  (A.) 

OwA 

Wheat. 

Rye,  Pease, 
and  Beans. 

Barley, 
BearorBigg. 

Oats. 

If  the  average  of  British 

Corn   be    under,    per 

Quarter 

8O5.      -       - 

53i.     -     - 

■10.«.      -    - 

'J8a. 

Higli  Duty 

-      V2s. 

-     -       8i. 

-      -      (is. 

-      -      -it. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter 

80a.      -     - 

RSs.      -     - 

40s.    -      - 

2Hs. 

Hut  under,     -     do. 

85a.      -      - 

5(is.      -     - 

42*.  6d.   - 

305. 

First  Low  Duty 

-     -       5.S-. 

-    ;u.  Gil. 

'JS.  i'ul. 

-     -      'Js. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter 

85.S-.      -     - 

.'i.-is.     -      - 

■\'2s.  (id.    - 

.}0w. 

Second  Low  Duly          -    -      -        U.       -            Srf. 

-     -      6d. 

■  ■  "• . 

[o] 


[54] 


Corn  Lav:  of  June  1822. 


[A  pp. 


Colonial  Coiii.  —  Corn  from  Quebec,  or  our  otlier  North 
American  Colonies,  is  adniilted  to  consiniiption  in  tliis 
country  whenever  our  own  averai^cs  arc  at  or  above 


Wheat     -         -         -     .5.9.9. 
llyc,  Pease,  and  Beans  39.s-. 
.A.t  the  foUowinir  duties  : 


Barley 
Oats 


.30.9. 
205-. 


SCHEDULE  (B.) 


Wheat. 

Rye,  Pease, 
and  Beans. 

Barley, 
BearorBigg 

Oats. 

If  British  Corn  be  under, 

per  Quarter 

67.9. 

.      - 

44.%      -    - 

3.3s.      -    - 

22s.  Gd. 

High  Duty 

-     ■ 

12s. 

-     -     8s. 

-     -      Gs. 

-      -     4s. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter           -         .          - 

67s. 

_ 

44s.      -    - 

3.3s.      -    - 

22s.  Gd. 

But  under,  per  Quarter 

71s. 

.     .. 

46s.      -    - 

35s.  6rf.    - 

24s. 

First  Low  Duty     - 

-     - 

5s. 

-       3s.  6d. 

2s.  Gd. 

-     -      2s. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter           -         -         - 

l\s. 

-     - 

46s.      -    - 

35s.      -    - 

24s. 

Second  Low  Duty 

~ 

1.9. 

-     -      M. 

-     -      4d. 

Additional  Duty  for  thejirst  three  Months  after  Admission 
to  Salcjor  Home  Consumption.  — To  prevent  an  abruj)!  im- 
port, or  lowering  of  the  market,  it  has  been  judged  advise- 
able  to  impose  by  the  present  act  an  additional  duty  on 

Wheat  -  -  -  5s.  Or/.  Barley  -  -  -2s.  Gd. 
Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans  35.  6d.     Oats        -     -      -2s.  Od. 

On  all  corn,  colonial  as  well  as  foreign,  payable  in  addition 
to  those  in  the  Schedules,  during  the  first  three  months  of 
ju'-nission  to  home  consumption,  whether  the  corn  be  taken 
from  the  warehouse  or  from  on  boai'd  of  ship. 

Cor}i  in  Warehouse. — Foreign  or  colonial  corn  at  present 
in  warehouse  may  be  taken  out  and  sold  for  home  con- 
sumption, as  soon  as  our  averages  shall  be  at  or  above  the 
preceding  rates  respectively,  of  705.  for  foreign,  595.  for 
colonial  wheat,  &c.,  but  subject  to  the  highest  duty  in  the 
Schedules  A.  and  B.     And 

Corn  at  present  in  warehouse  may  be  admitted  to  home 
consumption  in  conformity  with  the  Act  of  1815,  that  is 
free  of  duty,  whenever  our  averages  rise  to  the  rates  fixed 
in  that  Act,  viz. 


Wheat     -  -  -     805. 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans    535. 


Barley 
Oats 


-  405. 

-  26.V. 


A  pp.]  Corn  Laxc  (>/' June  \H22.  [55] 

Flour,  whether  of  wheal  or  oiiti>,  is  subject  to  dut'es 
proportioned  to  the  above-mentioned  duties  on  grain.  In 
this  respect  also  our  North  American  colonies  have  a  pre- 
ference, which  to  them  is  a  point  of  considerable  import- 
ance, since  the  shipments  on  the  opposite  shore  of  the 
Atlantic  take  i)lace  more  frequently  in  the  shaj)e  of  flour 
than  of  grain. 

Flour  made  from  wheat, 

IVr  cwt.  IVr  twi. 

Additional  during  the 

first  three  months    l.v.  1<L 


The  high  tluty      -      Ss.  3d. 
V\vsi  low  duty      -      \s.  Id. 


JSecond  low  duty  Ox.  A-d. 

Oatmeal  per  boll : 


High  duty     -      -     4-i-.  \0d. 
First  low  duly      -      2s.  2d. 


Additional  for  first 

three  months     -       2.v.  2d. 
Second  low  duty  -      O5.  (Sd. 


Additional  labour  hcsto-jocd  on  Tillage  since  1 8 1 4'.  —  To 
our  arguments  in  the  text  on  this  head  it  is  objected  in  a 
respectable  quarter,  (Farmer's  Magazine,  published  at 
Fdinburgh,  November  1822,)  that  the  years  since  the  peace 
have  been  in  general  a  period  of  discouragement  to  farmers, 
and  that  the  "  amount  of  labour  appiieil  to  tillage  is  more 
likely  to  have  been  reduced  than  augmented."  To  this, 
however,  we  cannot  assent,  and  must  observe  in  answer, 

1.  That  several  years  since  the  peace,  in  {)articular  1817, 
1818,  and  1819,  were  years  either  of  high  jirice,  or  of 
favourable  expectation  on  the  part  of  our  larmers,  who  at 
that  lime  experienced  no  ijuidecjuacy  of  means  for  the  pay- 
ment of  labour. 

2.  That  throughout  England,  the  produce  of  which 
forms  fully  thrtv'- fourths  of  the  corn  brouglit  to  market  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  fanners  frequently  employ  labourers 
at  a  loss,  to  avoid  an  increase  of  poor-rate.  Declarations 
to  this  effect  are  found  in  vari.  ..■>  parts  of  the  Fvidence 
before  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821,  whciv  also,  we 
iiiid  that  it  is  not  unusual  for  laiullords  in  England  to  pay 
a  portion  of  the  farming  charges,  on  condition  of  the  tenant 
keeping  up  the  productiveness  of  the  land,  by  :ip|>lying 
lime,  manure,  &c. 

,'}.  A  powerful  circumstance  of  the  same  tendency  is  the 
difficulty  of  withdrawing  labour  and  tapiuil  liom  tillage; 
a  truth  so  strongly   urged  by   Mr.  Clcghorn,  in  his  lately 

[D]  4 


[56]  (\)rn  Imu- 1)/ June   IH22.  [App. 

piihlislu'd  "  Essay  on  the  Causes  of"  the  I)ej)rcssion  of 
At^riculturc,"  (pp.  51,  52,)  and  proved  by  the  experience  of 
half  a  century  (from  1714-  to  17^)4-,)  (hiring  which  th(; 
quantity  produced  was  kept  up,  although  prices  continueil 
very  low. 

4.  Population  returns  1811  and  1821.  7'hese,  it  is  true, 
appear  to  favour  the  opinion  that  the  luimber  of  labourers 
engaged  in  agriculture  has  not  kept  pace  with  the  increase 
of  consumers ;  for  wliile  the  latter  were  augmented  in  the 
course  of  the  ten  years  in  question  15  per  cent.,  tlie  former 
appear  to  have  increased  hardly  10  per  cent.  It  is,  how- 
ever, to  be  remembered,  that 

5.  The  distinction  in  the  Population  returns  is  made,  not 
by  individuals,  but  by  families,  and  that  the  discharges 
from  the  army  and  militia,  or  rather,  the  suspension  of 
drain  by  enlistment,  by  leaving  the  able-bodied  at  home, 
gives  greater  efficiency  to  the  same  number  of  families. 
Also,  that 

6.  From  the  progress  of  improvement  in  husbandry  the 
same  number  of  labourers  raise  a  considerably  larger  share 
of  produce  than  they  did  ten  or  twelve  years  ago. 


App.] 


[57] 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTEK  VI. 


On  Poor  Hate. 

(From  the  Reports  on  the  Poor  Laws  in  1817  and  1821.) 

Table  of  the  Amowit  expended  at  different  dates  on  the  Poor 
of  England  and  IVales^  making  the  year  close  at  Easter^ 
and  adding  the  eorrcsjumding  average  Price  of  the  Bushel 
oflVlieat. —  These  sums  are  distinct  from  churchy  count  ly, 
or  highway  rates. 


IVicc  of 

Wheat  jxT 

Ikshel. 

£ 

.V.     d. 

1748-4-9-50  -     - 

-  avcra<^e 

689,971 

4       5 

1776  -     -     -     - 

— 

1,521,732 

6      9 

1783-84-85  -     - 

— 

1,912,241 

7     7 

1803  -     -     -     - 

— 

4,077,891 

H      1 

1813-14-15  -     - 

— 

6,129,Slt 

12      H 

1816-17-18  -     - 

— 

(;,S4i,290 

10      0 

1819-20  -     -     - 

— 

7,430,627 

9     a 

1821    -     -     -     - 

— 

6,917,660 

7    10 

[58] 


On  Poor  Hale 


[Apr 


Amoiinf  of  Expenditure  in  each  Tenth  Year  since  the  middle 
of  last  Ceiiturjj,  together  laith  the  Price  of  Wheat. 


Years. 

Expenditure. 

Wheat  per  Bushel. 

Ji 

s.      d. 

1750 

713,000 

4.      2 

1760 

.065,000 

4-    10 

1770 

1,306,000 

6      5 

1780 

1,774,000 

5    11 

1790 

2,567,000 

6      4 

1800 

3,861,000 

10     2 

1810 

5,407,000 

12      4 

The  following  are  given  in  successive  Years. 
Expended  on  the  Maintenance  of  the  Poor. 


Wheat  per 

Bushel. 
S.       d. 

.€ 

Year  ending  25th  March, 

1813 

6,656,105 

u;    8 

- 

1814 

6,294,584 

12     3 

_         _         -         - 

1815 

5,418,84-6 

8   10 

_         -         -         - 

1816 

5,724,507 

7     9 

_         _         -         - 

1817 

6,918,247 

10   11 

-         -         - 

1818 

7,890,148 

11      3 

_         -         -         - 

1819 

7,531,651 

10     4 

. 

1820 

7,329,594 

8     8 

-         -         -         - 

1821 

6,947,666 

7   10 

r     ..  J   ..      iir  ..±..- 

-J     O      .     /  7                   7 

London,  Westminster,  and  Southisark. 


Year  ending 

Easter,  1814. 

2otli  March, 

EXPENDITURE. 

Easter,  1813. 

1815. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

Number  of  poor  relieved  per- 

manently in  work-houses     - 

13,389 

13,373 

12,341 

Out  of  work-houses,  without 

reckoning  the  children    -     - 

12,654 

13,76'J 

13,341 

Parishioners  relieved  occasion- 

ally cither  in  or  out  of  work- 

houses      -         -         -         - 
Total  - 

40,993 

69,332 

70,322 

67,036 

96,467 

96,004 

App.]  On  Poor  Rate.  [59] 

Highxvay,  Churchy  cnid  Coiinly  rale. —  These  minor 
charges  form  collectively  somewhat  more  than  a  fii'th  ot"  the 
large  sum  which  passes  currently  under  the  name  of  poor- 
rate.  Are  they,  it  may  be  asketl,  likely  to  experience  a 
reduction  corresjionding  to  that  of  the  iiuid  applied  to  the 
relief  of  the  poor?  As  the  chief  constituent  ot"  charge  in 
these  lesser  rates  is  the  price  of  labour,  it  is  evident  thai 
at  the  reduced  wages  of  the  present  day,  a  smaller  sum  will 
suffice  for  an  equal  extent  of  work  :  on  tlie  other  hand,  it  is 
very  probable  that  from  a  sense  of  the  necessity  of  provid- 
ing employment  lor  the  lower  orders,  and  of  the  advantage 
of  carrying  farther  the  improvement  of  our  roads,  a  con- 
siderable extension  may  be  given  to  such  undertakings  ; 
none,  it  is  evident,  can  be  more  advantageous  to  the  pubhc, 
if  conducted  with  judgment  and  economy. 

Repm-t  of  15///  July  1822,  on  the  Poor-rate  Returns. — 
This,  the  latest  labour  of  the  Committee  on  the  manage- 
ment of  the  poor,  puts  in  a  striking  light  both  the  difier- 
ence  of  plan  followed  in  different  pai'ts  of  the  kingdom,  and 
our  imperfect  acquaintance  with  the  system  as  u  whole. 
There  continues,  says  the  Report,  an  evident  connexion 
between  the  rise  or  fall  of  the  }irice  of  wheat,  and  the  rise 
or  fall  of  expenditure  for  the  poor;  the  total  decrease  in  the 
latter  since  1818  being  22  per  cent.  'J'he  apiiointmcnl  of 
select  vestries  and  assistant  overseers  goes  on  in  different 
parts  of  the  kingdom,  but  more  slowly  than  might  have 
been  expected  after  the  recommendation  of  the  l*oor-law 
Committee  of  1817.  But  the  present  mode  of  keeping 
parish  accounts  presents  a  very  imperfect  check  on  the  ex- 
penditure, and  ought,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Conunittee,  to 
be  rendered  nuich  more  specific.  All  charges  either  for 
law,  or  for  such  purposes  as  building  or  repairing  work- 
houses, ought  to  be  discriminated  from  the  great  head  of 
"  money  exjiended  for  the  relief  and  maintenance  of  the 
poor  :  "  —  while  in  regard  to  the  latter  the  return  ought  to 
l)e-very  explicit,  when  aid  is  alTorded  according  to  the  lunn- 
ber  of  children,  or,  in  particular  ciwes,  to  able-bodied 
persons. 


[60]  [Apr. 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER    VII. 


On  Population. 


il<MPLOYMENT :  its  Subdivision  as  Society  advances.  —  We 
follow  up  the  reasoning  in  the  text  (page  213.)  by  a  few 
familiar  illustrations,  for  several  of  M'hich  we  are  indebted 
to  Mr.  Gray's  Remarks  on  Population.  —  In  a  primitive 
state  of  society,  like  that  of  England  in  the  days  of  the 
Britons  and  Anglo-Saxons,  or  like  that  of  the  interior  of 
Norway  in  the  present  day,  we  find  the  inhabitants  dis- 
tributed into  detached  cottages  or  petty  hamlets,  each 
family  being  obliged  to  provide  almost  every  thing  for 
itself.  To  cultivate  a  lot  of  ground  is,  in  such  a  state  of 
things,  indispensable ;  since  no  employment,  not  even  those 
of  first  necessity,  such  as  the  business  of  the  baker,  the 
tailor,  or  the  mason,  would  occupy  the  whole  of  their  time, 
or  prove  adequate  to  their  support.  Each  household  is 
therefore  obliged  to  build,  to  bake,  to  brew,  to  make  and 
to  mend  for  itself;  how  awkwardly  and  how  imperfectly  it 
is  needless  to  say.  To  rear  a  family  is  to  them,  whatever 
the  imagination  of  poets  may  figure  of  these  days  of  suji- 
posed  enjoyment,  a  task  of  greater  difficulty  than  in  this 
iron  age  of  rents  and  taxes.  Let  us  beware  of  forming  our 
ideas  of  the  condition  of  our  ancestors  from  the  ease  of 
acquiring  subsistence  in  countries  such  as  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  Upper  Canada,  or  the  United  States  of  Ame- 
rica. These  enjoy  all  the  advantages  of  colonies;  they 
pi'ofitby  the  capital,  the  activity,  the  knowledge  of  Europe, 
exhibiting  the  application  of  the  skill  and  formed  habits  of 
the  old  world  to  the  improvement  of  vast  tracts  of  unoccu- 
pied land,  Tiiey  exemplify,  in  short,  almost  all  the  circum- 


A  pp.]  Population,  Sfc.  [61] 

stances  which,  in  ancient  days,   led  to  the  rapid  growth  of 
the  Grecian  colonies  in  Italy  and  Asia  Minor. 

To  revert  to  the  characteristics  of  a  primitive  state  of 
society.  In  the  course  of  ages  the  hamlet  becomes  a  vil- 
lage, and  as  its  population  increases,  a  separation  of  enijiloy- 
ment  gradually  takes  j)lace  ;  a  jirocess  which  goes  on  in  an 
augmented  ratio  as  the  village  becomes  a  small  town,  a 
large  town,  and  eventually  a  city.  How  far  is  this  sub- 
division carried  in  the  case  of  a  population  of  between  1 .500 
and  3000  ?  The  more  common  species  of  labour,  such  as 
that  of  the  builder,  the  baker,  the  butcher,  the  tailor,  the 
shoemaker,  are  separated  ;  but  in  other  lines  the  division 
is  not  complete,  the  shopkeeper  is  a  linen  and  a  woollen- 
draper,  a  grocer,  a  druggist,  a  stationer ;  the  doctor  is 
apothecary,  surgeon,  physician  ;  the  lawyer  unites  the  func- 
tions of  conveyancer,  land-steward,  and  general  agent.  This 
mixture  undergoes  a  decomposition  as  the  inhabitants  in- 
crease from  5  to  10,000;  and  in  a  population  of  from  10  to 
15, 000,  the  various  classes,  whether  of  mechanics  or  dealers, 
are  tolerably  subdivided,  at  least  in  our  country ;  for  in 
France  and  most  parts  of  the  Continent,  the  subdivision, 
even  in  large  towns,  is  far  less  complete. 

Subdivision  of  Employmcyit  in  great  Cities. —  To  mark  this 
subdivision  in  all  its  extent,  the  observer  nuist  repair  to  the 
French,  or  rather  to  the  English  capital,  where  the  mercan- 
tile, the  manufacturing,  the  mechanical  professions,  all  as- 
sume the  most  simple  form.  A  London  banker,  diflerent 
from  his  provincial  brethren,  issues  no  notes,  and  keeps  no 
interest  account  with  his  customers :  a  merchant  confines 
his  connexions  to  a  few  foreign  sea-ports,  perhajis  to  a  parti- 
cular colony  or  town  ;  and  the  name  of  general  merchant, 
though  not  yet  disused,  is  hardly  applicable  even  to  our 
greatest  houses.  But  it  is  in  the  mechanical  arts  that  tlie 
subdivision  of  enijiloymcnt  takes  a  form  the  most  familiar 
and  most  intelligible  to  ordinary  observation.  In  London 
the  class  of  shoemakers  is  divided,  says  Mr.  dray,  iuto 
makers  of  shoes  for  men,  shoes  for  women,  shoes  tor  chil- 
dren: also  into  boot-cutters,  boot-closers,  boot-makers. 
Even  tailors,  though  to  the  public  each  appears  to  do  the 
whole  of  his  business,  are  divided  among  themselves  into 
makers  of  coats,  waistcoats,  breeches,  gaiters.  In  other 
lines  an  equally  minute  repartition  takes  place  :  and  as  to 
the  ornamental  or  elegant  arts,  such  as  those  of  jeweller, 
painter,  engraver,  nothing  would  be  more  easy  than  to  ex- 


[62]  Pnjnilation  ,-  [A pp. 

liihit  a  loiii,'  list  of  professions  limited  to  large  towns,  and 
wliolly  unknown  in  a  tliinly-pcopleil  district. 

r.[J'cct.  of  this  SuhdivisioJi.  —  What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  tlie 
practical  result  of  tliis  miimte  subdivision,  this  nice  distinc- 
tion of  employment  ?  By  fixinf^  the  attention  of  the  work- 
man on  a  single  part  of  his  business,  it  renders  him  sur- 
prisingly correct  and  expeditious  :  his  performance  gains 
equally  in  quality  and  in  dispatch.  This  is  the  result  of  a 
mechanical  dexterity,  ac(juired  without  any  particular  effort 
of  the  mind;  for  we  must  by  no  means  infer  that  the 
quickness  characteristic  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  large  town, 
that  promptitude  which  distinguishes  the  Londoner  and 
the  Parisian  from  the  hesitation  and  circumlocution  of  the 
countryman,  is  the  consequence  of  any  innate  superiority : 
those  who  walk  in  a  crowd  must  adopt  the  step  of  others, 
and  advance  with  the  rapidity  of  the  moving  mass.  The 
attainments  of  these  persons,  meaning  such  attainments  as 
they  possess  acciu'ately  and  thoroughly,  are  often  confined 
to  a  few  branches  ;  but  these  are  the  objects  of  their  profes- 
sion or  business  ;  and  the  result  is,  that  their  work  proceeds 
straight  forward,  very  little  time  being  lost  by  them  in  plan- 
ning, altering,  or  correcting. 

Propoi'tioji  borJie  hi)  different  Classes  in  our  Natiojial 
Income.  —  In  consequence  of  our  insular  position,  our  canals, 
and  our  mines,  the  proportion  of  our  national  income,  de- 
rived from  manufacture  and  trade,  is  greater  than  in  most 
other  countries.  The  following  table  is  taken,  as  far  as 
regards  its  plan,  from  a  publication  by  Mr.  Gray  ;  but  it  is 
subjected  to  several  modifications,  arising  in  one  resj^ect 
from  the  late  population  return,  in  another  from  the  fall  in 
the  price  of  commodities.  It  is  founded  partly  on  conjec- 
ture, partly  on  official  documents. 


App.] 


Ratio  of  its  Prog:ressive  Increase. 


[63] 


Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 

Proportion    of   tla- 
income  of  the  c1;lss 
to   tliu  national  in- 
come at  large. 

Agriculturists  and  all  ciigagctl  in  tlif  sujjply 
oT  subsistence,  whether  i'arniers,  labourers 
or  dealers             -                 ... 

Manufacturers  and  all  persons  occupied  in 
making  clothing,  hardware,  and  other  arti- 
cles for  home  consumption 

Mechanics,  masons,  and  all  engaged  in  sup- 
plying houses  with  furniture 

The  professional  classes,  viz.  lawyers,  clergy, 
medical  men,  artists  and  teachers,  to  whom 
is  added  a  very  numerous,  though  not  an 
affluent  class,  that  of  domestic  servants 

The  army,  the  nav)^  the  civil  servants  of 
government,  the  annuitants  drawing  an  in- 
come from  our  dividends ;  all,  in  short, 
who  arc  paid  through  the  medium  of  taxes 

The    classes    receiving    parish    support    and 

other  charitable  aid               ... 

Total     - 

30  per  cent. 

'20  do. 
Id  do. 

17  do. 

20  do. 

;5  ill). 

100 

The  proportion  allotted  to  the  agricidtural  classes  has 
unfortunately  not  been  earned  by  them  in  the  depression 
that  has  prevailed  since  1820;  but  the  case  must  ere  loii"- 
alter;  and  in  a  table  intended  to  be  referred  to  for  years,  it 
is  fit  to  keep  temporary  irrei^ularities  out  of  si<;ht. 

In  Ireland  the  distribution  of  productive  iiulustry  is  very 
different  from  that  of  iMii^land  :  were  it  added  to  our  esti- 
mate, there  would  be  a  great  aug;menUition  of  the  ay-ricui- 
tural  proportion. 


Population ,-  its  different  Degrees  of  Increase. 

In  a  primitive  stage  of  society  the  rate  of  incrcjise  is, 
doubtless,  very  slow,  since  no  atlvantage  arising  from  the 
boundless  command  of  territory,  can  counterbalance  tlie 
anti-i)oi)ulation  habits  oi'  the  hunter  state.  This  is  suffi- 
ciently exemplified  among  tin;  North  American  Indians, 
and  proves  that  in  the  early  jieopled  regions  ol"  Asia,  the 
increase,   even  with  the  aid  of  a  fine  climate,  could   not 


[G4-]  PopitlalioH:  [App, 

have  been  considerable  nntil  tlie  adoption  of  pastoral  ha- 
bits; nor  great,  until  these  gave  way  to  the  agricultural 
state,  in  which  the  augmentation  of  subsistence  concurs 
so  directly  with  health  of  occupation  to  augment  our 
numbers. 

The  Mercantile  07'  Mamifacturijig  Stage. — The  last  stage 
in  the  progress  of  society  may  be  termed  the  mercantile; 
the  stage  in  which  a  large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  of 
a  country  are  assembled  in  sea-ports  and  manufacturing 
towns.  Manufactures  and  trade  are  by  many  accounted 
adverse  to  population,  the  former  leading  to  sedentary 
habits,  the  latter  occasionally  prompting  a  resort  to  dan- 
gerous climates.  These,  we  admit,  are  serious  objections; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  commercial  state  is  favourable 
to  early  marriage,  as  will  be  readily  allowed  by  all  who 
have  resided  in  an  agricultural  country  like  France,  and 
marked  how  slowly  population  increases  amidst  the  pe- 
nury, the  ignorance,  and  unenterj^rising  habits  of  the 
tenants  of  the  soil.  Add  to  this,  that  many  of  the  irregu- 
larities of  the  manufacturing  state  have  arisen,  not  from 
permanent  causes,  but  from  the  fluctuation  of  wages  inci- 
dent to  a  state  of  war,  or  from  the  insalubrity  of  antiquated 
and  ill-planned  structures.  Evils  such  as  these  are  in  a 
state  of  progressive  cure  from  various  causes,  and  from 
none  more  than  that  distribution  of  population  throughout 
provincial  towns  which  canal  communication  so  directly 
promotes,  by  enabling  a  particular  place  to  confine  itself 
to  a  particular  manufacture,  instead  of  accumulating,  as  on 
the  Continent,  a  multitude  of  workmen  in  a  crowded  and 
overgrown  city.  Paris  and  Vienna  are,  far  more  than 
London,  the  centre  of  manufacture  for  their  respective 
countries;  for  France,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands, 
united,  do  not  exhibit  provincial  towns  to  be  compared 
to  Manchester,  Glasgow,  Birmingham,  Leeds,  Sheffield. 
These,  and  other  places  of  the  kind  in  England,  while 
exempt,  in  a  great  measure,  from  the  drawbacks  of  a  me- 
tropolis, in  regard  to  health  and  expence,  possess  advan- 
tages nearly  equal,  in  access  to  markets  and  division  of 
employment.  The  district  of  Birmingham  in  particular, 
inhabited  as  it  is  by  several  hundred  thousand  persons, 
affords  a  striking  proof  that  a  numerous  population  may 
prosecute  manufacture  without  crowding  themselves  into 
narrow  streets  or  lanes. 


App.]  Ratio  of  its  ^progressive  Inaease.  {35"^ 

Effect  of  the  Enlargement  of  Farms.  —  Increase  of  popu- 
lation is  conducive  to  increase  of  employment  in  many 
respects, rjn  which,  at  first,  we  should  hardly  suppose  it  to 
exert  such  an  influence.  Thus  the  common  notion  of 
small  farms  being  conducive  to  increase  of  numbers,  is  far 
from  correct ;  it  being,  in  the  first  place,  impracticable  in 
these  petty  occupancies  to  do  justice  to  the  productive 
powers  of  the  soil,  while  farms  of  larger  size  (from  300  to 
500  acres)  have  many  advantages,  admitting  of  the  appli- 
cation of  machinery  and  the  beneficial  employment  of 
capital.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that 
while  the  (juantity  of  subsistence  disposable  lor  die  market 
is  augmented  beyond  comparison,  the  number  of  persons 
supported  on  the  spot  is  (as  we  find  from  the  population 
returns  of  counties  so  highly  cultivated  as  Norfolk  and 
East  Lothian)  greater  than  it  was  in  the  age  of  small 
farms. 

Effect  of  Machinei-y  on  the  Conditioji  of  the  working  Classes, 
—  The  effect  of  mechanical  improvement  in  adding  to  the 
income  of  a  community  admits  of  no  doubt,  its  result  being 
to  afford  a  commodity  frequently  of  better  quality, .  and 
always  at  a  cheaper  rate.  To  be  satisfied  of  the  latter,  we 
have  merely  to  compare  the  prices  of  either  our  cottons  or 
hardware  of  the  present  day  with  those  of  similar  articles 
made  by  us  thirty  years  ago,  or  with  those  made  at  j)resent 
on  the  Continent,  where  machinery  is  as  yet  but  partially 
adojited.  But  what,  it  will  be  asked,  is  the  effect  of  ma- 
chinery on  the  income  and  comfort  of  the  workman  ?  At 
first  injurious,  bringing  with  it  the  evils  t)f  transition,  which 
are  very  serious  in  a  time  marked,  like  that  which  lollowed 
the  peace  of  18 14,  by  a  great  reduction  in  tiie  demand  lor 
liands  for  the  public  service.  To  take  an  instance  familiar 
to  those  of  our  countrymen  who  have  resided  in  France :  in 
that  country  coal  is  very  little  used,  and  the  general  fiiel, 
whether  in  town  or  country,  is  wood  :  the  trees,  after  being 
felled,  are  cut  into  short  but  thick  blocks,  carted  into  the 
towns,  sold  in  the  public  markets,  and  broken  up  by  men 
who  make  a  business  of  it,  but  whose  labour,  aided  only 
by  the  wedge  and  saw,  is  tedious  and  fatiguing,  adding 
nearly  ten  per  cent,  to  the  cost  of  the  article.  To  break 
these  solid  blocks  by  machinery  woulil  cause  a  consider- 
able saving  of  both  time  and  expence,  but  in  the  j)resent 
stagnation  of  the  demand  for  labour,  it  would  be  harsh,  and 
indeed  unsafe  to  resort  to  such  an  alternative,  without  pro- 


166']  Prqyidation: —  [App. 

vidina  for  the  thousands  who  would  thus   be  deprived  of 
employment. 

yuci),  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  is  the  case  m  almost 
every  transition  of  importance.  Eventually,  however,  the 
hardship  is  overcome,  and  the  use  of  machinery  becomes 
productive  of  great  additional  comfort  to  the  lower  orders. 
To  prove  that  its  beneficial  effects  are  general,  it  is  not 
enough  to  cite  the  prosperity  of  a  few  manulacturing  dis- 
tricts, as  the  success  of  these  may  be  accompanied  by 
distress  in  other  parts;  the  prosperity  of  Lancashire  may 
cause  embarrassment  in  Saxony,  Flanders,  or  the  banks  of 
the  Rhine.  The  advantage,  then,  arising  from  the  use  of 
machinery,  rests  on  a  broader  basis ;  on  that  law  in  pro- 
ductive industry  which  makes  every  real  reduction  of  cost 
an  addition  to  individual  income,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  to  the  comforts  procured  by  that  income.  The 
benefit  of  such  reduction  is  enjoyed  by  the  public  at  large: 
the  evil,  on  the  other  hand,  is  partial,  being  confined  to 
the  manufacturer.  He,  however,  is  benefited  in  his  capa- 
city of  consumer,  and  experiences  relief  from  his  distress 
as  soon  as  it  is  found  practicable  to  transfer  to  a  new- 
branch  a  portion  of  the  capital  and  industry  hitherto  em- 
ployed on  his  own.  Such  transfers  are,  it  is  true,  tasks  of 
great  time  and  difficulty :  we  have  felt  them  to  be  so  in  our 
own  country,  while  in  others  less  advanced,  they  can  hardly 
be  accomplished  in  the  lifetime  of  a  generation. 

Increase  of  Popidation  in  the  jn'cscnt  Age.  —  The  recent 
increase  of  our  numbers,  so  greatly  beyond  that  of  any 
former  age,  is  ascribed  by  many  persons  to  the  excitement 
attendant  on  the  war,  and  to  the  encouragement  it  afforded 
to  early  marriage  in  the  case  of  so  many  classes,  the  agri- 
cultural, the  manufacturing,  the  mercantile.  This,  how- 
ever, applied  chiefly  to  the  mechanical ;  all,  in  short,  except 
the  fixed  annuitants,  the  middle  classes :  among  the  lower 
the  advantage  in  wages  was  balanced,  or  nearly  balanced,  by 
the  rise  of  provisions.  We  must  also  put  in  the  opposite 
scale  the  serious  injury  to  population  arising  from  war,  as 
well  by  the  loss  of  lives  in  the  field  and  in  tropical  cli- 
mates, as  by  the  removal  from  home  of  many  who  would 
otherwise  have  become  fathers  of  families.  When  to  this 
we  add,  that  since  the  peace  the  7-atio  of  increase  is  not  less 
great  than  during  the  war,  we  are  led  to  attribute  the  aug- 
mentation of  our  numbers  to  causes  more  permanent  and 
satisfactory;  to  the  preservation  of  the  lives  of  children  by 


A  pp.]  Ratio  of  its  progressive  Increase.  [67] 

vaccination;  to  the  better  lodging,  the  greater  cleanhness 
and  sobriety  of  our  lower  classes.  This  result,  already  ex- 
emplified in  the  return  of  deaths  inserted  in  a  subsequent 
page,  will,  we  believe,  be  found  to  rest  on  a  broad  biisis, 
whenever  our  official  documents  shall  become  more  ample. 
Jiimilar  causes  prevail,  though  in  a  less  degree,  on  the 
Continent:  in  France  the  increase  of  population,  ibrmerly 
so  slow  as  hardly  to  yield  an  addition  of  30  per  cent,  in  a 
century,  may  now  be  computed  at  somewhat  more  than 
twice  that  proportion.  In  that  country  sobriety  was  always 
prevalent;  but  the  abolition  of  monasteries,  the  improve- 
ment of  medical  practice,  the  ameliorated  condition  of  the 
peasantry,  are  all  peculiar  to  the  present  age.  In  Ger- 
many the  degree  of  increase  is  probably  not  very  different 
from  that  of  France.  Of  Russia  we  have  as  yet  no  accu- 
rate returns:  Spain,  Italy,  and  the  south  of  Europe 
generally,  are  also  on  the  increase,  but  in  a  ratio,  which, 
when  we  consider  the  general  indolence  and  povert}'  of  the 
lower  orders,  is,  doubtless,  slower  than  that  of  France. 
And  in  the  countries  subject  to  the  Turks,  the  frequency 
of  the  plague,  and  all  the  pernicious  efi'ects  of  bad  govern- 
ment, are  likely  still  to  counteract  the  natural  tendency  of 
population  to  increase. 

Marriages.  —  The  proportion  of  marriages  to  that  of  our 
population  does  not  appear  to  have  increaseil  during  the 
late  wars : 

From  1780  to  1789,    marriages,    compared  to   the  whole 
population,   were  as  1  in  117 
1790  to  1799     -  -  -  -      1  in  11 9i 

1800  to  1809     -  -  -  -      1  in  U9i 

{Barton  on  the  iMboicring  Classes.) 

We  shall  be  more  succssful  in  searching  for  an  expla- 
nation of  the  rapid  increase  of  our  numbers  in  other  causes: 
none  can  be  more  gratifying  than  the  decrease  of  mortality 
in  conse(]uence  partly  of  the  introduction  of  vaccination, 
but  partly  too  of  the  greater  sobriety  and  comlbrt  ol  the 
poor. 

Progressive  Decrease  of  Deaths  in  Great  Britain. 

From  1785  to  1789  -         -         -  1  in  4-86 

1790  to  1794.  -  -  -  1  in  1-47 

1795  to  1799  -  -  -  1  in  465 

liiOO  to  1804  -         -  .  1  in  474 

[Barton,  ut  sutpra.) 
[E]  2 


[68] 


Pnpulalion. 


[Ai'P. 


To  Mr.  Hickman,  Clerk-Assistant  of  tlie  House  of 
Commons,  who  has  prepared  the  successive  Population 
Abstracts  of  1801,  1811,  1821,)  I  am  indebted  for  much 
useful  information,  in  particular  for 

A  Comparative  Vie-jo  of  the  Area  arid  Productive  Power  of 
the  several  Counties  of  England  and  Wales. 

COUNTIES    ACCORDING    TO    THEIR    AREA. 


Square 

Square 

Counties. 

Statute 

Counties, 

Statute 

Miles. 

Miles. 

1.  York 

5,961 

50.   Surrey 

758 

2.  Lincoln 

2,748 

51.  Berks 

756 

5.  Devon 

2,579 

32.  Oxford 

752 

4.  Norfolk 

2,092 

33.  Bucks 

740 

5.  Northumberland 

1,871 

34.  Worcester  - 

729 

C.   Lancaster   - 

1,831 

35.  Hertford     - 

528 

7.  Somerset    - 

1,642 

36.  Monmouth 

498 

8.  Hampshire  - 

1,628 

37.  Bedford 

468 

9.  Kent  - 

1,537 

38.  Huntingdon 

370 

10.  Essex 

1,532 

59.  Middlesex  - 

282 

11.  Suffolk 

1,512 

40.  Rutland 

149 

12.  Cumberland 

1,478 

15.  Sussex 

1,463 

England    - 

50,535 

14.  Wilts 

15.  Salop 

1,379 
1,341 

16.  Cornwall     - 

1,527 

1.  Carmarthen 

974 

17.  Gloucester  - 

1,256 

2.  Montgomery 

839 

18.  Stafford 

1,148 

3.  Glamorgan  - 

792 

19.  Durham 

1,061 

4.  Brecon 

7S4 

20.  Chester 

1,052 

5.  Cardigan     - 

675 

21.  Derby 

1,026 

6.  Merioneth  - 

663 

22.  Northampton 

1,017 

7.  Denbigh 

633 

23.  Dorset 

1,005 

8.  Pembroke  - 

610 

24.  Warwick     - 

902 

9.  Carnarvon  - 

544 

25.  Hereford     - 

860 

10.  Radnor 

426 

26.  Cambridge  - 

858 

11.  Anglesey     - 

271 

27.  Nottingham 

837 

12.  Flint  - 

244 

28.  Leicester     - 

804 

29.  Westmorland 

763 

Wales   . 
Total     - 

7,425 

57,960 

Scotland  and  Ireland  are  nearly  equal  to  each  other  in  area,  and  to- 
gether are  equal  to  or  somewhat  larger  than  England  and  Wales.  Th« 
Assessed  Rental  of  Scotland  in  1811  was  ^£3,899,364. 


App.] 


Pojnilation. 


[69] 


COUNTIES    ACCORDING     TO     THEIR    PRODUCTIVE 
POWER. 

Re7i(  and  Tithe  paid  in  each  Coitritij  in  1810,  per  square 
Mile  of  (JtO  Acres. 


Merioneth 

-     ^'137 

Cambridge 

-    £-^l\ 

Brecon 

154.  , 

Huntingdon   - 

574 

Cardigan 

173 

Hereford 

585 

Carnarvon 

192 

Lincoln 

594 

Montgomery 

198  ! 

Salop     - 

610 

Radnor 

229 

Ik-rks     - 

611 

Carmarthen 

21-}. 

Bedford 

619 

Ghimorgan    - 

284- 

Derby 

624 

Pembroke 

281. 

Kent 

651 

Anglesey 

288 

Wilts     - 

652 

Westmorland 

299 

Nottingham  - 

659 

Durham 

300 

(iloucester 

680 

Cumberland  - 

327 

Cheshire 

684 

Denbigli 

331 

Essex    - 

692 

Hampshire     - 

435 

Rutland 

692 

Monmouth     - 

436 

Stafford 

693 

Sussex 

44-5 

Northampton 

702 

Cornwall 

470 

Oxford 

709 

Norfolk 

509 

Bucks 

713 

Devon 

516 

Lancaster 

718 

Northumberland 

520 

Hertford 

734 

Flint       - 

536 

Warwick 

744 

Suffolk 

537 

Worcester 

772 

Dorset 

538 

Somerset 

876 

York      - 

541 

Leicester 

891 

Surrey 

550 

Middlesex 

-      1,325 

The  area  of  the  counties  vas  measured  on  Arrowsniith's 
last  map  (date  1815 — 1816),  wliicli  wasformed  on  the  trigo- 
nometrical survey.  The  process  of  s(|uarinir  and  computing 
the  miles,  as  well  as  of  cbtimating  the  parts  of  miles  on 
the  borders  of  each  county,  having  been  performed  with 
much  care  and  labour,  the  inacccuracies  are  few  and  in- 
considerable. 

Anmud  Value  of  Land  hi  the  square  mile  of  640  .?/a- 
tiite  acres. — This  is  computed  from  the  "rent  and  tithe 
collectively,"  and  the  average  of  England  and  M'ales  in 
1811  was  17s.  2r/.  per  acre:  the  counties  which  take  the 
lead  are  Leicester  and  Somerset,  and  the  chief  cause  of 
superiority  is  the  extent  of  good  jjasture  ground,  which,  of 
course,  yields  a  return  at  little  expcncc. 

[F.J   :^ 


C70] 


Population. 


[A  PP. 


The  Rental  is  taken  from  the  Property-lax  return  for 
the  year  ending  April,  1811,  (see  p.  6'6.  of  the  Property- 
tax  Accounts,  printed  2G  Feb.  1813.)  The  fall  of  rent  on 
the  one  hand,  and  extension  of  culture  on  the  other,  proba- 
bly render  this  return,  tiiough  comparatively  of  old  date, 
a  tolerably  accurate  representation  of  the  present  rental  of 
the  kingdom. 

One  method  of  computing  the  productiveness  of  land 
under  tillage  is  to  "  take  for  each  county  the  number  of 
families  employed  in  husbandr}-,  and  to  divide  by  it  the 
amount  of  rent  and  tithe."  The  result  may  be  said  to  ex- 
hibit the  "  average  net  produce  of  the  labour  and  capital  of 
each  family  thus  engaged,"  and  indicates,  we  believe  with 
tolerable  accuracy,  the  progress  of  the  improved  husbandry. 
For  England  and  Wales  the  average,  in  1811,  was  41/. 
per  family  of  agriculturists.  The  proportion  was  by  no 
means  greatest  in  the  counties  adjacent  to  the  metropolis ; 
for  while  in  Hertfordshire  and  Surrey  it  varied  from  SO/,  to 
40/.  per  family  of  agriculturists,  in  Lincoln  and  Durham  it 
exceeded  50/.,  and  in  Northumberland  went  considerably 
beyond  that  amount.  A  return  of  this  nature,  made  after 
rents  assume  a  settled  form,  would  be  a  very  interesting 
document,  particularly  if  combined  with  a  similar  return 
from  Scotland,  where  tithe  and  poor-rate  happily  form  so 
slight  a  deduction  from  the  income  of  the  landlord. 

Jtank  (^  our  different  Counties  i?i   j^oint    of  Density  of 
Popdation. 

19  Berks 

20  Norfolk 

21  Oxford 

22  Bedford 

23  Flint 


1  Middlesex 

2  Lancaster 

3  Surrey 

4  York,  W.  Rid. 

5  Kent 

6  Warwick 

7  Gloucester 

8  Nottingham 

9  Chester 

10  Worcester 

11  Durham 

12  Somerset 

13  Suffolk 

14  Derby 

15  Cornwall 

16  Leicester 

17  Northampton 

18  Essex 


24  Buckingham 

25  Hertford 

26  Wilts 

27  Southampton 

28  Cambridge 

29  Anglesea 

30  Huntingdon 

31  Stafford 

32  Salop 

33  Devon 

34  Sussex 

35  Rudand 

36  York,  E.  Rid. 


137  Denbigh 

38  Dorset 

39  Glamorgan 

140  Hereford 

41  Pembroke 

142  Caernarvon 

43  Monmouth 

144  Northumberl. 

145  York,  N.  Rid. 
i46  Lincoln 

47  Cumberland 

48  Caermarthen 
i49  Montgomery 
[50  Cardigan 

J51  Westnivireland 
152  Merioneth 
'53  Radnor 
54  Brecon 


A  pp.] 


Population. 


C71] 


CENSUS    OF    ISf^l. 

England,  Scotla)id  a?id  Wales  ;  Licrease  of  the  Population 
since  1811,  exhibited  by  Coimtics. 


1 
Increase 

Increase; 

Increase 

per  cent,  i 

percent. 

percent. 

Counties. 

from     j 

Counties. 

from 

Counties. 

from 

1811  to  I 

1811  to 

1811  to 

1821.   1 

1821.    1 

1 

18'.>1. 

-     1 
Peebles 

i 
1 

York,  E.  Rid- 

Durham -     - 

IT 

Sutherland    -  ; 

1      ; 

ing     - 

14 

Linlithgow     - 

17 

Perth      -      - 

5 

Aberdeen 

15 

Somerset 

17 

Forfar    - 

6 

Bute     - 

15 

Banff    - 

18 

Kincardine    - 

1 
6       ; 

Derby     -       - 

15 

Gloucester    - 

18 

Salop 

6       j 

Devon    - 

15 

Norfolk     -    - 

IR 

Kinross     -     - 

7       iKssex   - 

15 

Bedford     -    - 

19 

Berwick  -     - 

8 
9 

Inverness 

15 

Chester     -    - 

19 

Nairn     - 

Kirkcudbright 

15 

Cornwall  -    - 

19 

Clackmannan 

10 

Montgomery  - 

15 

Denbigh   -     - 

19 

Merioneth     - 

10 

Northampton 

15 

Lincoln     -     - 

19 

Hereford 

10 

Nottingham  - 

15 

Glamorgan    - 

20 

Radnor    -    - 

10 

Orkney  and 

Middlesex     - 

JO 

Roxburgh 

10       1 

Shetland   - 

15 

Warwick 

20 

Elgin      -      - 

11        i 

Hampshire    - 

15 

York,  N.  Rid- 

Argyle    -      - 

12 

Wilts    -       - 

15 

ing      -      - 

-20 

13erks     -      - 

1-        \ 

Worcester    - 

15 

Cambridge    - 

21 

Stirling   -      - 

12 

Brecon     -     - 

IC 

Renfrew 

21 

Westmorland 

12 

Dorset     -     - 

16 

Anglcscu 

22 

Dumbarton  - 

13 

Flint       -      - 

16 

Ayr 

22 

Dumfries 

13 

.Hertford 

1  Huntingdon  - 

16 

jPembroke 

22 

Fife      - 

15 

16 

Surrey     - 

83 

Haddington  - 

15 

Leicester 

16 

Sussex     - 

25 

Ross  and  Cro- 

i Monmouth    - 

16 

lYork.W.Rid- 

marty 

15 

Northumbcr- 

1     ing     -        - 

23 

Oxford    -      - 

15 

i     land     - 

16 

jWigton    -     - 

34 

Rutland   -     - 

13 

Staflbrd    -     - 

16 

{Lanark     -     - 

27 

Selkirk     -     - 

15 

Suffolk     -     - 

16 

'Lancaster 

1      -^ 

Buckingham  - 

14 

jCumbcrland  - 

17 

'Caithness 

:    29 

Cardigan  -    - 

14 

Cannarthcn  - 

J7 

Edinburgh     - 

1      29 

Kent"  - 

14 

Carnarvon     - 
i 

17 

The  ratio  of  most  frequent  occurrence  is  J. 5  per  cent.,  or 
an  average  between  13  and  17  per  cent.  In  several  conn- 
ties  the  augmentation  is  to  be  ascribed  tollu-  incrcasf  of  the 
principal  towns;  thus  the  increase  of  Middlesex  is  ilic 
increase  of  London,  Surrey  of  Southwark,  Warwickshire 
of  Birmingham,  Lanarkshire  of  Glasgow,  and  Lancashire 
of  Manchester,  Liverpool,  Preston,  &c.  In  the  remote 
county  of  Caithness,  the  increase  is  owing  to  the  extension 
of  the  herring  fishery;  while  the  almost  sl;tiionary  condition 
of  the  adjoining  county  of  Sutherland  is  owing  to  the  emi- 


[72] 


l^opidation. 


[App. 


frration  ofcottagers,  and  the  conversion  of  their  petty  occu- 
pancies into  pasture  ground. 
Englcmd  and  Wales:   Progressive  Increase  of  our  Pojndation. 

Its  amount  in  1801  -         -         -  9,343,578 

Ditto  1811  -         -         -  10,791,115 

Ditto  1821         -         -         -  11,977,665 


Fy 


ogressive  Increase  in  the  Ten  Principal  Towns  of  England. 


Year  1801. 

Year  1811. 

Year  1821. 

London         -         -      - 

900,000 

1,050,000 

1,225,964 

Manchester 

81,020 

98,573 

153,788 

Liverpool 

77,655 

94,.»76 

118,972 

Birmingham 

73,670 

85,755 

106,722 

Bristol 

63,645 

76,433 

87,779 

Leeds          _         _         . 

53,062 

62,534 

83,796 

Plymouth 

45,454 

56,060 

61,212 

Portsmouth 

32,166 

40,567 

45,648 

Norwich     -        -        - 

36,852 

57,256 

50,288 

Newcastle-on-Tyne 

28,365 

37,587 

46,948 

Scotland.  —  Here  the  rafio  of  increase  in  the  towns,  par- 
ticularly Edinburgh  and  Glasgow,  has  been  equally  great. 

Irelaiid.  —  The  returns  previous  to  1811  were  too  im- 
perfect to  afford  the  means  of  calculating  the  progressive 
increase  of  population,  nor  have  those  of  1821  as  yet  been 
given  to  the  public  in  a  satisfactory  form  :  the  general  re- 
sult is,  that  the  population  of  all  Ireland  amounts  in  round 


numbers  to 

That  of  the  principal  towns, 
Dublin 
Cork 
Limerick      -         -         - 


•      7,000,000 

186,276 

100,535 

66,042 


Great  Britai7i:  Return  o/'1821. 


Distribution  into  Classes, 

Families. 

Proportions    to 
the  whole  popu- 
lation in  parts 
of  100. 

Employed  chiefly  in  agriculture 
Do.  in  trade,  manufactures,  me- 
chanical employment,  &c.     - 
In  all  other  situations 

978,656 

1,350,293 
612,488 

53 

46 
21 

100 

1 

App.] 


Population. 


[73] 


Proportion  of  Agricitlfwnl  Population.  —  This  varies 
greatly,  according  to  tlie  particular  county.  In  a  highly 
manufacturing  county,  such  as  Lancashire,  it  is  not  halt' the 
average  of33  in  100;  inYorkshire,  which  in  the  West  Riding 
is  manufacturing,  and  in  other  parts  agricultural,  the  return 
approaches  to  the  average,  but  is  still  somewhat  below  it; 
while  in  Sussex,  Essex,  Suffolk,  where  there  are  so  tew 
manufactures,  it  greatly  exceeds  it,  being  above  50  in  100; 
in  Cambridgeshire,  Bedfordshire,  and  Herefordshire,  the 
proportion  is  the  largest  of  all,   being  above  GO  in  100. 

Comparison  of  the  Population  Returns  of  1S\  I  and  1821. 


England. 

Wales. 

Scotland. 

Totals. 

Increase 
per 
cent. 

Families  chiefly    employed  ) 
in  agriculture,        1811    J 

697,353 

72,846 

125,799 

895,998 

1821 
Do.     in    trade,    manufac-  y 

773,732  74,225 

130,699 

978,656 

9V 

tures,     and     mechanical  > 
employment      -       1 8 1 1  j 

923,588  36,044 

169,417 

1,129,049 

1821 
In  all  other  situations,  1811 
1821 

1,118,295  41,680 
391,450  20,866 
454,690  30,801 

i 

190,264 
106,852 
126,997 

1,350,239 
519,168 
612,488 

19J 

18 

The  most  important  reflection  suggested  by  these  returns, 
is  the  great  superiority  of  increase  in  our  town  population 
over  that  of  tiie  agriculturists.  This  is  remarkable  on  two 
accounts;  first,  as  indicating  a  rapid  increase  of" productive 
power,  and  next  as  jieculiar  to  our  island ;  the  augment- 
ation in  France  and  the  Continent  generally  being  no  greater 
in  town  than  in  the  country. 

Wales.  —  Here  agricultural  employiueiit  predominates. 
Among  persons  out  of  business  there  apjxars  a  remarkable 
increase;  the  consequence,  probably,  of  Wales  being  found  a 
comparatively  cheap  residence  by  half-pay  oflicers  and  other 
annuitants. 


[7*] 


PopuLalioii. 


[A  pp. 


Indications  of  an  Increase  of  National  Wealthy  taken  from 
Population  J  let  urns.  —  These  are, 

1.  An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  persons  who  are 
independent  of  labour;  we  mean  of  those  who  derive  their 
income  from  property,  whether  land,  houses,  or  money 
lent. 

2.  A  greater  comparative  increase  of  town  population. 

3.  It  follows  that  under  such  circumstances  afrriculturists 
will  increase  in  a  ratio  inferior  to  that  of  tiie  other  classes  : 
still  the  augmentation  of  produce  may,  and  probably  will, 
keep  pace  with  the  augmentation  of  the  consumers,  the 
improvements  in  husbandry  and  the  increased  use  of  ma- 
chinery (such  as  threshing  mills)  contributing  greatly  to 
lessen  the  manual  labour  employed  in  raising  corn. 

Census  of  1377-  —  As  a  matter  of  historical  curiosity,  we 
subjoin  the  population  of  the  principal  towns  of  England  in 
the  year  1377,  Avhen  an  enumeration  was  made  on  account 
of  a  poll-tax : 


London 

- 

- 

35,000 

York     -     - 

- 

- 

11,000 

Bristol 

■- 

- 

9,000 

Plymouth  - 

- 

- 

7,000 

Coventry    - 

- 

- 

7,000 

Norwich     - 

- 

- 

6,000 

Lincoln 

- 

- 

5,000 

Sarum,  Wiltshii 

'e 

5,000 

Lynn    -     - 

- 

- 

5,000 

Colchester     -  -     - 

Canterbury   -  -     - 

Beverley        -  -     _ 
Newcastle-on-Tyne 

Oxford  -  -     - 

Bury,  Suffolk  -     - 

Gloucester   C  Ea^h 

Leicester         <  somewhat 

Shrewsbury/ "'°'*'^*" 


4,500 

4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
3,500 
3,500 

3,000 


In  that  remote  age  the  total  population  of  England  was 
2,300,000 ;  but  the  proportion  of  town  population  was  far 
smaller  than  at  present,  since  the  number  of  towns  contain- 
ing above  3000  inhabitants  was  only  18. 


[75] 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


National  Revenue  and  Capital. 

J S  our  animal  Consumption  cqtud  to  onr  aivmal  Production  ? — 
\xi  advertincf  to  this  subject,  our  limits  prevent  our  enlarg- 
ing on  the  distinction  between  productive  and  un|ir()ductive 
consumption,  as  explained  by  M.  Say  and  Mr.  ^till,  or 
the  much  greater  latitude  given  to  the  term  jiroductive  by 
Mr.  Gray.  We  have,  in  tact,  room  for  little  more  than 
answering  the  plain  practical  question,  "  What  part  of  our 
national  income  appears  to  be  saved  or  invested,  so  as  to 
form  a  permanent  addition  to  the  national  property  ?" 

The  part  of  our  income  thus  appropriated  will  be  found 
very  small,  if  considered  in  the  limited  sense  of  investments 
in  money  securities,  such  as  the  funds  or  mortgage,  trans- 
actions of  that  nature  being  confined  in  a  great  measure 
to  annuitants,  or  rather  to  tlic  comparatively  small  portion 
of  them  that  are  opulent.  If  to  these  we  add  the  invest- 
ments in  the  form  of  money  in  the  part  of  all  other  classes, 
including  the  saving  banks  of  the  lower  orders,  we  shall 
probably  find  for  the  kingdom  at  large,  an  annual  appropri- 
ation of  9  or  10,000,000/.,  the  interest  of  which,  at  the  pre- 
sent reduced  rate,  affords  an  addition  of  only  .3  or  400,000/. 
to  our  national  income. 

But  if  we  take  in  a  more  liberal  sense  the  difference  be- 
tween the  revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  nation,  if  we 
consider  as  saving  or  as  increase  of  our  stock,  all  that  is 
laid  out  on  the  improvement  of  land,  the  building  or  re- 
pair of  houses,  the  increase  of  furniture,  and  if  to  these  we 
add  interest  of  money  saved,  we  shall  find  on  the  whole,  an 


[76]  National  Revenue  and  CapiUil :  C'o)Tes])ondcnctJ  [A pp. 

addition  to  our  national  capital  of  50  or  60,000,000,  mak- 
ing an  increase  in  otn-  taxable  income  of  nearly  3,000,000/. 
a-ycar,  and  renderin*^  it  probable  tliat  the  260,000,000/. 
of  this  year  will  in  182i  become  263,.000,000/.;  in  1825 
266,000,000/.,  &c.  This  result  will  be  confirmed,  if  we 
take  as  a  criterion  the  increase  of  our  population,  confining 
our  estimate  to  those  who  annually  attain  the  age  of 
twenty,  the  age  of  efficient  labour,  and  whose  number  we 
calculate  as  follows : 

In  1802  the  population  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
was  about  16,000,000,  the  annual  increase  by  births  over 
deaths,  Ih  per  cent,  or  24-0,000.  The  individuals  then 
born,  whether  male  or  female,  have  now  attained  the  age 
of  useful  labour,  and  must  be  considered  as  bearing  the 
same  share  as  the  rest  of  the  population,  in  augmenting  the 
national  income.  In  what  manner  ought  the  result  of  their 
exertions  to  be  calculated?  Our  national  income,  taken  in 
the  largest  sense,  is  (see  p.  256)  350,000,000/.  a-year,  and 
the  average  contribution  to  it,  reckoned  per  head  of  popu- 
tation,  is  nearly  17/.  Estimated  in  that  proportion,  the  ad- 
dition from  our  new  cultivators  of  the  field  of  national  in- 
dustry would  be  little  short  of  4,000,000/.  a  year ;  but  we 
prefer  the  safer  course,  and  reckon  as  a  bo7id  fide  addition 
to  our  resources  only  that  income  which  is  subject  to  taxes. 
Now,  on  dividing  the  taxable  income  of  the  nation  by  the 
number  of  our  population,  the  result  is  about  12/.  a  head 
as  the  product  of  each  individual,  and  the  quota  of  our  new 
contributors,  reckoned  by  that  scale,  approaches  to  the 
3,000,000/.  mentioned  above. 

This  will  be  found  a  fair  and  moderate  estimate  of  the 
annual  addition  to  our  national  income.  If  it  be  objected, 
that  a  deduction  ought  to  be  made  from  our  assumed 
number  of  240,000,  on  account  of  the  deaths  occurring 
ere  our  new  contributors  attain  the  age  of  labour,  we 
answer  that  that  is  amply  balanced  by  the  following  con- 
siderations : 

1.  The  growing  increase  of  our  numbers,  which,  follow- 
ing the  scale  of  our  population  returns  for  1803,  4,  &c. 
will  be  next  year  244,000;  the  year  after  250,000,  and 
seven  years  hence,  270,000. 

2.  The  fact  that  our  new  labourers  living  chiefly  in  towns 
where  wages  are  higher  than  in  the  country,  their  contri- 
butions might  fairly  be  estimated  at  somewhat  more  than 
12/.  ahead. 

3.  Particularly  as  that  sum   forms  the  average  contri- 


App.]  between  Production  and  Cu7isumj)t ion.  [77I 

bution  of  our  population  including  all  a<rcs^  wliereas  the 
240,000  on  whom  we  calculiUc  iuive  attained  the  a^-c  of 
labour. 

A  Table  of  annual  Consumption  substituted /'(n-  a  Table  of 
Production.  —  Since  all,  or  nearly  all,  that  is  })roduced, 
is  consumed  in  one  form  or  other,  whether  productively 
or  otherwise,  and  since  the  taxes  of  this  country  are 
imposed  chiefly  on  consumption,  it  will  be  more  suitable 
to  our  reasoning  to  exhibit  the  amount  in  the  form  of  con- 
sumption. 

National  Expenditure  or  Consumption  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland  for  1823. 

Expended  on  the  produce  of  the  soil  for  the 
food  of  }nan,  or  for  purposes  of  manufac- 
ture _  -  _  .€120,000,000 

On  the  produce  of  the  mines  -  -      10.000,000 

On  manufactures  for  liome  consumption        -      70,000,000 

On  houses  built  or  re})aired;  on  furniture; 
and  on  improvement  of  land  on  whatever 
is  termed  in  law  real  jjrojK-rty  -  -        30,000,000 

On  all  goods  imported,  whether  for  consump- 
tion, such  as  tea,  sugar,  coflee ;  or  for 
manufacture,  as  wool,  hemp,  iron  -        70,000,000 

On  all  commodities  or  jModucts  not  com- 
prized in  the  preceding  -  -       .j(),000,0()0 


Total  consumption     -     .1 350,000,000 


Correspondence  of  this  Sketch  xvith  the  Calculation  of  other 

Writers. 

Mr.  S.  Gray,  in  his  addition  to  the  Happiness  of  States, 
(p. 636.)  computes  the  total  expenditure  or  consumption  of 
the  population  of  Great  Britain  in  1818  at  i  280,000,000 
To  which,  if  we  add  for  Ireland  -  70,000,000 


The  result  is  as  above     -      .£\350,0()(),{)00 


Mr.  Colquhoun's  table  of  proj)erty  amuially  created,  will 
be  found  to  differ  in  a  few  particulars  only  frt)m  our  sketch 
of  consumption.      We  leave  out  in  the  latter 

The  produce  raised  for  the  food  of  iiorses,  cattle,  and 
the  lesser  animals  ;  also 


[78]    National  Reveyuu!  and  Capital :  Correapondnicc    [App. 

The  amount  of  niaiiufacturcs  exported  ;  wliile  in  lieu  of 
of  the  latter,  and  of  some  other  heads  in  Mr.  C's  table,  we 
insert  tlie  value  of  our  imports. 

Our  next  inquiry  relates  to  a  topic  of  considerable  in- 
tricacy. 

Pruportion  of  National  Expenditure  exempt  from  Taxation. 
—  In  France  and  other  countries  of  limited  trade,  the 
governments  are  obliged  to  impose  their  taxes  chiefly  on 
production,  exacting  from  the  landlord  and  farmer  a  piiy- 
ment  equivalent  in  general  to  20  percent,  of  their  incomes. 
With  us  the  form  of  impost  is  different :  the  direct  taxes 
since  the  peace  are  not  considerable,  but  those  on  com- 
suniption  have  long  been,  and  still  are  so  multiplied,  that 
many  persons  imagine  that  hardly  any  portion  of  our  ex- 
penditure escapes  the  visitation,  dii"ect  or  indirect,  of  the 
exchequer.  In  various  cases,  however,  the  transit  from 
production  to  consumption  is  too  direct  to  admit  of  assess- 
ment, particularly  in  regard  to  the  lower  orders.  The 
oats,  the  potatoes,  the  kitchen  vegetables  reared  by  the 
cottager  for  his  family,  or  by  the  farmer  for  his  labourers, 
though  all  comprised  in  our  estimate  of  r::Llonal  consump- 
tion, are  subject  to  very  slight  demands  on  the  score  of 
taxation. 

Case  of  Ireland.  —  This  is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the 
sister  island,  where  the  taxed  expenditure,  limited  as  it  is 
to  the  disburse  of  the  gentry,  the  merchants,  professional 
men,  and  the  comparatively  small  portion  of  the  lower 
classes  residing  in  towns,  cannot  with  confidence  be  com- 
puted at  more  than  25,000,000/.  But  a  population  of 
7,000,000,  supposing  their  average  rate  of  subsistence  not 
to  exceed  that  of  the  English  cottagers,  as  calculated  by  Sir 
F.  Eden,  (between  6  and  7/.  a  head,)  could  not  exist  with- 
out an  annual  produce  of  nearly  50,000,0000/. ;  and  if 
in  forming  a  calculation  for  Ireland,  we  make  allowance 
for  the  better  circumstances  of  her  town  population,  and 
for  the  comparative  comfort  of  her  linen  manufacturers, 
we  may,  perhaps  without  exaggeration,  carry  the  total 
property  created  in  that  island  to  70,000,000/.  a  year,  which 
is  in  the  proportion  of  nearly  3  to  1  to  the  sum  we  have 
assumed  as  representing  her  taxable  income. 

That  the  supposed  amount  of  the  latter  cannot  be  much 
above  25,000,000/-  is  unfortunately  too  clear  from  the 
state  of  the  revenue,  the  amount  of  which,  before  making 
any  deduction  for  collection,   hardly  exceeds  5,000,000/., 


App.j  lettsoeen  Production  ayid  Cwistmptimi.  [79] 

or  20  per  cent,  on  25,000,000/.,  although  levied  of  late 
years  on  nearly  the  same  stale  of  duties  as  in  England, 
where  taxation,  distinct  from  j)oor  rate,  exceeds  20  per 
cent,  of  the  national  income.  How,  it  may  be  asked,  does 
it  happen  that  the  two  countries  differ  so  greatly  in  the 
proportion  of  their  taxed  ami  untaxed  consumption  ?  Be- 
cause thre?:-fourths  of  the  population  of  Ireland  are  cot- 
tagers, whose  consumption  eludes  the  visit  of  the  tax- 
gatherer,  their  clothing  being  of  home  manufacture,  their 
food  the  patatoes  of  the  neighbouring  field,  their  fuel  the 
turf  of  the  common  bog.  One  generation  thus  succeeds 
to  the  poverty  of  another;  and  in  the  eye  of  the  political 
arithmetician,  Ireland  is  rich  only  in  recruits. 

France. — This  country  bears  a  considerable  resem- 
blance to  Ireland  in  the  density  as  in  the  poverty  of  her 
agriculturists;  their  total  consujnption  (exclusive  of  the  food 
of  horses  and  cattle)  is  not  over- rated  at  180,000,000/., 
but  as  in  the  rural  districts  of  France  the  excise  duties  are 
very  light,  taxation  in  these  districts  is  in  a  manner  confined 
to  the  45,000,000/.  of  rent  and  farmer's  income  returned 
as  subject  io  Jbncicr.  The  assessment  under  that  head, 
heavy  as  it  is,  would  not,  if  calculated  on  the  produce  of 
agriculture,  exceed  5  or  6  per  cent.;  yet  to  increase  the 
amount  of  this  tax  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty,  and  the 
contribution  of  French  agriculturists  to  their  govcrmnent 
takes  i)lace  much  more  in  men  than  in  money.  Thus  in 
1793,  when  the  cause  of  the  revolution  was  highly  j)opular, 
and  the  greatest  efforts  weie  necessary  to  repel  invasion,  the 
demand  of  the  government  was  directed  not  to  pecmiiary 
aid,  but  to  levies.  And  after  the  discredit  of  the  .issi^^udts, 
the  finances  of  France  owed,  in  a  ^reat  measure,  their  sup- 
port to  the  resources  of  the  Netherlands. 

Such  is  the  state  of  taxation  in  regard  to  agriculturists; 
the  next  question  respects  the  situation  of  manufacturers. 
Among  them  the  projiortion  of  exjienditure  subject  to  tax- 
ation may  at  first  appear  large,  the  majority  of  the  work- 
men residing  in  towns ;  however,  a  great  j^art  of  them  arc 

indiiient,  and  thourjh  the  wajjes  of  the  unmarried  are  ex- 

I        •  1  II 

pended  in  a  great  measure  on  taxecf  articles,  such  as  beer, 

spirits,  and  tobacco,  those  of  women,  children,  or  tiie 
fathers  of  families,  are  more  strictly  confined  to  the  pur- 
chase of  the  necessaries  of  life. 

Lastly,  in  rcnard  to  the  cxjieiuiiture  of  merchants,  pro- 
fessional men  and  traders,  foreign  commerce,  transacted  as 
it  is  in  sea-ports,  and  by  persons  in  the  command  of  capital. 


[80]    Natio7ial  lievenuc  and  (Japilal:  C'onesj)0?i(lenre   [App. 

creates,  lor  tlic  limited  luunber  employed  hy  it,  a  f^reat 
consiiinptioi)  of  taxed  articles.  Of  prolessioiuil  income 
tile  iippropriation,  from  tlie  respectable  station  of  the  indi- 
viduals, is  similar,  but  inland  traffic  comprises  many  per- 
sons of  a  very  bumble  rank,  mechanics,  labourers,  and 
others,  of  wliose  consumption  a  considerable  part  is  but 
sli^i^htly  productive  to  the  exchequer.  ^ 

It  would,  we  believe,  answer  no  useful  purpose  to  enter 
on  a  more  minute  distinction  of  the  expenditure  of  parti- 
cular classes.  Speaking  generally,  we  may  assume  that 
about  25  per  cent,  of  our  national  exjienditure  seems  ex- 
empt from  taxation,  and  that  if  the  wliole  be  computed  at 
350,000,000/.,  the  taxable  part  may,  agreeably  to  the 
table  in  the  text,  be  put  down  at  somewhat  more  than 
260,000,000/. 

We  may  perhaps  throw  some  light  on  this  intricate  topic 
by  adding  a  few  sentences  containing  the  amount  of  national 
income  in  several  of  our  great  departments,  with  some  re- 
marks on  its  appropriation. 

Income  from  the  Produce  of  the  Soil,  120,000,000/.  —  Of 
this  very  large  sura,  the  portion  constituting  the  income  of 
the  landlord  and  of  the  higher  class  of  farmers,  is  evidently 
expended  in  articles  subject  to  taxation ;  in  regard  to  the 
smaller  farmers  or  labourers  the  case  is  otherwise,  their 
principal  consmnption  of  taxed  articles  being  confined  to 
malt  liquor. 

Produce  of  the  Mines,  10,000,000/.  — Here  similar  re- 
marks apply  in  regard  to  the  rent  of  the  proprietor,  the 
salary  of  the  superintendant,  or  the  wages  of  the  workmen. 
As  to  the  raw  material,  a  considerable  duty  is  raised  from 
coal,  but  this  charge  is  avoided  on  all  that  is  not  carried 
coastways,  or  in  a  particular  direction  by  canal. 

Maimfactnres  for  home  Consumption,  70,000,000/.  — The 
expenditure  on  taxed  articles  in  this  case  arises  from  the 
income  of  master  manufacturers,  the  salaries  of  clerks, 
and  the  wages  of  the  less  indigent  workmen.  The  same 
may  be  said  to  apply  to  the  expenditure  (computed  at 
30,000,000/.)  on  buildings,  furniture,  and  agricultural  im- 
provements. 

Income  from  Trade,  Professions,  and  all  other  Sources, 
100,000,000/.  —  Under  this  very  comprehensive  head,  the 
expenditure  more  particularly  subject  to  taxation  consists 


A  pp.]  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [8 1  ] 

of  the  profit  of  merchants  ami  bankers  ;  of  the  income  of 
professional  men;  salaries  ofclerks;  income  of  shop-keep- 
ers ;  wages  of  ship-builders,  seamen,  &c. 

National  Capital. —  Calculations  of  national  capital  are 
not,  perhaj)s,  of  great  imporUuice  in  a  direct  sense,  since 
taxation  has  seldom  been  imposed  with  reference  to  the 
amount  of  capital.  A  table  of  this  nature  is,  however,  of 
interest  when  viewed  in  connexion  with  a  return  of  our 
national  income,  and  rendered  subservient  to  establishing 
the  accuracy  of  the  latter ;  this  will,  we  believe,  be  the 
effect  of  the  subjoined  sketch. 

The  fall  of  prices  attendant  on  a  state  of  peace  is,  from 
causes  which  shall  be  explained  presently,  productive  of 
much  less  diminution  in  regard  to  our  capital  than  our  in- 
come;  and  Mr.  Colquhoun's  calculation  having  been  made 
on  an  estimate  extremely  moderate  for  a  state  of  war,  the 
difi'erence  between  the  present  year  and  the  year  181 '2,  as 
calculated  by  him,  is  not  considerable.  Our  table  for  the 
present  year  is  consequently  little  more  than  a  re-statement 
of  i)is  results,  with  a  few  modifications. 


[F] 


[82] 


J'jSli/iiate  oj  Nutional  (!u})ilut. 


[Apr. 


Calculation  of  National  Property. 


Great  Biitaiii  and  Ireland. 


Lantl  under  cultivation,  whether  in 
]jasture,  tillage,  or  gardens 

Farming  capital,  whether  vested  in 
implements  of  husbandry  and 
farming  stock,  or  in  corn  and 
other  produce    -         -         -         - 

Dwelling  houses,  warehouses,  and 
manufactories     -         - 

Manufactured  goods  in  progress  or 
ready  for  sale,  whether  in  manu- 
factories, warehouses,  or  shops : 
also  foreign  merchandize  on 
hand  .         -         _         .         . 

British  shipping  of  every  descrip- 
tion ----- 

Here  it  seems  fit  to  make  an  ad- 
dition to  Mr.  Colquhoun's  state- 
ments on  account  of 

Mercantile  and  manufacturing  ca- 
pital not  specified  by  him,  viz. 
money  in  hand;  advances  to  cor- 
respondents abroad ;  manufactur- 
ing machinery ;  tools  and  imple- 
ments of  mechanics     -         -         - 

This  carries  to  nearly500,000,000/. 
our  mercantile  and  manufacturing 
capital  employed  in  current  business, 
and  exclusive  of  whatever  capital 
our  merchants  may  have  in  fixed 
property,  such  as  the  funds,  land  or 
houses. 

Such  arc  the  great  heads  of  our 
national   property ;     the   lesser   as 
given  by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  are 
Mines  and  minerals         -         .         . 
Canals,  tolls,  and  timber 

Total 


Com|)utation  for 
1812,  nearly  in 
the  form  adopted 
by  Mr.  Colqu- 
lioun. 


A  similar   com- 
putation for 
1823. 


£1,280,000,000 

228,000,000 
400,000,000 

160,000,000 
27,000,000 


75,000,000 
50,000,000 


£1,200,000,000 

200,000,000 

4  00,000,000 

140,000,000 
20,000,000 


1 30,000,000  1 30,000,000 


65,000,000 
45,000,000 


I  £2,350,000,000  £2,200,000,000 


This  table  is  to  be  understood  as  representing  private 
property,  and  exclusive  of 

1.  All  public  property,  such  as  militiiry  stores,  churches, 
hospitals  ;  also  of 


App.]  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [83] 

2.  Such  private  property  as  is  unproductive ;  viz.  waste 
lands,  furniture,  or  wearing  apparel;  and,  finally,  of 

3.  Whatever  is  exjiressive  of  a  debt  from  one  part  of 
the  community  to  another,  such  as  the  stocks,  mortgages, 
or  mercantile  accej)tances. 

How,  it  may  waw  be  asked,  does  it  happen  that  the 
decrease  of  our  national  property  since  the  i)eace  is  so  much 
less  than  is  commonly  supposed ?     'Ihe  reasons  are  — 

Land,  as  a  property,  is  vv'orth  in  peace  from  thirty -two 
to  thirty-five  years'  purchase ;  in  war,  only  twenty-seven  or 
twenty-eight  years'  j^urchase  ;  so  that  though  on  our  rental 
we  reckon  a  fall  of  fully  30  per  cent.,  the  principal  has  not 
sunk  above  1.5  or  20  jier  cent. 

Farming  capital  experiences  at  present  a  depression 
of  value  far  beyond  the  reduction  iu  our  table;  but  its 
amount  in  1812  was,  we  believe,  under-rated  by  Mr.  Col- 
quhoun,  while,  in  point  of  cjuantity,  whether  of  imi)lements, 
cattle,  or  corn  on  hand,  it  has  increased  probably  20  per 
cent,  since  that  year. 

As  to  buildings,  whether  warehouses,  manufactories,  or 
dwellings,  the  suqirising  increase  in  the  number  appears 
fully  to  have  balanced  the  decrease  of  rent,  particularly  as 
such  decrease  appears  to  have  been  much  smaller  in  this 
kind  of  property  than  in  land. 

In  our  niamdactured  and  foreign  goods  on  hand  the  fall 
of  price,  great  as  it  has  been,  is  nearly  equalleil  by  the  in- 
crease of  (juantity.  In  our  shipping  the  case  is  otherwise, 
and  we  have  accordingly  made  a  large  deduction. 

Such  is  the  conijiarative  amount  of  our  niuional  projjcrty 
in  1812  and  1822,  when  represented  in  money  of  the  re- 
spective years.  But  were  the  calculation  for  both  made  in 
money  of  equal  value,  the  balance  would  be  in  liivour  ot 
the  present  year ;  we  mean,  that  the  valuations  for  the  pre- 
sent year,  if  made  in  the  money  of  1812,  would  not  be  sliort 
of  2,500,000,000/. 

Were  we  to  take  a  retrospective  view  of  the  value  ot  <jur 
national  property  since  1792,  we  should,  in  the  absence  ot 
satisfactory  returns  lor  the  earlier  years,  estimatt;  it  at  /«v>- 
/hirds  of  the  present  amount. 


[F]  2 


[84]  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [Api*. 

Public  Burdenaiii.  the  present  Year{\H2^). —  Particulars 
of  the  64,000,000/.  assumed  in  the  text,  p.  269. 

Taxes,  gross  amount,  including  both  the 
charge  of  collecting  and  the  repayments 
in  the  form  of  drawbacks,  discounts,  and 
allowances ^£^58,000,000 

Deduct,  not  the  charge  of  collection,  but  the 
repayments,  which  form  in  fact  no  part  of 
our  burdens 4,000,000 

Remain     -     -       54,000,000 

This  is  after  a  full  deduction  for  the  dimi- 
nution in  the  duties  on  malt,  salt,  leather; 
also  in  the  assessed  taxes. 

Add  for  tithe,  including  Ireland  *       -         -         5,000,000 
Poor-rate,  after  deducting  such  portion  as  be- 
longs properly  to  wages  (see  text,  p.  201 .)  5,000,000 

In  all  -   jf  64,000,000 


This  amount,  reduced  to  money  of  1792  in 
the  proportion  of  nearly  130/.  to  100/., 
gives  the  sum  expressed  in  the  text,  viz.    ^50,000,000 
Or,  compared  to  our  national  income, 
a  proportion  of  25  to  100. 

*  TiTHB,  All  our  tables  include  the  tithe  paid  to  lay  impropriators. 


[85] 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  X. 


On  Flucfiuiiiati  of  Prices. 

^From   Mr.  Arthur  Young's  Inquiry  into  the  Value  of 
Money,  1812.) 

Abstract  of  part  of  Sir  G.  ShiickburgVs  Table. 
The  Prices  of  the  Year  1550  are  taken  for  the  Integer;  viz.  100. 


Years. 

Wheat. 

1550 

100 

1600 

— 

1650 



1675 

246 

1700 

— 

1720 



1740 

197 

1760 

203 

1780 

— 

1790 

~— 

1795 

426 

1800 

— 

Twelve 
Miscellaneous 
Articles,  viz. 
an  Ox,  Cow, 
Poultry,  &c. 

100 

239 


434 
492 


752 


Ihitchcr 
IMeat. 

Day 
Labour. 

100 

1(K) 

\m 

118 

266 

250 

400 

275 

511 

\'M\ 

— 

— 

Mean  of  all. 


KM) 
U4 
188 
210 

257 
2S7 
312 
1-27 
11(6 
53 1 
■AVI 


This  table  presents  a  very  great  rise  in  j-irices,  but  the 
grounds  of  calculation  are  liir  from  aiciuato.  Butcher 
meat  is  put  on  a  par  with  wheat,  although  with  the  niast.  of 

[Fj  3 


[8G] 


fltictuatioii  in  Ihc  Value  of  Muncij. 


[Aim'. 


the  population  it  docs  not  form  a  fifth  j);irt  of  the  con- 
snni]>tion.  Kach  of  the  twelve  miscellaneous  articles, 
whether  poultry  or  cattle,  are  considered  of  equal  import- 
ance, and  manufactures  of  every  sort  are  omitted.  There 
are,  besides,  a  number  of  inaccuracies  in  the  authorities 
from  which  the  table  is  compiled. 

Com'parhon  of  the  11  Ik  and  iSth  Centuries.  —  Bishop 
Fleetwood,  whose  inquiries,  in  regard  to  the  particular 
period  to  which  he  confined  them,  were  very  accurate ;  and 
Dr.  Heni'y,  the  author  of  the  History  of  Englantl,  both 
exhibit  results  very  different  from  Sir  George  Shuckburgh. 
From  these  Mi'.  Young  attempted  an  estimate  on  tlie  fol- 
lowing plan. 


ITth 

18th 

Rise  per 

C 

entiiry. 

Centu 

■y- 

Cent. 

£ 

s.      d. 

S^    s. 

d. 

Wheat 

1 

18     2 

1    18 

7 

Par. 

Barley  and  oats    - 

1 

y   5h 

2     0 

Oh 

33 

Butcher   meat,    butter, 

cheese,   or    whatever 

is  the  produce  of  grass 

land          _         -         - 

0 

1     9 

0     2 

3 

28^ 

Labour        -         -         - 

0 

0  10? 

0     1 

3 

461: 

Wool 

1 

9     li 

0  17 

8^ 

39A  fall. 

Iron              -         -         -'  0 

0    u 

0     0 

11 

16l  rise. 

Coals            -         -         -1 

5  lOi 

1   13 

0 

39  \ 

Repeating  wheat  five  times,  on  account  of  its  import- 
ance, bai-ley  and  oats  twice,  the  produce  of  grass  land  four 
times,  labour  five  times,  and  reckoning  wool,  coals,  and 
iron,  each  but  once,  while  iron  is  considered  the  repre- 
sentative of  all  manufactures,  the  rise  from  the  prices  of  ojie 
century  to  those  of  the  other  will  amount  to  no  more  than 
'22^  per  cent. ;  or  only  th.e  tenth  part  of  the  rise  stated  by 
Sir  George  Shuckburgh. 

Manufactures.  —  Under  the  impoi-tant  head  of  metals, 
and  particularly  of  iron,  Mr.  Y.  found  that  the  rise  for 
several  centuries  had  been  inconsiderable,  the  improve- 
ments in  the  process  of  preparing  them  sufficing,  in  a  great 
measure,  to  counterbalance  the  enhancement  of  labour. 
But  the  great  argument  against  Sir  G.  Shuckburgh's  alle- 


A  pp.] 


Fluctuation  in  the  Valxic  of  Mmieij. 


[87] 


gation  ol" general  depreciation  is  to  be  found  in  the  pric«!  of 
manufactures,  in  the  production  ol"  which,  far  more  than 
in  agriculture,  free  scope  is  given  to  the  application  of  all 
the  auxiliaries  called  forth  by  the  progress  of  society  ;  we 
mean  increase  of  capital,  division  of  labour,  and  aid  from 
machinery.  The  following  siiort  list  is  tiiken  irom  the 
books  of  Greenwich  IIos[)ilai. 


Average  of  the  Years  from 

Shoes. 

Stockings. 

Ilau. 

I'roportions 
in  twenty, 
when  taki'M 
i-olki'iivtly. 

1729  to  176.3 
1770  to  17S5       - 
1770  to  ISOO      - 
1790tolS(X)       - 
1805  to  1810       - 

s.   d.         s.    d. 
3  11    i     1     7 
3  10    '     1     S\ 
\     7il     1     h\ 
4.     6ri       1     6 
5     5        2     2 

s.   d. 
2    2i 
2     3* 
2     4- 

2  4. 

3  0 

Hi 

1+  ■ 

1.34 
20 

These  are  articles  of  subordinate  importance;  but  the 
fact  i.^,  that  in  almost  all  manufactured  connnodities,"we  are 
supplied  cheaper  than  our  ancestors,  and  that  u  lisc,  when 
it  has  taken  place,  is  to  be  ascribed  cithtr  to  a  tax  on  the 
raw  commodity,  or  to  some  cause  whicii  may  be  termed 
particular  or  incidental.  In  regard  to  the  qiuiiitij  of  our 
manuiacture.s,  we  nmst  speak  with  more  hesitation,  and  can 
hardly  decide  whetiier  the  balance  be  in  favour  of  ihc  pre- 
sent, or  of  a  former  age;  for  if  our  i'abrics  are  now  much 
more  neat  alid  convenient,  they  are  in  a  considerable  de- 
gree less  durable. 

Horses  and  Cattle. — In  these  the  improvement  in  point 
of  quality  admits  of  no  doubt.  In  comparing  the  present 
jirice  of  sheep  and  oxen  with  those  of  a  century  :igo,  a  great 
part  of  the  diflerence  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  inferior  .si/u  ol' 
the  animal,  at  a  time  when  the  art  of  gra/ing  was  not  under- 
stood ;  the  same  will  be  found  to  hold  in  ngaril  to  horses, 
and  at  a  later  date  than  is  connnonly  imagined.  The  only 
quarter  aflbrding  authentic  information  in  regard  to  the 
price  of  horses  is  the  War  Olfice,  from  the  record^  of  uhu  h 
Mr.  Young  extracted  the  following  averages. 


[i-J    I 


[88] 


Mucliiatio7i  in  the  Value  ofMona). 


[Arp. 


Years. 

Price. 

£    s.    d. 

1766  and  1767 

21     0     0 

From  1768  to  1792,  both  inclusive 

23     2     0 

1793  to  1802      -             -             - 

26      .5      0 

1803  to  1812      - 

26      5      0 

The  rise  of  price  in  this  period  of  forty-six  years  was 
much  less  than  might  have  been  supposed  from  the  rate 
paid  by  individuals.  But  the  War  Office,  looking  chiefly 
to  strength  and  the  power  of  standing  fatigue,  bought, 
throughout  the  whole  period,  horses  of  nearly  equal  value. 
Private  purchasers  were  not  so  easily  satisfied  ;  and  of  the 
higher  prices  so  generally  paid  by  them,  a  considerable 
part  is  to  be  ascribed  to  a  size  and  beauty  in  the  animal 
which  half  a  century  before  was  comparatively  rare. 

Sketch  of  the  progressive  Rise  of  Prices  since  the  Thirteenth 
Century^  taking  20  for  the  Integer  or  highest  Sum^  and 
exhibiting  the  other  Parts  by  their  proj^m-tion  to  it.  [Ab- 
stractedfrom  a  Table  of  Arthur  Young.) 


Beef  and 

Manufac- 

Trade, 

Periods. 

Wheat. 

Poik,  from 
the  Books 

of  the 
Victualling 

Labour. 

tures  at 
Green- 
wich 
Hospital. 

Popula- 
tion. 

calcu- 

laied 

from 

our  Ex- 

Office. 

jions. 

13th  Century 

5\ 

3^ 

_ 

__ 

_ 

14th  ditto      - 

6i 



44 

— 

— 

— 

15th  ditto     - 

5 



5} 

— 

— 

— 

IGth  ditto     - 

6 



5^ 

— 

— 

— 

17th  ditto     - 

9t 



8 

, — 

— 

— 

18th  ditto     - 

H 

— 

12^ 

— 

— 

— 

66  years  from  1701 

to  1766     - 

H 

H 

10 

14^ 

11 

5^ 

25  ditto  from  1767 

to  1789     - 

11 

11 

12i 

14 

13^. 

H 

54  ditto  from  1767 

to  1800      -       - 

12 

12^ 

14 

15J 

15J 

11 

14  ditto  from  1790 

to  1803       - 

15 

17 

16| 

15* 

184 

15^ 

7  ditto  from  1804 

to  1810     - 

20 

20 

£0 

20 

20 

20 

App.]  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Moncij.  [89] 

Annual  Coyisumption  of  Gold  and  Sili'e?'  Jbr  Plate,  orna- 
mental Ma7iufacture,  and  Furniture.  —  Calculations  of  tliiv 
nature  have  hitherto  been  founded  on  rtturns  i'vom  towns 
which,  like  Geneva,  were  remarkable  Ibr  the  manufacture 
of  watches,  or  like  Paris  and  Hirmin<rliam,  tor  uildiixr, 
trinkets,  and  other  ornamental  fabrics.  At  present,  liow- 
€ver,  we  are  inclined  to  draw  our  inferences  from  a  wider 
field,  from  a  calculation  of  the  probable  amount  of  indi- 
vidual income  founded  on  the  public  burdens  of  this  and 
other  countries.  If  we  refer  to  our  projKrty-tiix  returns 
during  the  war,  and  make  allowance,  on  the  one  hand,  for 
the  reduction  of  income,  on  the  other,  for  the  incretiic  of 
numbers  that  have  since  tiiken  place,  we  shall  find  reason 
to  estimate  the  number  of 

Families  in  England,  Scotland,  and  Wales,  pos- 
sessing 200/.  a  year  and  upwards,  at     -     -     -     100,000 

And  taking  our  island  as  representing,  in  point 
of  such  incomes,  a  fourth  of  the  civilized  world, 
we  add  for  the  latter,  that  is,  for  the  rest  of 
Europe  and  the  United  Stiites  of  America     -      300,000 

Together  -     -     -      l-OOjOOO 

Families  whose  incomes  are  between 
60/.  and  '200/.  a  year  amount  in 
Great  Britain  to  nearly     -     -     -       100,000 

Add  for  the  rest  of  Europe  and  the 

United  States  of  America     -     -     1,200,000 

Together     -     -     -     -     l,no(>,000 

Now  a  consumption  on  the  part  of  the  former 
class  at  the  conjectural  average  of  10/.  a 
family  amuially,  would  give     -     -     -     -       ^i,000,000 

The  same  for  the  second  class  at  the  rate  of 

somewhat  less  than  2/.  per  family     -     -     -      3,000,000 

Add  for  the  consumption  of  the  lower  orders 

in  watches,  ear-rings,  buckles,  &c.    -     -     -      1,<»(H),()00 

Total     -     -     -     -     .£8,000,000 

These  large  sums  include  loss  by  accident  and 
wear;  but,  as  a  considerable  amount  of  t)Id 
plate  or  old  manufacture  is  amuially  naltcd 
and  wrought  up,  we  deduct  as  not  forming 
a  demand  on  the  minc^ 2,()()0,()<)O 


[90]  Tbirhudion  in  the  faluc  of  Money.  [ App. 

llcniaiiulcr,  being  the  conjectural  amount  of 
specie  from  the  mines  annually  required  for 
jilate  and  ornarnenUil  manufacture  or  fur- 
niture      ,€'6,000,000 


Comparative  Expencc  of  France  and  England.  —  Not- 
witlistandinij  our  m-eat  intercourse  with  the  Continent  of 
late  years,  the  jiublic  are  not  yet  in  possession  of  a  correct 
com})arison  of  the  expence  of  living  in  France  and  England. 
Nothing  is  more  vague  and  unsatisfactory  than  the  notices 
on  this  subject  in  books  of  travels,  proceeding,  as  they  ge- 
nerally do,  from  persons  who  have  little  idea  of  compre- 
hensive calculation,  and  who  allow  themselves  to  dwell  with 
undue  emphasis  on  a  few  particular  points  in  which  France 
happens  to  differ  materially  from  England.  Such  persons 
seldom  make  allowance  for  a  countervailing  tendency  in 
other  items  of  the  account.  The  proper  mode  is  to  frame 
a  general  table,  including  not  only  provisions,  house-rent, 
iViel,  wages,  but  manufactures,  and  professional  charges. 
Alter  ascertaining  these  material  points,  there  will  remain 
to  be  made  a  distinction  betw^een  different  periods  :  thus, 
during  the  war,  particularly  in  the  latter  years,  the  dilTerence 
between  the  two  countries  was  very  great,  lOOZ.  in  France 
being  equivalent  to  140/.  or  150/.  in  England.  Since  the 
peace,  this  difference  has  progressivel}'  decreased,  the  fall 
of  prices  in  France,  though  not  inconsiderable,  being  much 
inferior  to  that  which  has  taken  place  in  England.  A  com- 
jxirison  made  in  1819  would  have  exhibited  100/.  in  France 
as  equal  to  fully  \30l.  in  England;  at  present  (1823)  it 
would  not  exceed  the  proportion  of  100/.  to  120/. 

After  attending  to  these  prelimhiaries,  the  progress  of 
comparison  becomes  less  difficult,  and,  by  balancing  one 
point  against  another,  is  made  to  assume,  at  last,  a  clear 
and  simple  form.  Thus,  as  to  the  respective  capitals,  Paris 
being  inferior  in  water  communication  incurs  a  greater 
enhancement  than  London  in  the  conveyance  of  bulky 
commodities,  such  as  corn,  coal,  wood ;  while,  in  respect  to 
number  of  consumers^  the  cause  of  enhancement  is  consi- 
derably less,  the  population  of  the  French  metropolis  being 
less  than  two -thirds  of  that  of  ours.  These  causes  may  be 
said  to  neutralize  each  other :  and  the  inferences  are,  — 

First,  that  Paris  is  as  much  dearer  than  the  provincial 
part  of  France,  as  London  is  dearer  than  the  provincial  part 
of  England.  -     -      • 

Secondly,  that  the  proportion  mentioned  above  as  con- 
14. 


App.]  Fluctuation  in  l/ic  Vahic  of  Money.  [91] 

stituting  the  difference  with  England,  viz.  30  per  cent,  in 
1819,  and  20  pur  cent,  at  present,  is  apjilicable  to  the  two 
countries  throughout,  provided  we  confine  our  [jurallel  to 
places  similarly  circumstanced,  comi)aring  Paris  with  Lon- 
don, and  Touraine  or  Lower  Normandy,  each  about  150 
miles  from  Paris,  with  Shropshire,  Derbyshire,  or  other 
counties,  at  a  similar  distance  from  London. 

Another  point  to  which  travellers  are  seldom  sufficiently 
attentive  is,  that  the  degree  of  diflL-rence  between  one  pro- 
vince and  another,  and  even  between  one  country  on  the 
Continent  and  another,  is  much  smaller  than  it  at  first  ap- 
pears. Take,  for  exam})le,  the  north  and  south  of  I-'rance, 
countries  very  diflerent  in  climate,  produce,  and  habits. 
At  first  the  south  appears  nmch  cheaper,  aflbrding  in  abun- 
dance wine,  fruit,  and  other  articles,  lor  which  we  are  Uiade 
to  pay  so  extravagantly  in  Kngland  ;  but  these,  on  a  closer 
examination,  are  found  to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  jiricc 
of  corn  always  higher  there  than  in  the  northern  districts 
of  France.  Again,  the  lower  wages  of  labour,  in  a  backward 
province  like  lirittany,  make  a  very  slight  difference  ulti- 
mately, when  we  take  into  account  the  inferiority  of  the 
labourers.  Similar  remarks  are  applicable  to  Germany, 
Italy,  Switzerland :  in  none  of  these  countries  are  the 
amount  of  taxation,  the  interest  of  money,  the  state  of  hus- 
bandry, or  any  of  the  main  constituents  of  price  so  mate- 
rially different  as  to  cause  any  great  difference  in  tlie  expence 
of  living.  Accordingly,  after  all  the  assertions  and  exag- 
gerations of  travellers,  the  distinctioris  on  the  Continent  are 
little  more  than 

1.  That  provincial  towns  are  considerably  less  expensive 
than  capitals. 

2.  That  by  living  in  a  petty  town,  or  in  the  country,  a 

farther  reduction  of  expence  may  be  accomplished,  but  with 

a  jrreater  sacrifice  of  comfort,  a  «ireater  removal  from  busi- 
es ..,.."  .  1  . 
ness  and  society,  than  is  implied  by  a  country  residence  in 

England. 

3.  That  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  water  communi- 
cation, the  price  of  bulky  commodities,  such  as  corn  or 
wood,  varies  more  in  the  provinces  of  the  Continent  llian 
in  the  counties  of  England;  still  the  difference  is  less  great 
than  is  often  asserted,  (Etlinburgh  Keview,  \'ol.  LXIV. 
p.  362.)  land  carriage  on  the  Continent  being  moderate 
in  consecjuence  of  the  insignificanc'  of  i.«!l^  mm,!  tnmDlKi- 
dues. 

i.  That  taking  France  as  the  rijnt  m  ;r.;i;i\r  m  ,ii>  v  ..ii- 
tinent  at   large  in   point  of  expence,  the  difference   with 


[92]  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Maueij.  [App. 

Kn^lanil,  great  during  tlie  war,  (particularly  from  1809  to 
1811),  is  at  present  not  more  than  20  per  cent. ;  any  dis- 
burse beyond  that  proportion  being  attributable,  not  to 
dillercnce  of  prices,  but  to  additional  comfort  or  luxury  on 
our  side. 

To  what  degree  did  a  difference  of  prices  exist  between 
France  and  England  prior  to  the  French  Revolution  ? 
Our  materials  for  such  a  comparison  are  far  from  complete: 
the  tables  collected  by  the  late  Arthur  Young  in  1789  in- 
dicate a  considerable  inferiority  of  price,  but  the  articles 
quoted  are  chiefly  agricultural ;  and  had  manufactures 
been  included,  the  general  result  would  have  been  less  un- 
favourable to  England.  If  we  revert  to  a  prior  date,  such 
as  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  we  shall  find  reason  to 
consider  the  two  countries  nearly  on  a  par.  At  that  time 
England  was  not  much  more  heavily  taxed  than  France, 
nor  were  our  manufactures  or  corn  dearer,  for  both  were 
articles  of  export.  The  result  accordingly  is,  that  prior  to 
1760  the  only  material  distinction  between  the  two  coun- 
tries consisted  in  the  style  of  living;  the  proportion  of 
English  population  in  towns  being  even  then  considerably 
greater,  and  the  inhabitants  consequently  requiring  com- 
forts little  known  or  thought  of  in  the  provincial  part  of 
France. 

Mr.  M'Culloch,  in  his  "  Essay  on  reducing  the  Interest 
on  our  National  Debt,"  published  in  1816,  maintains,  in 
contradiction  to  common  opinion,  that  the  rise  in  the  price 
of  corn  on  the  Continent  during  the  last  half  century  has, 
on  the  whole,  been  inconsiderable.  He  goes  into  the  ques- 
tion at  great  length,  treating  in  succession  of  France,  Spain, 
Italy,  and  the  countries  on  the  Baltic,  and  adducing  several 
cogent  arguments  in  opposition  to  those  who  maintain, 
that  there  took  place  on  the  Continent  a  rise  of  prices 
nearly  correspondent  to  the  rise  in  this  country.  His  con- 
clusions are,  that  in  France  there  was  no  rise  in  the  price 
of  corn  :  that  in  Italy  the  rise  was  a  consequence  of  the  ex- 
tension given  to  the  freedom  of  trade  ;  and  that  the  partial 
advance  which  he  admits  to  have  taken  place  in  Russia 
and  Poland  was  a  necessary  result  of  the  degree  of  im- 
provement introduced  in  the  present  age  into  these  very 
backward  countries.  To  this  statement  we  have  merely 
to  offer  the  qualifications  naturally  arising  from  a  state  of 
war.  In  the  long  period  from  1793  to  18 14  every  state  on 
the  Continent  was  either  engaged  in  hostilities,  or  obliged 
to  increase  its  taxes  and  military  establishment.  In  all  these 

13 


App.]  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  [95] 

was  felt  a  portion  of  tlie  activity  or  excitement  so  conspi- 
cuous in  England  during  the  war,  followed  in  all  by  a  sUig- 
nation  similar,  though  not  ecjual  in  degree,  to  that  which 
we  have  experienced  since  the  peace.  The  consequence 
was,  that  prices  rose  during  one  period  and  fell  in  the  other ; 
but  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  change  is  a  matter  of  great 
difficulty,  there  being  few  official  returns  in  any  j)art  d?  the 
Continent,  and  the  question  being  somewhat  jierplexed  by 
the  circulation  of  government  pajier  so  general  duriu"  the 
war.  On  the  whole,  however,  there  took  place,  in  family 
expenditure,  calculated  on  a  comprehensive  plan,  and  in- 
cluding along  with  corn  and  butcher  meat,  wages,  hou.^e- 
rent,  fuel,  &c.  a  rise  of  from  25  to  30  per  cent,  on  the 
prices  of  1792  ;  a  rise  which  has,  in  a  great  measure,  ills- 
appeared  in  the  continued  reduction  since  the  peace. 

In  forming  conclusions  on  the  jirice  of  corn,  allowance 
ought  evidently  to  be  made  for  particular  causes  operating 
in  particular  countries:  —  thus,  in  France,  the  abolition  of 
tithe,  and  the  sale  of  the  church  lands,  promoted  tillage  to 
a  degree  which  nearly  counteracted  the  rise  of  labour  at- 
tendant on  the  war. 


Annjial  Expence  of  the  familij  (f  an  jh^ricultural  Labourer., 
supposed  to  C07isist  of  S\  persons  ,-  beini:^  an  avrra<^c  if  the 
expence  of  (SS  families  of  labourers^  in  (lijf'ercnt  parts  of 
England,  collected  by  Sir  F.  Eden,  in  1796. 

Provisions  (as  dear  then  as  in  1823)     - 
Rent        ------ 

Fuel  and  candles        -         -         -         - 

Clothes  and  wasliing  .         _         - 

Contingencies  -         -         -         -         - 


The  same  table,  adapted  to  the  present  time  by  an  ad- 
dition of  25  per  cent,  to  the  respective  heads  of  expence, 
with  the  exception  of  provisions. 
Provisions         -         _         -         -         - 
Rent        ------ 

Fuel  and  candles        -         -         -         - 

Clothes  and  light        _         -         -         - 
Contingencies  ----- 


,i27 

1 

8 

1 

13 

3 

2 

10 

7 

4 

IS 

0 

0 

10 

10 

.VS6 

11 

J 

£"11 

1 

S 

2 

1 

7 

3 

3 

3 

fi 

2 

(i 

0 

13 

7 

.^'39 

'-' 

7 

[91] 


Plan  for  ^^iving  a  steady  F/due  to 


[A  PP. 


Table  cnmprisin;^  articles  of  frr.Jieral  conmmjttion^  to  each  of 
which  is  qjfixcd  the  probable  amount  ()f  money  expended  on 
on  it  by  the  jniblic,  referred  to  in  the  text^  p.  333. 


Expcndci!  by 

Articles 

Quantity 

Average 

tlie  public 

consumed. 

price. 

oil  cacli 
article. 

Produce  of  the  Soil. 

Qrs. 

.V. 

£ 

Wheat        -         -          -           - 

1 2,000,000 

50 

30,000,000 

Barley  (used  chiefly  in  the  brewery 

and  distillery) 

7,200,000 

25 

9,000,000 

Oats  (the  portion  appropriated  to 

human  food)         .          _         - 

10,000,000 

20 

10,000,000 

Butcher  meat  and  animal  food 

generally 

— 

— 

5  5,000,000 

Manufactures. 

The  following  sums  representing 

the  value,  exctusivc  of  exports, 

are,  of  course,  considerably  be- 

low the  total  of  the  value  an- 

nually prepared 

— 

— 

— 

Woollens         .              -              - 

— 

— 

22,000,000 

Cottons,    (the    exports   exceed 

20,000,000/.)          .          -           - 

— 

— 

20,000,000 

Linen             -              - 

— 

— 

1  5,000,000 

Silk 

— 

— 

8,000,000 

Leather            _              .            - 

— 

1  5,000,000 

Hardware             -             -         - 

— 

— 

9,000,000 

Foreign  Articles,  such  as 

Sugar                  -                 -         - 

— 

— 

9,000,000 

Tea          -              _        -            - 

— 

— 

8,000,000 

Various  other  articles  of  sufficient 

importance  to  be  specified,  and 

the  amount  of  which  it  would 

probably  be  practicable  to  ascer- 

tain from  official  documents    - 

— 

— 

100,000,000 

A  multiplicity  of  articles  of  less 

importance,  which   being  in  a 

great  measure  superfluities,  and 

dependent  for  their  consump- 

tion on  the  taste  of  individuals, 

require  to  be  noticed  no   far- 

ther than  by  assigning  to  them 

collectively  their  proportion  to 

1 

the  aggregate:  this  proportion 

we  shall  at  present  suppose  to 

be  about  17  per  cent.,  or  -    - 
Total  annual  consumption     -     - 

— 

—  • 

^0,000,000 

.350,000,000 

Sucli  is,  or  rather  would  be  when  conipleteJ,  a  table  of 
our  annual  consumption  at  tiie  present  time.     In  iVamiug 


App.] 


Monty  CutUracts. 


[95] 


or  correcting  such  a  table,  we  have  evidently  to  consider 
two  main  points  ;  the  (juantities  consumed,  and  the  pricL-. 
As  to  quantity,  a  variation  can  take  place  only  with  in- 
crease ol  population  or  change  of  habits,  anil  any  alteration 
of  that  kind  must  be  so  gradual,  that  we  run  very  little 
hazard  in  assuming  a  similarity  of  amount  during  a  given 
period,  which,  for  the  sake  of  precision,  we  shall  suppose 
to  be  five  years.  As  to  price,  the  case  is  different;  the 
produce  of  the  soil  may,  from  casualty  in  the  season,  rise 
10  or  20  per  cent.,  while  our  manufactures  may  exj)eri- 
ence  a  fall.  The  result,  as  far  as  founded  on  prices,  must 
therefore  undergo  some  change  annually  :  for  the  sake  of 
illustration  we  shall  suppose  in  one  )'ear  a  change  differing 
in  different  articles,  but  ending  in  an  average  rise  of  '>  per 
cent.:  thus, — 


Expended  hy 

Articles. 

Quantity 

Average 

the  public 

consumed. 

price. 

on  each 
article. 

Produce  of  the  xoU  covipult'il  on  the 

Qrs. 

.T. 

£ 

same  quantities  ;  but  with  an  ad- 

dition of   10  per    cent,  to    the 

prices. 

Wheat 

12,000,000 

5j 

.3.-,000,000 

Barley                 -                -        - 

7,200,000 

'21 

9,000,000 

Oats             -             ... 

10,000,000 

22 

11,000,000 

Butcher  meat  and  aniinal    food 

enhanced  in  the  same  propor- 

tion              ... 

— 

— 

-8,500,000 

Manufactures ;  here  we  suppose 

a  decrease  of  '>  per  cent. :  thus, 

Woollens 

— 

— 

1 9,000,000 

Cottons 

— 

— 

1  1,4(H'»,000 

Linen        -             .            .        - 

— 

— 

IJ.'.'.IO.IXK) 

Silk         .            .            -            - 

— 

— 

7,(;oo,oo(> 

Leather          -            ... 

— 

— 

14,250,000 

Hardware            ... 

— 

— 

8,500,0()0 

Foreign  arliclct. 

Sugar  the  same            ... 

— 

— 

!»,000,000 

Tea  the  same          -         - 

— 

— 

8,000,000 

In  the  other  component  parts  of 

the  table  the  fluctuations  are 

supposed  to  change  the  amount 

of  170,000,000/.  to 

Total     - 

\^  1 ,1 1«',<  >*)0 

367,500/X)0 

The  final  change  supjiosed  in  this  statement  is  that  XO'd. 
are  required  to  effect  the  jnnch:isi's  lor  which  100/.  siifliced 
in  the  preceding  year.     We  proceed  next  to  the 


C96] 


Plan  for  i!,hn7in  a  slcudij  Valur  lo 


[Apf, 


Apportionment  of  the  respective  Articles  iii  the  former  Table. 


Articles  consumed. 

Expenditure 
on  eacli 
Article. 

Proportion  of 
the  expendituii- 
on  each  article 

to  the  total 

expenditure  of 

tlic  public, 

calculated  in 

parts  of  100. 

Wheat            .... 
Barley                  ... 
Oats                 .... 
Butcher  meat  and  all  animal  food  .     - 
Woollens            -            -            .        . 
Linen            -             -            -             . 
Leather            -             -             -        - 
Cottons                  -                  -            - 
Silk             -                ... 
Hardware            -             -            -      - 
Sugar                -                ... 
Tea            .             .            - 
All  otherheads  of  national  consumption 

Total     - 

£ 

30,000,000 

9,000,000 

10,000,000 

.55,000,000 

20,000,000 

1 5,000,000 

1 5,000,000 

12,000,000 

8,000,000 

9,000,000 

9,000,000 

8,000,000 

1  70,000,000 

8.57 
2.57 
2.85 

10. 
5.71 
4.28 
4.28 
3.42 
2.28 
2.57 
2.57 
2.28 

48.62 

350,000,000 

100 

To  those  who  apprehend  complexity  in  such  calculations, 
we  would  observe,  that  the  details  would  rest  with  persons 
employed  for  the  purpose;  and  that  the  public  would  re- 
quire to  know  only  the  result,  which,  as  in  the  present 
returns  of  the  averages  of  sugar  and  corn,  might  be  com« 
municated  in  a  few  sentences. 

Ought  a  Table  of  National  Coiisumption  to  comprise  the 
smaller  Heads  of  Expenditure  ?  — To  calculate  the  smaller 
items  of  expenditure  would  be  a  task  of  great  difficulty,  and, 
as  far  as  we  can  judge,  of  little  utility,  since  it  is  easy  to 
make  an  allowance  for  the  proportion  omitted.  Besides, 
we  ought  to  introduce  into  the  table  no  sum  of  which  the 
accuracy  is  not  ascertained  with  considerable  confidence 
from  official  documents,  and  of  which  the  importance  is 
not  such  as  to  reward  the  labour  of  enquiry  and  comparison. 
Were  the  articles  enumerated  to  form  only  50  per  cent,  of 
the  total  national  consumption,  the  result,  supposing  them 
to  be  articles  of  general  use,  would  afford  a  very  fair  scale 
for  comparing  the  prices  of  different  years.  A  tiible  com- 
plete in  all  its  parts  would,  doubtless,  be  preferable  ;  but 
as  the  heads  of  our  public  offices,  like  our  individual  en- 
quirers, are  as  yet  in   only  an  early   stage  of  statistical 


App.]  MuiK'u  Cuntrach.  [y7] 

researcli,  a  consiJerahle  time  must  elapse  ere  their  irmte- 
rials  acquire  a  finished  Ibrm. 

In  the  case  of  the  lower  orders,  a  knowledge  of  the  cost 
of  a  few  great  lieads  of  expenditure,  such  as  corn,  course 
clothiqg,  beer,  fuel,  would  be  found  suflicient.  There  ought 
evidently  to  be  a  material  diireruiice  in  the  plan  of  a  table 
for  them  and  of  one  lor  their  superiors,  a  consideration 
which  leads  us  to  another  (juery  in  this  interesting  but 
somewhat  intricate  tliscussion. 

Hem  far  are  i)articidm-  Tables  required  for  partieuhir 
Classes  P  —  A  scale  formed  on  the  table  in  the  text  is 
adapted  to  very  many  persons  in  the  middle  and  up|>er 
classes, — to  the  receivers  of  annuities,  wlnther  fi(Mn  the 
public  funds  or  mortgages, — the  hmdlord  who  depends  on 
his  rent,  —  the  clerk  who  depends  on  his  s;ilary.  Hut  in 
regard  to  several  of  the  classes  currently  termed  productive, 
the  question  is  different,  as  will  apjHsar  from  a  reference  to 
a  specific  case,  such  as  that  of 

Farmers  on  Lease.  —  The  situation  of  the  farmer  on  lease, 
though  materially  affected  by  the  value  of  money  in  pur- 
chases generally,  depends  still  more  on  the})iice  oitlie  j)ro- 
duce  he  raises; — of  corn,  if  his  occupancy  be  chiefly  uiicicr 
the  plough;  of  butcher  meat,  butter,  cheese,  if  it  be'chiefly 
grass  land.  Leases  oufdit  thus  to  be  drawn  with  a  reference 
to  the  market  price  of  produce,  comi)uletl  on  the  average 
of  a  scries  of  years.  (3r,  if  a  regulator  of  a  more  com- 
prehensive character  be  desired,  the  price  of  the  produce 
might  be  combined  with  a  table  of  the  price  of  couimo- 
<lities  generally,  (Appendix,  p.  [95])  taking  the  latter  as  the 
basis ;  but  motlilying  its  result  by  repeating  the  price  of 
corn  or  of  butcher  meaf.  a  certain  niunber  of  limes,  so  as 
to  give  due  weight  to  these  main  constituents  of  the  income 
of  the  lessee. 

The  average  rate  of  labour,  an  object  of  the  first  iujport- 
ancc  in  farming,  might,  in  like  maimer,  be  addetl  to  tin- 
table,  and  repeated  several  times. 

Mines. — In  an  undertaking  of  this  nature,  the  profit 
evidently  depends  on  two  points:  the- market  price  of  the 
articles  produced  (whether  coal,  iron,  tin,  or  copju'r) ;  and 
the  average  rate  of  the  labour  by  means  of  which  it  is 
rendered  saleable.  There  are  thus  two  ways  of  stipulating 
the  conditional  amount  of  the  rent:  by  a  table  confined  to 
the  rate  of  labour  and  the  price  of  the  article  pro<luccd ; 
or  by  a  table  of  the  price  of  connnoditics  generally,  (as  in 
p.  [95])  with  sucli  repetitions  of  the  rate  of  labour,  or  price 


[08]  J*/a7i/(»!t^iviu_u,  a  ileadj/  I'dlur  /o  [A  PP. 

of  the  article  produced,  as   the  contractirifr  parties   niif,'lit 
think  expedient. 

Titlir.  —  The  case  of  tithe  is  (hfferent  from  that  of  rent. 
It  is  evidently  more  convenient  to  clergymen  that  the 
price  of  commodities  f^enerally  should  he  the  standard, 
than  the  price  of  agricultural  produce.  The  latter  deter- 
mines, it  is  true,  the  ability  of  the  payers  of  tithe ;  but  as 
the  payers  are  many,  and  the  receivers  comparatively  few, 
as  that  which  to  the  latter  forms  the  whole  of  income  is  to 
the  former  only  a  portion  of  their  disburse,  the  circumstance-; 
of  the  clergy  have  a  claim  to  prior  consideration  :  that  is, 
■witl)out  showing  the  slightest  partiality  to  either  party,  equity 
suggests  that  the  regulation  of  clerical  income  should  be 
made  with  a  view  to  the  value  of  money  in  the  purchase  of 
commodities  generally,  and  not  exclusively  in  the  purchase 
of  corn,  which  can  form  hardly  a  fifth  of  their  expenditure. 

It  would  be  no  difficult  task  to  suggest  farther  modifica- 
tions for  different  lines  of  business;  but  to  enter  into  detail 
seems  wholly  unnecessary,  since  CA'ery  thing  in  the  pro- 
posed plan  is  voluntary,  and  may  be  adopted  or  omitted 
as  may  suit  the  interest,  or  imagined  interest,  of  the  con- 
tracting parties.  We  shall,  therefore,  take  leave  of  the 
question,  after  answering,  by  anticipation,  a  few  objections, 
as  follows :  — 

1 .  ISIeed  there  be  any  apprehension  of  a  combination  to 
produce  undue  returns  of  prices  for  the  purpose  of  affecting 
the  standard  of  particular  contracts?  —  Attempts  of  that 
nature  are  very  little  to  be  dreaded  in  so  extensive  a  country 
as  this  :  they  could  be  effectual  only  if  undertaken  through- 
out the  whole  kingdom,  and  persevered  in  during  a  series 
of  years;  a  course  which  would  suppose  a  command  of 
capital,  and  a  degree  of  concealment,  wholly  at  variance 
with  probability. 

2.  Would  a  measure  of  this  nature  be  likely  to  affect  the 
sale  p'ice  of  other  property,  i7i  particular  of  lands  and 
houses  ?  —  The  majority  of  fund-holders  are,  as  we  shall 
explain  subsequently,  permanent  depositors ;  strangers  to 
the  manoeuvres  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  and  almost  as  little 
inclined  as  our  landholders  to  engage  in  speculative  sales 
and  purchases.  But  there  is  another  class,  persons  retir- 
ing from  business,  succeeding  to  property,  or  having,  fi-om 
any  other  cause,  funds  of  which  they  are  desirous  to  make  the 
investment.  To  these  persons  stock  would,  by  the  measure 
in  contemplation,  be  rendered  more  eligible  as  a  permanent 


Ai'i'.]  Money  Contracts,  [99] 

deposit,  and  the  motives  for  purcliasin^  landed  property 
would  in  some  degree  be  lessened.  Rut  the  complaint  ol" 
the  country  gentlemen  does  not  regard  inadequacv  of  sale 
price:  instead  of  the  'iG  or  'J7  years'  purchase  to  which 
they  were  accustomed  during  the  war,  land  will  now  sell  for 
34  or  35  years'  purchase:  their  (tesidiruliau  is  an  assured 
income,  —  relief  from  })resent  pressure;  and  such,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  would  be  the  result  of  the  proposed  measure. 

3.  It  may  be  objected  to  our  tabic,  that  "  it  does  not 
comprise  any  heads  of  expenditure,  except  those  repre- 
sented by  commodities;"  while  a  considerable  part  of  the 
disburse  of  the  middle  classes  (not  less  than  a  ihinO,  is  of 
another  descrijjtion,  as  appears  from  the  concluding  line  in 
the  following  sketch  : 

I'roportions  in  lUO  of 
eadi  licail  of  <■»  j.'i"'  ■• 

Provisions                 -              -               -  33 

Clothing  and  washing                -          -  LS 

Fuel  ami  light     -          -          -            -  (j 

House  rent               -               -               -  10 
Other  charges,  namely,  wages,  as-  \ 

sesscd  taxes,  education,  medical  J-  33 

attendance,  &c.         ~         -  J      

100 


To  the  objection  that  might  be  founded  on  a  statement 
like  this,  our  answer  wouUl  be,  that  the  money  paid  for 
waf^es,  education,  professional  aid,  i?cc.  is  ultiuuUely  ex- 
pended on  commodities;  and  were  the  case  otherwise, 
there  seems  no  necessity  that  a  scale  should  couiprise  nil 
the  items  of  expenditure. 

Extract  of  a  Letter  to  the  Author  from  a  respectable  Farvin- 
ill  Hampshire,  dated  June  1 .  1  823. 
"  During  the  low  prices  of  last  autumn,  I  was  led  to 
consider  of  the  plan  suggested  in  your  book  for  regulating 
the  wages  of  my  labourers,  by  a  reference  to  the  price  ot" 
their  subsistence,  in  other  words,  to  the  market  price  of 
corn.  This  plan  met,  at  first,  wid»  considerable  oppo- 
sition, but  the  ecjuity  of  it  became,  in  the  course  o\'  a  few 
weeks,  so  apparent,  as  to  remove  all  objections.  My  rule 
was  to  take  the  rate  of  wages  (7.v.  a  week^  currently  given 
in  my  neighbourhood,  to  explain  to  how  much  wheat  this 
was  equivalent,  and  to  pay  my  people  in  wlieat  or  in 
money,  at  their  option.  'I'hey  sotin  preferred  the  former, 
to  the  extent  of  their  consumption,   ami   took    in    nu)nev 


[  100]  Plan J'oi  f!^ivnn[  a  ^Iraihj  J'alui;  S^c.  [A PP. 

only  what  tlioy  required  for  tlieir  lesser  purcluises.  On 
taking  an  average  (jI  tlieir  weekly  receij)ts,  during  the 
winter,  and  reckoning  them  in  wheat,  on  the  plan  adopted 
by  Mr.  Barton,  and  stated  in  your  book,  (in  the  chapter 
on  Poor  Laws),  I  find  it  to  have  been  about  80  pints  of 
wheat,  which  lornis  a  kind  of  medium  of  the  wages  of  the 
country  labourer,  computed  in  wheat  for  the  last  seventy 
years. 

"  This  was  found  suflicient  for  the  maintenance  of  the  fa- 
milies of  my  labourers,  which  averaged  five  persons:  viz, 
the  man,  his  wife  and  three  children.  During  the  whole 
winter  none  of  my  labourers,  who  were  from  IC  to  18  in 
number,  hod  recourse  to  the  parisli. 

"  My  inference  is  that  80  pints  of  wheat,  or  its  value  in 
money,  would  form  a  fair  permanent  rate  of  wages  for  the 
country  labourers  throughout  all  that  part  of  England  in 
which  wheat  is  the  usual  food  of  the  country  people." 

On  high  and  low  Prices  since  1792.  By  Thomas  Toohe^Esq. 
Parti. — It  was  afterwriting  our  chapter  on  the  Rise  of  Prices 
during  the  War,  that  Mr. Tooke's  Treatise  fell  intoour  hands. 
This  First  Part  relates  chiefly  to  the  effect  of  the  currency, 
and  Mr.  T.  maintains  that  the  bullionists  over-rate  greatly 
the  effect  on  prices  of  the  substitution  of  bank  paper  for 
coin;  while  their  opponents  are  almost  equally  erroneous  in 
refusing  to  admit  a  partial  enhancement  (about  20  per  cent, 
in  the  latter  years  of  the  war)  arising  from  that  cause.  He 
is  not  disposed  to  allow  that  the  war  had  so  great  or  general 
an  effect  on  prices  as  has  been  supposed :  the  rise  of  corn 
he  attributes  chiefly  to  an  extra-proportion  of  indifferent 
seasons ;  and  after  recapitulating  the  events  affecting  other 
commodities  of  consequence,  such  as  cotton,  sugar  or  wool, 
his  inference  is,  that  the  fluctuation  in  the  price  of  each  de- 
pended less  on  any  general  cause  than  on  circumstances  of 
demajid  and  supply  peculiar  to  the  ixirticular  article.  He 
steers  a  middle  course  throughout,  and  concludes  (p.  201.) 
b}'  reminding  the  bullionists  of  the  remarkable  fact,  that 
money  was  less  abundant  during  the  bank  restriction  than 
at  present,  when  prices  are  so  much  lower ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  assures  the  agi'iculturists  that  as  the  fall  of 
prices  since  1819  may  be  explained  by  favourable  seasons, 
they  may  safely  forbear  their  complaints  against  Mr.  Peel's 
Bill. 

This  publication  is  valuable  as  a  collection  of  materials, 
as  a  specimen  of  reasoning  founded  on  specific  documents, 
instead  of  the  mania  for  generalizing,  so  common  in  the 
present  age. 


[lOlJ 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Oft  Fifiance. 

Linking  Fu?id.  —  On  this  subject  a  lew  explanatory  jia- 
ragraphs  may  be  .'icceptable  to  those  of  our  readers  who 
are  not  initiated  in  the  mysteries  of  the  Treasury  or  Stock 
Exchange. 

T/ie  SujypUes  constituting  our  Sinkiu}j^  Fund.  —  Tiic  com- 
plex form  of  our  budget,  and  the  appearance  of  inviolability 
given  to  the  sinking  fund,  may  induce  pcisons  in  common 
life  to  imagine  that  ihnt  fund  derived  part  of  its  income 
from  taxes  vested  in  tlie  connnissioners,  antl  managed  by 
them  without  reference  to  the  rest  of  the  revenue.  'J  jjc 
appropriation,  however,  never  went  so  far :  the  income  of 
the  sinking  fund,  jxiid  to  the  connnissioners  at  the  bank, 
arose  chiefly  from  — 

Ibt.  The'  1,000,000/.  (increased  hi  1792  to  l,l.'0O,O00/.) 
annually  payable  out  of  tlie  general  revenue. 

2d.  The  dividends  of  redeemed  stock,  which,  standing 
in  the  name  of  the  Sinking  Fund  Conunisiicjiiers,  were 
considered  as  entitled  to  interest  at  the  ijuaiierly  payments 
at  the  Bank,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  re.^t  ul  the  })ublic 
debt. 

Sd.  The  sur|)lus  interest  provided  on  contracting  each 
loan  since  1793.  This  provision,  adopted  by  Mr.  I'itt  on 
the  suggestion  of  Dr.  Price,  will  be  unilcr.-,tood  by  sup- 
posing that  the  loan  for  a  [)articular  year  is  10,000,000/., 
at  5  per  cent.,  for  which  stock  given  in  tlie  5  jier  cents.  ;it 
par  involves  anamuial  charge  of  .000,000/.  Now  the  plan 
was,  to  provide  taxes  yieUling,  not  000,000/.,  but  tiOO,000/. 


[102]  On  Finance:   flic  SinLing  I'nnd.  [App. 

:i  year,  the  1()(),()()0/.  fbruiinpr  a  fund  lor  tlie  gradual  ex- 
tinction of  the  principal  —  a  purpose  wliicli  in  the  case  in 
(jiicstion  would  be  accomplished  in  37  years. 

The  merits  or  demerits  of  this  plan  of  surplus  interest 
are  now  ordy  matters  of  historical  curiosity,  the  season  of 
Joans  heino-  })ast,  or  at  least  suspended.  Tiie  question, 
however,  is  not  merely  arithmetical ;  it  is  in  a  threat  mea- 
sure similar  to  that  of  the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of 
war  taxes;  and  if  the  war  was  a  season  of  large  profits, 
it  was  evidently  politic  to  make  it  bear  as  large  a  portion  as 
possible  of  our  burdens.  It  is  in  a  consideration  of  this 
nature,  and  not  in  the  imaginary  advantage  of  compound 
interest,  that  we  are  to  seek  for  a  justification  of  the  mea- 
sure of  providing  a  surplus  revenue  ;  we  mean  for  a  coun- 
terpoise to  the  sacrifice  with  which  it  may  easily  be  shewn 
to  have  been  attended. 

The  nomiyial  Sinking  Fund.  —  Our  sinking  fund  exhibit- 
ed until  the  late  change  a  surplus,  which,  for  illustration, 
we  shall  call  17,000,000/.,  and  the  revenue  at  the  same 
time  a  deficiency  which  we  shall  term  12,000,000/.  It 
M'as  for  some  time  a  question  whether  the  better  plan  was 
to  leave  the  17,000,000/.  to  operate  in  weekly  purchases 
for  the  redemption  of  stock,  and  supply  the  revenue  defi- 
ciency by  a  loan,  or  to  adopt  the  more  simple  course  of 
receiving  from  the  sinking  fund  the  12,000,000/.,  and  con- 
fining the  redemption  purchases  of  the  commissioners  to 
5,000,000/.  This  gave  rise  to  considerable  discussion 
after  1815,  the  former  plan  being  maintained  by  the  con- 
verts to  the  doctrine  of  compound  interest,  the  believers 
in  the  arithmetical  wonders  of  Dr.  Price.  But  in  1819 
ministers  consented  to  adopt  the  latter  course,  and  found  in 
it  (see  Ricardo  on  the  Funding  System,  in  Napier's  Supple- 
ment to  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,)  a  degree  of  advan- 
tage which  may  be  said  to  have  given  the  first  blow  to  the 
complex  plan  of  paying  with  one  hand,  while  we  borrowed 
with  the  other. 

The  topic  was  again  brought  under  discussion  in  the  ses- 
sion of  1822,  in  the  debates  on  the  plan  for  converting  our 
half-pay  and  pensions  into  long  annuities.  On  that  occa- 
sion Mr.  Vansittart,  unwilling  to  part  with  the  semblance 
after  he  had  relinquished  the  substance  of  the  sinking  fund, 
urged  for  a  time  the  expediency  of  making  the  requisite 
loans  from  the  public,  but  was  at  last  persuaded  to  follow 
the  direct  course,  and  to  admit  of  the  loans  being  made 


App.]  On  Finance.  [103] 

from  the  portion  of  revenue  at  his  clisj)osaI.  This  plan  has 
been  confirmed  by  ISIr.  Robinson  ;  so  that  tiie  sinkinp;  fand 
is  now  divested  of  its  complexity,  and  brou<:ht  back  to  n 
form  from  which,  as  far  as  we  can  jiid^e,  it  ouf^ht  never  to 
have  been  made  to  deviate,  —  that  of  the  balance  of  cur- 
rent revenue  applied  to  the  redemption  of  stock. 


Companion  of  our  pracnt  Bnrdcm  with  those  ofl'9(i. 

Amount  of  taxation,  tithe,  and  poor-rate,  in 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland  in  179'J  -  J. 'J3,0()(),0()0 

The  increase  of  our  population  since  then 
(nearly  50  per  cent.)  enables  us,  without 
additional  pressure  on  the  individual,  to 
bear  a  farther  burden  oi"         -  -  -        1 1  ,()U(),000 

Continental  countries,  our  competitors  in 
productive  industry,  haviuir,  in  general, 
increased  their  burdens  in  a  ratio  some- 
what greater  than  their  population,  we  are 
justified  (see  Chap.  IX.  p.  280.)  in  re- 
garding a  corresponding  increase  on  our 
part  as  not  detrimental  to  our  foreign  trade. 
We  add,  on  this  account,  a  smn  of  -  .'5, 000,000 

The  money  in  which  taxes  were  {)aid  in  1 7^^ 
being,  when  compared  with  our  present 
currency,  as  100  to  130  in  value,  winiake 
a  corresponding  insertion  ol'         -  -       10,000,000 

on  the  ground  that,  to  that  cxttiit,  tliu  ex- 
cess of  our  |)resent  taxatitju  over  that  of 
1792,  /5  nominal. 

Amount  of  burden  which  can  be  borne  by 
us  at  presentjwithout  greater  disadvantage, 

in  comparison  with  other  countries,  than     ■ 

we  experienced  in  1792  -  -  -  Z  t8,000,()()0 

Our  actual  burdens  arc  (see  Aj)p.  p.  [Si])  r)4-,000,0()o/. 

We  have  here  assumed  the  increase  of  population 
as  the  measure  of  the  increase  of  national  wealth,  arising 
from  our  various  improvements  in  agiiciillnre.  manufacture, 
navigation,  &c.  Tliis  projiorlioM  will  be  deemed  consider- 
ably below  the  mark  by  the  majority  ol"  those  who  writ*-  or 
fliink   on   such  subjects,    wlietlier  it  be  the  convert  to   Mr. 


[10+]  On  I'inaiKe.  [Afp. 

Gray's  doctrine,  (p.  23G.)  tliat  in  the  prof^ress  of"  society 
individual  income  increases  in  a  larrrer  ratio  than  population, 
or  the  practical  observer,  who  founds  his  calculation  on  the 
surprising  improvements  in  agriculture,  manufacture,  and 
productive  industry  generally,  during  the  last  thirty  years. 
These  arguments  rest,  doul>tless,  on  a  very  substantial 
basis,  and  nothing  but  the  unfortunate  fluctuations  in  indi- 
vidual property,  attendant  on  our  rapid  transitions,  would 
have  prcventetl  us  from  inserting  a  larger  sum  (probably 
16  or  18,000,000,  instead  of  11,000,000/.)  as  the  mea- 
sure of  the  increase  of  national  wealth,  arising  from  our 
improvements. 

The  Malt  Tax. — The  hopes  of  the  agriculturists  were  at 
one  time  excited  by  the  expected  repeal  of  a  large  share 
of  the  duty  on  malt;  but,  while  we  sympathize  with  their 
sufferings  and  anxiously  desire  a  diminution  of  their  tithe 
and  j)oor-rate,  we  cannot  help  expressing  a  doubt  of  the 
expediency  of  any  great  reduction  of  taxation  on  an  article 
already  so  much  cheapened  b}-  the  fall  of  the  materials. 
Sudden  changes  are  to  be  avoided  ;  malt  liquor  conies  only 
in  some  respects  under  the  description  of  a  necessary  of  lil'e; 
and  the  extended  cultivation  of  barley  that  might  have  been 
prompted  by  a  reduction  of  duty,  would  probably  have  pre- 
vented any  material  rise  in  the  price. 

Prices  of  Cojnmoditics  a  Century  ago.  Text,  p.  379. — In 
comparing  our  present  national  income  with  that  of  the  last 
century,  we  have  assumed  the  power  of  money  in  the  pur- 
chase of  commodities  as  less  at  present  by  30  per  cent,  than 
in  the  reign  of  George  I.,  or  in  any  period  of  last  century 
prior  to  1792.  This  allowance  is  ample  when  we  take  into 
account  that  prices  have  fallen  since  1820,  and  that  the 
prospect  of  war,  at  least  of  such  a  war  as  would  be  pro- 
ductive of  general  enhancement,  seems  very  remote.  On 
this  interesting  topic  we  have  given  a  short  table  in  page  [7] 
of  the  Appendix.  Those  who  dissent  from  this  opinion, 
and  who  imagine  money  to  have  been  formerly  of  much 
greater  value,  will  do  well  to  recollect  that  many  manu- 
factures are  now  cheaper  than  in  that  age,  and  that  roi-7i  is 
very  little  dearer.  The  chief  difference,  in  fact,  is  in  pro- 
fessional fees,  salaries,  and  wages,  all  raised  during  the  war, 
and  not  yet  brought  to  a  level  like  the  price  of  jiroduce, 
manufactures,  or  whatever  is  regulated  at  aii  open  market. 


A  pp.]  On  Finance.  [105] 

Then  as  to  the  charges  of  house-keeping  in  a  compre- 
hensive sense,  the  difference  between  the  present  time  and 
a  century  ago,  resolves  itself  chiefly  into  a  difference  in  ihf 
style  of  living;  not  unlike  the  existing  difference  between 
France  and  England,  in  which,  though  the  prices  of  a 
number  of  articles  are  on  a  par,  the  total  outlay  is  less 
in  France,  in  consequence  of  the  plainer  habits  of  the 
country. 

Historical  Parallel  of  the  Revenue  of  England  and  France 
in\x  385.  of  the  Text. — These  sums  exhibit  the  net  produce 
of  the  taxes,  after  deducting  the  expence  of  collecting  ;  ami 
the  latter  years  of  the  column  of  England  include  ScotLuid 
and  Ireland. 

Back-ward  State  of  France. 
Extract  of  a  letter  from  ISIr.  S.  Gray  to  Monsieur  J.  B.  Say, 

printed  in  1817  in  the  Apj>endix  lo  the  volume,  entitled 

"  All  Classes  productive." 

"  In  a  visit  which  I  made  to  your  country  last  year,  I 
confess  I  did  not  find  such  striking  or  brilliant  results. 
Travelling  partly  with  a  view  to  ascertain  how  far  the  doc- 
trines, which  I  had  deduced  from  the  facts  around  me  in 
our  island,  as  well  as  from  information,  agreed  with  the 
facts  found  in  so  populous  a  state  as  France-,  I  scrutiui/cil 
as  narrowly  as  I  could  the  circumstances  of  the  j)opulation. 
Considering  the  extension  of  buildings,  and  an  improvement 
in  their  style,  which  show  the  increase  of  ])opulation  com- 
bined with  the  concomitant  increase  of  wealth,  as  the  surest 
symptoms  of  a  thriving  country,  I  paid  particular  attention 
to  your  towns  and  villages  in  these  points,  and  am  sorry  to 
say,  I  saw  no  progress  whatever.  I  have  no  recollection 
of  any  strictly  additional  buildings  :  the  only  new  buildings 
which  I  perceived  were  in  some  villages  that  had  been  partly 
destroyed  in  tiie  conflicts  with  the  invading  armies.  Jn 
truth,  though  we  alM)  are  sufllring  from  an  unusual  stag- 
nation, I  found,  at  my  return,  more  new  houses  going  on 
in  the  petty  suburb  of  London,  Camden  Town,  and  its 
neighbourhood,  than  I  had  seen  in  the  whole  of  my  route 
through  France.  Every  town  and  every  village  -H-emcd 
stationary.  I  own,  however,  I  found  nnich  of  what  I  ex- 
pected, on  my  principles,  from  a  state  so  long  well  peopled. 
There  was  an  appearance  of  wealth,  though,  in  genernl,  it 
is  true,  but  of  little  cajiital.  ^'ollr  soil  is  almoM  univcr?ally 
under  cultivation,  but,  with  some  exception*,  in  a  very  in- 
ferior style.     Your  people  arc  generally  employed  and  busy, 

[Hj 


[106]  On  Finance.  (Ai*P. 

vet  iiol  very  cncctively.  Though  the  population  of  Frande 
i)e  to  tliat  of  Eufrlnnd  only  as  about  1.50  to  230  per  square 
niilo,  France  seems  to  be  at  a  still  more  considerable  rate 
behind  our  island  in  capital,  and  the  results  of  active  capital. 
In  several  statistical  points  we  have  got  the  start  of  a  full 
century  before  you." 


THE    LND. 


London  : 

Printed  by  A.  &  R.  Spottiswoode, 

New-Street-Square. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  <  *'  '»^ORNIA   I  '"  *  ^^\ 


UC  SOUTHf  RN  RtC,\(\Ul.i   i  ibbaov  [«; 


AA    001  261  275 


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